UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO SOFTWARE
`
`BVBA, and HEIDELBERG, USA,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,611,349
`
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO SOFTWARE
`
`BVBA, and HEIDELBERG, USA,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`CTP INNOVATIONS, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,611,349
`
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`SUMMARY OF ISSUES FOR REHEARING
`
`I.
`
`Petitioners Eastman Kodak Company, Agfa Corporation, Esko Software
`
`BVBA, and Heidelberg, USA, Inc. (“Petitioners”) request rehearing under 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) of the Board’s Final Written Decision (“Decision,” Paper No.
`
`40) finding that Petitioners have not demonstrated that claims 1-3 of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 6,611,349 (“the ’349 patent”) are unpatentable.
`
`Independent claims 1-3 require, inter alia, a “central service facility” that
`
`“generat[es] a plate-ready file from pages designed at said end user facility....”
`
`There is no dispute that the Apogee reference teaches the generation of a plate-
`
`ready file—what Apogee calls a “PIF,” which is the file that is the output of
`
`Apogee’s PDF RIP Process. (Ex. 1008 at 6.) Rather, the sole reason the Board
`
`ruled in favor of Patent Owner was due to the mistaken belief that there is no
`
`evidence “that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
`
`combine Jebens and Apogee in such a way that a plate-ready file would have been
`
`produced at Jebens’ host facility ... rather than at its printing facility.” (Decision at
`
`27-28, 32-33.)
`
`In reaching this conclusion, the Board overlooked directly contradictory
`
`evidence in the trial record, particularly the cited portion of the Apogee reference
`
`itself. For the element of “generating a plate-ready file from pages designed at said
`
`end user facility,” Petitioners relied upon Apogee’s teaching of PDF RIPs, which
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`are undisputed to be “plate-ready files” within the meaning of the ’349 patent.
`
`Importantly, Apogee expressly describes these plate-ready files as being sent to a
`
`remote printing facility “in another town.” (See, e.g., Petition1 at 33-34, 51-52,
`
`citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) On page 7, Apogee describes its PrintDrive system (which
`
`receives the plate-ready files after they have been created by the PDF RIP process)
`
`as “allow[ing] you to physically separate the rendering from the actual plate
`
`production, so your PDF RIP can be in the desktop department and the PrintDrive
`
`can sit next to the output device, even in another town.” (Petition at 33-34, 51-
`
`52, citing Ex. 1008 at 7, emphasis added.) Petitioners’ claim charts, accepted by
`
`the Board as demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits,
`
`directed Patent Owner and the Board to this precise portion of Apogee. (See
`
`Petition at 33-34, 36, 38, 51-52, 54, and 58.) Patent Owner failed to rebut this
`
`evidentiary showing that Apogee employs a printing facility remote from the
`
`facility that performs plate-ready file processing, with the plate-ready files then
`
`being sent from the file processing facility (i.e., Jeben’s/Dorfman’s central service
`
`facility) to the remote printing facility. The Board’s sole reason for not holding
`
`claims 1-3 unpatentable overlooked this key aspect of the record.
`
`Lastly, Petitioners’ obviousness grounds rely on the system architecture
`
`from Jebens and Dorfman as primary references, not Apogee. There is no doubt
`
`
`1 Citations to the Petition are to the “corrected” Petition, Paper 4.
`2
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`(or dispute) that the central service facility of Jebens routes to-be-printed files from
`
`a remote client, through its host or central service facility, to a remote printing
`
`facility. The Board agreed with the architectural framework of the Jebens Ground
`
`in its final written decision. (Decision at 13-14, 23-24.) The same holds true for
`
`the Dorfman grounds. (Decision at 29-30.) When Jebens/Dorfman is modified
`
`with the PDF processing teachings of Apogee—as applied in the grounds accepted
`
`by the Board—the to-be-printed file routed from the central service facility to the
`
`remote printing facility is the plate-ready file of Apogee. Yet, the Board’s
`
`Decision mistakenly looks to the secondary reference (Apogee) for architectural
`
`structure relied upon in the primary references, and then suggests that Apogee, not
`
`the primary references, would have to be modified to produce a plate-ready file at a
`
`central service facility, rather than at a printing facility.
