UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FIRST DATA CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`CARDSOFT (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
`
`BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2014-00720
`
`Patent 7,302,683 B2
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`ON THE DECISION NOT TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FIRST DATA CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`CARDSOFT (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
`
`BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2014-00720
`
`Patent 7,302,683 B2
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`ON THE DECISION NOT TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... .. l
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`RELIEF REQUESTED .................................................................................. ..l
`
`III.
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`STANDARD OVERVIEW ........................................................................... ..l
`
`IV.
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`MATTERS OVERLOOKED ........................................................................ ..2
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`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`D.
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`E.
`
`F.
`
`A decision on Real Party in Interest is premature — it is a
`“highly fact—dependent question” and should be decided after
`IPR institution and an opportunity for fact discovery, petition
`and response. ....................................................................................... ..2
`
`Any control by Verifone in the court litigation is not pertinent
`to determining the real party—in—interest in this IPR proceeding......... ..5
`
`Funding is insufficient to make a party a real party-in-interest. ......... ..6
`
`The existent of an indemnity (which inherently includes
`funding) is insufficient to make a party a real party-in-interest
`where the indemnity arose less than one year before filing the
`IPR. ...................................................................................................... ..8
`
`There are no facts showing that Verifone is indemnifying for all
`of Petitioner’s accused products. ......................................................... ..9
`
`The decision cites presumptions and supposition as support for
`the a “highly fact—dependent question” of real party-in-interest. .... .. 10
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... .. 12
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioner requests reconsideration of the Board’s Decision in Paper 9
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`(“Decision”) to deny the Institution of Inter Partes Review herein based on
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`Petitioner’s petition (“Petition”) because the decision was based on suppositions
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`and presumptions, and not just facts, and for the other reasons set forth herein.
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`Specifically, the Board determined that Petitioner was not the only real party in
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`interest behind the filing of the Petition based not on the facts established by the
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`record evidence before it but rather based on mere supposition and conjecture.
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`Petitioner’s petition paper clearly established that VeriFone played no role in
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`preparing the instant Petition except for agreeing to indemnify Petitioner. Yet the
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`Board concluded, based on mere suggestion and innuendo, rather than evidence,
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`that VeriFone played a more significant role than this. This constituted an abuse of
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`discretion justifying a rehearing.
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`II.
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`RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Petitioner requests a rehearing of the Decision and institution of an Inter
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`Partes Review (“IPR”).
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`III.
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`STANDARD OVERVIEW
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.7l(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a
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`panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion
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`-1-
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`
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`occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
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`erroneous factual findings, or
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`a clear error ofjudgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v
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`Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
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`(citations omitted). The request must “specifically identify all maters the party
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`believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter
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`was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.71(d).
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`IV. MATTERS OVERLOOKED
`
`A.
`
`A decision on Real Party in Interest is premature —— it is a “highly
`fact-dependent question” and should be decided after IPR
`institution and an opportunity for fact discovery, petition and
`
`response.
`
`The only requirement for an IPR petition regarding real party-in-interest is
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`that the Petitioner identify such parties [37 CFR 42.8(b)(1)]. There is no
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`requirement that Petitioner submit sufficient facts to anticipate and disprove any
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`suppositions or presumptions Patent Owner may make in a Preliminary Response
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`regarding other parties as potential real parties in interest. The Oct. 17 Decision in
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`this IPR2014—00720 (the “Decision”) states that “Petitioner, however, does not
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`provide sufficient evidence that would support this assertion [that it alone decide to
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`use different prior art] ....” Decision, p. 7).
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`It is not Petitioner’s obligation in an
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`IPR petition to prove the negative that someone else is not a real party-in-interest.
`
`
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`Rather, it is Patent Owner’s obligation to present facts that show this, or request
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`discovery of such facts.
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`As noted in the Decision, the determination of a real party-in-interest “is a
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`highly fact-dependent question.” Since the Patent Owner often may not know the
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`facts, provision is made in IPR proceedings for discovery. Patent Owner has not
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`requested such discovery.
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`“In certain instances, however, a patent owner may be granted additional
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`discovery before filing its preliminary response and submit any testimonial
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`evidence obtained through the discovery. For example, additional discovery may
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`be authorized where patent owner raises sufficient concerns regarding the
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`petitioner’s certification of standing.” Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review
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`Proceedings, Post—Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for
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`Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 77, 157, 48680, 48689 (2012).
`
`Other decisions finding that another party was a real party in interest
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`occurred after discovery, with the ability for a petition and response. See, e.g.,
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`RPX Corporation v. Virnetx Inc., IPR2014—O00171 (Scheduling Order re
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`discovery, paper 20). See also IPR2013—00488 (Decision, paper 29), IPR20l4-
`
`00041 (Order, paper 126), 1PR2014—00735 (Order, paper 17).
