UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`__________________
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`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`__________________
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`
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`MEDTRONIC INC., MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST
` Patent Owner
`
`________________
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00695
`Patent No. 5,593,417
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`__________________
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`
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`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`TO PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
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`IPR2014-00695
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 1
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`A.
`
`B.
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`Enforcement of the ’417 Patent ............................................................. 1
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`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-00100 ............................................. 2
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`III. TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED .................................................... 3
`
`A.
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`Trial Should Not be Instituted Regarding the Two
`Challenges Based on Lazarus. ............................................................... 4
`
`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`The Lazarus Challenges are Redundant to Those for
`Which Trial has Been Instituted in IPR2014-00100................... 4
`
`Instituting Trial on the Lazarus Challenges Would
`Subvert the Rehearing Rules. ...................................................... 7
`
`Alternatively, the Board Should Deny the Lazarus-
`Based Challenges Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). .......................... 14
`
`The Patent Owner Has Not Waived its Right to File
`This Preliminary Response to the Second Petition. .................. 15
`
`B.
`
`If the Motion for Joinder is Denied, Then the Second
`Petition Should be Denied in its Entirety. ........................................... 17
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`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 18
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, IPR2013-00440, Paper 16 (Feb. 20, 2014) .............. 13
`
`Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., IPR2013-00324, Paper 19
`(Nov. 21, 2013) ................................................................................................. 15
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7 (Oct.
`25, 2012) ......................................................................................................... 5, 6
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ....................... 13
`
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-00581, Paper 15 (Dec. 30, 2013)
` ........................................................................................................................... 15
`
`Ex Parte Smith, No. 2009-014595 (BPAI Aug. 17, 2010) .............................. 16, 17
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,(Fed. Cir. 1996) ................... 13
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 4
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ...................................................................................................17
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) ..................................................................................................... 6
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`Rules
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) ..............................................................................................8, 9
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2) .............................................................................................. 8
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`37 C.F.R. 42.101(b) .................................................................................................17
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, the Patent Owner
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`hereby provides a Preliminary Response to the Petition for Inter Partes Review
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`(herein “Second Petition,” or “2nd Pet.”) initially filed April 25, 2014 and
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`corrected on May 5, 2014. A Notice dated April 30, 2014 (Paper 4) set July 30,
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`2014 as the deadline for this Preliminary Response. This Preliminary Response is
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`timely filed, and no fee is due with this Preliminary Response. If, however, the
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`Office believes that any additional fee is due, it is authorized to charge deposit
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`account No. 50-5836.
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`The Patent Owner is the Marital Deduction Trust, created under the
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`Valentine J. Rhodes Revocable Trust. Dr. Valentine J. Rhodes, now deceased, was
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`a medical doctor who specialized in vascular surgery and the inventor of the ’417
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`Patent that is the subject of this proceeding.
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`The Patent Owner respectfully requests that the Board deny the Second
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`Petition and not institute trial for at least the reasons provided herein.
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`A. Enforcement of the ’417 Patent
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`Endotach LLC, the exclusive licensee of the ’417 Patent, has brought
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`lawsuits to enforce the ’417 Patent against three different companies. First, a suit
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`against W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. was filed in the Northern District of Florida
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`in June 2012 and terminated in October 2012. Second, suits were filed against
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`Cook Medical Inc. in the Southern District of Indiana, where claim construction
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`briefing began in December 2012, and the court made claim construction rulings in
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`April 2013. Trial is scheduled to begin against Cook in September 15, 2014.
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`Third, an infringement lawsuit was filed against the Petitioners in the Northern
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`District of California in July 2013, and that case has been stayed since April 2014
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`pending inter partes review of the ’417 Patent.
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`B.
