Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 1 of 16 PageID 10732
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
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`PARKERVISION, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
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`v.
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`QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
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`
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 3:11-cv-719-J-37TEM
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`PARKERVISION’S REPLY TO QUALCOMM’S OPPOSITION TO PARKERVISION’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NO INVALIDITY
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 1
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 2 of 16 PageID 10733
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
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`ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES................................................................................1
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`A.
`
`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`Qualcomm Has Not Set Forth Expert Testimony That Any
`Prior Art Reference Generates A Lower Frequency Signal
`From The Transferred Energy. ................................................................................1
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`Qualcomm Has Not Set Forth Expert Testimony That Any
`Prior Art Reference Discharges Energy From A Storage
`Device. .....................................................................................................................4
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`Qualcomm Previously Agreed That The Plain And
`Ordinary Meaning Of The “Generating” Limitation
`Required Discharge Of Energy From A Storage
`Device. .........................................................................................................4
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`The “Generating” Limitation’s Plain And Ordinary
`Meaning Requires Discharge Of Energy From A
`Storage Device.............................................................................................4
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`The Court Must Determine Whether, As A Matter
`Of Law, Dr. Razavi Has Misapplied The Plain And
`Ordinary Meaning Of The “Generating” Limitation. ..................................6
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`Summary Judgment Is Proper Because Dr. Razavi
`Excluded Discharge Of Energy In His Validity
`Analysis........................................................................................................7
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`Qualcomm’s Enablement Challenge Fails As A Matter Of
`Law. .........................................................................................................................9
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`Qualcomm Fails To Show That Any Asserted Claim Is
`Indefinite................................................................................................................10
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`Qualcomm Has No Evidence That The Patents-In-Suit Are
`Otherwise Invalid...................................................................................................10
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`III.
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`CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................10
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 2
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 3 of 16 PageID 10734
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`CASES
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`Alexsam, Inc. v. Idt Corp.,
`Nos. 2012-1063, -1064, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10009 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2013)...............7, 9
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`Apple, Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`Case No. 11-CV-01846, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13237 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) ................10
`
`Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co.,
`No. 10-cv-819-J-37 JBT, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2012).......................................................1
`
`Herbert v. Lisle Corp.,
`99 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................9
`
`Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,
`353 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2003)....................................................................................................7
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse’s Computers & Repair, Inc.,
`211 F.R.D. 681 (M.D. Fla. 2002).............................................................................................10
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`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................7
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`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..............................................................................................4, 6
`
`Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..........................................................................................3, 7, 9
`
`Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC,
`588 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................4
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 494 (1989) ......................................................3
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 3
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 4 of 16 PageID 10735
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`I.
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`
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`INTRODUCTION
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`ParkerVision’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 269) presents only questions of law,
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`and, therefore, does not require the Court to engage in the “troublesome venture” of evaluating
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`disputed factual issues or competing expert opinions. Because Qualcomm failed to provide
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`evidence to establish any of its invalidity assertions by clear and convincing evidence, summary
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`judgment in favor of ParkerVision is appropriate on each of the grounds in its motion.
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`First, Qualcomm’s validity expert, Dr. Razavi, fails to set forth any evidence that any
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`prior art reference generates a lower frequency signal from the transferred energy. Additionally,
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`Dr. Razavi fails to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the “generating” limitation. Thus,
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`Dr. Razavi fails to opine, let alone establish, that any prior art reference meets the “generating”
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`limitation of the Asserted Claims of the ’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents. Second, Dr. Razavi’s
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`enablement opinion is premised on an incorrect application of the law. Third, Dr. Razavi fails to
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`establish indefiniteness, which is a question of law. Fourth, Qualcomm concedes it has no
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`evidence regarding its other invalidity assertions. Because each of the foregoing grounds raises
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`pure questions of law, no genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment.
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`II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
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`Unlike the “troublesome venture” discussed by the Court in the Graphic Packaging case,
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`ParkerVision’s motion does not turn on disputed factual issues. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v.
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`C.W. Zumbiel Co., No. 10-cv-819-J-37 JBT, slip op. at 8-9 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2012). Instead,
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`ParkerVision raises pure questions of law that the Court should resolve in ParkerVision’s favor.
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`A. Qualcomm Has Not Set Forth Expert Testimony That Any Prior Art Reference
`Generates A Lower Frequency Signal From The Transferred Energy.
