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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO SOFTWARE
`
`BVBA, and HEIDELBERG, USA,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,611,349
`
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`SUMMARY OF ISSUES FOR REHEARING
`
`I.
`
`Petitioners Eastman Kodak Company, Agfa Corporation, Esko Software
`
`BVBA, and Heidelberg, USA, Inc. (“Petitioners”) request rehearing under 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) of the Board’s Final Written Decision (“Decision,” Paper No.
`
`47) finding that Petitioners have not demonstrated that claims 10-14 of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 6,611,349 (“the ’349 patent”) are unpatentable.
`
`Independent claim 10 requires, inter alia, “providing said plate-ready file to
`
`a remote printer.” Before this occurs, the plate-ready file must be generated.
`
`There is no dispute that the Apogee reference teaches the generation of a plate-
`
`ready file—what Apogee calls a “PIF,” which is the file that is the output of
`
`Apogee’s PDF RIP Process. (Ex. 1008 at 6.) Rather, the sole reason the Board
`
`ruled in favor of Patent Owner was due to the mistaken belief that there is no
`
`teaching in Apogee of providing a plate-ready file to a remote printer—i.e., that
`
`“there is no evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`
`considered generating a plate-ready file anywhere other than where the printing
`
`plates are produced: at the printing facility.” (Decision at 26, 30.)
`
`In reaching this conclusion, the Board overlooked directly contradictory
`
`evidence in the trial record, particularly the cited portion of the Apogee reference
`
`1
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`

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`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`itself. (See Petition1 at 40-41 and 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) For the step of
`
`“generating a plate-ready file from said PDF file,” Petitioners relied upon
`
`Apogee’s teaching of PDF RIPs, which are undisputed to be “plate-ready files”
`
`within the meaning of the ’349 patent. Importantly, Apogee expressly describes
`
`these plate-ready files as being sent to a remote printer “in another town.” On page
`
`7, Apogee describes its PrintDrive system (which receives the plate-ready files
`
`after they have been created by the PDF RIP process) as “allow[ing] you to
`
`physically separate the rendering from the actual plate production, so your PDF
`
`RIP can be in the desktop department and the PrintDrive can sit next to the output
`
`device, even in another town.” (Ex. 1008 at 7, emphasis added.) Petitioners’
`
`claim charts directed Patent Owner and the Board to this precise portion of Apogee
`
`teaching the generation of a plate-ready file at locations remote from the printing
`
`company facility, with those files then being sent from the file processing facility
`
`to the remote printing facility. (See Petition at 40-41, 53, 57.) The Board’s sole
`
`reason for not holding claims 10-14 unpatentable overlooked this key aspect of the
`
`record.
`
`Second, Petitioners’ obviousness grounds rely on the system architecture
`
`from Jebens and Dorfman as primary references, not Apogee. There is no doubt
`
`
`
`1 Citations to the Petition are to the “corrected” Petition, Paper 4.
`
`2
`
`

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`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`(or dispute) that the central service facility of Jebens routes to-be-printed files from
`
`a remote client to a remote printer. The Board agreed with the architectural
`
`framework of the Jebens Ground in its final written decision. (Decision at 12-13,
`
`22.) The same holds true for the Dorfman ground. (Decision at 29-30.) When
`
`Jebens/Dorfman is modified with the PDF processing teachings of Apogee—as
`
`applied in the grounds accepted by the Board—the to-be-printed file routed to the
`
`remote printer is the plate-ready file of Apogee. Yet, the Board’s Decision
`
`mistakenly looks to the secondary reference (Apogee) for architectural structure
`
`relied upon in the primary references, and then suggests that Apogee, not the
`
`primary references, would have to be modified to route a plate-ready file to a
`
`remote printer.
`
`However, the issue for obviousness is not whether Apogee needs to be
`
`modified, but whether one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify
`
`Jebens/Dorfman to include the PDF processing teachings of Apogee. As to this
`
`point, and as explained below, the Petition and supporting evidence provided an
`
`unrebutted motivation of why the PDF workflow of Apogee and accompanying
`
`plate-ready file were desirable and would have been an obvious modification to the
`
`Jebens/Dorfman architecture. (See Petition at 27-29, 32-33, and 47-49.) Thus,
`
`even if Apogee’s explicit teaching of remote printing could be ignored, which it
`
`cannot, the Board’s Decision misapprehends the trial grounds.
