Case 1:12-cv-00499—WDQ Document 90 Filed 12/16/13 Page 1 of 44
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
`BALTIMORE DIVISION
`
`PAICE LLC and THE ABELL FOUNDATION,
`
`
`
`INC.,
`
`V.
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY,
`HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, KIA
`
`MOTORS CORPORATION, and KIA
`
`MOTORS AMERICA, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C. A. No. WDQ-12-499
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFFS PAICE LLC AND THE ABELL FOUNDATION, INC.’S
`RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`WE
`
`Egg
`
`1.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS OF CLAIM INTERPRETATION ............................................... l
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Court May Adopt Plain and Ordinary Meaning For Disputed Terms ............. 1
`
`Claims Are Not Limited to a Preferred Embodiment ............................................. 2
`
`II.
`
`RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF DISPUTED CLAIM
`TERMS ............................................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`“Road Load” is “the instantaneous torque required for propulsion of the vehicle,
`which may be positive or negative in value.” ......................................................... 3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`“Road Load” does not include the Defendants’ additional limitation “to
`maintain a given speed” .............................................................................. 4
`
`“Road Load” Measures Instantaneous Torque ........................................... 6
`
`Plaintiffs’ Construction is Consistent With Two Prior Court Decisions 9
`
`B.
`
`“Motor” ................................................................................................................. 10
`
`1.
`
`2
`
`3.
`
`4
`
`5.
`
`“Motor” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning ......................... 10
`
`Defendants’ Argument Regarding “Transmission” Is a Red-Herring
`
`ll
`
`Defendants Misstate the Law Regarding Claim Scope ............................. l4
`
`Defendants Misconstrue “Variable-Ratio Transmission” ......................... 16
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction for “Motor” Is Incorrect .................. 17
`
`“Setpoint” is “a definite, but potentially variable value at which a transition
`between operating modes may occur.” ................................................................. 18
`
`l.
`
`2.
`
`Defendants’ Constructions Merely Parrot the Claim Language ............... l9
`
`Plaintiffs’ Construction is Consistent With A Prior Court Decision ........ 20
`
`“wherein SP is a setpoint expressed as a predetermined percentage of MTO”
`
`20
`
`“road load (RL) and said setpoint SP, both expressed as percentages of the
`maximum torque output of the engine when normally-aspirated (MTO)” ........... 21
`
`“a second setpoint (SP2), wherein the SP2 is a larger percentage of the MTO than
`the SP.” ................................................................................................................. 22
`
`“max torque output (MTO) of said engine” .......................................................... 24
`
`l.
`
`2.
`
`MTO Is Not the Maximum Physical Quality ............................................ 24
`
`The Court Is Not Required to Construe This Term .................................. 25
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
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`Page(s)
`
`H.
`
`The Claim Terms are Not Indefinite ..................................................................... 26
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`“a setpoint (SP) above which said engine torque is efficiently produced”/
`“wherein the engine is operable to efficiently produce torque above the
`SP”/ “engine is operable to efficiently produce torque above SP” ........... 27
`
`“wherein the torque produced by said engine when operated at said
`setpoint (SP) is substantially less than the maximum torque output (MTO)
`of said engine.”/ “wherein the SP is substantially less than the MTO”/
`“wherein SP is substantially less than MTO” ........................................... 3O
`
`“a rapid increase in the torque to be applied to the wheels of the vehicle as
`desired by the operator is detected” .......................................................... 3l
`
`“wherein a rate of change of torque output of said engine is limited to a
`threshold value” ........................................................................................ 33
`
`1.
`
`J.
