`571-272-7822
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`Paper 33
`Entered: December 15, 2014
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`WESTERNGECO LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00688
`Patent 7,080,607 B2
`
`
`Before BRYAN F. MOORE, SCOTT A. DANIELS, and
`BEVERLY M. BUNTING, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DANIELS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Decision on Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00688
`Patent 7,080,607 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`A. Background
`Petroleum Geo-Services Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition to institute
`an inter partes review of claims 1 and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,080,607 B2
`(“the ’607 patent”).1 Paper 1 (“Pet.”). WesternGeco LLC (“Patent Owner”)
`timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 26 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes
`review under 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Upon consideration of
`the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has
`established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the claims challenged in
`the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review for claims 1
`and 15 of the ’607 patent.
`B. Additional Proceedings
`Petitioner states that related lawsuits involving the ’607 patent
`presently asserted against Petitioner are WesternGeco LLC v. Petroleum
`Geo-Services, Inc., 4:13-cv-02725, in the Southern District of Texas and
`WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 4:09-cv-01827 (the “ION
`lawsuit”), also in the Southern District of Texas. Pet. 8.
`Petitioner also has concurrently filed three additional petitions
`challenging the patentability of claims 1, 2, 6, 18, 19, and 23 of U.S. Patent
`No. 7,293,520 B2 (“the ’520 patent”); claims 1 and 15 of U.S. Patent No.
`7,162,967 B2 (“the ’967 patent”); and claim 14 of U.S. Patent No. 6,691,038
`
`
`1 The Petition was initially accorded the filing date of April 23, 2014. Paper
`6. Following submission of an updated Mandatory Notice (Paper 18) on
`August 5, 2014, including additional real-parties-in-interest, we exercised
`our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), changing the filing date of the
`Petition to August 5, 2014. Paper 22.
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`B2 (“the ’038 patent”).2 See IPR2014-00689; IPR2014-00678; IPR2014-
`00687.
`C. The ’607 Patent
`The ’607 patent (Ex. 1001), titled “Seismic Data Acquisition
`Equipment Control System,” generally relates to a method and apparatus for
`improving marine seismic survey techniques by more effectively controlling
`the movement and positioning of marine seismic streamers towed in an array
`behind a boat. Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 16–24. As illustrated in Figure 1 of the
`’607 patent reproduced below, labeled prior art, a seismic source, for
`example air gun 14, is towed by boat 10 producing acoustic signals, which
`are reflected off the earth below. Id. The reflected signals are received by
`hydrophones (no reference number) attached to streamers 12, and the signals
`“digitized and processed to build up a representation of the subsurface
`geology.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 31–33.
`
`
`2 The ’520, ’607, and ’967 patents each issued as a continuation of
`application No. 09/787,723, filed July 2, 2001, now U.S. Patent No.
`6,932,017, which was in turn a 35 U.S.C. § 371 national stage filing from
`Patent Cooperation Treaty application number PCT/IB99/01590, filed
`September 28, 1999, claiming foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 from
`Great Britain patent application number 9821277.3, filed October 1, 1998.
`See Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 4–12.
`
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`Figure 1 depicts an array of seismic streamers 12 towed behind the
`vessel.
`In order to obtain accurate survey data, it is necessary to control the
`positioning of the streamers, both vertically in the water column, as well as
`horizontally against ocean currents and forces which can cause the normally
`linear streamers to bend and undulate and, in some cases, become entangled
`with one another. Id. at col. 1, l. 42–col. 2, l. 16. As illustrated in Figure 1,
`each streamer is maintained in a generally linear arrangement behind the
`boat by deflector 16 which horizontally positions the end of each streamer
`nearest the vessel. Id. at col. 3, ll. 37–46. Drag buoy 20 at the end of each
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`streamer farthest from the vessel creates tension along the streamer to
`maintain the linear arrangement.
`Additionally, to control the position and linear shape of the streamer a
`plurality of streamer positioning devices, called “birds” 18, are attached
`along the length of each streamer. Id. at col. 3, ll. 47–49. The birds are
`horizontally and vertically steerable and control the shape and position of the
`streamer in both vertical (depth) and horizontal directions. Id. at col. 3, ll.
`49–55. The birds’s job is usually to maintain the streamers in their linear
`and parallel arrangement, because when the streamers are horizontally out of
`position, the efficiency of the seismic data collection is compromised. Id. at
`col. 2, ll. 5–7. The most important task of the birds, however, is to keep the
`streamers from tangling. Id. at col. 3, ll. 65–66.