`
`
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`It would be an unreasonable burden, and vitiate the viability of IPRS as a
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`process to challenge patents, if Petitioner were required to anticipate every
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`supposition the Patent Owner may make, and present facts to prove a negative,
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`while at the same time making the case for invalidity in 60 double spaced pages.
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`We submit this is the reason Petitioner is required to make a declaration regarding
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`real party in interest, and provision is made for discovery by Patent Owner after
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`institution.
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`Petitioner chose to disclose certain uncontested facts to avoid wasted time
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`and costs in the event that the Board considered those facts alone to preclude an
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`IPR. Those facts are the existence of an indemnity agreement for a portion of the
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`accused products, with control provisions disclaimed, and the funding of an IPR
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`with no other involvement other than the identification of prior art by shared
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`litigation counsel that was not used (See Petition, pp. 1-2). The other facts relate to
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`court litigation, which is not pertinent to the real party-in-interest for this separate
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`proceeding, as separately discussed below. Everything else relied on in the
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`Decision, such as presumed involvement and ability to control by VeriFone up to
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`two days before filing, is supposition or presumption.
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`We believe the proper procedure would have been find insufficient facts to
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`show VeriFone as a real party-in-interest, but, either before or after instituting an
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`IPR, allowing Patent Owner to do discovery related to the real party in interest, and
`
`-4-
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`
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`then make a motion to terminate on that basis (on facts discovered, not
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`supposition), with Petitioner being able to file a response to that motion.
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`B.
`
`Any control by VeriFone in the court litigation is not pertinent to
`determining the real party—in-interest in this IPR proceeding.
`
`The Decision stated that, “A common consideration is whether the non—party
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`exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation i_r_1__a
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`proceeding.” (Decision at 6, emphasis added, quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893-
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`895.). The relevant proceeding is this IPR, not the separate court proceeding.
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`IPRS were designed to address validity separately from the infringement
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`issues in court. Estoppel attaches so the Petitioner doesn’t have a “second bite at
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`the apple” in court. Thus, any involvement by VeriFone in the separate
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`proceedings in court is irrelevant to control in this proceeding, and not probative of
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`control.
`
`The decision notes that VeriFone has an interest in the outcome of this IPR.
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`However, that does not show control. If it did, every other party being sued on the
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`same patent would be a real party—in—interest. The PTAB has held that being a co-
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`defendant does not make one a real party—in—interest (See, e.g., Innolux
`
`Corporation V. Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. Ltd, lPR20l3-00038, paper
`
`
`
`no. 12). Also see In re Arviv Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,526,
`
`Decision Dismissing section 1.182 and section 1.183 Petitions at 5 (Apr. 18, 2011):
`
`“. . .even a search for prior art, review of possibly useful prior art with
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`respect to the patent claims, preparation of an invalidity defense based on found
`
`and evaluated prior art to support a litigation defense, and financial support to
`
`carry out a litigation defense —— do not amount to participation in a request for
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`reexamination based on such activities, where the activities were conducted with
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`only an intent to defend the litigation suit.” In order to qualify as a real party—in—
`
`interest, the BPAI found that “a party must participate in some manner in the
`
`request for reexamination.”[Id.]
`
`C.
`
`Funding is insufficient to make a party a real party-in-interest.
`
`The only thing identified in the rules as definitely making a party a real
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`party—in—interest is complete funding and control — not funding alone.
`
`“For example, a party thatfunds and directs and controls an IPR
`
`constitutes a ‘real party-in—interest’ ....But whether something less than
`
`complete funding and control suffices to justifiz similarly treating the party
`
`requires consideration of the pertinentfacts.” Office Patent Trial Practice
`
`Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (2012).
`
`
`
`The only submitted facts related to control of this IPR proceeding show no
`
`control by VeriFone (see Petition, pp. 1-2). The things suggesting control by
`
`Patent Owner are suppositions and presumptions, which are in fact incorrect. It is
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`not necessary to point out the correct facts at this stage, merely the lack of a factual
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`showing, but Petitioner has chosen to do so below to illuminate to the Board that
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`these are in fact suppositions and presumptions by Patent Owner, and illustrate
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`what would come out during fact discovery. Petitioner will not oppose a motion
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`for reasonable discovery on these facts by Patent Owner.
