UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`Washington, D.C.
`
`Before The Honorable David P. Shaw
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN DIGITAL MEDIA DEVICES,
`INCLUDING TELEVISIONS, BLU-RAY
`DISC PLAYERS, HOME THEATER
`SYSTEMS, TABLETS AND MOBILE
`PHONES, COMPONENTS THEREOF
`AND ASSOCIATED SOFTWARE
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-882
`
`BLACK HILLS MEDIA, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO
`GOOGLE INC.’S MOTION TO INTERVENE
`
`Complainant Black Hills Media, LLC (“BHM”) hereby opposes Google Inc.’s
`
`(“Google’s”) Motion to Intervene (the “Motion”) in this investigation.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`The Commission is investigating Respondents’ devices for infringement of the asserted
`
`BHM patents as set forth in greater detail in BHM’s Complaint. Google is one of at least twenty
`
`different third parties that possess information related to the devices that are subject to this
`
`investigation. Most of those third parties have a similar connection to Respondents’ infringing
`
`devices (providing applications). Their connection alone is not sufficient to establish the right to
`
`intervene in a Commission investigation:
`
`that exclusion orders might affect non-respondents does not
`The fact
`automatically serve as the basis for a due process claim or support intervention.
`Such a rule would require every party potentially touched by an exclusion order to
`be a party to the investigation. See In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips and
`Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips, Power Control Chips, and
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`Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets, Inv. No. 337-
`TA-543, Order No. 29 at 10, n.44. (March 9, 2006, Bullock, A.L.J.)
`The Commission has established stringent
`requirements
`for
`
`intervening in an
`
`investigation as a Respondent. Google does not attempt to satisfy those requirements and
`
`Google must not be permitted to participate in this investigation as a Respondent ipso facto. The
`
`Commission should also exercise its considerable discretion to deny Google’s motion to
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`participate in a more limited fashion as an intervenor. Google has not satisfied its burden of
`
`demonstrating that it is entitled to intervene in this investigation. Google’s motion does not
`
`address one of the four factors required for intervention and Google does not sufficiently
`
`distinguish its own interests from those of the Respondents to credibly establish that Google’s
`
`interests are not already adequately represented by Respondents.
`
`Indeed, because Respondents
`
`and Google have the same ultimate goal, there is a presumption that Google’s interests are
`
`adequately represented. Moreover, Google’s proposed intervention is not practical under these
`
`circumstances where there are approximately twenty other third parties similarly situated to
`
`Google whose unfettered participation would only distract attention from Respondents’ devices
`
`that are the actual focus of the Commission’s investigation.
`
`The Commission is required to conclude its investigation at the earliest practicable time
`
`in the interests of expeditious adjudication. Google’s proposed intervention does not advance
`
`that goal and does not provide any countervailing benefits. BHM respectfully requests the
`
`Commission to deny Google’s motion to intervene.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`On May 13, 2013, BHM filed its Complaint alleging patent infringement and seeking a
`
`limited exclusion order against devices imported into the United States by Respondents Samsung
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`Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America,
`
`Inc., Samsung Telecommunications
`
`America, L.L.C., LG Electronics,
`
`Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A.,
`
`Inc., LG Electronics
`
`MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., Panasonic Corporation, Panasonic Corporation of America, Toshiba
`
`Corporation, Toshiba Corporation America Information Systems, Inc., Sharp Corporation, and
`
`Sharp Electronics Corporation (the “Respondents”). A non-confidential version of the complaint
`
`and its attachments have been publicly available on EDIS since at least May 2013.
`
`The Commission noticed the institution of this investigation against the Respondents on
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`June 18, 2013. On June 25, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Shaw issued nineteen subpoenas to
`
`third party entities possessing information relating to Respondents’ infringing devices.1 Google
`
`was one such third party. Google moved to intervene in this investigation on July 26, 2013 on
`
`behalf of itself and YouTube LLC. The briefing on Google’s motion will be completed by
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`August 5, 2013. The preliminary hearing is set before the Commission on August 6, 2013.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A. Legal Standard for Intervention
`
`Google does not have an automatic right to participate in this proceeding. Whether to
`
`permit a third party to intervene in an investigation “is a discretionary decision that involves
`
`consideration of the facts of the specific matter.”
