`By: Andrew Crain (andrew.crain@thomashorstemeyer.com)
`
`Vivek A. Ganti (vivek.ganti@thomashorstemeyer.com)
`
`THOMAS | HORSTEMEYER, LLP
`
`400 Interstate North Parkway, SE
`
`Suite 1500
`
`Atlanta, Georgia 30339
`
`Tel: (770) 933-9500
`
`Fax: (770) 951-0933
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`---------------
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`---------------
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.;
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.; and
`
`SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS AMERICA, LLC
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`BLACK HILLS MEDIA, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`---------------
`
`Case IPR2014-00717
`
`U.S. Patent 6,108,686
`
`---------------
`
`
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE BY
`PATENT OWNER UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
`
`THE ASSERTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY ....................... 2
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III. GROUND I IS REDUNDANT IN VIEW OF GROUND II ...................... 3
`
`IV. THE PROPOSED COMBINATION UNDER GROUND I OF
`REILLY WITH
`THE
`TLA
`RENDERS
`REILLY
`UNSATISFACTORY FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE ......................... 5
`
`V.
`
`PETITIONER HAS NOT ARTICULATED ANY SUFFICIENT
`REASON AS TO WHY A PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN
`THE ART WOULD COMBINE THE DISCLOSURES OF REILLY
`AND THE TLA, AS ALLEGED IN GROUND I ....................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Petitioner has not articulated a sufficient reasoning as to why a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would consider “revenue
`models” ................................................................................................. 8
`
`Even if Reilly and the TLA “relate to commercial online
`services,”
`this
`is
`insufficient
`to support a conclusion of
`obviousness ........................................................................................ 11
`
`VI. DR. ALMEROTH IS NOT AN EXPERT WITH RESPECT TO
`“BUSINESS MODELS” AND “REVENUE MODELS” .........................12
`
`VII. PATENT OWNER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO FILE A
`MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL CONCERNING WHETHER
`PETITIONER FAILED TO IDENTIFY ALL PARTIES IN
`INTEREST IN ITS PETITION .................................................................14
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................15
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`CASES
`Heart Failure Tech. v. CardioKinetix, Inc., IPR2013-00183 (Paper 12) ................11
`In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ................................................5, 7
`InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGo Communs., Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
` .................................................................................................................................... 8
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (U.S. 2007) ...................... 8, 10, 11
`Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-
`00003, Paper 7 ............................................................................................................ 3
`Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, IPR2013-00088, Paper 13 .............................4, 5
`
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 314 ....................................................................................................1, 15
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 .................................................................................................1, 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.120 ..................................................................................................... 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64 ....................................................................................................... 3
`Fed. R. Evid. 802 ....................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Patent Owner Black Hills Media, LLC
`
`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`
`
`
`(hereinafter “Patent Owner”) hereby respectfully submits this Preliminary
`
`Response to the Petition (hereinafter “the Petition”) filed by Samsung Electronics
`
`Co. Ltd.; Samsung Electronics America, Inc.; and Samsung Telecommunications
`
`America, LLC (hereinafter “Petitioner”) for inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 20,
`
`23, 29, and 30 of U.S. Patent No. 6,108,686 (hereinafter “the ’686 Patent”). This
`
`filing is timely under 35 U.S.C. § 313, and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, as it is being filed
`
`within three months of the May 7, 2014 mailing date of the Notice granting the
`
`filing date of the Petition (“Paper 3”).
`
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
`
`unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed
`
`under section 311 . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A trial should not be instituted in this matter as none of the
`
`references relied upon by Petitioner in its Petition gives rise to a reasonable
`
`likelihood of Petitioner prevailing with respect to any challenged claim of the ’686
`
`Patent, either alone or in any combination with each other.
`
`1
`
`
`
`Because a patent owner is precluded from filing new testimonial evidence to
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`
`
`
`support a preliminary response to a petition for inter partes review, Patent Owner
`
`is unable to submit a declaration from an expert in the art to assist in the Board’s
`
`understanding of the ’686 Patent and the cited references. 37 CFR § 42.107(c). As
`
`such, Patent Owner declines to present through this Preliminary Response
`
`substantive arguments regarding the technology of the ’686 Patent and the
`
`disclosures of the cited references. Despite not filing substantive technical
`
`arguments in this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner nevertheless submits that
`
`the bases presented herein support the denial of Petitioner’s Petition. But if the
`
`Board does institute trial with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition,
`
`Patent Owner reserves the right to present any arguments through a Patent Owner
`
`response under 37 C.F.R. § 42.120 and to submit any admissible evidence in
`
`support thereof. Patent Owner’s election to reserve its substantive arguments
`
`regarding the technology of the ’686 Patent and the cited references should not
`
`lead to any adverse inferences by the Board.