`
`However, the issue for obviousness is not whether Apogee needs to be
`
`modified, but whether one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify
`
`Jebens/Dorfman to include the PDF processing teachings of Apogee at the
`
`disclosed central service facilities of the prior art. As to this point, and as
`
`explained below, the Petition and supporting evidence provided an unrebutted
`
`motivation of why the PDF workflow of Apogee and accompanying plate-ready
`
`file were desirable and would have been an obvious modification to the
`
`Jebens/Dorfman central service architecture. (See Petition at 25-27 and 43-45.)
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`Thus, even if Apogee’s explicit teaching of remote printing could be ignored,
`
`which it cannot, the Board’s Decision misapprehends the trial grounds.
`
`Apogee plainly employs a remote printing facility in “another town” from
`
`the facility that performs plate-ready file processing (i.e., the central service
`
`facilities of Jebens or Dorfman), and Petitioners explicitly relied on this teaching in
`
`the Petition. The Board has overlooked the record in this proceeding and
`
`misapprehended the trial grounds. For these reasons, Petitioners respectfully
`
`request that the Board grant rehearing and cancel claims 1-3 of the ’349 patent.
`
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing,
`
`without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request
`
`must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
`
`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a
`
`motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. Here, the Board overlooked Apogee’s
`
`express teaching that one of ordinary skill would have, and in fact did, consider
`
`generating a plate-ready file at locations remote from the printing company
`
`facility, such as the central service facility of Jebens or Dorfman. Similarly, the
`
`Board misapprehended Petitioners’ proposed grounds of unpatentability, relying on
`
`the system structure of Apogee when the proposed grounds were based upon the
`
`system architecture of the primary references Jebens and Dorfman.
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`
`A. The Board Overlooked Explicit Evidence That Apogee
`Discloses Generating Plate Ready Files At Facilities Remote
`From The Printing Facility
`
`The sole reason that claims 1-3 of the ’349 patent were held not unpatentable
`
`
`
`is because Petitioners allegedly provided no evidence “that a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Jebens and Apogee in such a
`
`way that a plate-ready file would have been produced at Jebens’ host facility ...
`
`rather than at its printing facility.” (Decision at 27-28, 32-33.) This rationale is
`
`incorrect and directly refuted by Apogee and even by the ’349 patent’s description
`
`of known practices in the art.
`
`Before a plate-ready file can be provided to a printing company facility as
`
`specified in claims 1-3, the file must be generated. There is no dispute that Apogee
`
`teaches the generation of a plate-ready file—what Apogee refers to as the “PIF,”
`
`which is the output of the “PDF RIP” process described in Apogee. Specifically,
`
`Petitioners’ claim charts point to Apogee as disclosing the generation of a plate-
`
`ready file through the PDF RIP process. (See Petition at 33-34, 36, 38, 51-52, 54,
`
`and 58, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) Patent Owner and its declarant agree that the PDF
`
`RIP process in Apogee creates the plate-ready file. (See Decision at 24, citing PO
`
`Resp. at 32 and Ex. 2014 ¶ 24.)
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`In opposing the Petition, Patent Owner urged an interpretation of the claims
`
`requiring “offsite” file processing, asserting that a “POSITA would consider [the
`
`PDF RIP] process to be occurring at the jobber or supplier, i.e., at a printing
`
`company facility” and not the central service facility of Jebens. (PO Resp. at 31-
`
`32, citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 24.) The Board agreed with Patent Owner’s argument,
`
`concluding that Petitioners did not provide “any evidence” “that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Jebens and Apogee
`
`in such a way that a plate-ready file would have been produced at Jebens’ host
`
`facility ... rather than at its printing facility.” (Decision at 27-28.)