`
`In re Certain Garage Door Operators
`
`Including Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-459, Order No. 7 (Nov. 20, 2001) at 3-4.
`
`(“Thus, whether to allow or deny intervention, and to what extent, is a discretionary decision that
`
`involves consideration of
`
`the facts of
`
`the specific matter.”)
`
`(hereinafter “Garage Door
`
`1
`
`Administrative Law Judge Shaw issued a twentieth third party subpoena on July 22, 2013.
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`Operators”). Rule 210.19 calls upon the Commission to exercise its discretion to grant or deny a
`
`motion to intervene, and only “to the extent and upon such terms as may be proper under the
`
`circumstances.”
`
`Id.; In re Certain Electronic Devices with Image Processing Systems,
`
`Components Thereof, and Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-724, Comm’n Op. at 57 (Dec.
`
`21, 2011) (“As indicated by the word "may" in Rule 201.19, intervention is a matter of
`
`Commission discretion, not a matter of right.”) (hereinafter “Image Processing Systems”); c.f.
`
`Google’s Motion to Intervene at n.2 (wrongly implying it has an automatic right to intervention
`
`by quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) instead of ITC Rule 210.19).
`
`The Commission permits a moving party to fully intervene as a Respondent only if it
`
`“produce[s] relevant evidence sufficient to show that articles supplied by the moving party could,
`
`in fact, be found in violation of section 337 and could therefore be excluded from entry in to the
`
`United States if the remedy sought by the complainant were granted." Certain Network Interface
`
`Cards and Access Points for Use in Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Wireless Local Area
`
`Networks and Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-455, Comm'n. Op. at 10 (July 17,
`
`2001) (hereinafter "Network Interface Cards"). Google’s motion does not even purport to make
`
`such a showing.
`
`Absent such strong proof, the Commission may, in its discretion, permit more limited
`
`intervention guided at least in part by the four factors that are relevant to intervention under the
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a). Image Processing Systems at 57 (“Federal Rule of
`
`Civil Procedure 24 provides some guidance in determining whether intervention in a particular
`
`matter is appropriate.”). The moving party has the burden to establish at least that (1) it made a
`
`timely motion; (2) it has “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
`
`the action;” (3) it is “so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
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`or impede its ability to protect that interest;” and (4) it is “not adequately represented by existing
`
`parties.” Id.
`
`As explained below, Google should not be accorded any intervenor status. However, if
`
`the Commission determines that intervention is appropriate under the circumstances, it must also
`
`determine the extent of intervention by balancing the impact that the movants’ participation
`
`might have on the interests of the present parties in the investigation with the need for expedition
`
`in § 337 investigations. Garage Door Operators at 7; Image Processing Systems at 61-62 (“the
`
`intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights”).
`
`In such circumstances, only very limited intervention should be approved.
`
`B. Google is Not Entitled to Intervene in the Investigation as a Respondent
`
`The Commission requires a “compelling justification” to grant an intervenor the same
`
`status as a Respondent to the investigation. Network Interface Cards at 7 (July 17, 2001).
`
`Google thus bears the burden of “produc[ing] relevant evidence sufficient to show that articles
`
`supplied by [Google] could, in fact, be found in violation of section 337 and could therefore be
`
`excluded from entry in to the United States if the remedy sought by the [BHM] were granted."
`
`Id. at 10. That burden is not met.
`
`Google’s does not address or even attempt to satisfy the strict requirements that the
`
`Commission has placed on a party seeking to gain Respondent status.2 Since it is Google’s
`
`burden to establish that it is entitled to intervention, and Google has failed to establish that it is
`
`2
`Instead, Google “reserves the right” to become a Respondent if additional unidentified facts
`“come to light in the investigation that would support such a request.” Motion at n.1. But
`Google offers no authority demonstrating that such reservation of rights is appropriate or
`acceptable and further identifies no facts which could come to light which would support
`Google’s intervention as a Respondent.
