`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FIRST DATA CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`CARDSOFT (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
`
`BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2014—00715
`
`Patent 6,934,945 B1
`
`PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71
`
`ON THE DECISION NOT TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... .. 1
`
`RELIEF REQUESTED ................................................................................. .. 1
`
`III.
`
`STANDARD OVERVIEW ........................................................................... .. 1
`
`IV.
`
`MATTERS OVERLOOKED ........................................................................ .. 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`A decision on Real Party in Interest is premature — it is a
`“highly fact-dependent question” and should be decided after
`IPR institution and an opportunity for fact discovery, petition
`and response ........................................................................................ .. 2
`
`Any control by Verifone in the court litigation is not pertinent
`to determining the real party—in—interest in this IPR proceeding. ....... .. 5
`
`Funding is insufficient to make a party a real party-in—interest. ........ .. 6
`
`The existent of an indemnity (which inherently includes
`funding) is insufficient to make a party a real party-in~interest
`where the indemnity arose less than one year before filing the
`IPR. ..................................................................................................... .. 8
`
`There are no facts showing that Verifone is indemnifying for all
`of Petitioner’s accused products. ........................................................ .. 9
`
`The decision cites presumptions and supposition as support for
`the a “highly fact-dependent question” of real party—in-interest. .... .. 10
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... .. 12
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner requests reconsideration of the Board’s Decision in Paper 9
`
`(“Decision”) to deny the Institution of Inter Partes Review herein based on
`
`Petitioner’s petition (“Petition”) because the decision was based on suppositions
`
`and presumptions, and not just facts, and for the other reasons set forth herein.
`
`Specifically, the Board determined that Petitioner was not the only real party in
`
`interest behind the filing of the Petition based not on the facts established by the
`
`record evidence before it but rather based on mere supposition and conjecture.
`
`Petitioner’s petition paper clearly established that VeriFone played no role in
`
`preparing the instant Petition except for agreeing to indemnify Petitioner. Yet the
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`Board concluded, based on mere suggestion and innuendo, rather than evidence,
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`that VeriFone played a more significant role than this. This constituted an abuse of
`
`discretion justifying a rehearing.
`
`II.
`
`RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Petitioner requests a rehearing of the Decision and institution of an Inter
`
`Partes Review (“IPR”).
`
`III.
`
`STANDARD OVERVIEW
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a
`
`panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion
`
`
`
`occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
`
`erroneous factual findings, or
`
`a clear error ofjudgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v
`
`Celcmese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
`
`(citations omitted). The request must “specifically identify all maters the party
`
`believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter
`
`was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.71(d).
`
`IV. MATTERS OVERLOOKED
`
`A.
`
`A decision on Real Party in Interest is premature — it is a “highly
`fact-dependent question” and should be decided after IPR
`institution and an opportunity for fact discovery, petition and
`
`response.
`
`The only requirement for an IPR petition regarding real party—in—interest is
`
`that the Petitioner identify such parties [37 CFR 42.8(b)(l)]. There is no
`
`requirement that Petitioner submit sufficient facts to anticipate and disprove any
`
`suppositions or presumptions Patent Owner may make in a Preliminary Response
`
`regarding other parties as potential real parties in interest. The Oct. 17 Decision in
`
`this IPR2014—O07l5 (the “Decision”) states that “Petitioner, however, does not
`
`provide sufficient evidence that would support this assertion [that it alone decide to
`
`use different prior art] ....” Decision, p. 8).
`
`It is not Petitioner’s obligation in an
`
`IPR petition to prove the negative that someone else is not a real party—in-interest.
`
`
`
`Rather, it is Patent Owner’s obligation to present facts that show this, or request
`
`discovery of such facts.
`
`As noted in the Decision, the determination of a real party-in-interest “is a
`
`highly fact-dependent question.” Since the Patent Owner often may not know the
`
`facts, provision is made in IPR proceedings for discovery. Patent Owner has not
`
`requested such discovery.