`
`“operating said internal combustion engine to provide torque to the hybrid vehicle
`when the torque required to operate the hybrid vehicle is between a setpoint SP
`and a maximum torque output (MTO) of the engine” .......................................... 35
`
`“the state of charge of the battery is below a predetermined level” ..................... 36
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 37
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Active Video Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm ’n, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ passim
`
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................ 15, 18
`
`Barco N. V. v. Tech. Properties Ltd, 5:08-CV-05398 JF/HRL, 2011 WL 3957390, *2
`(ND. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) .........................................................................................................26
`
`Breville Pty Ltd. v. Storebound LLC,
`12-CV—01783-JST, 2013 WL 1758742 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2013) .........................................26
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. ,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec,
`CIV. WDQ-04-2607, 2013 WL 4587522 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2013) ........................................... 1
`
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
`674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................2
`
`Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog. LLC,
`703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..........................................................................................28, 30
`
`Digital- Vending Servs. Int'l, LLC v. Univ. ofPhoenix, Inc,
`672 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4
`
`Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
`226 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................29
`
`Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc.,
`264 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................28
`
`Epistar Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm 'n,
`566 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................4
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Fleming v. Escort, Inc,
`CV 09-105-S-BLW, 2011 WL 1542126 (D. Idaho Apr. 21, 2011) .........................................27
`
`iii
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`
`Page(s)
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................2, 7, 19
`
`JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................2, 29
`
`Kinzenbaw v. Case LLC,
`179 Fed. App'x 20 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .........................................................................................28
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................................2
`
`M30 Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`474 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................ ll
`
`02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., LTD,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).................................................................................................. 1
`
`02 Micro Int '1 Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys, Inc. ,
`467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..........................................................................................26, 35
`
`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al.,
`No. 2:04-CV—211-DF, Dkt. No. 91 (ED. Tex. Sep. 28, 2005) ..................................................9
`
`Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp, et al.,
`No. 2:07-CV-180-DF, Dkt. No. 63 (ED. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) ..................................... 10, 20, 23
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................2, 29, 31
`
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013)..................................................................................................4
`
`Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc,
`543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).................................................................................... 12, 27, 31
`
`Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG,
`318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................ 12
`
`SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods, Inc,
`415 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................26
`
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`Page(s)
`
`Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc.,
`607 F.3d 784 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................................2
`
`Sorensen v. Int ’1 Trade Comm ’n,
`427 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................................3
`
`US. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................21
`
`Varco, LP. v. Panson Sys. USA Corp,
`436 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..................................................................................................3
`
`Verve v. Crane Cams, Inc,
`311 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................28
`
`Vitronz'cs Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................................23
`
`Voda v. Cordis Corp,
`536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 12
`
`Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co.,
`642 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1541, 182 L. Ed. 2d 162 (US.
`2012) ........................................................................................................................................32
`
`York Prod, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr,
`99 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................................2
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .............................................................................................................................. 27
`
`35 U.S.C. §112(d) .................................................................................................................... 15, 23
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`Plaintiffs Paice LLC (“Paice”) and the Abell Foundation, Inc., (“Abell”) hereby submit
`
`their responsive brief on the proper construction of the disputed terms.
`
`1.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS OF CLAIM INTERPRETATION
`
`Plaintiffs provided the general principles of claim construction in their opening brief.
`
`Defendants’ brief misapplies the law to reach claim construction proposals that are
`
`fundamentally flawed. Plaintiffs address a few of Defendants’ misstatements below.
`
`A.
`
`The Court May Adopt Plain and Ordinary Meaning For Disputed Terms
`
`When the parties disagree over the construction of a claim term, a district court may
`
`properly adopt the plain and ordinary meaning for that term. See, e.g., Active Video Networks,
`
`Inc. v. Verizon Comm ’n, Inc, 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The district court did not
`
`err in concluding that these terms have plain meanings that do not require additional
`
`construction. ActiveVideo’s proposed construction erroneously reads limitations into the claims
`
`and the district court properly rejected that construction and resolved the dispute between the
`
`parties”). Defendants’ reliance on 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.. LTD,
`
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) is misplaced. Since 02 Micro’s publication, the Federal Circuit
`
`has clarified that it is completely proper for a district court to adopt the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning of a term, even where the defendants dispute plaintiffs’ argument that the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning should apply. See e. g. Active Video Networks, 694 F.3d at 1326 (upholding
`
`district court’s decision to reject defendant’s construction and adopt plain and ordinary meaning
`
`for a disputed claim term); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp, 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2010) (finding no violation of 02 Micro and upholding district court’s decision to reject
`
`defendant’s construction and adopt plain and ordinary meaning for a disputed claim term); see
`
`also Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v, Biogen Idec, CIV. WDQ-04-2607, 2013 WL 4587522, at
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`*15 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2013) (relying on plain and ordinary meaning and declining to adopt
`
`proposed construction because term itself is clear).