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`The Asserted Claims of the ’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents require generating the lower
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`frequency or baseband signal from the transferred energy. See Dkt. 269 at 8; Dkt. 243 at 38-39.
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 4
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 5 of 16 PageID 10736
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`While the Court recognized in its claim construction that it is possible to “integrate energy while
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`simultaneously generating a down-converted signal” and determined that the “generating”
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`limitation did not require construction, it further recognized that the energy “transfer” step is a
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`distinct action (and distinct limitation) from the “generation” of a down-converted signal from
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`transferred energy. See Dkt. 243 at 39 (“the Court does not understand the disclosed inventions
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`to require the completion of an ‘energy transfer step’ before the generation of a down-converted
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`signal begins”); id. at 40 (“one could understand the claim language … as referring to the fact
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`that transferred energy is the source of the energy used to generate the down-converted signal”).
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`Instead of applying the Court’s construction of the “transferring” limitation, see Dkt. 243
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`at 10-13, and separately addressing the “generating” limitation consistent with the Court’s
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`analysis of that limitation and the claim language, see id. at 38-40, Dr. Razavi merges the
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`“transferring” and “generating” limitations and sets forth no evidence that any prior art reference
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`“generates” a lower frequency signal from the transferred energy.1 Dr. Razavi’s analysis fails as
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`a matter of law because while he endeavors to show that energy is transferred in the prior art
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`(satisfying the “transfer” limitation) and that a lower frequency signal results in the prior art
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`(whether simultaneous with the transfer or not), Dr. Razavi entirely fails to show that the lower
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`frequency signal is “generated from the transferred energy” as the claims require. It is this causal
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`relationship that Dr. Razavi fails to identify and describe. See also Dkt. 269 at 7-10.
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`In opposition, Qualcomm points to paragraphs 166-167 of Dr. Razavi’s report, together
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`with various citations to claim charts attached to Dr. Razavi’s report. Dkt. 275 at 10. This
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`“evidence” cited by Qualcomm in opposition does no more than explain that Dr. Razavi
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`contends that in the prior art energy is transferred into a storage device (i.e., that the “transfer”
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`1 See Ex. 24 at ¶¶ 166, 175-76, 188-90, 199-01, 207-08, 220-21, 231-33, 239-41, 273-74, 362-63, 370-71, 377-78,
`384-85, 391-92, 398-99, 405-06, 432, 438-39, 445, 451, 457, 463, 486-92, 495, 521-24, 529-36, 538-45, and 546-52.
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 5
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`limitation is alleged to be met). Dr. Razavi’s discussion of “LO gating” and “principle[s] of
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`physics” does nothing to explain how the lower frequency signal is “generated from the
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`transferred energy” as the claims require. Rather, Dr. Razavi’s analysis reads the “generating”
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`limitation out of the claims, so that any reference that transfers energy into a storage device and
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`somehow results in a lower frequency signal will meet this claim element, regardless of whether
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`the lower frequency signal is generated from the transferred energy.2
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`Qualcomm also argues that ParkerVision is reading into the claims the temporal
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`relationship that the Court expressly rejected in its claim construction order. Dkt. 275 at 10.
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`ParkerVision does not argue that the “generating” limitation must occur after the “transfer”
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`limitation. Instead, ParkerVision acknowledges that the transfer of the energy from the carrier
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`signal and the generation of the lower frequency signal may occur at the same time. But, as the
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`claims require, ParkerVision argues that the “generating” limitation must occur and that it must
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`occur from the “transferred energy.” See Dkt. 243 at 40 (“one could understand the claim
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`language…as referring to the fact that transferred energy is the source of the energy used to
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`generate
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`the down-converted signal”); see also WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
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`DICTIONARY 494 (1989) (stating “from” is “used as a function word to indicate the source, cause,
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`agent, or basis”). This is a causal relationship, as opposed to a temporal relationship. Having
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`merged the “transfer” and “generating” limitations together without addressing the causal
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`relationship between the two, Dr. Razavi never sets forth evidence or opinion that any prior art
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`reference generates a lower frequency signal from the transferred energy. Accordingly,
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`Dr. Razavi’s validity analysis fails as a matter of law. See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc.,
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`308 F.3d 1304, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dkt. 269 at 7, 16 (setting forth additional cases).
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`2 The Patents-in-Suit expressly distinguish “voltage samplers” where no energy is discharged. Dkt. 269 at 12.