`
`“In certain instances, however, a patent owner may be granted additional
`
`discovery before filing its preliminary response and submit any testimonial
`
`evidence obtained through the discovery. For example, additional discovery may
`
`be authorized where patent owner raises sufficient concerns regarding the
`
`petitioner’s certification of standing.” Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review
`
`Proceedings, Posi—Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for
`
`Covered Business Method Parents, 77 Fed. Reg. 77, 157, 48680, 48689 (2012).
`
`Other decisions finding that another party was a real party in interest
`
`occurred after discovery, with the ability for a petition and response. See, e.g.,
`
`RPX Corporation v. Virnetx Inc., IPR20l4—000171 (Scheduling Order re
`
`discovery, paper 20). See also lPR20l3-00488 (Decision, paper 29), IPR2014-
`
`00041 (Order, paper 126), IPR20l4-00735 (Order, paper 17).
`
`
`
`It would be an unreasonable burden, and vitiate the viability of IPRs as a
`
`process to challenge patents, if Petitioner were required to anticipate every
`
`supposition the Patent Owner may make, and present facts to prove a negative,
`
`while at the same time making the case for invalidity in 60 double spaced pages.
`
`We submit this is the reason Petitioner is required to make a declaration regarding
`
`real party in interest, and provision is made for discovery by Patent Owner after
`
`institution.
`
`Petitioner chose to disclose certain uncontested facts to avoid wasted time
`
`and costs in the event that the Board considered those facts alone to preclude an
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`IPR. Those facts are the existence of an indemnity agreement for a portion of the
`
`accused products, with control provisions disclaimed, and the funding of an IPR
`
`with no other involvement other than the identification of prior art by shared
`
`litigation counsel that was not used (See Petition, pp. 1-2). The other facts relate to
`
`court litigation, which is not pertinent to the real party-in—interest for this separate
`
`proceeding, as separately discussed below. Everything else relied on in the
`
`Decision, such as presumed involvement and ability to control by Verifone up to
`
`two days before filing, is supposition or presumption.
`
`We believe the proper procedure would have been find insufficient facts to
`
`show VeriFone as a real party—in-interest, but, either before or after instituting an
`
`IPR, allowing Patent Owner to do discovery related to the real party in interest, and
`
`-4-
`
`
`
`then make a motion to terminate on that basis (on facts discovered, not
`
`supposition), with Petitioner being able to file a response to that motion.
`
`B.
`
`Any control by VeriFone in the court litigation is not pertinent to
`determining the real party—in-interest in this IPR proceeding.
`
`The Decision stated that, “A common consideration is whether the non-party
`
`exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in__a
`
`proceeding.” (Decision at 6, emphasis added, quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893-
`
`895.). The relevant proceeding is this IPR, not the separate court proceeding.
`
`IPRS were designed to address validity separately from the infringement
`
`issues in court. Estoppel attaches so the Petitioner doesn’t have a “second bite at
`
`the apple” in court. Thus, any involvement by VeriFone in the separate
`
`proceedings in court is irrelevant to control in this proceeding, and not probative of
`
`control.
`
`The decision notes that VeriFone has an interest in the outcome of this IPR.
`
`However, that does not show control. If it did, every other party being sued on the
`
`same patent would be a real party—in-interest. The PTAB has held that being a co-
`
`defendant does not make one a real party—in-interest (See, e.g., Innolux
`
`Corporation v. Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. Ltd., IPR20l3—00O3 8, paper
`
`
`
`no. 12). Also see In re Arviv Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,526,
`
`Decision Dismissing section 1.182 and section 1.183 Petitions at 5 (Apr. 18, 2011):
`
`“. . .even a search for prior art, review of possibly useful prior art with
`
`respect to the patent claims, preparation of an invalidity defense based on found
`
`and evaluated prior art to support a litigation defense, and financial support to
`
`carry out a litigation defense —- do not amount to participation in a request for
`
`reexamination based on such activities, where the activities were conducted with
`
`only an intent to defend the litigation suit.” In order to qualify as a real party-in-
`
`interest, the BPAI found that “a party must participate in some manner in the
`
`request for reeXamination.”[Id.]