`
`B.
`
`Claims Are Not Limited to a Preferred Embodiment
`
`In the absence of the inventor’s express intent to deviate from the ordinary meaning of
`
`claim terms, the claim terms are controlled by their plain meaning. See, e. g., York Prod, Inc. v.
`
`Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr. , 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Without an express
`
`intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary
`
`meaning.” ). The scope of a claim is defined by the language of the claim: “[i]t is a ‘bedrock
`
`principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is
`
`entitled the right to exclude.’” See Phillips v. A WH Corp, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004)); see also York Prod, 99 F.3d at 1572. Specifications cannot limit claims because “[t]he
`
`written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude .
`
`.
`
`. [t]hat
`
`is the function and purpose of claims.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967,
`
`980 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`
`The Federal Circuit has frequently cautioned that the specification must be used with
`
`care: “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
`
`specification.” Dealertrack. Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also
`
`Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc, 607 F.3d 784, 792 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A
`
`construing court’s reliance on the specification must not go so far as to import limitations into
`
`claims from examples or embodiments appearing only in a patent's written description
`
`unless
`
`the specification makes clear that the patentee
`
`intends for the claims and the embodiments in
`
`the specification to be strictly coextensive”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); JVW
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`2
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`Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We do not
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`import limitations into claims from examples or embodiments appearing only in a patent's
`
`written description, even when a specification describes very specific embodiments of the
`
`invention or even describes only a single embodiment .
`
`.
`
`. .”); Varco, L. P. v. Panson Sys. USA
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`Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In examining the specification for proper context,
`
`however, this court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the
`
`claims”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
`
`It is well known that a “patentee need not describe in the specification every conceivable
`
`and possible future embodiment of his invention.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp, 288
`
`F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Similarly, the prosecution history may shed light on what a
`
`term means, but “it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim
`
`construction purposes.” Id. The prosecution history will not limit claim scope unless it contains
`
`a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer. Sorensen v. Int ’1 Trade Comm 'n, 427 F.3d 1375, 1378-
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`79 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`For the reasons discussed below and in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, Defendants have done
`
`nothing to demonstrate a legitimate basis to depart from the general rule in this case.
`
`II.
`
`RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF DISPUTED CLAIM
`TERMS
`
`A.
`
`“Road Load” is “the instantaneous torque required for propulsion of the
`vehicle, which may be positive or negative in value.”
`
`Plaintiffs’ Construction
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`
`
`“the amount of torque actually required to
`“the instantaneous torque required for
`
`
`propel the vehicle on the road to maintain a
`propulsion of the vehicle, which may be
`
`given speed, which may be positive or negative
`positive or negative in value.”
`
`
`
`in value.”
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`1.