`Dr. Razavi attempts to broaden the claims so that they read on prior art that “holds” energy. Id.; Dkt. 269 at 14.
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 6
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 7 of 16 PageID 10738
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`B. Qualcomm Has Not Set Forth Expert Testimony That Any Prior Art Reference
`Discharges Energy From A Storage Device.
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`1. Qualcomm Previously Agreed That The Plain And Ordinary Meaning Of The
`“Generating” Limitation Required Discharge Of Energy From A Storage Device.
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`As Qualcomm admits, the plain and ordinary meaning of “generating” the lower
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`frequency signal “from the transferred energy” requires the discharge of energy from a storage
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`device. In its claim construction order, the Court concluded that construction of the “generating”
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`limitation was not necessary and that it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Dkt. 243
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`at 38-40. Up until June 24, 2013, when Qualcomm filed its Opposition, the parties were in
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`agreement that the plain and ordinary meaning of “all asserted claims require[s] discharge of
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`energy from a storage device”—this is a verbatim quote of the heading for Section C.1 of
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`Qualcomm’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 270 at 20; see also id. at 22 and 23 (Headings
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`for Sections C.2 and C.3 of Qualcomm’s motion for summary judgment referring to “discharge
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`of energy from a storage device”). Having taken the position that the plain and ordinary meaning
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`requires the discharge of energy from a storage device to support its own summary judgment
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`motion, Qualcomm should not be heard to advance a contrary understanding now. Qualcomm
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`must interpret the “generating” limitation consistently for both invalidity and infringement.
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`Source Search Techs., LLC v. Lending Tree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`2. The “Generating” Limitation’s Plain And Ordinary Meaning Requires
`Discharge Of Energy From A Storage Device.
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`Even putting aside Qualcomm’s admission, the plain and ordinary meaning of
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`“generating” the lower frequency signal “from the transferred energy” requires the discharge of
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`energy from a storage device. In claim construction, a patent’s “specification is always highly
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`relevant. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”
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`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 7
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 8 of 16 PageID 10739
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`2013) (citation omitted). The specifications of the ’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents explain that the
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`lower frequency signal is generated by discharging transferred energy from the storage device.
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`See Dkt. 269 at 11-12. The specification of the ’551 Patent describes the sawtooth-like voltage
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`waveform of Fig. 57E as a baseband signal “generated by the down-conversion process.” ’551
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`Patent at 85:40-41; see also ’518 Patent at 86:15-25; ’371 Patent at 6:32-54.
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`With respect to Fig. 57E, the generated baseband signal includes portions 5710A,
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`representing energy transferred from the carrier signal, and 5710B, representing “energy stored
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`in a storage device continuing to drive the load.” ’551 Patent at 85:48-57. The falling edges of
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`the sawtooth-like waveform (portion 5710B) “occur when the switching module is opened” and
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`indicates the discharge of energy from the storage device. Id. at 85:57-58. As shown by the
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`specifications of the ’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents, it is this discharge of energy, or the falling
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`edge of the sawtooth, that generates a lower frequency signal or baseband signal from transferred
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`energy. This is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Prucnal, ParkerVision’s expert:
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`When the switch closes, non-negligible current from the RF carrier signal is allowed to
`flow into a relatively large capacitor. The capacitor accumulates and stores energy
`while the switch is closed. When the switch opens, part of the accumulated non-
`negligible energy in the capacitor is transferred to the load impedance ... creating a
`sawtooth-like waveform and generating the baseband signal.
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`Ex. 1 at 45-46. It is also consistent with the portions of the specification that distinguish prior art
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`voltage samplers that “hold”—but never discharge—transferred energy. See, e.g., ’551 Patent at
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`55:8-25 (In the prior art, as explained by reference to FIG. 79D, “[t]he holding module 2706
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`substantially holds or maintains each under-sampled amplitude until a subsequent under-sample.
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`... The holding module 2706 outputs the under-sampled amplitudes [voltage values] as the down-
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`converted signal 1308A.”). See also Dkt. 269 at 12, 14-15.
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`Qualcomm disagrees, arguing that ParkerVision’s interpretation “seeks to redefine the
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`term ‘signal’ to exclude the voltage on a capacitor.” Dkt. 275 at 15. ParkerVision acknowledges
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 8
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`that the stored energy is related to voltage across the storage device—but they are not the same.