`
`C.
`
`Funding is insufficient to make a party a real party-in-interest.
`
`The only thing identified in the rules as definitely making a party a real
`
`party-in-interest is complete funding _a_ric_l control — not funding alone.
`
`“For example, a party thatfunds and directs and controls an [PR
`
`constitutes a ‘real party-in-interest’ ....But whether something less than
`
`complete funding and control suflices to justifjz similarly treating the party
`
`requires consideration of the pertinentfacts.” Office Patent Trial Practice
`
`Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (2012).
`
`
`
`The only submitted facts related to control of this IPR proceeding show no
`
`control by VeriFone (see Petition, pp. 1-2). The things suggesting control by
`
`Patent Owner are suppositions and presurnptions, which are in fact incorrect. It is
`
`not necessary to point out the correct facts at this stage, merely the lack of a factual
`
`showing, but Petitioner has chosen to do so below to illuminate to the Board that
`
`these are in fact suppositions and presumptions by Patent Owner, and illustrate
`
`what would come out during fact discovery. Petitioner will not oppose a motion
`
`for reasonable discovery on these facts by Patent Owner.
`
`Patent Owner has suggested that the cases cited by petitioner (to show
`
`funding does not make one a real party in interest) are not relevant to this
`
`proceeding because the facts are different. By the same reasoning, In re Guan
`
`(Inter Partes Reexamination, Control No. 95/001,045, “Decision Vacating File
`
`Date,” Aug. 256, 2008), relied on in Patent Owner’s argument, is also not relevant,
`
`or any other case for that matter. The facts of In re Guan are also different — much
`
`more so. Patent Owner is correct that In re Guan has not been overruled.
`
`However, that appears unnecessary, because each case is uniquely dependent on its
`
`particular facts. But while In re Guan has not been overruled, it is not controlling.
`
`The results of subsequent decisions finding no real party in interest would have
`
`been the opposite if the tests set forth in In re Guan was applied. For example, In
`
`re Schlecht (Inter Partes Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,206,
`
`-7-
`
`
`
`June 22, 2010) would have failed the 3“ test of In re Guan (“provide the prior
`
`patents/printed publications on which the reexam is to be based”). The unique
`
`other facts in In re Schlecht dictated the opposite result. In re Schlecht was cited
`
`and discussed on p. 4 of the Petition.
`
`. D.
`
`The existent of an indemnity (which inherently includes funding)
`is insufficient to make a party a real party—in-interest where the
`indemnity arose less than one year before filing the IPR.
`
`In Atlanta Gas Light Company 12. Bennett Regulator Guards Inc., (IPR2013-
`
`00453), referenced in the Petitioner’s Petition (IPR2014-00720 petition, pages 4-5)
`
`[and discussed on p. 5 of the Petition], the PTAB held the existence of a
`
`contract/indemnification clause does not create privity. In essence, the PTAB held
`
`that the indemnity obligation did not arise until the petitioner was served, which
`
`was within the 1 year period: “To the extent that such obligation or opportunity for
`
`control arose when Petitioner was served on July 18, 2012, Petitioner’s filing of the
`
`petition on July 18, 2013, is tirnely.2‘
`
`2'Our present analysis is consistent with the Board’s reasoning under
`
`different facts in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics C0rp., IPR2012-00042
`
`(Paper 16). In Synopsys, a third party became a wholly owned subsidiary of
`
`the petitioner after the date on which the petition for inter partes review was
`
`filed. That third party had been served with a complaint alleging
`
`
`
`infringement of the patent at issue more than a year before the petition was
`
`filed. The Board concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 3 l 5(b) did not bar institution of
`
`the inter partes review because the patent owner provided no persuasive
`
`evidence that the petitioner could have exercised control over the third
`
`party’s participation in the inter partes review at the time of service of the
`
`complaint upon the third party.” (IPR20l3-00453, Decision, paper 31, p. 16)
`
`E.