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`entitled to fully intervene in these proceedings as a Respondent, Google must not be afforded
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`status as a Respondent.
`
`C. Google Is Not Entitled to Intervene in the Investigation as an Intervenor
`
`1. Prior Commission Decisions Involving Google Do Not Determine the Propriety of
`
`Google’s Intervention in this Investigation
`
`Google’s motion places undue emphasis on two prior Commission decisions that
`
`permitted Google to intervene as an intervenor, but not as a Respondent. Motion at 5-6. Both
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`decisions involve the same Complainant, Nokia, and the same Respondent, HTC.
`
`In the earlier of the two investigations, Google moved to intervene as a Respondent and
`
`Nokia opposed Google’s intervention. In re Certain Electronic Devices, Including Mobile
`
`Phones and Tablet Computers, and Components thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-847 (Aug. 3, 2012).
`
`Judge Pender denied Google’s motion to intervene as a Respondent, finding that Google had not
`
`met the requirements for establishing that it was entitled to Respondent status. Id. at 10.
`
`Nevertheless, Judge Pender exercised his discretion to allow Google to intervene as an
`
`intervenor. Id. at 11.
`
`In the second investigation, Google moved unopposed to intervene only as an intervenor
`
`stating, “[t]he present investigation involves most of the same parties and accused products as
`
`another investigation of an earlier complaint filed by Nokia against HTC. . .” In re Certain
`
`Portable Electronic Communication Devices, including Mobile Phones and Components
`
`Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-885, Motion No. 885-01 at pp. 1 (July 11, 2013) (Google’s
`
`Unopposed Motion to Intervene). Given the substantial relationship between the two
`
`investigations, and the fact that Nokia did not oppose Google’s intervention a second time, Judge
`
`Essex granted Google’s motion in his discretion. Id., Order No. 5 at 5 (July 16, 2013).
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`Google’s intervention in the two prior Nokia-HTC investigations does not determine the
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`propriety of Google’s intervention in this proceeding. In exercising its discretion to allow or
`
`deny intervention, the Commission considers “the facts of the specific matter.” Garage Door
`
`Operators, Order No. 7 (Nov. 20, 2001) at 3-4. This matter involves six entirely different
`
`patents and different infringement theories, including different Respondents and different
`
`products, as well as at least twenty different third parties with information relevant to
`
`Respondents’ infringement. Google’s proposed intervention in this matter thus requires
`
`independent analysis.
`
`2. Google Should Have Moved to Intervene Earlier in these Proceedings
`
`Google could and should have moved to intervene in this action at least one month ago.
`
`The Complaint and its attachments have been public since May 2013 and Google was issued a
`
`subpoena in June 2013 for information in its possession relating to the Respondents’ devices.
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`Google provides no explanation for why it waited so long to file its motion to intervene.
`
`Although Google may argue that its moved sufficiently early, it has not identified why it delayed
`
`seeking such status or explain why it did not seek intervention until after the ALJ set a target date
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`and after the Respondents have suggested that 18 months would be required.
`
`In the intervening month, BHM has worked in good faith with the Respondents to narrow
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`the issues concerning the source code protocol and procedural stipulation in advance of the
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`August 6, 2013 preliminary hearing. Google did not participate in those discussions and Google
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`does not explain in the Motion how Google’s intervention will affect the investigation moving
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`forward.3 Moreover, Google offers no proposed parameters for its intervention nor does Google
`
`3
`
`Respondents sought an 18-month schedule prior to Google’s Motion to Intervene.