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`Dkt. 269 at 15 (Dr. Razavi agreeing that voltage and energy are not the same). The energy, E,
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`stored in a capacitor is proportional to the square of the voltage, V, where C represents the
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`capacitance: E = 1/2CV2. Ex. 1 at 49. Nonetheless, discharge of energy, in addition to voltage
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`across a capacitor, is required—as the patents teach. ’551 Patent at 55:8-25; Dkt. 269 at 14-15.
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`The parties agree that the sawtooth waveform illustrated in the patents shows that a lower
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`frequency signal is generated, but disagree about whether this sawtooth waveform is the lower
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`frequency signal itself or whether it represents the generation of the lower frequency signal. See
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`Dkt. 269 at 11-12; Dkt. 275 at 16. Under Qualcomm’s interpretation, the lower frequency signal
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`is not generated from the transferred energy—it is the voltage on the capacitor. However, this
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`ignores that the sawtooth waveform includes falling edges with successive discharges of energy
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`from the storage device and that this discharge is sent to the downstream circuitry as the lower
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`frequency signal. In this way, the lower frequency signal is generated from transferred energy.
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`Because this interpretation “stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the
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`patent’s description of the invention,” the proper interpretation of the “generating” limitation’s
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`plain and ordinary meaning requires discharge. See Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1361.3
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`3. The Court Must Determine Whether, As A Matter Of Law, Dr. Razavi Has
`Misapplied The Plain And Ordinary Meaning Of The “Generating” Limitation.
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`Consistent with the specification of the patents-in-suit, the Court’s claim construction
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`order, and Qualcomm’s own prior position, the plain and ordinary meaning of “generating” the
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`lower frequency signal “from the transferred energy” requires the transferred energy to be
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`discharged from a storage device. See Dkt. 269 at 11-12; see also Dkt. 243 at 40 (The
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`3 Qualcomm argues that ParkerVision’s interpretation “requires a sawtooth signal generated solely by energy
`discharged through a low-impedance load” and that “the patents themselves describe the sawtooth voltage pattern on
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 9
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`“transferred energy is the source of the energy used to generate the down-converted signal.”
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`(emphasis added)). If there is no discharge of the transferred energy, then the transferred energy
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`is not the “source of the energy used to generate the down-converted signal.” In conflict with its
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`motion for summary judgment, Qualcomm argues that “[t]he claims at-issue in this motion
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`require only that the signal be generated; they have no discharge requirement.” Dkt. 275 at 15.4
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`The parties’ dispute raises an issue of law—whether Dr. Razavi correctly applied the
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`plain and ordinary meaning of the “generating” limitation.5 Accordingly, the Court must
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`determine whether Dr. Razavi correctly applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the
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`“generating” limitation in his validity analysis, even though he admittedly excluded the
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`discharge of energy from his analysis. Dkt. 269 at 13.
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`4. Summary Judgment Is Proper Because Dr. Razavi Excluded Discharge Of
`Energy In His Validity Analysis.
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`The parties agree that Qualcomm’s anticipation and obviousness assertions must be
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`supported by expert testimony. Alexsam, Inc. v. Idt Corp., Nos. 2012-1063, -1064, 2013 U.S.
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`App. LEXIS 10009, at *28-29 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2013); see also Dkt. 269 at 7; Dkt. 270 at 12.
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`And this expert testimony must address each and every claim element. See, e.g., Medichem, S.A.
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`v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Specifically, “testimony concerning
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`anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element,
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`the capacitor as being the generated downconverted signal.” Dkt. 275 at 16. The sawtooth waveform’s falling edge
`(Portion 5710B) indicates a voltage drop on the storage device, which occurs from energy discharge.
`4 If Qualcomm’s position that no discharge is required is accepted, its motion for summary judgment, which is
`premised on the absence of energy discharge from Qualcomm’s products, must also be denied. Dkt. 270 at 20-27.
`Unlike Qualcomm, ParkerVision has been consistent in both its infringement and validity analysis that discharge is
`required. And, as explained in ParkerVision’s opposition to Qualcomm’s summary judgment motion, Dr. Prucnal
`has opined that the Accused Products infringe because they discharge energy. Dkt. 277 at 12-13, 19-20.
`5 The Court is required to “determine what claim scope is appropriate in the context of the patents-in-suit.” O2
`Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “When the parties present a
`fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.” Id. at 1362.