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`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-00100
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`This is the second petition for inter partes review of the ʼ417 Patent filed by
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`the Petitioners. On October 31, 2013, the same Petitioners filed a first petition1 for
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`inter partes review of the ʼ417 Patent, asserting the following six challenges
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`against claims 1, 2, 9, 10, and 13 of the ’417 Patent:
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`(1) Anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 5,104,399 (Lazarus)
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`
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`1 The first petition was refiled in corrected form on November 7, 2014 as Paper 4
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`in IPR2014-00100. Citations herein to the “First Petition” or “1st Pet.” are with
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`reference to that corrected petition.
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`(2) Anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 4,562,596 (Kornberg)
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`(3) Anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 5,397,355 (Marin)
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`(4) Obviousness over U.S. Patent No. 5,122,154 (Rhodes ’154) in
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`view of Lazarus
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`(5) Obviousness over Rhodes ’154 in view of Kornberg
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`(6) Obviousness over Rhodes ’154 in view of Marin
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`That first inter partes review is case no. IPR2014-00100.
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`The Board denied four of those six challenges while instituting trial only as
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`to the two challenges involving Kornberg. (IPR2014-00100 Paper 15 (Mar. 25,
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`2014).) The Board found that the other four challenges – those involving Lazarus
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`and Marin – were redundant to the Kornberg challenges. (Id. at 14-15.) The
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`Petitioner did not request rehearing of that institution decision. The deadline to
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`have done so was April 24, 2014 – one day before this Second Petition was filed.
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`III. TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED
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`The Second Petition presents the following five challenges to each of claims
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`1, 2, 9, 10, and 13 of the ’417 Patent:
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`(1) Anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 5,104,399 (Lazarus)
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`(2) Obviousness over Rhodes ’154 in view of Lazarus
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`(3) Anticipation by U.S. Patent No. 5,562,725 (Schmitt)
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`(4) Obviousness over Rhodes ’154 in view of Schmitt
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`(5) Obviousness over Rhodes ’154 in view of U.S. Patent No.
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`5,370,657 (Irie)
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` The Second Petition should be denied at least in part for at least the
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`following reasons.
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`A. Trial Should Not be Instituted Regarding the Two Challenges
`Based on Lazarus.
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`The two challenges involving Lazarus in the Second Petition are exactly the
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`same as the two denied Lazarus-based challenges in the First Petition. It would be
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`improper for the Board to institute trial on those challenges now after refusing to
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`do so in response to the First Petition. That is so for at least two reasons: (1)
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`Those challenges are just as redundant now as they were in the First Petition, and
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`(2) instituting trial on those challenges would be a circumvention and subversion
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`of the rehearing rules.
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`1.
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`The Lazarus Challenges are Redundant to Those for Which
`Trial has Been Instituted in IPR2014-00100.
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`In considering whether the Second Petition’s challenges are redundant, the
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`Board should consider both the First Petition and Second Petitions together, rather
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`than focusing on just the Second Petition in isolation. Any other approach would
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`create a loophole in the redundancy doctrine and burden the Board and patent
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`owners with not just redundant challenges but duplicative proceedings.
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`The Board has explained that the redundancy doctrine protects the Board
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`and patent owners:
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`The underlying principle is this: If either the base ground
`or the ground with additional reference is better from all
`perspectives, Petitioner should assert the stronger ground
`and not burden the Patent Owner and the Board with the
`other. If there is no difference, Petitioner should assert
`just one ground. Only if the Petitioner reasonably
`articulates why each ground has strength and weakness
`relative to the other should both grounds be asserted for
`consideration.
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003, Paper 7, at 2
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`(Oct. 25, 2012) (emphasis added). Although this quote was presented in terms of
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`vertical redundancy, the “underlying principle” applies with equal force to all types
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`of redundancy.
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`
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`If a petitioner could evade the redundancy doctrine by simply filing a second
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`review petition to present a redundant challenge, the effect would be an added
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`burden on both the Board and the patent owner. The patent owner would be
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`forced, as here, to respond to two different petitions, and the Board would need to
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`administer an additional proceeding, thereby doubling its administrative burdens,
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`at least during the pre-trial stage. If the Board were to join the two reviews
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`together for trial, then the petitioner would have effectively bought its way around
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`the redundancy doctrine by paying an extra petition fee, causing the patent owner
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`to respond to additional challenges in a compressed time frame. Such a tactic
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`might be commonly employed by petitioners, given the already high rate at which
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`petitioners attempt to present redundant challenges in a single petition. Such a
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`result, besides being burdensome to patent owners and the Board, would be
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`contrary to “the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the
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`Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete [review] proceedings.” 35
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`U.S.C. § 316(b); see also Liberty Mut. at 2 (considering the same).