`
`
`
`
`
`II. THE ASSERTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 2, 20, 23, 29, and 30 are unpatentable under
`
`the following two grounds:
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`Ground
`
`Claims
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`Basis
`
`1, 2 , 20, 23, 29, and 30
`
`1, 2, 20, 23, 29, and 30
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Reilly and
`the TLA
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) based on Reilly
`
`I
`
`II
`
`
`Paper 1 (the Petition), p. 4. Ground II is an anticipation challenge to claims 1, 2,
`
`20, 23, 29, and 30 based on the U.S. Patent No. 5,740,549, issued to Reilly et al.
`
`(hereinafter “Reilly”). Ground I is an obviousness challenge to these same claims
`
`also based on Reilly and further in view of Weiss, “New Places to Go Online,”
`
`14(8) Technology and Learning 109-115 (1994)1 (hereinafter “the TLA”).
`
`
`
`
`
`III. GROUND I IS REDUNDANT IN VIEW OF GROUND II
`The Board should not institute inter partes review for a ground that is
`
`redundant over another ground. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive
`
`Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7, p. 2 (Oct. 25, 2012)
`
`(“[M]ultiple grounds, which are presented in a redundant manner by a petitioner
`
`who makes no meaningful distinction between them, are . . . not all entitled to
`
`
`
` 1
`
` Patent Owner reserves the right to object to and, if necessary, move to exclude
`the TLA under 37 C.F.R. § 42.64, as the TLA is being relied upon for inadmissible
`hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 802.
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`consideration.”). Petitioner has advanced Ground I (obviousness based on Reilly
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`in view of the TLA) to challenge the same set of claims that are subject to Ground
`
`II (anticipation by Reilly). More specifically, Petitioner alleges in Ground II that
`
`all claim elements are explicitly or inherently disclosed in Reilly, while at the same
`
`time arguing in Ground I that one or more claim elements are not explicitly or
`
`inherently disclosed in Reilly but are nonetheless obvious in view of Reilly. In
`
`other words, Petitioner alleges that the same claims are anticipated by a reference
`
`and are also obvious in view of that same reference.
`
`
`
`When advancing alternative grounds, a petitioner should "articulate a
`
`meaningful distinction in terms of relative strengths and weaknesses with respect
`
`to application of the prior art disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” Oracle
`
`Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, IPR2013-00088, Paper 13, at p. 3 (June 13, 2013)
`
`(emphasis added). In the present case, the Petition is devoid of any explanation as
`
`to why two different grounds are warranted to challenge the ’686 Patent,
`
`particularly when the same art (Reilly) is used as a primary reference in both
`
`grounds. Petitioner provides no discussion of the relative weaknesses or even the
`
`strengths pertaining to each ground.
`
`
`
`In Oracle Corp., a petitioner for an inter partes review alleged that claims
`
`were (i) anticipated in view of a reference under a first ground and (ii) obvious in
`
`view of the same reference combined with an additional reference under a second
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`ground. Id. at p. 2. The Board found that the obviousness ground was redundant
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`over the anticipation ground. Id. at p. 3. Specifically, the Board stated:
`
`Because Oracle alleges that all the features of the claims at issue are
`disclosed by Schilit, the ground based on a combination of Barrett and
`Schilit is redundant in the absence of the Petition’s explanation as to
`why Barrett is more preferred for satisfying some elements, while
`Schilit is more preferred for satisfying some other elements.
`Id. In the present case, the obviousness ground based on Reilly (Ground I) is
`
`redundant because Petitioner also alleges that all the claim elements are anticipated
`
`by Reilly (Ground II) without “articulat[ing] a meaningful distinction in terms of
`
`relative strengths and weaknesses” between the two alleged grounds. Id.