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`state whether and to what extent Google intends to participate in discovery, motions, briefing, or
`
`the evidentiary hearing. Google should not be permitted to interfere with the orderly
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`administration of this investigation through sheer delay and lack of clarity. Google’s motion to
`
`intervene is thus not timely as Google could and should have moved earlier to “protect its
`
`[allegedly] significant interests” (Mot. at 1). Google has failed to identify any discovery,
`
`deposition, motion or legal position that it intends to take that is different from or not supported
`
`by any of the Respondents.
`
`3. Google Failed to Identify an Adequate Interest in this Investigation
`
`In this investigation, BHM seeks a limited exclusion order against certain of
`
`Respondents’ devices that infringe BHM’s patents. Respondents’ devices incorporate third party
`
`software and hardware from a number of third parties. Twenty such third parties were issued
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`subpoenas to provide information relevant to this investigation. Google is only one of these third
`
`parties and it offers no facts to compel elevating Google above the other third parties who also
`
`happen to possess information relating to Respondents’ devices.
`
`Although Google broadly suggests that it has a compelling interest in this investigation
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`based on BHM’s infringement theories, Mot. at 5, it does not explain how the existence of those
`
`infringement theories establish that Google has the required “direct, substantial, legally
`
`protectable interest in the proceedings” to warrant intervention. New Orleans Public Service,
`
`Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984). In reality, Google’s
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`interests in this proceeding are purely economic. Mot. at 6 (asserting that Google “has a business
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`interest in the continued importation and sale of Respondents’ accused products.”). But “a mere
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`economic interest in the outcome of the litigation is insufficient to support a motion to
`
`intervene.” Mt. Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361 (3d Cir.
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`1995). As Google has not established the requisite interest in the investigation, Google’s motion
`
`to intervene should be denied. It has failed to identify a single point or fact upon which its
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`interests diverge from any of the Respondents.
`
`4. Google Failed to Demonstrate that the Disposition of this Action Will Impair or
`
`Impede Google’s Ability to Protect Its Interest
`
`Perhaps more fundamentally, Google does not attempt to address how the disposition of
`
`these proceedings will impair Google’s interests in any way. This is a keystone requirement of
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`the intervention analysis under Rule 24(a) that Google entirely omits from its motion. Here,
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`BHM seeks a limited exclusion order against the Respondents’ devices. Google does not argue
`
`that it will be bound by the outcome of these proceedings in subsequent proceedings. Google’s
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`failure to meet this element should defeat Google’s motion as a matter of law. U.S. v. City of
`
`New York, 198 F.3d 360, 366 (2nd Cir. 1999) (“[T]he harm to their interests must be attributable
`
`to the court’s disposition of the suit in which intervention is sought”) (citing Weisman v.
`
`Darneille, 89 F.R.D. 47, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
`
`5. Google’s Interests Are Adequately Represented by the Respondents
`
`The Respondents share the same ultimate objective as Google—to establish that
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`Respondents’ devices do not infringe the asserted patents and/or to establish that the asserted
`
`patents are invalid. Where the proposed intervenor shares the same ultimate goal as a party
`
`already in the suit, courts apply “a presumption of adequate representation.” United Nuclear
`
`Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982)). “To overcome that presumption, petitioner
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`ordinarily must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.” Id.
`
`Google’s motion does nothing to rebut the presumption that Google’s interests are
`
`already adequately protected by the Respondents. Respondents are no less than five large
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`manufacturers represented by highly qualified and reputable counsel. Google nowhere suggests
`
`that the Respondents will fail to make all of the necessary arguments, are incapable or unwilling
`
`to make such arguments, or that Google would offer any necessary additions to the proceedings
`
`that the Respondents would neglect. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, 2011 WL 533549 at *3 (E.D.
`
`Cal. Feb. 11, 2011). While Google correctly recognizes that other third parties possess
`
`information relevant to the infringement of Respondents’ devices, Google does not identify any
`
`adversity of interest between Google and those third parties, or between Google and the
`
`Respondents because of those third parties. Google does not suggest that it will pursue its own
`
`independent claim construction, its own independent validity theories, or do anything other than
`
`exactly what the Respondents already plan to do.