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`Here, the challenges involving Lazarus in the present Second Petition and
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`the First Petition are the same – not just nearly the same but exactly the same. The
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`Board has already determined that those challenges are redundant to the Kornberg-
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`based challenges for which trial has been instituted. Indeed, Kornberg and Lazarus
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`are highly similar in their technical teachings. Both disclose grafts with wall
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`engaging members or hooks, as can be seen in the following annotated drawings
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`from Lazarus and Kornberg (annotations added by the First Petition):
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`2.
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`Instituting Trial on the Lazarus Challenges Would Subvert
`the Rehearing Rules.
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`Rule 42.71(d) requires that any party dissatisfied with a decision of the
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`Board in an inter partes review may request rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The
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`deadline for doing so is “[w]ithin 30 days of the entry of . . . a decision not to
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`institute trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2). “The burden of showing a decision
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`should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must
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`specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or
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`overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed . . .” 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`The Petitioners did not file a request for rehearing of the Institution Decision
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`in IPR2014-00100. The deadline to have done so was April 24, 2014 – 30 days
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`following the March 25, 2014 Institution Decision. (March has 31 days.) Instead,
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`a day later, the Petitioners filed the Second Petition along with a Motion for
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`Joinder (IPR2014-00695 Paper 2). This tactic by the Petitioners attempts to end-
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`run around the rehearing rules and should not be tolerated.
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`The Motion for Joinder is nothing more than a rehearing request in disguise.
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`The Motion for Joinder asserts that the Lazarus challenge grounds “were
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`improperly deemed to be redundant in the First Petition.” (Id. at 10-11.) Yet,
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`neither the Motion for Joinder nor the Second Petition satisfies the strict
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`requirements for a request for rehearing, even assuming for the sake of argument
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`that they could be considered a request for rehearing (which they are not) and were
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`timely filed before the deadline for a request for rehearing (which they were not).
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`The Second Petition does not even attempt to identify any errors in the Institution
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`Decision in IPR2014-00100, and the Motion for Joinder attempts to justify re-
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`raising the same challenges without identifying any points “misapprehended or
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`overlooked” in the Institution Decision in IPR2014-00100. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`Instead the Motion for Joinder seems to contend that the Patent Owner’s position
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`in the Cook Medical litigation regarding the construction of the phrase “tightly
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`engage” somehow justifies the Petitioners’ belated challenges. No such argument
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`was made in the First Petition, even though the Petitioners should have realized the
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`Patent Owner’s position by the time of the filing the First Petition, as explained
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`next.
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`The Patent Owner’s position regarding the construction of “tightly engage”
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`has been a matter of public record in the Cook Medical litigation for over a year
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`and a half. In December 2012 and January 2013, respectively, the Patent Owner
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`filed opening and responsive claim construction briefs, which detail the Patent
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`Owner’s claim construction positions regarding “engage” and “tightly engage.”
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`(Ex. 2002 at 31-33; Ex. 2003 at 21-23). Those positions are consistent with the
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`ones taken by the Patent Owner in the Medtronic litigation against the Petitioners.
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`Those briefs were publicly filed and available as docket numbers 82 and 85 on
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`PACER.