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`“Road Load” does not include the Defendants’ additional limitation
`
`“to maintain a given speed”
`
`Defendants’ definition of “road load” impennissibly imports the limitation “to maintain a
`
`given speed” without providing any support in the specification or file history for that extra
`
`limitation. Defendants’ sole citation to the file history cherry-picks a limited part of the relevant
`
`quote, fails to provide the full picture, and is not a “clear disavowal” as required by Federal
`
`Circuit case law. See e. g. Digital- Vending Servs. Int'l, LLC v. Univ. ofPhoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d
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`1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause the prosecution history represents an ongoing
`
`negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation,
`
`it often lacks the clarity of the specification” and “[flor this reason, it is particularly important
`
`not to limit claim scope based on statements made during prosecution absent a clear disavowal or
`
`contrary definition”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc,
`
`724 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “when the patentee unequivocally and
`
`unambiguously disavows a certain meaning to obtain a patent the doctrine of prosecution history
`
`disclaimer narrows the meaning of the claim consistent with the scope of the claim surrendered”)
`
`(citations and quotations omitted); Epistar Corp. v. Int '1 Trade Comm ’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1334
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that defendants “must also overcome a heavy presumption that claim
`
`terms carry their full ordinary and customary meaning, unless it can show the patentee expressly
`
`relinquished claim scope”).
`
`The full quotation is provided below, and makes clear that “road load” is not limited to
`
`Defendants’ proposed “to maintain a given speed”:
`
`“As a preliminary matter, it should be clear that ‘road load’ as used in the claims
`of this application refers to the instantaneous torque requirements of the vehicle,
`i.e., that amount of torque required to propel
`the vehicle at a desired speed.
`[citations omitted] The operator's input, by way of the accelerator or brake pedals,
`or a ‘cruise control’ device,
`indicates that continuing at steady speed is
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`the
`desired, or that a change in vehicle speed is called for. For example,
`operator's depressing the accelerator pedal signifies an increase in desired speed,
`i.e., an increase in road load, while reducing the pressure on the accelerator or
`depressing the brake pedal signifies a desired reduction in vehicle speed,
`indicating that the torque being supplied is to be reduced or should be negative.
`More particularly,
`it
`is important to note that the road load can vary
`between wide limits, independent of vehicle speed, and can be positive or
`negative,
`i.e., when decelerating or descending a hill,
`in which case the
`negative road load (that
`is,
`torque available at
`the wheels in excess of that
`required to propel the vehicle) is usually employed to charge the battery bank.”
`
`Ex. 7, ’672 File History, Sep. 27, 2000, Amendment at 10-11 (emphasis added).
`
`Defendants’ construction therefore impermissibly attempts to confuse the patentee’s clear
`
`statement to the PTO that “road load” takes into account a driver’s desired speed. Of course, the
`
`speed at which a driver wishes to drive the vehicle is one factor that goes into how much torque
`
`is required to propel the vehicle at any instant. However, as the statements above make clear,
`
`“road load” is an instantaneous measurement that also takes into account “that a change in
`
`vehicle speed is called for.” Even more importantly, the patentee noted that “road load” may
`
`vary “independent of vehicle speed” in response to, for example, climbing or descending a hill.
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`This is not a meaningless distinction: “road load” measures more than merely vehicle speed, and
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`by holistically accounting for the instantaneous torque requirements of the vehicle, leads to
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`improvements in fuel economy and efficiency.
`
`Additionally, the above cited passage, and the arguments about prior art that follow, are
`
`not a disclaimer of claim scope for the term “road load.” An accurate and full reading of the
`
`patentee’s argument about the Koide and Schmidt-Brficken references make plain that those
`
`references taught changing mode based on only vehicle speed:
`
`“By the same taken, control of the vehicle '3 operating mode in response to
`monitoring of road load is not the same as controlling its operating mode in
`response to vehicle speed. The distinction is critical here because both Koide and
`Schmidt-Brficken do the latter, i.e., both control the vehicle operating mode in
`response to vehicle speed. (Frank ’534 and Moroto do the same, as mentioned
`5
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`above.) Neither Koide nor Schmidt-Brficken recognizes that the desired vehicle
`operational mode should preferably be controlled in response to the vehicle's
`actual
`torque requirements,
`i.e.,
`the road load. As a consequence, neither is
`capable of providing good performance, in terms of either vehicle response to
`operator commands or
`fuel efficiency, under
`the widely-varying conditions
`encountered in ‘real world’ driving situations. More specifically, both Koide and
`Schmidt—Brficken explicitly teach controlling the vehicle operating mode in
`response to vehicle speed, not road load. ”
`
`Ex. 7, ’672 File History, Sep. 27, 2000, Amendment at 11—12 (emphasis added).