`The invention described in the ’607 patent relies on global control
`system 22 located on the vessel to control the birds on each streamer to
`maintain the streamers in their particular linear and parallel arrangement. Id.
`at col. 3, ll. 56–60. The control system is provided with a model (desired)
`representation of each streamer in the towed streamer array, and also
`receives (actual) position information from each of the birds. Id. at col. 4,
`ll. 15–19. The control system uses the desired and actual position of the
`birds to “regularly calculate updated desired vertical and horizontal forces
`the birds should impart on the seismic streamers 12 to move them from their
`actual positions to their desired positions.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 28–34.
`The Specification explains that the control system has two primary
`modes, a feather angle mode, and a turn control mode. Id. at col. 10, ll. 30–
`32. The feather angle mode is used to maintain the linear form of the
`streamer at an angle offset from the direction of towing, usually to account
`
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`for ocean crosscurrents affecting the streamers. Id. at col. 10, ll. 32–40. The
`’607 patent explains “[o]nly when the crosscurrent velocity is very small
`will the feather angle be set to zero and the desired streamer positions be in
`precise alignment with the towing direction.” Id. at col. 10, ll. 38–40.
`The turn control mode is used when the vessel is turning during a
`survey operation. Id. at col. 10, ll. 41–43. In a first part of the turn, birds 18
`are instructed to “throw out” the streamer by generating a force in the
`opposite direction from the turn. Id. at col. 10, ll. 43–49. In a second part of
`the turn, the birds are directed back to the position defined by the feather
`angle mode. Id. The control system determines the first and second part of
`the turn according to data provided by the vessel navigation system. Id. at
`col. 10, ll. 53–56.
`During inclement weather conditions, the control system can also
`operate in streamer separation mode, important for keeping the streamers
`from tangling. Id. at col. 10, ll. 58–61. In this mode, the birds are directed
`to maintain the streamers a distance apart from one another, where
`[t]he streamers 12 will typically be separated in depth and the
`outermost streamers will be positioned as far away from each
`other as possible. The inner streamers will then be regularly
`spaced between these outermost streamers, i.e. each bird 18 will
`receive desired horizontal forces 42 or desired horizontal
`position information that will direct the bird 18 to the midpoint
`position between its adjacent streamers.
`
`Id. at col. 10, l. 63–col. 11, l. 3. These different modes allow the vessel to
`operate more efficiently, turn faster, and lower the incidents of tangling
`during survey operations leading to a reduction in time and equipment costs
`of marine surveying. Id. at col. 10, ll. 49–51, col. 1, l. 63–col. 2, l. 16.
`
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`Basis
`§ 102
`§ 103
`§ 103
`§ 103
`
`D. Illustrative Claim
`Claims 1 and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is a method claim, and
`claim 15, an apparatus claim, illustrates the claimed subject matter and is
`reproduced below:
`
`15. An array of seismic streamers towed by a towing
`vessel comprising:
` (a) a plurality of streamer positioning devices on or inline
`with each streamer;
` (b) a prediction unit adapted to predict positions of at least
`some of the streamer positioning devices; and
` (c) a control unit adapted to use the predicted positions to
`calculate desired changes in positions of one or more of
`the streamer positioning devices.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 11, ll. 16–24 (emphasis added).
`E. The Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable on the
`following specific grounds.3
`
`References
`Workman4
`Workman
`Workman and Elholm5
`Gikas6 and ’636 PCT7
`
`Claims Challenged
`1 and 15
`1 and 15
`1 and 15
`1 and 15
`
`
`3 Petitioner supports its challenge with Declarations of Dr. Brian J. Evans,
`Ph.D. (Ex. 1002) (“Evans Decl.”) and Dr. Jack H. Cole, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003)
`(“Cole Decl.”). See infra.
`4 Ex. 1004, U.S. Patent No. 5,790,472 (Aug. 4, 1998).
`5 Ex. 1005, U.S. Patent No. 5,532,975 (July 2, 1996).
`
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`References
`Gikas and Elholm
`
`
`Basis
`§ 103
`
`Claims Challenged
`1 and 15
`
`II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Petitioner proposes constructions for “streamer positioning device,”
`“predict[ing] positions,” and “on or in-line with.” Patent Owner proposes a
`competing claim construction only for “streamer positioning device.” The
`first two limitations are common to both claims 1 and 15, while the third
`limitation is found only in claim 15.