`
`As noted above, the parties and the parties’ declarants agree that the Apogee
`
`PDF RIP process is the software component of the Apogee system that generates a
`
`plate-ready file. (Decision at 24, citing PO Resp. at 32 and Ex. 2014 ¶ 24.) In the
`
`Petition, Petitioners relied specifically on this PDF RIP process and based their
`
`unpatentability arguments on the processing flow of Apogee’s PIF plate-ready file
`
`from the PDF RIP process to a remote printing company facility. (See Petition at
`
`33-34, 36, 38, 51-52, 54, and 58, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) After a plate-ready file is
`
`generated by the PDF RIP process, the “Apogee PrintDrive manages the Print
`
`Image Files (PIF)” to output “to a variety of output devices including Agfa
`
`imagesetters, proofers, and platesetters.” (Petition at 33-34, 36, 38, 51-52, 54, and
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`58, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) On the same two pages consistently relied on by
`
`Petitioners (pages 6 and 7), Apogee goes on to explain that
`
`Apogee PrintDrive can be fed by multiple PDF RIPs over a TCP/IP network.
`This unique feature allows you to physically separate the rendering from
`the actual plate production, so your PDF RIP can be in the desktop
`department and the PrintDrive can sit next to the output device, even in
`another town.
`(Ex. 1008 at 7, Petition at 33-34, 51-52, emphasis added.) Aside from the
`
`necessity to read the content of these two pages for technical context, the exact
`
`“another town” sentence quoted above is explicitly reproduced in Petitioners’
`
`charts for claims 1-3. (See, e.g., Petition at 33-34 (excerpts of pages 33-34
`
`reproduced below), 51-52.)
`
`
`
`*****
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`
`*****
`
`
`
`
`
`These claim charts cite the very passage of Apogee that forms the basis of
`
`Petitioners’ rehearing request and show plainly that one of ordinary skill would
`
`have combined Jebens and Apogee in such a way that the plate-ready file would
`
`have been produced at Jeben’s central service facility (i.e., at a location remote
`
`from the printing facility), and then transmitted to Jeben’s remote printing facility.
`
`The same holds true for the Dorfman grounds. Importantly, Patent Owner never
`
`rebutted the trial ground in this regard and, thus, Apogee’s teachings stand
`
`uncontested in the record.
`
`Similarly, the workflow schematic spanning pages 6 and 7 of Apogee shows
`
`the Apogee PDF RIP process and the Apogee PrintDrive located at discrete
`
`locations, connected over a TCP/IP network, thereby routing the PIF, or plate-
`
`ready file, from a remote PDF RIP (e.g., at Jebens or Dorfman’s central service
`
`facility) to a remote printing company facility. (Petition at 33-34, 51-52, citing
`
`Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) Indeed, this teaching is also corroborated by the ’349 patent
`
`itself, which explains in its Background of the Invention Section that remote
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`printing was known long prior to filing the ’349 patent, namely, that “[o]nce
`
`approval of the proof is given by the end user, a medium, such as a computer to
`
`plate (CTP) file [i.e., plate-ready file] is produced and sent to the printer.” (Ex.
`
`1001 at 1:36-38, emphasis added.) Clearly the end user is remote to the printer,
`
`which corroborates the generation of known CTP plate-ready files at locations
`
`other than the printing facility.2 See also Petition at 8-11; In re Morsa, 803 F.3d
`
`1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing approvingly to the Board’s use of the
`
`specification of the patent under examination to establish the knowledge of a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art).
`
`
`
`Thus, contrary to the Board’s sole rationale for not finding claims 1-3
`
`unpatentable, there is significant, documentary evidence of record—unrebutted,
`
`and relied on by Petitioners in their claim charts—that one of ordinary skill was
`
`well aware of generating plate-ready files at locations remote from the printing
`
`
`
`2 As other portions of the ’349 patent’s prior art background section indicate, the
`
`referenced “printer” was known to be a separate business or entity located at an
`
`offsite, remote location. For instance, the patent discusses the “printer” who is sent
`
`the plate-ready file as the entity that, e.g., “manufactures a printing plate,”
`
`“converts the CTP file into a printing plate,” and “uses the printing plate to create
`
`the printed product.” (Ex. 1001 at 1:45-51.)