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`More importantly, in April 2013 – over six months before the First Petition
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`was filed and over a year before the Second Petition was filed – the district court in
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`the Cook Medical litigation gave a construction to “tightly engage” that excludes
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`perforation of or creating holes through the lumen wall – the very aspect of the
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`interpretation that the Petitioners allegedly just realized. The most salient part of
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`the court’s claim construction opinion for present purposes here reads as follows:
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`. . . The patent never contemplates that the
`protrusions perforate – creates a hole in - the walls of the
`vessels, ducts or lumens; it teaches just the opposite. As
`Cook itself acknowledges, an object of the invention is to
`provide an anchoring means that “does not pose a
`significant risk of perforating the tissue of the vessel,
`duct, or lumen.” In the context of the remainder of the
`specification, it is clear that penetration of some kind,
`including burrowing or digging into, the interior surface
`is contemplated, but not perforating or creating holes
`through the wall. Therefore, Cook’s secondary definition
`of “perforate” to mean “penetrate” is too limiting.
`
`Specifically, the patent teaches that “to tightly
`engage,” the projections must “burrow slightly into[] the
`interior wall of the vessel, duct, or lumen . . . .” ‘417
`patent, col.4, ll.23-25. See also, id. col.4, ll.37-38; col.7,
`ll.30-31; col.8, ll. 22-23. The plain meaning of “burrow”
`is “dig,” which necessarily requires penetration. The
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`patent even uses the terms “penetration” and “burrowing”
`as synonyms, stating “the more projections utilized the
`less ‘penetration’ or ‘burrowing’ will [be] necessary for
`good securement against migration.” Id. col.8, ll.43-45.
`Further, given the multiple references to penetration of
`the projections, penetration points and/or penetration
`edges in the description of the preferred embodiment, id.
`col.8, ll.6-7; id. ll.22-23; id. 25-26; id. ll.64, it is clear
`that the definition for “tightly engage” must allow for
`some level of penetration. The patent also makes clear
`that if penetration is desirable, it is only into the initial
`surface layer of the vessel, duct, or lumen; it does not
`penetrate, or perforate,
`the entire wall of
`the
`passageway.2 Id. col.8, ll.25-28. It is this concept, the
`penetration of the initial surface layer, that the Court
`believes is conveyed by the additional references in the
`claims to the interior surface of the vessel, duct, or
`lumen: the penetration is limited to the interior surface
`layer of the passageway.
`
`***
`
`2 Endotach’s argument that Rhodes was his own
`lexicographer for the term “tightly engage” because of
`the description of the preferred projection height for the
`most desirable penetration
`in
`the specification
`is
`unsubstantiated by the specification. As Cook points out,
`there is no reference in this section of the patent that links
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`the height of the projections to the definition for “tightly
`engage.” See ‘417 patent, col.8, ll. 25-37. Rather, as the
`Court has discussed, this section of the specification
`illuminates that “tightly engage” includes penetration of
`the interior surface layer of the relevant vessel, duct, or
`lumen, but not puncturing a hole into or tearing through
`the wall of such passageways.
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`(Ex. 2004 at 38-39 (emphases added).) This claim construction was set forth in an
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`order publicly posted as docket number 102 in PACER on April 10, 2014.
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`Naturally, the Patent Owner applied this claim construction in its
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`infringement contentions against Cook. In fact, on June 28, 2013, Cook filed on
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`PACER a publicly available copy of the Patent Owner’s infringement contentions
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`for the ’417 Patent that detail the Patent Owner’s claim construction positions
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`regarding “engage” and “tightly engage” as related to Cook’s accused products.
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`(Ex. 2005 at 21-26.)
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`Thus, the Petitioners should have known much sooner that it purports to
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`have known that the Patent Owner (and the court in the Cook Medical case)
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`interprets the phrase “tightly engage” to exclude penetration that perforates or
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`creates holes through the wall. Whether Petitioners’ ignorance was purposeful or
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`negligent, the fact is that the Petitioners could and should have known of the Patent
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`Owner’s claim construction position in time to address that in the First Petition.
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`That fact that they did not do so means that the Board did not misapprehend or
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`overlook that point. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, IPR2013-00440, Paper 16, at
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`5 (Feb. 20, 2014) (“The Board cannot have misapprehended or overlooked an
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`argument that was not made by Petitioner.”).