`A. Streamer Positioning Device
`We construe the same limitation “streamer positioning device,” in the
`context of claims 1 and 18 of the ’520 patent. See IPR 2014-00689, Paper
`31 at 9–10. As set forth below, we adopt that same construction here,
`although we do not repeat our analysis. See NTP Inc., v. Research in
`Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (When construing claims
`in patents that derive from the same parent application and share common
`terms, “we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted
`patents.”). Because, inter alia, the Specification of the ’520 patent discloses
`that “positioning” of the device may be accomplished by either horizontal
`and vertical steering, or both, of the device, and that the device may be a
`bird or other type of device, any interpretation including specific directional
`terms would read limitations improperly from the Specification into the
`
`
`6 Ex. 1006, V. Gikas, P. A. Cross, & A. Asiama-Akuamoa, A Rigorous and
`Integrated Approach to Hydrophone and Source Positioning during
`Multi-Streamer Offshore Seismic Exploration, 77 THE HYDROGRAPHIC
`JOURNAL 11–24 (July 1995).
`7 Ex. 1013, WO 98/28636 (July 2, 1998).
`
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`claims. The broadest reasonable interpretation of “streamer positioning
`device” is therefore, “a device that positions a streamer as it is towed.”
`B. Predicting Positions
`Petitioner argues that “predicting positions” should be interpreted in
`terms of the root word “predict” as “encompass[ing] either present or future
`predictions of streamer positioning device locations (i.e., ‘estimates of the
`real time or future locations’).” Pet. 23. The Specification of the ’607 patent
`explains that “[d]ue to the relatively low sample rate and time delay
`associated with the horizontal position determination system, the global
`control system 22 runs position predictor software to estimate the actual
`locations of each of the birds 18.” Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 51–55 (emphasis
`added). From this description, we understand that because of a low sample
`rate and time delay in the process of determining the actual position of birds
`18 at any given time, the global positioning system uses “position predictor
`software to estimate the actual locations of each of the birds 18.” Id. In
`other words, the received position data of any bird 18 is old, i.e., not
`instantaneous, or current, but is used to estimate a position of bird 18, and
`assess the estimate as an actual position of bird 18. Based on this
`disclosure, and for purposes of this Decision, the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of “predicting positions” is “estimating the actual locations.”
`C. On or in-line with
`Independent claim 15 recites the limitation “on or in-line with.”
`Petitioner does not explain sufficiently why the term “on or in-line with”
`requires an express construction on this record. On this record, no express
`construction of “on or in-line with” is needed for this Decision.
`
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`III. ANALYSIS
`A. Statutory Bar Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`Patent Owner disputes that Petitioner timely filed its Petition for an
`inter partes review. Prelim. Resp. 6–10. Specifically, under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(b), a party may not file a petition for inter partes review if the party
`had been served with a complaint alleging infringement more than one year
`previously. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner was served with a
`complaint on March 14, 2011.
`On June 12, 2009, Patent Owner filed, via the court’s electronic case
`filing procedure (“ECF”), a complaint initiating the ION lawsuit, alleging
`infringement of the ’607 patent against ION based on ION’s “DigiFIN” and
`other products. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also filed a similar complaint
`against a company called Fugro, a customer of ION, which was consolidated
`with the ION lawsuit. Id. (citing Ex. 2037). On December 8, 2009,
`remarking that Petitioner may have been involved in the design and testing
`of the ION products, Patent Owner provided Petitioner via email with a copy
`of the complaint against ION. Id. (citing Ex. 2008).
`Subsequently, Patent Owner subpoenaed Petitioner on January 22,
`2010 to produce documents and evidence relating inter alia to Petitioner’s
`use and operation of ION’s DigiFIN product. Id. (citing Ex. 2009). In
`response to the subpoena, Petitioner appeared in the ION lawsuit through its
`counsel, Heim, Payne & Chorush. Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 2011). On March 14,
`2011, Patent Owner filed an amended complaint in the ION lawsuit via the
`court’s electronic filing system (“ECF”), naming ION and Fugro, but not
`Petitioner, and incorporating the original 2009 complaint against ION in its
`entirety. Id. (citing Ex. 2012). Patent Owner argues that because
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`Petitioner’s counsel, as an ECF notice recipient in the ION lawsuit, received
`a copy of the amended complaint against Fugro and ION on March 14, 2011,
`Petitioner was, therefore, “served” in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`the same day. Id. Thus, it is Patent Owner’s position that because Petitioner
`was “served” with the complaint more than one year before filing, the
`Petition here is now time-barred.
