Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 1 of 39 PagelD #: 729
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`PAICE LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Case No.: 2-04CV-211 (DF)
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a
`Japanese Corporation, TOYOTA MOTOR
`NORTH AMERICA, INC, and TOYOTA
`MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PLAINTIFF PAICE LLC’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REPLY BRIEF
`
`March 29, 2005
`
`Samuel F. Baxter (Bar No. 01938000)
`MCKOOL SMITH PC.
`
`505 East Travis Street, Suite 105
`Marshall, TX 75670
`
`0fcounsel:
`
`Ruffin B. Cordell (Bar No. 04820550)
`Ahmed J. Davis
`Peter J. Sawert
`
`FISH & RICHARDSON PC.
`1425 K Street, N.W., 11'h Floor
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`Robert E. Hillman
`
`FISH & RICHARDSON PC.
`225 Franklin Street
`
`Boston, MA 02110
`
`Andrew D. Hirsch, Esquire
`PAICE LLC
`
`6830 Elm Street
`
`McLean, VA 22101
`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`ll.
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
`
`RESPONSE TO TOYOTA’S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
`
`OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS ........................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`’970 Patent ...............................................................................................................2
`
`1.
`
`Claim 1 .........................................................................................................2
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`0.
`
`d
`
`e
`
`Drive torque .....................................................................................2
`
`Controllable torque transfer unit ......................................................3
`
`Input shafts .......................................................................................4
`
`. and for
`.
`A controller for controlling the operation of .
`controlling the relative contributions of .
`.
`. .................................... 5
`
`Output member ................................................................................ 5
`
`2.
`
`Claim 2 ......................................................................................................... 6
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`Controller means .............................................................................. 6
`
`Operating mode................................................................................7
`
`3
`
`Claim 9 ......................................................................................................... 8
`
`a.
`
`. means for converting
`.
`Solid state switching means .
`.
`[and] means for rectifying .........................................................8
`
`4.
`
`Claim 11 ....................................................................................................... 9
`
`a.
`
`Solid state switching means .............................................................9
`
`5.
`
`Claim 32 ....................................................................................................... 9
`
`a.
`
`.
`
`Means for performing the following functions responsive
`to input commands and monitored operation of said
`vehicle: selecting an appropriate mode of operation .
`
`.
`
`. ................9
`
`b.
`
`Low speed running [mode] ............................................................ l O
`
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`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`6.
`
`f.
`
`g.
`
`Steady state running [mode] .......................................................... l 1
`
`Acceleration or hill climbing [mode] ............................................. 11
`
`Battery charging [mode] ................................................................ 12
`
`Braking [mode] .............................................................................. 12
`
`Engine starting ............................................................................... 13
`
`6.
`
`Claim 38 ..................................................................................................... 13
`
`a.
`
`Solid state switching network ........................................................ 13
`
`B.
`
`’672 Patent ............................................................................................................. 14
`
`1.
`
`Claim 1 ....................................................................................................... 14
`
`3.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`Clutch ............................................................................................ 14
`
`Controllable clutch ......................................................................... 15
`
`Directly coupled ............................................................................. 16
`
`2.
`
`Claim 2 ....................................................................................................... 17
`
`a.
`
`Instantaneous road load/RI.- ........................................................... 17
`
`3.
`
`Claim 3 ....................................................................................................... 20
`
`a.
`
`Monitoring commands provided by the vehicle operator ..............20
`
`4
`
`Claim 13 ..................................................................................................... 20
`
`a.
`
`Total torque available at the road wheels from said
`engine .............................................................................................20
`
`5.
`
`Claim 15 .....................................................................................................21
`
`3.
`
`Operating said controller to control selection of the
`operational mode of said vehicle between a low-speed
`mode I, a cruising mode 1V, and an acceleration mode V.............21
`1.
`Low wspeed operation mode I ............................................21
`ii.
`Cruising mode IV ...............................................................22
`iii.
`Acceleration mode V ......................................................... 23
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`b.
`
`c.
`
`Monitoring the instantaneous torque requirements
`required for propulsion of the vehicle (RL) ................................... 24
`
`Operating mode .............................................................................. 24
`
`6.