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`company facility (i.e., in another town), and would have combined Jebens and
`
`Apogee (or Dorfman and Apogee) in such a way that the plate-ready file would
`
`have been produced at Jeben’s (or Dorfman’s) central service facility. One benefit
`
`of remotely generating the plate-ready file at a central service facility was also
`
`explicitly explained by Apogee and relied on by Petitioners: to allow multiple
`
`physically separate PDF RIP processes to feed a single printing system at a
`
`printing company facility (such as the PrintDrive disclosed in Apogee), ensuring
`
`that the platesetter, for example, is running at full capacity. (Petition at 33-34, 51-
`
`52, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.)
`
`Further, Petitioners’ expert testified that, as a matter of technical
`
`implementation, one of ordinary skill would have known that plate-ready files
`
`were either produced at a location remote from, or local to, the printer. In other
`
`words, there was a known design choice of performing this file processing at either
`
`a central service facility or a printing company facility (see Reply at 6-7), and
`
`pages 6 and 7 of Apogee consistently relied upon by Petitioners confirm both
`
`options. The Board misapprehended Petitioners’ statement in its Reply that “one
`
`of ordinary skill could predictably implement Apogee at a central service facility”
`
`as an inadequate motivation to combine argument. Rather, Petitioners’ Reply
`
`statement was simply a summary of its Petition grounds, already accepted by the
`
`Board, which explicitly referenced Apogee’s remote printing and the preceding
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`generation/processing of the PIF plate-ready file at a central service facility, for
`
`example, or alternatively at the printing company facility. (Petition at 33-34, 51-
`
`52, citing Ex. 1008 at 6-7.) Because Apogee uses the same remote printing
`
`company facility arrangement as the Jebens/Dorfman references, there is simply no
`
`need to modify the trial grounds in this regard.
`
`
`
`
`
`The requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) have been met. Petitioners
`
`respectfully request that the Board institute a rehearing to cancel claims 1-3 of the
`
`’349 patent.
`
`B. The Board Misapprehended Petitioners’ Obviousness
`Grounds, Treating Apogee, Rather Than Jebens Or Dorfman,
`As The Primary References
`
`Petitioners’ grounds of unpatentability are based upon Jebens and Dorfman
`
`as primary references. In this manner, Petitioners rely upon the specific system
`
`architecture of Jebens and Dorfman in the proposed grounds, and not the precise
`
`architecture of Apogee. For example, Petitioners’ rely on Jeben’s disclosure that
`
`the central service facility, or host system, routes to-be-printed files from a remote
`
`client to a remote publishing entity such as a printer. (See Petition at 23-24 (citing
`
`Ex. 1006 at 2:64−3:10; 5:1-22), 30-31 (claim 1 preamble and claim 1 element [a]),
`
`33 (claim 1 element [d]), 34 (claim 1 element [e]).) There is no dispute that Jebens
`
`operates in this manner. (Decision at 13-14.) The same analysis applies to
`
`Dorfman’s central service facility (PDF builder 6 and memory 4), which routes to-
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`be-printed files from a remote client to a commercial printer. (See Petition at 47
`
`(claim 1 element [a]), 49 (claim 1 element [c]), 51 (claim 1 element [d]), 52 (claim
`
`1 element [e]); Decision at 29-30.) When combined with Apogee, the to-be-
`
`printed file is the plate-ready file produced by Apogee, which is then routed from
`
`Jeben’s host system or central service facility to a “publishing entity such as a
`
`printer, where the finalized brochure would be published,” or to Dorfman’s
`
`commercial printer from Dorfman’s central service facility (PDF builder 6 and
`
`memory 4). (Petition at 34 (claim 1 element [e]); Petition at 52 (claim 1 element
`
`[e]).)