`
`D. Any Intervention Should be Strictly Limited
`
`Google should be denied intervention altogether. If the Commission is inclined to grant
`
`Google’s Motion, it should narrowly tailor Google’s intervention in order to minimize further
`
`disruption to the investigation. “Administrative Law Judges in § 337 actions have often imposed
`
`restrictions on an intervenor based on the facts and circumstances of the case.” Garage Door
`
`Operators, Inv. No. 337-TA-459, Order No. 7 at 4 (citing Certain Hardware Logic Emulation
`
`Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-383, Order No. 30 (May 14, 1996) (moving
`
`party permitted to intervene at the permanent phase of the investigation but not in the temporary
`
`relief phase); Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, Inv. No. 337-TA-281 (April 27, 1988)
`
`(moving party would be conditionally permitted to intervene in second phase of investigation if it
`
`could make a certain showing but was not permitted to intervene during first phase); Certain
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`Double-Sided Floppy Drives and Components Therefore, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, Order No. 24
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`(Aug. 23, 1985) (permitting intervention for limited purpose of cross-examining one witness and
`
`adducing evidence relating to moving party's products)).
`
`A judge thus exercises discretion to determine the scope of intervention based on the
`
`facts presented to the judge. Garage Door Operators, Order No. 7 at 4 (Reaffirming initial
`
`determination preventing intervenor from noticing depositions and participate in the hearing).
`
`The judge may balance the interests of the intervenor with the interests of the parties to the
`
`investigation as well as the expedited nature of the proceedings. Id. at 7 (“Allowing Microchip
`
`to notice depositions and to participate in the hearing as a party could add substantially to the
`
`time necessary to complete this investigation, as well as to add time, effort and expense to the
`
`parties that do not purchase from Microchip, and in general to all parties. This additional burden
`
`and inconvenience to the parties and the Commission is further exacerbated by the ITC's
`
`mandate to expedite litigation.”).
`
`Here, there are multiple facts and circumstances that warrant limiting Google’s
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`participation:
`
`Nature of the Proceedings
`
`This investigation involves a number of claims from six patents asserted against five
`
`different Respondents. There is little room in the schedule for additional burdens by way of
`
`additional depositions, document requests, or interrogatories. Google should thus not be
`
`permitted to notice additional depositions or serve its own discovery requests in the
`
`investigation.
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`Large Number of Third Parties
`
`There are a not insignificant number of third parties who can essentially make the same
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`arguments that Google makes in its support of intervention. If Google is permitted to intervene,
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`others might argue that there may be no rational basis to prevent them from intervening as well.
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`The investigation could be bogged down in unnecessary distractions from these other
`
`intervenors. Thus, Google should only be permitted to intervene on a very limited basis, if at all,
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`such that if the other third parties move to intervene on the same grounds, the investigation could
`
`still proceed efficiently.
`
`At most, Google should be permitted to intervene for the purposes of providing discovery
`
`in order to aid the Commission in determining infringement and otherwise observe, but not
`
`participate, in the investigation. Certainly, Google and the other third parties could cooperate
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`informally with the Respondents (as is likely already the case).
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`Limited Value of Google’s Intervention
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`Google’s intervention should also be limited based on Google’s failure to articulate any
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`basis upon which its interests diverge from the interests already represented among the
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`Respondents. Because they have sufficiently aligned interests, it is sufficient for Google to
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`review Respondents’ discovery requests and Respondents’ briefs and suggest their own changes
`
`or additions. Google has not shown any basis upon which Google should be permitted to have
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`its own briefing or its own time reserved at the evidentiary hearing.
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`Google should be required to expressly identify the issues it believes are not adequately
`
`presented by the other Respondents, Respondents should be required to state whether they will
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`not pursue those same issues.
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`If the Respondents will pursue those same issues, then Google
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`should be required to articulate specifically why those Respondents can’t adequately do the job.