`
`Patent Owner has suggested that the cases cited by petitioner (to show
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`funding does not make one a real party in interest) are not relevant to this
`
`proceeding because the facts are different. By the same reasoning, Im re Guam
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`(Inter Partes Reexamination, Control No. 95/001,045, “Decision Vacating File
`
`Date,” Aug. 25, 2008), relied on in Patent Owner’s argument, is also not relevant,
`
`or any other case for that matter. The facts of In re Guam are also different — much
`
`more so. Patent Owner is correct that Im re Guam has not been overruled.
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`However, that appears unnecessary, because each case is uniquely dependent on its
`
`particular facts. But while Im re Guam has not been overruled, it is not controlling.
`
`The results of subsequent decisions finding no real party in interest would have
`
`been the opposite if the tests set forth in Im re Guam was applied. For example, Im
`
`re Schlecht (Inter Partes Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,206,
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`-7-
`
`
`
`June 22, 2010) would have failed the 3rd test of In re Guan (“provide the prior
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`patents/printed publications on which the reexam is to be based”). The unique
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`other facts in In re Schlecht dictated the opposite result. In re Sehlecht was cited
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`and discussed on p. 4 of the Petition.
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`D.
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`The existent of an indemnity (which inherently includes funding)
`is insufficient to make a party a real party-in-interest where the
`indemnity arose less than one year before filing the IPR.
`
`In Atlanta Gas Light Company v. Bennett Regulator Guards Inc., (IPR2013—
`
`00453), referenced in the Petitioner’s Petition (IPR2014-00720 petition, pages 4-5)
`
`[and discussed on p. 5 of the Petition], the PTAB held the existence of a
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`contract/indemnification clause does not create privity. In essence, the PTAB held
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`that the indemnity obligation did not arise until the petitioner was served, which
`
`was within the 1 year period: “To the extent that such obligation or opportunity for
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`control arose when Petitioner was served on July 18, 2012, Petitioner’s filing of the
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`petition on July 18, 2013, is timely. 2
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`2 Our present analysis is consistent with the Board’s reasoning under
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`different facts in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., IPR2012-00042
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`(Paper 16). In Synopsys, a third party became a wholly owned subsidiary of
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`the petitioner after the date on which the petition for inter partes review was
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`filed. That third party had been served with a complaint alleging
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`
`
`infringement of the patent at issue more than a year before the petition was
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`filed. The Board concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 3l5(b) did not bar institution of
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`the inter partes review because the patent owner provided no persuasive
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`evidence that the petitioner could have exercised control over the third
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`party’s participation in the inter partes review at the time of service of the
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`complaint upon the third party.” (IPR2013-00453, Decision, paper 31, p. 16)
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`E.
`
`There are no facts showing that VeriFone is indemnifying for all
`of Petitioner’s accused products.
`
`As stated in the Petition: “. . .of the indemnity which provides
`
`indemnification for some although not all of the accused devices.” (Petition, p. 2)
`
`As pointed out in the Declaration submitted herewith, “. .. a significant portion of
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`the accused units are not supplied by VeriFone and thus not subject to the
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`indemnity.” (Declaration, 1] 4). It would be contrary to the reasons for establishing
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`Inter Partes Reviews to deny Petitioner the opportunity for an IPR challenge while
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`leaving it exposed to infringement suit on products where there is no indemnity.
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`The Decision would allow Patent Owner a second bite at the apple in suing
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`Petitioner (the retailer) after suing VeriFone (the manufacturer), but deny
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`Petitioner the ability to effectively challenge validity.
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`
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`F.
`
`The decision cites presumptions and supposition as support for
`the a “highly fact-dependent question” of real party-in-interest.
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`The fact that a written disclaimer was signed two days before the petition
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`does not provide any facts regarding actual control prior to that date. It also does
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`not provide any facts as to the opportunity to control prior to that date. For
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`example, it is possible that an earlier oral agreement precluded such an opportunity
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`to control. In fact, that is the case here, as Petitioner and its counsel made clear to
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`VeriFone from the beginning that this IPR would only be prepared if VeriFone
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`agreed to have no control.
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`An explanation of the facts which disprove Patent Owner’s suppositions is
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`included herein, with a supporting declaration, to show the Board (which may not
`
`have been apparent in View of Patent Owner’s characterizations) that Patent Owner
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`was providing supposition and presumptions, not facts. However, there is no
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`requirement that Petitioner needed to present this declaration with the original
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`petition or now, as the absence of facts showing no control should be sufficient.
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`The Decision states: “We find that per this same indemnity agreement
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`VeriFone had an opportunity to control all of the events leading up to the filing of
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`the Petition.” (Decision, p. 7) This is based on supposition, not facts. Patent
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`Owner has presented no proof of this. In fact, not only was an oral agreement to
`
`-10-
`
`
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`the contrary, Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel would not have proceeded if
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`VeriFone had the ability to control.