`
`It is simply a non-sequitur to argue that because the patentee differentiated prior art that
`
`made mode-changing decisions based solely on vehicle speed, that somehow acts to limit the
`
`definition of “road load.” “Road load” is a quantitative measurement of the torque required to
`
`propel the vehicle at any given instant, which measurement may include vehicle speed because
`
`the operator’s desired speed necessarily contributes to the total torque required to propel the
`
`vehicle. “Road load” is then used by the control system of the invention to make decisions about
`
`what mode to operate in. See e. g. ’672 patentl, claim 16 (“wherein said controller controls said
`
`vehicle to operate in said low speed mode I while RL<SP, wherein SP is a setpoint expressed as
`
`a predetermined percentage of MTO”). Defendants’ definition therefore inappropriately
`
`attempts to confuse these two important and distinct ideas: (1) what “road load” is, and (2) how
`
`“road load” is used by the control system of the asserted patents.
`
`2.
`
`“Road Load” Measures Instantaneous Torque
`
`The Court also should reject Defendants‘ attempt to read in the limitation “actually
`
`required,” which is unsupported by the claims or specification of the asserted patents. First, it
`
`should be noted that the phrase “actually required” does not appear anywhere in the claims or
`
`specification, let alone modify or define “road load.” Additionally, the word “actually” is merely
`
`' The asserted patents were attached as Exhibits to Plaintiffs’ Opening Claim
`Construction Brief: ’672 patent (Exhibit 1), ’347 patent (Exhibit 2), ’634 patent (Exhibit 3), ’388
`patent (Exhibit 4),and ’097 patent (Exhibit 5).
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`surplus language, and adds nothing to clarify or define the meaning of “road load.” Conversely,
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`Plaintiffs” proposed definition is clear and consistent with the claim language itself: “wherein
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`torque to propel said vehicle is provided by said traction motor, said engine, and both,
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`respectively, in response to monitoring the instantaneous torque requirements required for
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`propulsion of the vehicle (RL).” See ’672 patent, claim 15. This clear claim language should
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`therefore control. See e.g. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
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`1111, 1115—16 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] claim construction analysis must begin and remain
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`centered on the claim language itself, for that is the language the patentee has chosen to
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`particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his
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`invention”) (quotations and citations omitted).
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`To read in their new “actually required” limitation, Defendants misconstrue the file
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`history and specification of the asserted patents by again confusing (1) the definition of “road
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`load” and (2) how “road load” is used by the control system of the claim inventions.
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`Specifically, while Defendants correctly point out that the file history and specification of the
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`asserted patents differentiated prior art systems that made mode changing decision based on, for
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`example, only accelerator pedal position, Defendants then reach the illogical conclusion that
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`“road load” must not take into account accelerator pedal position. As the quotation above from
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`the file history makes clear however, “road loa ” simply measures the instantaneous torque
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`demand of the vehicle; that demand may take into account as one factor the accelerator pedal
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`position. See e. g. ’672 patent, col. 29: 10-15 (“[W]hen a sensed increase in the road load (e.g., by
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`a continued operator request for more power) indicates that the preferred operating mode is
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`changing from low-speed to highway cruising operation, the microprocessor controls starting
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`motor 21 by way of inverter/charger 23 to start engine 40.”).