`
`Claim 30 ..................................................................................................... 24
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`At least one traction motor being coupled to road
`wheels of said vehicle .................................................................... 24
`
`. and controlling
`.
`A controller for controlling operation .
`flow ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Configured as a number of batteries connected
`by nominally—open switching devices, such that said
`batteries are electrically isolated from one another in the
`event power is cut off from said switching devices .......................28
`
`C.
`
`’088 Patent ............................................................................................................. 28
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`Instantaneous torque demands (RL) .............................................. 28
`
`Said microprocessor controls operation. . .so as to
`operate said vehicle in a selected one of said operating
`modes in response to the instantaneous torque demands
`(RL) of said vehicle ....................................................................... 29
`
`Operating mode .............................................................................. 29
`
`Said selected operating mode being selected such that
`said engine is operated only in response to a load equal
`at least to a predetermined minimum value of its maximum
`torque output .................................................................................. 30
`
`Ill
`
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 32
`
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`Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 5 of 39 PagelD #: 733
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Page
`
`Adv. Cardiovascular 5355., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc,
`265 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................... 19
`
`Al-Site C012. v. VSA In! ’I Inc.I
`174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ......................................................................................4
`
`Agex, Inc. v. Raritan Comgzutcr, Inc.
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................5, 26
`
`CCS Fitness, Inc. 12. Brunswick Cora,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 3, 4
`
`Clearstream I'Vastem-‘ater S s. v. H ’dro-Actz'on. Inc.
`
`
`
`206 F.3d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ....................................................................................25
`
`Cole 1!. Kimberly-Clark Cora,
`102 F.3d 524 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........................................................................................ 8
`
`FraI-zk 'S Casin Crew & Rental 7’0015 Inc. v. Weather brd Int ’1' Inc.
`
`
`389 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................................6
`
`Gaming Inc. v. Inr'l Game Tech,
`184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)....................................................................................2’7
`
`Greenberg v. Erlzicon Endo-Surgerv, Inc,
`91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)........................................................................................3
`
`Innova.-/Pure Water. Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004).................................................................................... 14
`
`Itron Inc. v. Benghiat
`169 F.Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Minn. 2001)28
`
`Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.
`382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004)...................................................................................... 3
`
`On-Line Tech v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer
`
`386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004).................................................................................... 16
`
`
`Personalized Media Comm. LLC v. Int ’1 Trade Comm ’2:
`
`161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ........................................................................................4
`
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`Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 6 of 39 PagelD #: 734
`
`
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Inc. v. VDON. Am. L.L.C.
`
`375 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2004)...................................................................................... 8
`
`'
`.
`TurboCare Div. 0 Dema Delaval Turbomachine
`
`
`
`
`264 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 6
`
`. v. Gen. Elec. C0.
`
`Vitronics Com. v. Concegtronics. Inc.
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................... 16
`
`Watts v. XL S119, Inc.
`232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................ 4
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ....................................................................................... 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8
`
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`Plaintiff Paice LLC (“Paice”) hereby submits its reply brief in support of its proposed
`
`construction of certain disputed terms in the asserted patents.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`In its opening Markman brief, Paice offered proposed constructions for each of the claim
`
`terms that it identified, as well as the over 30 claim terms Toyota claimed required construction.
`
`Paice’s proposed constructions were true to the ordinary meaning of the terms as they would be
`
`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and, where the intrinsic record compelled a
`
`construction different from the ordinary meaning, Paice scrupulously adhered to the well-known
`
`canons of claim construction.
`
`Toyota, by contrast, did not offer proposed constructions for many of the claim terms for
`
`which it, and not Pat'ce, specifically said construction was necessary. Of the claim
`
`constructions it did propose, many fly in the face of well—established case law. Toyota’s
`
`proposed constructions are flawed because they forsake the plain meaning ofterms without
`
`justification, improperly import limitations into the claims, read out disclosed preferred
`
`embodiments, and seek to impose iimitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 11 6 where none are required.
`
`For the few claim terms about which the parties generally agree, Toyota has made them unduly
`
`and unnecessarily complex, when a simpler construction was sufficient.