`
`3
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`

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`
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`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`Apogee plainly employs a remote printer in “another town” and Petitioners
`
`explicitly relied on this teaching in the Petition. The Board has overlooked the
`
`record in this proceeding and misapprehended the trial grounds. For these reasons,
`
`Petitioners respectfully request that the Board grant rehearing and cancel claims
`
`10-14 of the ’349 patent.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing,
`
`without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request
`
`must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
`
`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a
`
`motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. Here, the Board overlooked Apogee’s
`
`express teaching that one of ordinary skill would have, and in fact did, consider
`
`generating a plate-ready file at locations remote from the printing company
`
`facility. Similarly, the Board misapprehended Petitioners’ proposed ground of
`
`unpatentability, relying on the system structure of Apogee when the proposed
`
`ground was based upon the system architecture of the primary references Jebens
`
`4
`
`and Dorfman.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A. The Board Overlooked Explicit Evidence That Apogee
`Discloses Sending Plate Ready Files To A Remote Printer
`
`The sole reason that claims 10-14 of the ’349 patent were held not
`
`unpatentable is because Petitioners allegedly provided “no evidence that a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art would have considered generating a plate-ready file
`
`anywhere other than where the printing plates are produced: at the printing
`
`facility.” (Decision at 26, 30.) This rationale is incorrect and directly refuted by
`
`Apogee and even by the ’349 patent’s description of known practices in the art.
`
`Before a plate-ready file can be provided to a remote printer as specified in
`
`claim 10, the file must be generated. There is no dispute that Apogee teaches the
`
`generation of a plate-ready file—what Apogee refers to as the “PIF,” which is the
`
`output of the “PDF RIP” process described in Apogee. Specifically, Petitioners’
`
`claim charts point to Apogee as disclosing the generation of a plate-ready file
`
`through the PDF RIP process. (See Petition at 40-41, 53, 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-
`
`7.) Patent Owner and its declarant agree that the PDF RIP process in Apogee
`
`creates the plate-ready file. (See Decision at 23, citing PO Resp. at 27 and Ex.
`
`2014 ¶ 24.)
`
`In opposing the Petition, Patent Owner urged an interpretation of the claims
`
`requiring “offsite” file processing, asserting that a “POSITA would consider [the
`
`PDF RIP] process to be occurring at the jobber or supplier, i.e., at a printing
`5
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`

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`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`company facility.” (PO Resp. at 27, citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 24.) The Board agreed with
`
`Patent Owner’s claim construction argument, concluding that Petitioners did not
`
`provide “any evidence” “that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`
`combined Jebens and Apogee in such a way that the plate-ready file would have
`
`been produced at Jebens’ host facility or end user facility....” (Decision at 26.)
`
`As noted above, the parties and the parties’ declarants agree that the Apogee
`
`PDF RIP process is the software component of the Apogee system that generates a
`
`plate-ready file. (Decision at 23, citing PO Resp. at 27 and Ex. 2014 ¶ 24.) In the
`
`Petition, Petitioners relied specifically on this PDF RIP process and based their
`
`unpatentability arguments on the processing flow of Apogee’s PIF plate-ready file
`
`from the PDF RIP process to a remote printer. (See Petition at 40-41, 53, 57, citing
`
`Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) After a plate-ready file is generated by the PDF RIP process, the
`
`“Apogee PrintDrive manages the Print Image Files (PIF)” to output “to a variety of
`
`output devices including Agfa imagesetters, proofers, and platesetters.” (Petition
`
`at 40-41, 53, 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) On the same two pages consistently relied
`
`on by Petitioners (pages 6 and 7), Apogee goes on to explain that
`
`Apogee PrintDrive can be fed by multiple PDF RIPs over a TCP/IP network.
`This unique feature allows you to physically separate the rendering from
`the actual plate production, so your PDF RIP can be in the desktop
`department and the PrintDrive can sit next to the output device, even in
`another town.
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`(Ex. 1008 at 7, emphasis added.)