`
`There are no facts showing that VeriFone is indemnifying for all
`of Petitioner’s accused products.
`
`As stated in the Petition: “. . .of the indemnity which provides
`
`indemnification for some although not all of the accused devices.” (Petition, p. 2)
`
`As pointed out in the Declaration submitted herewith, “. .. a significant portion of
`
`the accused units are not supplied by VeriFone and thus not subj ect to the
`
`indemnity.” (Declaration, 1] 4). It would be contrary to the reasons for establishing
`
`Inter Partes Reviews to deny Petitioner the opportunity for an IPR challenge while
`
`leaving it exposed to infringement suit on products where there is no indemnity.
`
`The Decision would allow Patent Owner a second bite at the apple in suing
`
`Petitioner (the retailer) after suing VeriFone (the manufacturer), but deny
`
`Petitioner the ability to effectively challenge validity.
`
`
`
`F.
`
`The decision cites presumptions and supposition as support for
`the a “highly fact-dependent question” of real party-in-interest.
`
`The fact that a written disclaimer was signed two days before the petition
`
`does not provide any facts regarding actual control prior to that date. It also does
`
`not provide any facts as to the opportunity to control prior to that date. For
`
`example, it is possible that an earlier oral agreement precluded such an opportunity
`
`to control. In fact, that is the case here, as Petitioner and its counsel made clear to
`
`VeriFone from the beginning that this IPR would only be prepared if VeriFone
`
`agreed to have no control.
`
`An explanation of the facts which disprove Patent Owner’s suppositions is
`
`included herein, with a supporting declaration, to show the Board (which may not
`
`have been apparent in view of Patent Owner’s characterizations) that Patent Owner
`
`was providing supposition and presumptions, not facts. However, there is no
`
`requirement that Petitioner needed to present this declaration with the original
`
`petition or now, as the absence of facts showing no control should be sufficient.
`
`The Decision states: “We find that per this same indemnity agreement
`
`VeriFone had an opportunity to control all of the events leading up to the filing of
`
`the Petition.” (Decision, p. 7) This is based on supposition, not facts. Patent
`
`Owner has presented no proof of this. In fact, not only was an oral agreement to
`
`-10-
`
`
`
`the contrary, Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel would not have proceeded if
`
`VeriFone had the ability to control.
`
`The Decision states that, “By then, presumably, most of the work had been
`
`done by both Petitioner and VeriFone in preparation of the 51—page Petition,
`
`assemblance of prior art, and gathering of witnesses and their declarations, and
`
`Petitioner does not indicate otherwise.” (Decision at p. 9) [emphasis added]. There
`
`is no evidence or facts to support this presumption. In fact, VeriFone had no
`
`involvement in all of these steps. In addition, VeriFone had no opportunity to be
`
`involved in accordance with an oral agreement and with the firm position of
`
`Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel that they would not have proceeded if VeriFone
`
`had the ability to control.
`
`The Decision states: “Petitioner, as a party who controlled or had the
`
`opportunity to control what went into the Petition, is a real party—in—interest despite
`
`turning over the reins to another party after all of the work has been done.”
`
`(Decision, p. 9) There is no evidence to support this, and in fact it is untrue, as the
`
`Demetriades Declaration demonstrates.
`
`-11-
`
`
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board
`
`grant this request for rehearing.