`
`As a result, for the reasons stated below and in Paice’s opening Markman Brief, Paice’s
`
`proposed constructions set forth the correct interpretations of the disputed terms.l
`
`'
`
`For the Court’s convenience, Paice has attached hereto as Appendix 1 a table comparing each
`party’s proposed claim construction.
`
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`II.
`
`RESPONSE TO TOY OTA’S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF DISPUTED
`CLAIM TERMS
`
`Paice offers below its response to Toyota’s proposed claim constructions. For uniformity
`
`and clarity, Paice has maintained the format of its opening Mar-Imam brief and addressed the
`
`disputed terms in the order in which they appear in the asserted claims.
`
`A.
`
`’970 Patent
`
`1.
`
`Claim 1
`
`a.
`
`“Drive torque”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction:
`
`the torque transmitted to the wheels to propel the vehicle
`
`the rotary force generated by the power unit of a hybrid
`Toyota’s proposed construction:
`electric vehicle for use in moving the drive wheels of that vehicle
`
`As explained in Paice’s initial brief, Paice’s construction of the term “drive torque”
`
`represents the ordinary meaning of the term. Although Toyota’s construction is similar, it is less
`
`precise and incorporates unsupported limitations outside of the ordinary meaning.
`
`In particular, the term “drive torque” is not unique to hybrid vehicles. In a traditional
`
`automobile with only an internal combustion engine, for example, some of the engine’s torque
`
`powers the alternator and air conditioning compressor, so not all engine torque becomes drive
`
`torque. Accordingly, Toyota’s inclusion of “generated by the power unit of a hybrid electric
`
`vehicle” in its proposed definition is unnecessarily limiting and therefore inappropriate.
`
`Moreover, it is unnecessary to further define the word torque within the term “drive
`
`torque” because torque has an exact and well-understood meaning. While the use of the term
`
`“rotary force” is generally correct, it. is unnecessary since “rotary force” is torque. See Paice’s
`
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`Opening Mar/avian Brief (hereafter Paice Opening Br.) at l n.1. Therefore, Paice respectfully
`
`requests that the Court adopt its proposed construction of “drive torque.”
`
`b.
`
`“Controllable torque transfer unit”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: a multi-input device or component that is controlled to
`transfer variable amounts of torque
`
`Tovota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 1 12, 1] 6) applies, four
`constantly-meshing bevel gears, housing having teeth formed on its outer circumference, and
`locking devices of Pi g.
`l 1 of the ’970 patent when used to controllably transfer torque
`
`Toyota argues, unpersuasively, that this claim term should be construed as a means—plus-
`
`function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § '1 12,116. “‘[A] claim term that does not use 'means' will
`
`trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112 1] 6 does not apply.” Lighting World, Inc. v.
`
`Birclm'ood Lighting, Inc, 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
`
`Brunswick Corp, 288 F.3d 1359., 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The presumption that a limitation
`
`lacking the term ‘means’ is not subject to section 112 1] 6 can be overcome if it is demonstrated
`
`that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without
`
`reciting Sufficient structure for performing that function [but] the presumption .
`
`.
`
`. is a strong one
`
`that is not readily overcome.” 1d. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Toyota’s
`
`conclusory statement that the claim “does not recite sufficient structure adequate to interpret the
`
`limitation for use in the hybrid electric vehicle” is not sufficient to carry Toyota’s heavy burden.2
`
`2
`
`To the contrary, the phrase “controllable torque transfer unit” calls to mind substantial
`structure. A brief search of automaker websites reveals numerous examples of controllable
`torque transfer units which are described and treated as structural elements. For example,
`Acura describes its controllable torque transfer unit as a “VTM—4 torque transfer unit” which
`is “a compact cast-aluminum housing bolted directly to MDX's transaxle.” See Exhibit J
`(ht
`://www.hondanews.com/CatIDB025?midx2004083154264&mime=asc) at 2. Similarly,
`
`
`a Mitsubishi sold in Europe is described as “featur[ing] a constant mesh torque transfer unit.
`and centre differential with planetary gears and a .
`.
`. Viscous Coupling Unit.” See Exhibit K
`(http://wwwcarpagesco.uk/mitsubishi/mitsubishi_2003_shogun_part_5_22_12_02.asp) at 2.