`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`
`Similarly, the workflow schematic spanning pages 6 and 7 of Apogee shows
`
`the Apogee PDF RIP process and the Apogee PrintDrive located at discrete
`
`locations, connected over a TCP/IP network, thereby routing the PIF, or plate-
`
`ready file, from a remote PDF RIP to a remote or offsite printer. (Petition at 40-41,
`
`53, 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) Indeed, this teaching is also corroborated by the
`
`’349 patent itself, which explains in its Background of the Invention Section that
`
`remote printing was known long prior to filing the ’349 patent, namely, that
`
`“[o]nce approval of the proof is given by the end user, a medium, such as a
`
`computer to plate (CTP) file [i.e., plate-ready file] is produced and sent to the
`
`printer.” (Ex. 1001 at 1:36-38, emphasis added.) Clearly the end user is remote
`
`to the printer, which corroborates the generation of known CTP plate-ready files at
`
`locations other than the printing facility.2 See also Petition at 8-11; In re Morsa,
`
`
`
`2 As other portions of the ’349 patent’s prior art background section indicate, the
`
`referenced “printer” was known to be a separate business or entity located at an
`
`offsite, remote location. For instance, the patent discusses the “printer” who is sent
`
`the plate-ready file as the entity that, e.g., “manufactures a printing plate,”
`
`“converts the CTP file into a printing plate,” and “uses the printing plate to create
`
`the printed product.” (Ex. 1001 at 1:45-51.)
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`803 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing approvingly to the Board’s use of the
`
`specification of the patent under examination to establish the knowledge of a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art).
`
`
`
`Thus, contrary to the Board’s sole rationale for not finding claims 10-14
`
`unpatentable, there is significant, documentary evidence of record—unrebutted,
`
`and relied on by Petitioners—that one of ordinary skill was well aware of
`
`generating plate-ready files at locations remote from the printing company facility
`
`(i.e., in another town). One benefit of that remote printing arrangement was also
`
`explicitly explained by Apogee and relied on by Petitioners: to allow multiple
`
`physically separate PDF RIP processes to feed a single printing system, such as the
`
`PrintDrive disclosed in Apogee, ensuring that the platesetter, for example, is
`
`running at full capacity. (Petition at 40-41, 53, 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) And,
`
`although Petitioners did not argue for a construction of the term “remote printer,”
`
`the Board’s construction of the term (i.e., an offsite printing company facility
`
`accessible via a private or public communication network) was directly addressed
`
`by Petitioners’ citation to pages 6 and 7 of Apogee.
`
`Further, Petitioners’ expert testified that, as a matter of technical
`
`implementation, one of ordinary skill would have known that plate-ready files
`
`were either produced at a location remote from, or local to, the printer. In other
`
`words, there was a known design choice of performing this file processing at either
`
`8
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`location (see Petitioners Reply at 4-5), and pages 6 and 7 of Apogee consistently
`
`relied upon by Petitioners confirm both options. The Board misapprehended
`
`Petitioners’ statement in its Reply that “one of ordinary skill could predictably
`
`implement Apogee at a central service facility” as an inadequate motivation to
`
`combine argument. Rather, Petitioners’ Reply statement was simply a summary of
`
`its Petition grounds, already accepted by the Board, which explicitly referenced
`
`Apogee’s remote printing and the preceding generation/processing of the PIF at a
`
`geographic location remote from the printer or, alternatively, at the same
`
`geographic location as the printer. (Petition at 40-41, 53, 57, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-
`
`7.) Because Apogee uses the same remote printer arrangement as the
`
`Jebens/Dorfman references, there is simply no need to modify the trial grounds in
`
`this regard.
`
`The requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) have been met. Petitioners
`
`respectfully request that the Board institute a rehearing to cancel claims 10-14 of
`
`the ’349 patent.
`
`B. The Board Misapprehended Petitioners’ Obviousness
`Grounds, Treating Apogee, Rather Than Jebens Or Dorfman,
`As The Primary References
`
`Petitioners’ grounds of unpatentability are based upon Jebens and Dorfman
`
`as primary references. In this manner, Petitioners rely upon the specific system
`
`architecture of Jebens and Dorfman in the proposed grounds, and not the precise
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`architecture of Apogee. For example, Petitioners’ rely on Jeben’s disclosure that
`
`the central service facility, or host system, routes to-be-printed files from a remote
`
`client to a remote publishing entity such as a printer. (See Petition at 39-40, citing
`
`Ex. 1006 at 2:64−3:10, 5:11-35; Petition at 41, citing Ex. 1006 at 5:17-22.) There
`
`is no dispute that Jebens operates in this manner. (Decision at 12-13.) The same
`
`analysis applies to Dorfman, which routes to-be-printed files from a remote client
`
`to a commercial printer. (See Petition at 57, citing Ex. 1007 at p. 8, ll. 21-26;
`
`Decision at 27-28.) When combined with Apogee, the to-be-printed file is the
`
`plate-ready file produced by Apogee, which is then routed from Jeben’s host
`
`system to a “publishing entity such as a printer, where the finalized brochure
`
`would be published,” or to Dorfman’s commercial printer. (Petition at 41, citing
`
`Ex. 1006 at 5:17-22; Petition at 57, citing Ex. 1007 at p. 8, ll. 21-26.)