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`The Decision states that, “By then, presumably, most of the work had been
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`done by both Petitioner and VeriFone in preparation of the 50—page Petition,
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`assemblance of prior art, and gathering of witnesses and their declarations, and
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`Petitioner does not indicate otherwise.” (Decision at pp. 8-9) [emphasis added].
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`There is no evidence or facts to support this presumption. In fact, VeriFone had no
`
`involvement in all of these steps. In addition, VeriFone had no opportunity to be
`
`involved in accordance with an oral agreement and with the firm position of
`
`Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel that they would not have proceeded if VeriFone
`
`had the ability to control.
`
`The Decision states: “Petitioner, as a party who controlled or had the
`
`opportunity to control what went into the Petition, is a real party—in—interest despite
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`turning over the reins to another party after all of the work has been done.”
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`(Decision, p. 9) There is no evidence to support this, and in fact it is untrue, as the
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`Demetriades Declaration demonstrates.
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`-11-
`
`
`
`V.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board
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`grant this request for rehearing.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Dated: NoVember17, 2014
`
`By:
`
`9?/W//’
`
`~ 4 "’
`
`~
`3
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`Registration No. 31,836
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners
`
`7
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`
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`
`
`
`
` Lead Counsel ‘ I is A A T ’iiBack—Ui “Counsel . A
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`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`Registration No. 31,836
`phaughey@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Darin J. Gibby
`Registration No. 38,464
`d ibb
`kil atricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`Two Embarcadero Center, Eighth Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 576-0200
`Fax: (415) 576-0300
`
`Postal and Hand-Deliveg Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1400 Wewatta Street, Suite 600
`Denver , CO 80202
`Telephone: (303) 571-4000
`Fax: (303)
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`-12-
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of this Petitioner’s Request for
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`Rehearing UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 ON THE DECISION NOT TO INSTITUTE
`
`INTER PARTIES REVIEW, has been served via Express Mail on November 17,
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`2014, upon the following:
`
`Birch, Steward, Kolasch & Birch, LLP
`8110 Gatehouse Road, Suite 100 East
`
`Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
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`With copies by email, per Patent Owner consent, to:
`
`mrb@buscherlaw.com
`dra@bskb.com
`gsd@bskb.com
`
`Dated: November 17, 2014
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`66715445V.l
`
` Paul C. Haughey
`
`Registration No. 31,836
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FIRST DATA CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`CARDSOFT (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
`BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2014-00715 and IPRZOI4-00720
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 and No. 7,302,683
`
`DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER P. DEMETRIADES
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l4-00715 & IPR20l4—00720
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 and No. 7,302,683
`
`DECLARATION
`
`I, Christopher P. Demetriades, hereby state as follows:
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`I am over the age of 18 and am competent to make this declaration.
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`I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.
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`I am employed by First Data Corporation (“FDC”) as a Senior
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`Counsel - Litigation.
`
`4.
`
`In my capacity as Senior Counsel I oversee outside counsel and assist
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`in managing IP litigation. One of the cases I was asked to assist on was the
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`CardSoft litigation, Cardsoft (Assignmentfor the Benefit of Creditors) LLC v. First
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`Data Corp, Civil Action No. 2:l3~cv~290 (E.D. Tex.). That
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`lawsuit alleged
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`infringement of U.S. Pat. 6,934,945 by FDC point-of—sa1e (POS) terminals.
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`Among its different areas of business, FDC provides financial
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`transaction
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`processing services on behalf of merchants.
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`In that role, it provide POS terminals
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`and solutions that allow merchants to accept a variety of credit card, debit card and
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`other payments. The FDC line of terminals for merchants includes FDC terminals
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`as well as terminals from VeriFone and other manufacturers.
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`5.
`
`VeriFone was providing a partial
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`indemnification to FDC in
`
`connection with the CardSoft litigation because some of the accused terminals
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l3—0O246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`were supplied to FDC by VeriFone. The indemnification was only partial in that it
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`extended to just the accused terminals that were being provided to FDC by
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`VeriFone.
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`Indeed, a significant portion of the accused units are not supplied by
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`VeriF one and VeriFone is not indemnifying FCD for those terminals.
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`6.
`
`In connection with my duties related to the Cardsoft lawsuit I had
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`occasion to speak with my counterpart at VeriFone, Suzanne Tom. During one
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`such conversation, the idea of filing an IPR was raised by VeriFone. During the
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`initial conversations the parties discussed but did not decide whether under the
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`indemnity VeriFone would be obliged to pay for an IPR, given the language of the
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`indemnity agreement and the fact
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`that a substantial number of the accused
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`terminals were not covered by the indemnity.