`
`
`
`IV. THE PROPOSED COMBINATION UNDER GROUND I OF
`REILLY WITH
`THE
`TLA
`RENDERS
`REILLY
`UNSATISFACTORY FOR ITS INTENDED PURPOSE
`
`If a modification to a cited reference would render the disclosure of the cited
`
`reference unsatisfactory for its intended purpose, then such a modification is not
`
`obvious. In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984). As explained below,
`
`Petitioner proposes a modification of Reilly that would render Reilly unsatisfactory
`
`for its intended purpose.
`
`The entire disclosure of Reilly is directed towards a system for distributing
`
`advertising with information. In fact, the title of Reilly is “Information and
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`Advertising Distribution System and Method.” Ex. 1003 (Reilly), title (emphasis
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`added). Additionally, both the Abstract and the Summary of the Invention of
`
`Reilly state, “In summary, the present invention is an information and advertising
`
`distribution system.” Id. at abstract and 2:62-63 (emphasis added). The purpose
`
`of the disclosure of Reilly is also set forth in the Background of the Invention,
`
`which states:
`
`Up until the present, distributing information via the Internet or other
`publicly accessible computer communication networks has been
`largely unsupported by advertising revenues due to the lack of good
`mechanisms for mixing advertising and information content in such a
`way as to be acceptable to both end users and advertisers.
`Id. at 1:45-53 (emphasis added). The Background of the Invention also states “The
`
`present invention mixes advertising and information content dissemination in a
`
`manner unlike the examples mentioned above.” Id. at 2:25-27. Thus, Reilly
`
`makes it clear that the intended purpose of the disclosure is to distribute advertising
`
`with information.
`
`Even though the purpose of Reilly is to distribute advertisements with
`
`information, Petitioner somehow concludes that it would be obvious to modify
`
`Reilly so that advertising would not be distributed. Specifically, Petitioner alleges:
`
`In particular, as set forth in the Technology & Learning Article, a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that, in an
`educational context, the system of the Reilly patent may be
`
`6
`
`
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`
`
`implemented instead based on a revenue model in which no ads are
`served to the users. Almeroth Dec., ¶ 39. For that reason, a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have reason to implement the system
`and method of the Reilly patent using a business model that included
`no ads, as disclosed in the Technology & Learning Article, in order to
`provide customers a user experience free of ads. Almeroth Dec., ¶ 39.
`Paper 1 (the Petition), pp. 26-27.
`
`
`
`However, it is self-evident that modifying an information and advertising
`
`distribution system so that it does not distribute advertising defeats the purpose of
`
`the information and advertising distribution system. In addition, it is readily
`
`apparent that a system that does not distribute advertisements would not “be
`
`acceptable to both users and advertisers,” which is the intent of Reilly. Ex. 1003
`
`(Reilly), 1:51-52.
`
`Therefore, the proposed combination of Reilly and the TLA renders Reilly
`
`unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of being an information and advertising
`
`distribution system. For at least this reason, Petitioner’s proposed combination of
`
`Reilly and the TLA is not obvious. In re Gordon, 733 F.2d at 902.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`V.
`
`PETITIONER HAS NOT ARTICULATED ANY SUFFICIENT
`REASON AS TO WHY A PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN
`THE ART WOULD COMBINE THE DISCLOSURES OF
`REILLY AND THE TLA, AS ALLEGED IN GROUND I
`
`
`
`
`
`A.
`
`Petitioner has not articulated a sufficient reasoning as to
`why a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider
`“revenue models”
`
`A challenge under obviousness requires an “articulated reasoning with some
`
`rational underpinning” to support its conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int'l Co. v.
`
`Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). See also, InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGo
`
`Communs., Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (overturning a finding of
`
`obviousness because an expert’s testimony did not sufficiently explain why a
`
`proposed combination was obvious). Petitioner’s obviousness allegation lacks
`
`sufficient rationale because Petitioner speculates as to what a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art (POSITA) would have known while ignoring its own definition of a
`
`POSITA.
`
`Petitioner alleges:
`
`The person of ordinary skill in the art, based on the disclosure in the
`Reilly patent of the service of ads to the users of its system, would be
`aware that an ad-based revenue model may be used to provide online
`information services to users. Almeroth Dec., ¶ 39. Such a person
`would have reason to consider other revenue models, including
`subscription-based models that incorporate fewer ads, or no ads, that
`would be more appropriate for contexts such as, for example, the
`
`8
`
`
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`
`
`provision of online educational services. Almeroth Dec., ¶ 39. In
`particular, as set forth in the Technology & Learning Article, a person
`of ordinary skill in the art would understand that, in an educational
`context, the system of the Reilly patent may be implemented instead
`based on a revenue model in which no ads are served to the users.