`
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`Lighting World supports Paice’s position. In that case, the Federal Circuit described its
`
`treatment of this issue in Greenberg v. Etlzicon Elicia-Surgery, Inc, 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1996), where the term “detcnt mechanism” was not treated as a term covered by § 112 it 6:
`
`[in Greenberg. we] explained that the fact that a particular mechanism is
`defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing
`that term into a means for perfomring a specified function within the meaning of
`section 1 12(6). We noted that the definitions made clear that the noun 'detent'
`denotes a type of device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical
`arts, even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms. Moreover, we
`rejected the claim that because a term does not bring to mind a particular
`structure, it invokes section 1 12 '1] 6. Specifically, we said, ‘lt is true that the term
`'detent' does not call to mind a single well-defined structure, but the same could
`be said of other commonplace structural terms such as ’clamp‘ or 'container.‘
`
`382 F.3d at 1360 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
`
`The Federal Circuit has similarly held that such broad terms as “digital detector,"
`
`“eyeglass hanger member.” “sealingly connected [joints]” and “reciprocating member” do not
`
`trigger section 112 it 6. Personalized Media Comm. LLC v. Int ’1 Trade Comm 'n, 161 F.3d 696,
`
`704 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Al-Sire Corp. v. VSA Int’l, Inc, 174 F. 3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
`
`Watts v. XL Sys., Inc, 232 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and CCS Fitness v. Brunswick Corp,
`
`288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, Toyota’s attorney argument that the term
`
`“controllable torque transfer unit” recites inadequate structure is not factually correct and
`
`misstates the law.
`
`Toyota has not overcome the strong presumption that the term “controllable torque
`
`transfer unit" is not subject to § 112 1] 6. Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the Court
`
`adopt its proposed construction.
`
`c.
`
`“Input shafts”
`
`the mechanical components that transfer torque between
`Paice’s groposed construction:
`the engine and motor, respectively, and the controllable torque transfer unit
`
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`Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 11 of 39 PageID #: 739
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`Tovota’s proposed construction: NONE
`
`Although Toyota is the party that identified this claim term as one requiring construction,
`
`it failed to offer a construction in its opening Markn-zan brief. Therefore, Paice respectfully
`
`requests that the Court adopt its proposed construction.
`
`d.
`
`“A controller for controlling the operation of . . . and for
`controlling the relative contributions of. . . .”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: a computerized control device
`
`Tovota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 1 12, 1f 6) applies, a
`microprocessor programmed to receive operating commands and data input, and to be responsive
`to a determined mode of operation of the hybrid electric vehicle, for controlling operation of the
`engine, the electric motor, and the torque transfer unit
`
`Like the term “controllable torque transfer unit,” Toyota argues that this claim term
`
`should be subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ii 6. Again, however, this phrase does not use the term
`
`“means” and Toyota has not presented any persuasive argument to rebut the presumption that §
`
`112, ii 6 does not apply. The fact that the term may have a functional aspect does not mean that
`
`it lacks sufficient structure. See Apex, Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc, 325 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2003). To the contrary, a “controller" has a generally understood meaning to one of skill in
`
`the art. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Houghton Mifflin C0,,
`
`2000, 4th Ed. (Exhibit L) at 400 (“Controller [def #3]: a regulating mechanism, as in a vehicle
`
`or electric device”). Therefore, Paice respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed
`
`construction.
`
`e.
`
`“Output member”
`
`Paice‘s proposed construction: a mechanical component that transfers the drive torque
`out of the controllable torque transfer unit
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction: NONE
`
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`Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 12 of 39 PageID #: 740
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`Although Toyota is the party that identified this claim term as one requiring construction,
`
`it failed to offer a construction in its opening Markman brief. Therefore, Paice respectfully
`
`requests that the Court adopt its proposed construction.
`
`2.
`
`Claim 2
`
`3.
`
`“Controller means”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: a computerized control device
`
`Tovota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 1 12,1} 6) applies, a
`microprocessor programmed to receive operating commands and data input, and to be responsive
`to a determined mode of operation of the hybrid electric vehicle, for controlling operation of the
`engine, the electric motor, and the torque transfer unit
`
`Toyota’s argument that the word “means” invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, '[l 6 is unsupported.