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`Only after that process has been completed, could the commission be in a position to determine
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`if the potential for delay, confusion, and inefficiency caused by Google’s proposed intervention,
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`would be outweighed by some perceived benefit.
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`Based on the above facts and circumstances, BHM requests that if Google is allowed to
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`intervene, any intervention be limited solely to reviewing discovery responses and documents
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`produced, participating in discovery committee meetings, observing depositions, and offering
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`briefs or participating in trial only to the extent that Google’s interests diverge from the
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`Respondents. Such limitations are wholly appropriate and within the Judge’s discretion under
`
`the circumstances. Such limitations also further the Commission’s Congressional mandate to
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`conclude Section 337 investigations “at the earliest practicable time.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, BHM respectfully requests that Google’s motion to
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`intervene be denied.
`
`Date: August 5, 2013
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`s/ Howard Wisnia
`Howard Wisnia
`James Conley
`John Giust
`MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
`GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
`3580 Carmel Mountain Road
`Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Telephone: 858-314-1500
`hnwisnia@mintz.com
`jconley@mintz.com
`jgiust@mintz.com
`
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`Certain Digital Media Devices, Including Televisions, Blu-Ray Disc Players, Home Theater
`Systems, Tablets and Mobile Phones, Components Thereof and Associated Software
`Inv. No. 337-TA-882
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I, Stacey Barnes, certify that on August 5, 2013 a copy of the foregoing document was
`served upon the following parties as indicated:
`The Honorable Lisa R. Barton
`Acting Secretary, Office of the Secretary
`U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
`COMMISSION
`500 E Street, SW, Room 112-F
`Washington, DC 20436
`
`Via Electronic Filing (EDIS)
`Via Overnight Courier (2 copies)
`
`Via Overnight Courier (2 copies)
`Via E-mail: Patricia.Chow@usitc.gov
`
`Via E-mail: Monisha.Deka@usitc.gov
`
`Via E-mail: Samsung-Blackhills@cov.com
`
`Via Email: LG-882@finnegan.com
`
`The Honorable David P. Shaw
`Administrative Law Judge
`U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
`COMMISSION
`500 E Street, SW
`Washington, DC 20436
`
`Monisha Deka
`Investigative Attorney
`Office of Unfair Imports Investigations
`U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
`COMMISSION
`500 E Street, SW
`Washington, DC 20436
`
`Counsel for Respondents Samsung Electronics
`Co. Ltd, Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
`and Samsung Telecommunications America,
`LLC
`
`Alexander D. Chinoy
`COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
`1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20004
`
`Counsel for Respondents LG Electronics, Inc.,
`LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and LG Electronics
`MobileComm U.S.A., Inc.
`
`Elizabeth A. Niemeyer
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, L.L.P.
`901 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`
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`Certain Digital Media Devices, Including Televisions, Blu-Ray Disc Players, Home Theater
`Systems, Tablets and Mobile Phones, Components Thereof and Associated Software
`Inv. No. 337-TA-882
`
`Counsel for Respondents Panasonic
`Corporation, and Panasonic Corporation of
`North America
`
`Via Email: Panasonic-
`BlackHills@mwe.com
`
`Daniel R. Foster
`MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
`4 Park Plaza, Suite 1700
`Irvine, CA 92614-2559
`
`Counsel for Respondents Toshiba Corporation,
`and Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc.
`
`Via Email: Toshiba882@quinnemanuel.com
`
`Paul F. Brinkman
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 825
`Washington, DC 20004
`
`Counsel for Respondents Sharp Corporation,
`and Sharp Electronics Corporation
`
`Via Email: BHM-
`SharpGDC@gibsondunn.com
`
`Josh A. Krevitt
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`
`/s/ Stacey Barnes
`Stacey Barnes
`Legal Specialist
`MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
`GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
`3580 Carmel Mountain Road
`Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Telephone: 858.314.1500
`sbarnes@mintz.com
`
`2
`
`Samsung v. Black Hills Media
`IPR2014-00717
`SAMSUNG EX. 1010
`
`15/15
`
`