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`Nor should the Patent Owner’s position have come as a surprise to the
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`Petitioners or anyone else reading the ’417 Patent specification, which is the
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`“single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
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`F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
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`Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Every paragraph of the
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`’417 Patent specification containing the phrase “tightly engage” also says either
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`“tightly engage, e.g., burrow slightly into” or “tightly engage (and not necessarily
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`penetrate).” (’417 Patent at 4:10-25, 4:26-38, 7:9-33, 9:1:17.) Further, it is a
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`stated object of the invention in the ’417 Patent “to provide anchoring means for
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`intraluminal medical devices to be secured within in a vessel, duct, or lumen of a
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`living being, and which anchoring means does not pose a significant risk of
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`perforating the tissue of the vessel, duct, or lumen.” (Id. at 3:53-58). It is also
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`stated more specifically in the ’417 Patent specification, that:
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`If some penetration is deemed desirable the height of the
`projections is selected so that their penetrating points do
`not penetrate too deeply into the artery wall. In this
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`regard, the height of the projections is selected so that
`they do not penetrate into the adventicial or medial layers
`of the artery wall, but can penetrate its intima.
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`(Id. at 8:25-31). The terms “intima,” “medial,” and “adventicial” here refer to the
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`innermost, middle, and outer layers of an artery wall, respectively.
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`To sum up, the Petitioners’ belated realization of the meaning of the phrase
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`“tightly engage” in the ’417 Patent does not justify its filing of the Second Petition
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`at all and certainly does not justify re-presenting the same Lazarus challenges in
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`the Second Petition. Rather than re-presenting the same redundant Lazarus
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`challenges in the Second Petition, the Petitioners should have requested rehearing
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`of the Institution Decision in IPR2014-00100 to pursue those challenges. It is
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`procedurally improper for the Petitioners to circumvent the rehearing process, and
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`the Board should not institute the Lazarus challenges in the Second Petition for that
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`reason.
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`3.
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`Alternatively, the Board Should Deny the Lazarus-Based
`Challenges Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
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`An alternative reason not to institute trial on the Lazarus-based challenges is
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`that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) gives the Board discretion to “take into account whether,
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`and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior
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`art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Although that statute
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`appears in the chapter of Title 35 concerning post-grant review, it is also applicable
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`to inter partes reviews in “chapter 31.” Id.
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`It would be appropriate to apply § 325(d) to the present petition because
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`“substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
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`Office” in IPR2014-00100. In fact, the Board has applied § 325(d) to deny second
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`petitions like this one in at least two other cases. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v.
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`Illumina Cambridge Ltd., IPR2013-00324, Paper 19, at 5-7 (Nov. 21, 2013)
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`(denying institution of review requested in second petition in light of similar
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`grounds raised in first petition filed by the same petitioner); see also SAS Inst., Inc.
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`v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-00581, Paper 15, at 20-23 (Dec. 30, 2013)
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`(same). This case is even more extreme than Intelligent Bio-Systems and SAS
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`Institute because the Lazarus-based challenges here are not just “substantially the
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`same” but exactly the same as “previously were presented to the Office” in
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`IPR2014-00100.
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`4.
`
`The Patent Owner Has Not Waived its Right to File This
`Preliminary Response to the Second Petition.
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`The Petitioners argue in its Motion for Joinder that the Patent Owner is
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`administratively estopped from filing a preliminary response regarding the Lazarus
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`challenges because the Patent Owner did not file a preliminary response to the First
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`Petition. (Mo. for Joinder at 11.) The Patent Owner disagrees.
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`The Patent Owner chose not to file a preliminary response to the First
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`Petition because it presented clearly redundant challenges that the Board would
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`recognize as such. That choice in no way reflects any acquiescence to the
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`propriety of the Lazarus-based challenges or a waiver of the right to resist such
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`challenges in different circumstances, such as here. The Patent Owner’s arguments
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`made above against the Lazarus-based challenges in the Second Petition are unique
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`to the rather bizarre posture of the exact same challenges being re-presented in a
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`second petition after they were denied in a first petition, and after a request for
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`rehearing could have been but was not filed. Such arguments could not have been
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`made by the Patent Owner in response to the First Petition. The Patent Owner
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`cannot waive arguments that were not previously available to it.