`The Board has dealt with similar arguments regarding the statutory
`interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) before in Motorola Mobility LLC v.
`Arnouse, Case IPR2013-00010 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2013) (Paper 20) (the
`“Motorola decision”). For reasons similar to those set forth in the Motorola
`decision, we do not adopt the statutory construction that mere receipt of a
`complaint, via email or even ECF, initiates the one-year time period. We
`specifically agree with the Motorola Panel’s review and interpretation of the
`legislative history and intent of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) in that, “[w]e do not
`believe that the Congress intended to have the time period start before a
`petitioner is officially a defendant in a law suit.” Id. at 5.
`Patent Owner specifically argues that the present proceeding differs
`from Motorola because in the ION lawsuit “Petitioner was served with
`process and formally appeared,” (emphasis omitted) and was thus “‘brought
`under a court’s authority, by formal process’ before being served with the
`amended complaint.” Prelim. Resp. 8–9 n.1 (citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v.
`Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999)). Despite this
`factual difference from Motorola, Petitioner was not, and never has been, a
`party defendant in the ION lawsuit.
`Petitioner, in the ION lawsuit, was served, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45,
`with a third party subpoena to produce documents and things relating to the
`
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`ION lawsuit. See Ex. 2009. Although a person, or entity, may have been
`served properly with a subpoena, and may fall under a court’s authority for
`purposes of producing appropriate documents and things not protected by a
`privilege or protection, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)–(e) does not express, or imply,
`that a person subject to the subpoena is a defendant to a lawsuit. Indeed,
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 specifically differentiates between a “person” served with
`the subpoena, and “a party” to the lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (c)(1)–(2)
`(“A person commanded to produce documents or tangible things or to permit
`inspection may serve on the party or attorney designated in the subpoena a
`written objection to inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling any or all of
`the materials.”). We are aware of no case law or precedent, nor has Patent
`Owner cited to any, indicating that serving a person with a subpoena, and
`subjecting them to the authority of the court in enforcing such subpoena
`under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e), provides sufficient legal process to make such
`person a defendant to a lawsuit.
`Thus, Petitioner was not a defendant in the ION lawsuit. Concomitant
`with our colleagues’ Motorola decision, we interpret 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) as
`requiring service upon a defendant to the lawsuit. Petitioner was not a
`defendant; thus, it was never “served with a complaint” in the ION lawsuit
`as required by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).8
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`
`8 Patent Owner’s argument that S.D. Texas L.R. 5-1 states that the ECF
`notice “constitutes service of the document on those registered as Filing
`Users,” is not persuasive as to the intent of Congress with respect to
`§ 315(b). See 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of
`Senator Kyl) (“it is important that the section 315(b) deadline afford
`defendants a reasonable opportunity to identify and understand the patent
`claims that are relevant to the litigation”).
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`B. Real Parties-in-Interest Under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)
`(1) PGSAI
`The statute governing inter partes review proceedings sets forth
`certain requirements for a petition for inter partes review, including that “the
`petition identif[y] all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (emphasis
`added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1) (requirement to identify real parties
`in interest in mandatory notices). The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Practice Guide”) explains
`that “[w]hether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding
`nonetheless constitutes a ‘real party-in-interest’ . . . to that proceeding is a
`highly fact-dependent question.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759. The Practice
`Guide further states that
`
`However, the spirit of that formulation as to IPR and PGR
`proceedings means that, at a general level, the ‘real party-in-
`interest’ is the party that desires review of the patent. Thus, the
`‘real party-in-interest’ may be the petitioner itself, and/or it may
`be the party or parties at whose behest the petition has been
`filed.
`
`Id. (emphasis added). The determination of whether a non-party is a real
`party-in-interest involves a consideration of control; “[a] common
`consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised
`control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” Id.
`Patent Owner alleges that a company called PGS Americas, Inc.,
`(“PGSAI”) is a real party in interest to this proceeding because an in-house
`attorney for PGSAI, Kevin Hart, has been involved in the ION lawsuit, and
`“controlled the review, dissemination and discussion of the prior art that was
`presented in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner argues that
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`Kevin Hart retained trial counsel for Petitioner and PGSAS, and “acted as
`[Petitioner’s] in-house counsel.” Id. Patent Owner argues that Kevin Hart
`of PGSAI also controlled the negotiation of indemnity protections for
`PGSAS, with ION, for potential patent infringement related to DigiFIN. Id.