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`7.
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`FDC was also concerned about the issue of control. FDC wanted
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`control of the IPR proceeding, and did not want a settlement of the IPR that would
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`leave FDC exposed with respect to non—indemnified terminals.
`
`8.
`
`In subsequent follow up discussions with VeriFone, FDC indicated
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`that it was interested in filing an IPR if VeriFone would agree to indemnify FDC
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`for the IPR and cover the costs under its indemnity, but only if FDC retained sole
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`control over all aspects of the preparation,
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`filing and direction of the IPR
`
`proceeding. For example, FDC wanted to use its long time patent counsel for the
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l3—O0246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`IPR proceeding, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (“Kilpatrick Townsend”),
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`and not VeriFone counsel.
`
`9.
`
`Subsequently, in or about March 2014 in follow up phone calls with
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`Suzanne Toms
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`at VeriFone concerning the IPR, FDC confirmed that while
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`VeriFone would fund the IPR,
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`its participation would be limited solely to that.
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`Accordingly, as previously discussed between VeriFone counsel and myself, I
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`agreed that FDC would proceed with preparing and filing an IPR only if VeriFone
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`agreed it would have no opportunity to exercise control, and ceded selection of
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`counsel and all control over the IPR proceedings to FDC.
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`10. At no time during tl1e preparation of the IPRs did VeriFone exercise
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`any direction or control over FDC’s actions whatsoever.
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`Ind.eed, VeriFone never
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`saw any drafts of the IPR requests, never provided any comments or suggestions
`
`on how to prepare the IPRS, nor any comments on any prior art.
`
`I did request a
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`copy of certain specific publically available materials from VeriFone, consisting of
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`the Omni 300 manual.
`
`I also obtained an identification of the best prior art
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`identified in the litigation from our litigation counsel, Jones Day (which was also
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`VeriFone’s counsel). However, neither Jones Day nor VeriFone had any
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`opportunity to control whether FDC would use this identified prior art in the IPR,
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`and indeed FDC did not use it.
`
`This was the sole extent of VeriFone’s
`
`4
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`
`
`Case No. IPR2013—O0246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`involvement aside from agreeing to fund the IPR. Apart from this, they played no
`
`other role. Kilpatrick Townsend was instructed to perform a new prior art search.
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`and to develop an invalidity position separate from anything prepared in
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`connection with the litigation.
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`11.
`
`The agreement whereby VeriFone disclaimed its ability to control
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`under the indemnity (EX. 1011) (the “Disclaimer Agreement”) memorialized the
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`earlier oral agreement of the parties and reflected the fact that VeriFone did not
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`play any role in preparing the IPR except as identified herein. There was no
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`determination or agreement that the original indemnity agreement would obligate
`
`VeriFone to prepare an IPR or the right or ability to control any IPR. The oral and
`
`written agreements simply made clear that there would be no de facto opportunity
`
`to control, regardless of Whether the indemnity provided that obligation or ability,
`
`and extend VeriFone’s payment to the IPR costs. While the oral agreement was
`
`in effect before work on the IPRS started as described above, respective in-house
`
`counsel began work on the written Disclaimer Agreement to memorialize the oral
`
`agreement in April 2014, a process which led to a signed agreement on April 28,
`
`2014.
`
`9. At no time, either before or after the signature date of the Disclaimer
`
`Agreement, did VeriFone in fact provide any comments, suggestions, directions or
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2013—00246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`mandates as to how the IPRS should proceed. Every part of the process in
`
`preparing, reviewing and filing the lPRs was performed solely under the direction
`
`of FDC and their attorneys at Kilpatrick Townsend. At no time did VeriFone have
`
`any input, nor did they ever see orcomment on any drafts of the IPR requests.
`
`I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing Declaration is true and
`
`correct.
`
`Date: November [Z2014
`
`fl/Z2: L.»/e--
`
`Christopher P. Demetriades
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014—00715
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 B1
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the DECLARATION OF
`
`CHRISTOPHER P. DEMETRIADES, has been served via Express Mail on
`
`November 17, 2014, upon the following:
`
`Birch, Steward, Kolasch & Birch, LLP
`8110 Gatehouse Road, Suite 100 East
`
`Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
`
`With copies by email, per Patent Owner consent, to:
`
`mrb@,buscherlaw.oom
`dra@,bskb.com
`gsd@bskb.com
`
`
`
` fl
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`Registration No. 31,83
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`Dated: November 17, 2014
`
`By:
`
`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND 66710910 1
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