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 10
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`state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim
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`element is disclosed in the prior art reference.” Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315.
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`Dr. Razavi admitted that his anticipation and obviousness analysis did not attempt to
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`show that any prior art reference generated a lower frequency signal by discharging energy from
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`a storage device. See Dkt. 269 at 13-14. Dr. Razavi testified that in his analysis, the “generating”
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`limitation “does not require the capacitor to be discharged to generate the down-converted
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`signal” and that he applied this analysis to each prior art reference. Ex. 23 at 267:17-268:2,
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`277:11-21. Significantly, Qualcomm’s response does not address or refute Dr. Razavi’s
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`admissions that he did not provide any evidence or opinion that any prior art reference generates
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`a lower frequency signal by discharging energy, as the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims
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`require. In fact, all Qualcomm points to are some “900+ pages” of invalidity claim charts for the
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`’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents, which never once mention the word “discharge” or “sawtooth.”6
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`Exs. 2-22. Qualcomm fails as a matter of law to satisfy its burden as to its anticipation and
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`obviousness assertions regarding the ’551, ’518, and ’371 Patents.
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`In its response, Qualcomm argues summary judgment is not proper if the “generating”
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`limitation’s plain and ordinary meaning includes discharge of a storage device. Dkt. 273 at 11-
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`15. Qualcomm contends ParkerVision “simply ignores the disclosures of the sawtooth charge/
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`discharge cycle in the references cited by Qualcomm.” Id. at 11. However, this is nothing more
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`than attorney argument, which is insufficient for Qualcomm to carry its burden. See Ferring B.V.
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`v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Conclusory allegations and attorney
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`arguments are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”). Qualcomm cites
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`nothing from Dr. Razavi mapping any of the alleged “disclosures of the sawtooth
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 11
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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 12 of 16 PageID 10743
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`charge/discharge cycle in the references cited by Qualcomm” to the asserted claims. Nor could
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`it—Dr. Razavi admitted that he never attempted to explain how any prior art reference, including
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`Weisskopf, Estabrook and Nozawa, generates the lower frequency signal by discharging energy.7
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`Because the parties agree the case involves complex technology requiring, expert
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`testimony to map the asserted claims to the alleged prior art, Dr. Razavi’s admitted and
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`undisputed failure to set forth an analysis or evidence that any prior art reference generates the
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`lower frequency signal by discharging energy, mandates summary judgment in ParkerVision’s
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`favor. See Dkt. 269 at 7; Dkt. 270 at 12; see also Alexsam, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS at *28-29.
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`The attorney argument raised by Qualcomm for the first time in its opposition regarding
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`Weisskopf, Estabrook, and Nozawa, and their alleged discharge of energy, is insufficient to
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`defeat ParkerVision’s summary judgment, or somehow create a disputed issue of fact or “battle
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`of the experts.” Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1193. There can be no “battle” between Qualcomm’s expert
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`and ParkerVision’s expert on this point—Qualcomm’s expert admitted he provided no analysis.
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`C. Qualcomm’s Enablement Challenge Fails As A Matter Of Law.
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`In its opposition, Qualcomm does not contest ParkerVision’s assertion that Dr. Razavi
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`applied the legally incorrect test for enablement. See Dkt. 275 at 18-19. In fact, Qualcomm still
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`points to Dr. Razavi’s analysis of Mr. Sorrells’ technology tutorial testimony, not the patents
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`themselves. Id. Thus, Dr. Razavi’s opinion is legally incorrect. See Dkt. 285 at 22-25; Herbert v.
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`Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Incorrect statements of law are no more
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`admissible through ‘experts’ than are falsifiable scientific theories.”).
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`6 Qualcomm points to the length of Dr. Razavi’s report (totaling over 1,700 pages) to argue that “Dr. Razavi
`carefully analyzed the asserted claims in this case.” Dkt. 275 at 9. The quantity of Dr. Razavi’s discussion cannot
`rectify its lack of quality. Cf. Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315 (testimony must be clear, convincing, and detailed).
`7 Even if Qualcomm’s attorney argument is considered sufficient for summary judgment purposes, Qualcomm only
`provided attorney argument regarding the Estabrook, Nozawa, and Weisskopf references. See Dkt. 275 at 11-15. No
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`McKool 903354v2
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`9
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 12
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 13 of 16 PageID 10744
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`D. Qualcomm Fails To Show That Any Asserted Claim Is Indefinite.