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`The Petitioners cite Ex Parte Smith, No. 2009-014595 (BPAI Aug. 17, 2010)
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`as support for so-called administrative estoppel against the patent owner, but that
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`case does not support application of such administrative estoppel here. Smith
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`merely stands for the proposition that a patent owner may be estopped from later
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`contesting untraversed examiner findings. In that case, the patent owner did not
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`traverse an examiner’s specific findings during original prosecution that claims of
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`a continuation-in-part application were not entitled to the parent’s filing date. Id.,
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`slip op. at 6, 13-14. When, during a reexamination, the patent owner tried to
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`contest that determination in an effort to antedate a reference, the Board held that
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`the patent owner was administratively estopped from doing so. Id. at 8, 13-14.
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`Quite differently here, the Patent Owner did not, by opting not to file a preliminary
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`response to the First Petition, accede to any argument that it now makes regarding
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`Lazarus. Unlike the patent owner in Smith, the Patent Owner did not, during the
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`prior proceeding, have a “full and fair opportunity to contest” the facts now
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`contested, which in this case is the appropriateness of a repeat of the Lazarus
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`challenges. Id. at 14. The Patent Owner obviously could not have made that
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`argument earlier, when the Lazarus challenges where presented for the first time.
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`In conclusion, the doctrine of administrative estoppel has no place in this case.
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`B.
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`If the Motion for Joinder is Denied, Then the Second Petition
`Should be Denied in its Entirety.
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`The Patent Owner does not oppose the Motion for Joinder, provided that a
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`schedule for the joined proceedings is fair and reasonable. However, if the Board
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`decides that joinder would not be appropriate, then the Second Petition should be
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`denied in its entirety as untimely and barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) and 37 C.F.R.
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`42.101(b). The Petitioners were served with a complaint alleging infringement of
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`the ’417 Patent on November 1, 2012, which was more than one year before the
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`filing of the Second Petition on April 25, 2014. The Petitioners point out that the
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`rules make an exception to that one-year bar in cases of joinder and that the Second
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`Petition is therefore timely. (See Mo. for Joinder at 1-2, 7.) However, in the
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`absence of joinder, the Second Petition would be untimely and should be barred.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For at least the foregoing reasons, the Patent Owner respectfully requests
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`that the Board deny the Second Petition at least in part.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Date: 2014 June 25
`
`Matthew C. Phillips
`Reg. No. 43,403
`
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
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`Renaissance IP Law Group LLP
`9600 SW Oak Street, Suite 560
`Portland, Oregon 97223
`Telephone: 503-964-1129
`Facsimile: 503-517-9919
`matthew.phillips@renaissanceiplaw.com
`
`By: / M.C. Phillips /
`Matthew C. Phillips
`Registration No. 43,403
`
`Brett M. Pinkus, Reg. No. 59,980
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`Jonathan T. Suder (pro hac vice)
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`Backup Counsel for Patent Owner
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`Friedman, Suder & Cooke
`604 E. Fourth Street, Suite 200
`Fort Worth, TX 76102
`Telephone: (817) 334-0400
`Facsimile: (817) 334-0401
`pinkus@fsclaw.com
`jts@fsclaw.com
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on June 25, 2014, copies of the foregoing PATENT
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`OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE and all documents filed with it were
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`served via electronic mail, as agreed to by counsel, upon the following counsel for
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`the Petitioner:
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`Jack Barufka: jack.barufka@pillsburylaw.com
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`Ngai Zhang: ngai.zhang@pillsburylaw.com
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`Evan Finkel: evan.finkel@pillsburylaw.com
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`with a courtesy copy to docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com.
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`/ M.C. Phillips /
`Matthew C. Phillips
`Registration No. 43,403
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