`Almeroth Dec., ¶ 39.
`Paper 1 (the Petition), pp. 26-27 (emphasis added). As noted above, Petitioner’s
`
`reason to combine the cited references is based entirely on the allegation that a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would consider the implementation of different
`
`revenue models. However, Petitioner does not provide any articulated reasoning as
`
`to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to consider “revenue
`
`models.”
`
`
`
`Petitioner does not show or even allege that a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art would have any level of knowledge or skill with respect to revenue models,
`
`even under Petitioner’s own definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The
`
`Petition states that a person of ordinary skill would “have had a M.S. degree in
`
`computer science in addition to two or more years of work experience relating to
`
`the field of the provision of information and multimedia services over wide area
`
`and local area networks.” Id. at p. 9. Notably, there is no mention of educational
`
`or experience requirements relating to revenue models. Petitioner’s definition of a
`
`person of ordinary skill does not have, for example, a business degree or a certain
`
`number of years making business decisions based on revenue models.
`
`9
`
`
`
`The skill set for a person of ordinary skill in the fields of computer science
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`
`
`
`and “the provision of information and multimedia services over wide area and
`
`local area networks” would be much different from the skill set for a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the field of revenue models. Furthermore, a person having only
`
`two years of experience in the field of “the provision of information and
`
`multimedia services over wide area and local area networks” would not be in the
`
`position to make decisions regarding (or even consider) revenue models, as a
`
`person with such little experience would not likely be tasked with managing
`
`revenue operations.
`
`
`
`Therefore, Petitioner has failed to sufficiently articulate a reasoning why a
`
`person having ordinary skill in the art of computer science and the provision of
`
`information and multimedia services over wide area and local area networks would
`
`“have reason to consider other revenue models, including subscription-based
`
`models that incorporate fewer ads, or no ads,” as is alleged in the Petition. Paper 1
`
`(the Petition), p. 26. For at least this reason, Petitioner has failed to provide the
`
`necessary “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” to support its
`
`conclusion of obviousness. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
`
`(2007).
`
`10
`
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`B.
`
`Even if Reilly and the TLA “relate to commercial online
`services,” this is insufficient to support a conclusion of
`obviousness
`
`Petitioner also alleges that it would have been obvious to combine the
`
`disclosures of Reilly and the TLA because “each of the Reilly patent and the
`
`Technology & Learning Article relate to commercial online services.” Paper 1 (the
`
`Petition), p. 27. However, even if two references are in the same field, that alone is
`
`not enough to support a conclusion of obviousness under KSR. For example, in
`
`Heart Failure Tech. v. CardioKinetix, Inc., IPR2013-00183 (Paper 12), p. 9, a
`
`petitioner alleged that a combination of references was obvious because both the
`
`references “related” to the same field of technology. In that case, the Board
`
`refused to institute inter partes review, finding that such a conclusory statement
`
`did not satisfy the standard that KSR set for establishing obviousness. Id.
`
`Specifically, the Board stated:
`
`The fact that Murphy, Khairkhahan, and Lane all concern human heart
`repair is not in itself sufficient rationale for making the combination.
`Many heart repair devices exist. That fact alone would not make it
`obvious to combine their features. Petitioner must show some reason
`why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have thought to
`combine particular available elements of knowledge, as evidenced by
`the prior art, to reach the claimed invention. See KSR Int’l Co. v.
`Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). This, the Petitioner has not
`done. That the references relied upon all relate to human heart repair
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`does not amount to “some articulated reasoning with some rational
`underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”
`Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, in the present case, even if Reilly and the TLA
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
`
`were related to commercial online services, this alone is insufficient to support a
`
`conclusion of obviousness under KSR.
`
`
`
`VI. DR. ALMEROTH IS NOT AN EXPERT WITH RESPECT TO
`“BUSINESS MODELS” AND “REVENUE MODELS”
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s contentions with respect to Ground I rely on Dr. Almeroth’s
`
`declaration stating that the TLA discloses various “business models” and that a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to implement different types
`
`of “revenue models.”2 Ex. 1005 (Almeroth Decl.), ¶¶ 38-39. However, Dr.