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`Minor typographical errors and claims using terms including “substantial” and “accurate”
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`are not indefinite. Dkt. 269 at 19-24. Qualcomm’s assertion that these terms lack a required
`
`frame of reference must fail as a matter of law because the Court construed the term
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`“substantial” and Dr. Razavi construed each of the terms with typographical errors and “accurate
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`voltage reproduction” and applied them in his validity analysis. Dkt. 269 at 20-22; Apple, Inc., v.
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No. 11-CV-01846, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13237, at *26 (N.D. Cal.
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`Jan. 29, 2013) (expert’s application of “substantially centered” to accused products supported
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`conclusion that term was not insolubly ambiguous).
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`E. Qualcomm Has No Evidence That The Patents-In-Suit Are Otherwise Invalid.
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`Qualcomm contends that summary judgment as to all of its other invalidity assertions and
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`counterclaims is improper.8 Qualcomm’s amended answer maintains these invalidity assertions
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`and, thus, they remain at issue. Dkt 248 at 3-5. Qualcomm admits that it has not provided any
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`evidentiary support for any of these assertions. Dkt. 277 at 20. The Court should therefore grant
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`summary judgment in ParkerVision’s favor or should dismiss Qualcomm’s remaining assertions
`
`with prejudice. Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse’s Computers & Repair, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 681, 684 (M.D.
`
`Fla. 2002) (dismissing affirmative defenses where no factual support was alleged).
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, ParkerVision’s summary judgment motion should be granted.
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`attorney argument was presented regarding the van Graas, Tayloe, Shahani, Traylor, MDS-2000, Crols, and Gordy
`references. At the very least, summary judgment in ParkerVision’s favor is appropriate as to these references.
`8 Qualcomm’s most recent answer and counterclaims asserts that the Patents-in-Suit are invalid for the following
`grounds: (i) patentable subject matter and double patenting under § 101; (ii) abandonment, prior foreign filing, or
`derivation from another under § 102; or (iii) best mode under § 112. Dkt. 248 at 3-5.
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`McKool 903354v2
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`10
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 13
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 14 of 16 PageID 10745
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`July 11, 2013
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`McKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`
`/s/ Douglas A. Cawley
`Douglas A. Cawley, Lead Attorney
`Texas State Bar No. 04035500
`E-mail: dcawley@mckoolsmith.com
`Richard A. Kamprath
`Texas State Bar No.: 24078767
`rkamprath@mckoolsmith.com
`Ivan Wang
`Texas State Bar No.: 24042679
`E-mail: iwang@mckoolsmith.com
`McKool Smith P.C.
`300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`Telephone: (214) 978-4000
`Telecopier: (214) 978-4044
`
`T. Gordon White
`Texas State Bar No. 21333000
`gwhite@mckoolsmith.com
`Kevin L. Burgess
`Texas State Bar No. 24006927
`kburgess@mckoolsmith.com
`Josh W. Budwin
`Texas State Bar No. 24050347
`jbudwin@mckoolsmith.com
`Leah Buratti
`Texas State Bar No. 24064897
`lburatti@mckoolsmith.com
`Mario A. Apreotesi
`Texas State Bar No. 24080772
`mapreotesi@mckoolsmith.com
`McKool Smith P.C.
`300 West Sixth Street, Suite 1700
`Austin, Texas 78701
`Telephone: (512) 692-8700
`Telecopier: (512) 692-8744
`
`SMITH HULSEY & BUSEY
`
`/s/ James A. Bolling
`
`McKool 903354v2
`
`11
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 14
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`

`
`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 15 of 16 PageID 10746
`
`Stephen D. Busey
`James A. Bolling
`Florida Bar Number 117790
`Florida Bar Number 901253
`225 Water Street, Suite 1800
`Jacksonville, Florida 32202
`(904) 359-7700
`(904) 359-7708 (facsimile)
`jbolling@smithhulsey.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`PARKERVISION, INC.
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`McKool 903354v2
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`12
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 15
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`

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`Case 3:11-cv-00719-RBD-TEM Document 295 Filed 07/11/13 Page 16 of 16 PageID 10747
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day, July 11, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing
`
`with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic
`
`filing to all counsel of record.
`
` /s/ Mario A. Apreotesi
`Mario A. Apreotesi
`
`McKool 903354v2
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`13
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`RPX-Farmwald Ex. 1016, p 16