`
`Petitioners provided an unrebutted rationale, supported by the declaration of
`
`Prof. Lawler, for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
`
`modify the architecture of the primary references with the PDF workflow and
`
`plate-ready file of Apogee; namely, the known and obvious need to include a
`
`rasterization process—such as the PDF RIP process of Apogee (by which plate-
`
`ready files are generated)—into a printing prepress workflow such as that disclosed
`
`by Jebens or Dorfman. (See Petition at 25-27 and 43-45.) Because Apogee uses
`
`the same remote printing facility as Jebens/Dorfman from where the plate-ready
`
`file processing occurs, no modifications of the references are necessary to generate
`
`a plate-ready file at the central service facility of Jebens or Dorfman, and nothing
`
`else is required to cancel claims 1-3 as unpatentable.
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`The Board’s Decision mistakenly looks to the secondary reference (Apogee)
`
`for architectural features relied upon in the primary references Jebens and
`
`Dorfman, and then suggests that Apogee would have to be modified to generate a
`
`plate-ready file at a central service facility remote from a printing facility. This is
`
`incorrect for two reasons. First, as discussed above, Petitioners’ proposed
`
`combinations and hypothetical systems are based upon Jebens or Dorfman as
`
`primary references, both of which route to-be-printed files from a central service
`
`facility to a remote printing facility. There is no modification of the primary
`
`reference/system required to route a to-be-printed file (i.e., the plate-ready file of
`
`Apogee) from a central service facility to a printing company facility as claimed.
`
`Stated differently, the obviousness inquiry does not ask “whether [Jebens
`
`and Apogee, or Dorfman and Apogee] could be physically combined but whether
`
`the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a
`
`whole.” In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also In re
`
`Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (stating “[t]he test for obviousness is not
`
`whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
`
`structure of the primary reference”); M.P.E.P. § 2145(III). Similarly,
`
`nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually
`
`when a challenge is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In
`
`re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because both Jebens
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`and Dorfman are based on, and explicitly disclose, a distributed system
`
`architecture where to-be-printed files are routed from a central service facility to a
`
`printing company facility, claims 1-3 are unpatentable as obvious when combined
`
`with Apogee’s teaching of a plate-ready file.
`
`Second, even if physically combined, Apogee explicitly teaches generating a
`
`plate-ready file at a processing location that is geographically remote from a
`
`printer (such as the central service facility of Jebens or Dorfman), and then routing
`
`that file over a communication network to a remote printing facility “in another
`
`town.” That is, even if considering the system architecture of Apogee were proper,
`
`which it is not, physical incorporation of Apogee into the primary references would
`
`also result in the claims of the ’349 patent because Apogee teaches the same
`
`architecture: a remote printing facility where the printer is located “in another
`
`town” from the central service facility generating the plate-ready file.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners respectfully request that the
`
`Board institute rehearing and cancel claims 1-3 of the ’349 patent.
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: December 28, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00790
`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`Respectfully submitted,
`Oblon, McClelland, Maier &
`Neustadt, LLP
`
`
`
`
`/Scott A. McKeown/
`Scott A. McKeown (Reg. No. 42,866)
`Attorney for Petitioners
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
`AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO
`SOFTWARE BVBA, and
`HEIDELBERG, USA, INC.
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies service of
`
`PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) on
`
`the counsel of record for the Patent Owner by filing this document through the
`
`Patent Review Processing System as well as delivering a copy via electronic mail
`
`to the following address:
`
`W. Edward Ramage
`L. Clint Crosby
`BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL
`& BERKOWITZ, P.C.
`eramage@bakerdonelson.com
`ccrosby@bakerdonelson.com
`
`
`
`Dated: December 28, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Scott A. McKeown/
`Scott A. McKeown (Reg. No. 42,866)
`Attorney for Petitioners
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY,
`AGFA CORPORATION, ESKO
`SOFTWARE BVBA, and
`HEIDELBERG, USA, INC.
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