`
`Almeroth is not an expert with respect to business models or revenue models, and
`
`his opinions based on business models and revenue models should be given very
`
`little weight, if any.
`
`
`
`Dr. Almeroth’s declaration indicates that he believes that he is a person of
`
`skill in the field of “the provision of information and content over wide area and
`
`
`
` 2
`
` The terms “business model” and “revenue model” do not appear in the TLA. By
`using the terms “business model” and “revenue model” interchangeably, Dr.
`Almeroth appears to believe that these terms have the same meaning.
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`local area networks.” Id. at ¶ 4. However, nothing in the Petition or Dr.
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`Almeroth’s declaration presents Dr. Almeroth as being an expert with respect to
`
`business models or revenue models. Additionally, Dr. Almeroth’s curriculum vitae
`
`does not show an advanced business degree, extensive practical business
`
`experience, or anything else that would indicate that he is potentially an expert
`
`with respect to business models or revenue models. Thus, Dr. Almeroth is not an
`
`expert in business models or revenue models, nor is he even presented by
`
`Petitioner as being an expert in these areas.
`
`
`
`Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Almeroth is not an expert with respect to
`
`business models or revenue models, Dr. Almeroth still provides an opinion
`
`regarding these areas. In particular, in his declaration, Dr. Almeroth states:
`
`In particular, as set forth in the Technology & Learning Article, a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that, in an
`educational context, the system of the Reilly patent may be
`implemented instead based on a revenue model in which no ads are
`served to the users. For that reason, a person of ordinary skill in the
`art would have reason to implement the system and method of the
`Reilly patent using a business model that included no ads, as disclosed
`in the Technology & Learning Article, in order to provide customers a
`user experience free of ads.
`Ex. 1005 (Almeroth’s Declaration), ¶ 39. Because Dr. Almeroth is not an expert in
`
`business models or revenue models, his opinions regarding business models and
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`revenue models (e.g., paragraphs ¶ 38-41) are not credible and should be given
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`very little weight, if any.
`
`
`
`VII. PATENT OWNER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO FILE A
`MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL CONCERNING WHETHER
`PETITIONER FAILED TO IDENTIFY ALL PARTIES IN
`INTEREST IN ITS PETITION
`
`On August 7, 2014, the Board issued Paper No. 8, Authorization for Patent
`
`Owner to File Motion for Additional Discovery, which Patent Owner requested
`
`based on its belief that Petitioner should have identified Google, Inc. as a real party
`
`in interest in this proceeding pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §312(a)(2). Should the Board
`
`grant Patent Owner’s motion for additional discovery, and if Patent Owner
`
`thereafter believes it can establish that Google should have been identified as a real
`
`party-in-interest to this proceeding, then Patent Owner reserves the right to seek
`
`authorization to move for termination of this proceeding pursuant to at least 35
`
`U.S.C. §312(a)(2).
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, there is no reasonable likelihood of Petitioner
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`Case IPR2014-00717
`Patent No. 6,108,686
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`
`
`
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`prevailing with respect to even one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, the
`
`Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`Dated: August 7, 2014
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/N. Andrew Crain/_____
`N. Andrew Crain
`(Reg. No. 45,442)
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
`Thomas | Horstemeyer, LLP
`400 Interstate North Pkwy Ste. 1500
`Atlanta, Georgia 30339
`Tel: (770) 933-9500
`Fax: (770) 951-0933
`
`15
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`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`Case IPR2014-00717
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`In accordance with 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e) and 42.107, the undersigned
`
`certifies that on the 7th day of August, 2014, a complete and entire copy of the
`
`PRELIMINARY RESPONSE BY PATENT OWNER UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
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`(“Preliminary Response”) including exhibits relied upon were served on counsel of
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`record for Petitioner at the correspondence address as follows,
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`Andrea G. Reister
`Gregory S. Discher
`areister@cov.com
`gdischer@cov.com
`
`Covington & Burling LLP
`1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20004
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`Attorneys for Petitioner
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`
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`via Federal Express No. 8019-4601-2178, postage prepaid because this is likely to
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`
`
`THOMAS | HORSTEMEYER, LLP
`
`
`/N. Andrew Crain/
`N. Andrew Crain (Reg. No. 45,442)
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`
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`effect service.
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`
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`
`
`
`
` August 7, 2014
`
`
`Date