`
`Dated: November 17,2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By:
`
`V37/“ «4; /
`/I
`‘
`'
`V}
`
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`6
`Registration No. 31,
`Lead Counsel for Petitioners
`
`Lead Counsel
`
`Back—Up Counsel
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`Registration No. 31,836
`phaughey@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`Darin J. Gibby
`Registration No. 38,464
`dgibby@l<i1patricktownsend.com
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`Two Embarcadero Center, Eighth Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 576-0200
`Fax: (415) 576-0300
`
`Postal and Hand-Delivery Address:
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1400 Wewatta Street, Suite 600
`Denver , CO 80202
`Telephone: (303) 571-4000
`Fax: (303)
`
`-12-
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of this Petitioner’s Request for
`
`Rehearing UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 ON THE DECISION NOT TO INSTITUTE
`
`INTER PARTIES REVIEW, has been served via Express Mail on November 17,
`
`2014, upon the following:
`
`Birch, Steward, Kolasch.& Birch, LLP
`
`8110 Gatehouse Road, Suite 100 East
`
`Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
`
`With copies by email, per Patent Owner consent, to:
`
`mrb@buscherlaw.com
`_dra@bskb.com
`gsd@bskb.com
`
`Dated: November 17,2014
`
`WM /
`By: J”
`A
`‘
`1%/it
`I
`
`
`Paul C. Haughey
`"
`Registration No. 31,83/' /
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`667149l3V.l
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FIRST DATA CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
`
`V.
`
`CARDSOFT (ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
`BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Case IPR2014-00715 and IPRZOI4-00720
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 and No. 7,302,683
`
`DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER P. DEMETRIADES
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l4-00715 & IPR20l4—00720
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 and No. 7,302,683
`
`DECLARATION
`
`I, Christopher P. Demetriades, hereby state as follows:
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`I am over the age of 18 and am competent to make this declaration.
`
`I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.
`
`I am employed by First Data Corporation (“FDC”) as a Senior
`
`Counsel - Litigation.
`
`4.
`
`In my capacity as Senior Counsel I oversee outside counsel and assist
`
`in managing IP litigation. One of the cases I was asked to assist on was the
`
`CardSoft litigation, Cardsoft (Assignmentfor the Benefit of Creditors) LLC v. First
`
`Data Corp, Civil Action No. 2:l3~cv~290 (E.D. Tex.). That
`
`lawsuit alleged
`
`infringement of U.S. Pat. 6,934,945 by FDC point-of—sa1e (POS) terminals.
`
`Among its different areas of business, FDC provides financial
`
`transaction
`
`processing services on behalf of merchants.
`
`In that role, it provide POS terminals
`
`and solutions that allow merchants to accept a variety of credit card, debit card and
`
`other payments. The FDC line of terminals for merchants includes FDC terminals
`
`as well as terminals from VeriFone and other manufacturers.
`
`5.
`
`VeriFone was providing a partial
`
`indemnification to FDC in
`
`connection with the CardSoft litigation because some of the accused terminals
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l3—0O246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`were supplied to FDC by VeriFone. The indemnification was only partial in that it
`
`extended to just the accused terminals that were being provided to FDC by
`
`VeriFone.
`
`Indeed, a significant portion of the accused units are not supplied by
`
`VeriF one and VeriFone is not indemnifying FCD for those terminals.
`
`6.
`
`In connection with my duties related to the Cardsoft lawsuit I had
`
`occasion to speak with my counterpart at VeriFone, Suzanne Tom. During one
`
`such conversation, the idea of filing an IPR was raised by VeriFone. During the
`
`initial conversations the parties discussed but did not decide whether under the
`
`indemnity VeriFone would be obliged to pay for an IPR, given the language of the
`
`indemnity agreement and the fact
`
`that a substantial number of the accused
`
`terminals were not covered by the indemnity.
`
`7.
`
`FDC was also concerned about the issue of control. FDC wanted
`
`control of the IPR proceeding, and did not want a settlement of the IPR that would
`
`leave FDC exposed with respect to non—indemnified terminals.
`
`8.
`
`In subsequent follow up discussions with VeriFone, FDC indicated
`
`that it was interested in filing an IPR if VeriFone would agree to indemnify FDC
`
`for the IPR and cover the costs under its indemnity, but only if FDC retained sole
`
`control over all aspects of the preparation,
`
`filing and direction of the IPR
`
`proceeding. For example, FDC wanted to use its long time patent counsel for the
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR20l3—O0246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`IPR proceeding, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP (“Kilpatrick Townsend”),
`
`and not VeriFone counsel.