`
`Petitioners provided an unrebutted rationale, supported by the declaration of
`
`Prof. Lawler, for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
`
`modify the architecture of the primary references with the PDF workflow and
`
`plate-ready file of Apogee; namely, the known and obvious need to include a
`
`rasterization process—such as the PDF RIP process of Apogee (by which plate-
`
`ready files are generated)—into a printing prepress workflow such as that disclosed
`
`by Jebens or Dorfman. (See Petition at 27-29, 32-33, and 48-49.) Because Apogee
`
`uses the same remote printer arrangement as Jebens/Dorfman, no modifications of
`
`10
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`the references are necessary in this regard, and nothing else is required to cancel
`
`claims 10-14 as unpatentable.
`
`The Board’s Decision mistakenly looks to the secondary reference (Apogee)
`
`for architectural features relied upon in the primary references Jebens and
`
`Dorfman, and then suggests that Apogee would have to be modified to transmit a
`
`plate-ready file to a remote printer. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, as
`
`discussed above, Petitioners’ proposed combinations and hypothetical systems are
`
`based upon Jebens or Dorfman as primary references, both of which route to-be-
`
`printed files to a remote printer. There is no modification of the primary
`
`reference/system required to route a plate-ready file to a remote printer as claimed.
`
`Stated differently, the obviousness inquiry does not ask “whether [Jebens
`
`and Apogee, or Dorfman and Apogee] could be physically combined but whether
`
`the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a
`
`whole.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also In re
`
`Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (stating “[t]he test for obviousness is not
`
`whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
`
`structure of the primary reference”); M.P.E.P. § 2145(III). Similarly,
`
`nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually
`
`when a challenge is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In
`
`re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because both Jebens
`
`11
`
`

`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`and Dorfman are based on, and explicitly disclose, a distributed system
`
`architecture where to-be-printed files are routed to a remote printer, claims 10-14
`
`are unpatentable as obvious when combined with Apogee.
`
`Second, even if physically combined, Apogee explicitly teaches generating a
`
`plate-ready file at a processing location that is geographically remote (as required
`
`by the Board’s construction) from a printer and then routing that file over a
`
`communication network to the remote printer “in another town.” That is, even if
`
`considering the system architecture of Apogee were proper, which it is not,
`
`physical incorporation of Apogee into the primary references would also result in
`
`the claims of the ’349 patent because Apogee teaches the same architecture: a
`
`remote printer where the printer is located “in another town” from the location
`
`where the plate-ready file processing occurs.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners respectfully request that the
`
`Board institute rehearing and cancel claims 10-14 of the ’349 patent.
`
`12
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`Dated: December 28, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00791
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`Respectfully submitted,
`Oblon, McClelland, Maier &
`Neustadt, LLP
`
`
`
`
`/Scott A. McKeown/
`Scott A. McKeown (Reg. No. 42,866)
`Attorney for Petitioners
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
`AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO
`SOFTWARE BVBA, and
`HEIDELBERG, USA, INC.
`
`13
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies service of
`
`PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) on
`
`the counsel of record for the Patent Owner by filing this document through the
`
`Patent Review Processing System as well as delivering a copy via electronic mail
`
`to the following address:
`
`W. Edward Ramage
`L. Clint Crosby
`BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL
`& BERKOWITZ, P.C.
`eramage@bakerdonelson.com
`ccrosby@bakerdonelson.com
`
`
`
`Dated: December 28, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Scott A. McKeown/
`Scott A. McKeown (Reg. No. 42,866)
`Attorney for Petitioners
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
`AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO
`SOFTWARE BVBA, and
`HEIDELBERG, USA, INC.

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