`
`The “controller means” of dependent claim 2 refers back to the controller identified in claim 1.
`
`See ’970 patent, col. 22:35-36 (“The vehicle of claim 1, wherein said controller means controls
`
`flow .
`
`.
`
`. .”). As a canon of claim construction, these terms should be construed consistently.
`
`Frank ’5 Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherjbrd Int’l, 1716., 389 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2004). Because the controller of claim 1 is not subject to § 112 11 6, the use of “means" in
`
`dependent claim 2 is surplusage.
`
`In any event, Toyota’s position is untenable because, like the term controller, the term
`
`“controller means” calls to the mind of one of ordinary skill in the art a specific structure. See,
`
`c.g., TurboCare Div. ofDemag Delaval ’Ilzrbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. .Elec. Ca, 264 F.3d 1111 9
`
`l 121 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed
`
`construction.
`
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`Case 2:04-ev-00211-DF Document 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 13 of 39 PageID #: 741
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`b.
`
`“Operating mode”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: mode or state of operation
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction: mode of operation that is determined by the selection of
`torque needed to propel the (claimed) vehicle
`
`As explained in Paice’s initial brief, Paice’s construction of the term “operating mode”
`
`represents the ordinary meaning of the term.
`
`In contrast, Toyota’s proposed construction
`
`includes not only the operating mode, but how that mode is determined. This is yet another
`
`improper attempt to import limitations from other claim language and the specification.
`
`“[O]perating modes” in claim 2 are “selected dependent on desired vehicle performance.” ‘970
`
`patent, col. 22:38-39. lf Toyota’s proposed construction was correct, the additional language
`
`describing how the operating mode is selected would be completely redundant.
`
`Furthermore, even if a narrower construction of the term than Paice’s proposed
`
`construction were called for, Toyota’s proposed construction contradicts the specification.
`
`Describing the battery charging mode in a preferred embodiment, for example, the specification
`
`teaches that “[i]nternal combustion engine 40 charges battery 22 by rotating motor 20, providing
`
`AC rectified by switching unit 44 to DC suitable for charging battery 22. If this mode is entered
`
`during driving, internal combustion engine 40 also supplies torque to road wheels 34 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`’970
`
`patent, col. 15:5—10.
`
`In this case, the mode of Operation is determined by the selection of torque
`
`needed to propel the vehicle and by the torque needed to power the motor to charge the battery.
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction would therefore read out a preferred embodiment.
`
`Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the Court adopt the ordinary meaning of this
`
`term in accordance with Paice’s proposed construction.
`
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`Case 2:04-cv-00211-DF DOCUment 27 Filed 03/29/05 Page 14 of 39 PagelD #: 742
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`3.
`
`Claim 9
`
`a.
`
`“Solid state switching means . . .means for converting .
`means for rectifying"
`
`. . [and]
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: a solid~state circuit for converting DC to AC and
`rectifying AC to DC
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 112, 11 6) applies, a
`solid— state switching AC!DC convertert’motor controller, which consists of a three-phase bridge
`circuit comprising six solid state devices connected in parallel with six flyback diodes and a
`microprocessor for controlling operation of AC/DC converter/’microcontroller
`
`As explained in Paice’s initial brief, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1] 6 does not apply here because the
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`term recites sufficient structure to perform the claimed function. See T1 Group Auto. Sys. (N.
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`Am), Inc. v. VDO N. Am, L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark
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`Corp, 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“perforation means .
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`.
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`. for tearing" not subject to §
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`112 ll 6 because it described the structure supporting the tearing function (i.e., perforations).”).
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`Similarly the term “solid state switching" device sufficiently describes to those of ordinary skill
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`the structure to perform the functions of converting and rectifying. Accordingly, Paicc
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`respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed construction.
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`Even should the Court decide to extend means plus function treatment to this term, the
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`construction proposed by Toyota is incorrect. The structure corresponding to this term disclosed
`
`in the specification is simply a solid state AC to DC and DC to AC converter. Sec, e.g., ’970
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`patent, col. 5:60-69. Toyota’s proposed construction attempts to import additional structure and
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`even functions beyond that recited by the claim. This is plain error.
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`4.