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`But “road load” more holistically captures the total measurement of the instantaneous
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`torque required to propel a vehicle. As noted previous, this approach leads to increases in
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`efficiency and fuel economy. For example, “road loa ” also accounts for other instantaneous
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`torque demands on the vehicle such as when the vehicle is climbing or descending a hill. See
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`e. g. ’672 patent, col. 29:23-25 (“If extra torque is needed during highway cruising, e.g., for
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`acceleration or hill-climbing, either or both of motors 21 and 25 can be powered”) Similarly,
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`“road loa ” accounts for the rate of change of the pedal position, and not merely the position of
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`the pedal. See e. g. ’672 patent, col 20:37-40 (“The microprocessor monitors the rate at which the
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`operator depresses pedals 69 and 70 as well as the degree to which pedals 69 and 70 are
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`depressed”). Defendants are simply wrong that “road load” and accelerator pedal position are
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`two completely unrelated quantitative measurements.
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`Defendants make the same error with respect to the specification’s references to the
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`Egami2 and Deguchi3 prior art references.4 In both cases, the specification makes clear that the
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`references fail to disclose “road load” because they do not disclose determining the instantaneous
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`torque requirements of the vehicle. The specification notes that Egami discloses using only “the
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`vehicle speed V, the accelerator lift ACC, the brake state BRK, and the shift position SFT as the
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`input parameters.” See ’347 patent, col 14:58-60. Deguchi similarly accounts for only vehicle
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`speed and accelerator pedal position. See ’347 patent, col. 14:66-col. 15:15. “Road load” may
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`include some of these factors, but more holistically includes all instantaneous torque required to
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`2 US. Patent No. 6,018,694
`3 us. Patent No. 5,993,351
`4 The discussion of Egami and Deguchi appears only in the specification of the ’347,
`’388, ’634, and ’097. It does not appear in the ’672 specification.
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`propel the vehicle such as, for example, the rate of change of the pedal position and whether the
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`vehicle is climbing a hill, something the prior art simply failed to recognize.
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`In fact, the specification gives examples of including vehicle speed and accelerator pedal
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`position as part of the calculation of the instantaneous torque required to propel the vehicle, i.e.
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`the “road load.” See e. g. ’672 patent, col. 20:31-37 (“The acceleration and deceleration
`commands may be provided by position-sensing encoders 71 and 72
`connected to
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`microprocessor 48 by lines 67 and 68, to inform the microprocessor of the operator's commands
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`responsive to motion of accelerator and brake pedals 69 and 70 (FIG. 3) respectively”); id. at col.
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`19:33-39; id. at 20:40-47; id. at col. 22:57-66; id. at col. 29:10-22; id. at col. 30:42-51.
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`The Court should therefore reject Defendants’ attempt to impermissibly read in the new
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`limitation “actually required” into the definition of “road load.”
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`3.
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`Plaintiffs’ Construction is Consistent With Two Prior Court Decisions
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`Additionally, the Plaintiffs’ construction of “road load” is consistent with two prior
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`district court decisions construing the claim term. In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp, et al.,
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`No. 2:04-CV-2l l-DF, Dkt. No. 91 (ED. Tex. Sep. 28, 2005), Judge Folsom of the Eastern
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`District of Texas rejected essentially the same arguments that Defendants are making here.
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`Judge Folsom found that the cited portions of the ’672 prosecution history did “not amount to the
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`clear and unambiguous disavowal necessary for inclusion of these limitations in claim
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`construction”:
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`the patentee acknowledges the input
`“In discussing the Koide reference,
`parameters used to control
`the vehicle’s operating mode.
`‘672 File History,
`September 27, 2000 Amendment at 12. The patentee then distinguishes the
`invention of the ‘672 patent from the Koide and Schmidt-Brfiken prior art
`references because those references ‘explicitly teach controlling the vehicle
`operating mode in response to vehicle speed, not road load.’ Id. This does not
`amount to disavowing the use of those same parameters found in the prior
`art to calculate ‘road load.’”
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`See id. at 38.
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`Judge Folsom construed “road 10a ”to mean the “instantaneous torque [rotary force]
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`required for propulsion of the vehicle.” See id.
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`In a later case