`
`9.
`
`Subsequently, in or about March 2014 in follow up phone calls with
`
`Suzanne Toms
`
`at VeriFone concerning the IPR, FDC confirmed that while
`
`VeriFone would fund the IPR,
`
`its participation would be limited solely to that.
`
`Accordingly, as previously discussed between VeriFone counsel and myself, I
`
`agreed that FDC would proceed with preparing and filing an IPR only if VeriFone
`
`agreed it would have no opportunity to exercise control, and ceded selection of
`
`counsel and all control over the IPR proceedings to FDC.
`
`10. At no time during tl1e preparation of the IPRs did VeriFone exercise
`
`any direction or control over FDC’s actions whatsoever.
`
`Ind.eed, VeriFone never
`
`saw any drafts of the IPR requests, never provided any comments or suggestions
`
`on how to prepare the IPRS, nor any comments on any prior art.
`
`I did request a
`
`copy of certain specific publically available materials from VeriFone, consisting of
`
`the Omni 300 manual.
`
`I also obtained an identification of the best prior art
`
`identified in the litigation from our litigation counsel, Jones Day (which was also
`
`VeriFone’s counsel). However, neither Jones Day nor VeriFone had any
`
`opportunity to control whether FDC would use this identified prior art in the IPR,
`
`and indeed FDC did not use it.
`
`This was the sole extent of VeriFone’s
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2013—O0246
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
`
`involvement aside from agreeing to fund the IPR. Apart from this, they played no
`
`other role. Kilpatrick Townsend was instructed to perform a new prior art search.
`
`and to develop an invalidity position separate from anything prepared in
`
`connection with the litigation.
`
`11.
`
`The agreement whereby VeriFone disclaimed its ability to control
`
`under the indemnity (EX. 1011) (the “Disclaimer Agreement”) memorialized the
`
`earlier oral agreement of the parties and reflected the fact that VeriFone did not
`
`play any role in preparing the IPR except as identified herein. There was no
`
`determination or agreement that the original indemnity agreement would obligate
`
`VeriFone to prepare an IPR or the right or ability to control any IPR. The oral and
`
`written agreements simply made clear that there would be no de facto opportunity
`
`to control, regardless of Whether the indemnity provided that obligation or ability,
`
`and extend VeriFone’s payment to the IPR costs. While the oral agreement was
`
`in effect before work on the IPRS started as described above, respective in-house
`
`counsel began work on the written Disclaimer Agreement to memorialize the oral
`
`agreement in April 2014, a process which led to a signed agreement on April 28,
`
`2014.
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`9. At no time, either before or after the signature date of the Disclaimer
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`Agreement, did VeriFone in fact provide any comments, suggestions, directions or
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`5
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`Case No. IPR2013—00246
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,108,704
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`mandates as to how the IPRS should proceed. Every part of the process in
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`preparing, reviewing and filing the lPRs was performed solely under the direction
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`of FDC and their attorneys at Kilpatrick Townsend. At no time did VeriFone have
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`any input, nor did they ever see orcomment on any drafts of the IPR requests.
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`I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing Declaration is true and
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`correct.
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`Date: November [Z2014
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`fl/Z2: L.»/e--
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`Christopher P. Demetriades
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`
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`Case No. IPR2014—00715
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,934,945 B1
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the DECLARATION OF
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`CHRISTOPHER P. DEMETRIADES, has been served via Express Mail on
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`November 17, 2014, upon the following:
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`Birch, Steward, Kolasch & Birch, LLP
`8110 Gatehouse Road, Suite 100 East
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`Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
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`With copies by email, per Patent Owner consent, to:
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`mrb@,buscherlaw.oom
`dra@,bskb.com
`gsd@bskb.com
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`
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` fl
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`Paul C. Haughey
`Registration No. 31,83
`Counsel for Petitioner
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`
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`Dated: November 17, 2014
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`By:
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`KILPATRICK TOWNSEND 66710910 1