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`Claim 11
`
`a.
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`“Solid state switching means”
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`Paice’s proposed construction: a solid-state circuit for converting DC to AC and
`rectifying AC to DC
`
`Tovota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 1 12, 1] 6 applies) a
`solid-state switching AC/DC converter/motor controller, which consists of a three-phase bridge
`circuit comprising six solid state devices connected in parallel with six flyback diodes and a
`microprocessor for controlling operation of AC/DC converter/microcontroller
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`The parties agree that this term from claim It should be construed consistently with the
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`same term in claim 9. As discussed above, the Toyota’s suggestion that 35 U.S.C. § 112, it 6
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`applies is overcome by the recitation of sufficient structure to perform the stated functions.
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`Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed construction.
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`5.
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`Claim 32
`
`a.
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`“Means for performing the following functions responsive to
`input commands and monitored operation of said vehicle:
`selecting an appropriate mode of operation .
`.
`. .”
`
`Paice’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 112, ll 6) applies, a
`computerized control device and associated components for selecting an operating mode and
`controlling the engine, motor, and battery to implement that mode
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction: means plus function (35 U.S.C. § 1 12, 1i 6) applies, a
`microprocessor programmed to receive operating commands and data input for determining the
`mode of operation of the hybrid electric vehicle from a group of available operating modes,
`selecting the appropriate flow paths of electrical energy and/or combustible fuel and of torque to
`effectuate the selected mode of operation, and controlling the controllable torque transfer unit,
`electric motor and internal combustion engine in accordance with the selected flow path
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`The parties agree that this phrase is a means-plus-function term governed by § 1 12 ii 6.
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`Although the parties” proposed constructions are largely similar, Paice’s proposal is preferable.
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`First, Toyota’s proposed definition improperly incorporates a requirement that the
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`controller “receive operating commands and data input.” This limitation is not present in the
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`stated functions of the meansaplus-function language and therefore should be excluded from the
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`definition. Second, Toyota’s proposed definition simply restates the claim language (excluding
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`its improperly imported limitations) and does little to clarify the term. Third, Toyota’s proposed
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`construction implies that the operating modes that may be selected according to this function are
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`limited solely to those appearing in the remainder of the claim. As an open-ended claim using
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`the transition “comprising,” however, such a limitation is unwarranted.
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`Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the court adopt its construction.
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`b.
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`“Low speed running” [model
`
`Paiee’s proposed construction:
`
`the vehicle is powered by the motor
`
`Toyota’s proposed construction: a mode of operation employed when the claimed hybrid
`electric vehicle is used in city traffic or in reverse. wherein the flow ofenergy in the vehicle is
`from the battery to the electric motor and all torque directed to the road wheels of the vehicle is
`provided by the electric motor
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`Toyota’s proposed construction improperly imports limitations from the specification
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`into the claim. Specifically, the section of the specification quoted by Toyota in its opening brief
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`refers to “operation in low speed circumstances, e.g. [for example], in city traffic or reversing.”
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`’970 patent, col. 10:52-53 (emphasis added). Adoption of Toyota’s proposed construction would
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`lead to an absurd result: driving a car forward in electric only mode outside of a city would not
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`be “low speed running" mode because the vehicle is not “in city traffic or in reverse.”
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`As the specification sections referenced by both parties in their opening briefs
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`demonstrate, it is the fact that the vehicle is powered by the electric motor that defines “low
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`speed running” mode. Accordingly, Paice respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed
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`construction.
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`c.
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`“Steady state running” [mode]
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`Paice’s proposed construction:
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`the vehicle is powered by the engine
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`Toyota’s proposed construction: a mode of operation employed when the hybrid vehicle
`is used at normal highway speeds, wherein the flow of energy is from the fiiel tank to the engine
`and all torque directed to the road wheels is provided by the internal combustion engine
`
`Here again, Toyota’s proposed construction is overly narrow and imports limitations
`
`from the specification into the claim. Specifically, Toyota seeks to impose a negative limitation
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`on the claims wherein no other system element may be active, requiring that “all torque” directed
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`to the road wheels be provided by the engine. However, the ”970 patent expressly contemplates
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`that the electric motor may, in some instances, be on duri