`(citing Ex. 2022; Ex. 2023). Patent Owner further asserts that PGSAI
`controlled the payment of DigiFIN invoices to ION as well as the repair and
`shipment of DigiFIN products for PGSAS. Id. (citing Ex. 2019–2021).
`Patent Owner’s argument relies on the requirement that all real
`parties-in-interest be identified in the Petition and its speculation that
`“[b]ecause PGSAI’s counsel is controlling [Petitioner’s] interests in the
`validity and infringement of the ‘607 patent, PGSAI is an RPI.” Id. at 12.
`The Practice Guide provides guidance regarding factors to consider in
`determining whether a party is a real party-in-interest. Considerations may
`include whether a non-party exercises control over a petitioner’s
`participation in a proceeding. Other considerations may include whether a
`non-party, in conjunction with control, is funding the proceeding and
`directing the proceeding. 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759–60.
`
`Patent Owner provides insufficient evidence to support its speculative
`contention that any party other than Petitioner, in fact, is funding or
`controlling Petitioner’s involvement in this proceeding, or that the Petition
`was filed “at the behest” of any party other than Petitioner. We are not
`persuaded that the evidence of common in-house counsel between PGSAI
`and Petitioner shows that PGSAI funded, or directed, Petitioner in
`connection with the filing of this Petition. While Kevin Hart may act on
`behalf of PGS at times, and for PGSAI at other times, this employment
`association does not explain the corporate, or legal, relationship between
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`PGSAI and Petitioner, or demonstrate that PGSAI has the ability to control
`the proceeding before the Board, nor is it evidence of corporate control
`between Petitioner and PGSAI. Discussions of potential remedies and
`indemnity protections by Mr. Hart on behalf of either entity, without specific
`evidence of corporate relationship, control, or contractual obligations of
`these entities, fail to prove that any entity is able to control the actions of
`another. Moreover, invoice payments by PGSAI for the DigiFIN product
`repair and development, at best, show that PGSAI, may have a corporate
`structure financial relationship with PGS and PGSAS, not that any control
`was exercised by PGSAI over Petitioner and this inter partes review
`proceeding.
`
`(2) ION
`Patent Owner asserts that ION is a real party in interest because
`(a) ION and Petitioner have a mutual desire to invalidate the ’607 and other
`WesternGeco patents, and because in this regard, Petitioner claimed a
`“common interest privilege” over communications with ION; (b) ION
`expressed its desire to satisfy its product assurance pledge and fulfill its
`obligations to Petitioner by securing rights to the DigiFIN product, or
`replace it with a non-infringing product; and (c) because Petitioner invoked
`ION’s indemnity obligations, notifying ION that Petitioner expected ION to
`fulfill its obligations and provide a remedy should infringement be found in
`the district court. Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (citing Exs. 2022, 2027).
`The common interest privilege serves to protect confidential, or
`privileged, communications with third parties, which might otherwise be
`exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. There is nothing surreptitious
`about separate entities, as either third parties, or separate parties to a legal
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`action, proclaiming shared interests to protect communications that are
`relevant to advance the interests of the entities possessing the common
`interest. See In re Regents of Univ. of California, 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed.
`Cir. 1996) (“The protection of communications among clients and attorneys
`‘allied in a common legal cause’ has long been recognized.”) (quoting In re
`Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F.Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y.1975)).
`The fact that Petitioner and ION, have a desire, and common interest, in
`invalidating the ’607 patent and other WesternGeco patents, and have
`collaborated together, and invoked a common interest privilege with respect
`to sharing potentially invalidating prior art references, does not persuade us
`that ION has the ability to control the instant petition or is directing or
`funding the present proceeding.
`The Board has issued decisions determining that a non-party entity is
`a real party-in-interest. See Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Philips Electronics North
`America Corp., Case IPR2013-00609 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2014) (Paper 15) (the
`“Zoll Decision”). In the Zoll Decision, the Board was persuaded that an
`unnamed party to the IPR, Zoll Medical, exercised consistent control over
`Zoll Lifecor for over six years, including control of the inter partes review.
`Id. at 11. Specific evidence of control included Zoll Lifecor’s
`acknowledgment that Zoll Medical controlled 100% of Zoll Lifecor and
`approved Zoll Lifecor’s corporate budget and plans. Id. Other evidence of
`control included the fact that common counsel for Zoll Medical and Zoll
`Lifecor, would not state affirmatively that counsel did not provide input into
`preparation of the IPRs. Id. at 11–12. Additional evidence showed that only
`Zoll Medical’s management team attended court-ordered mediation in the
`underlying district court litigation filed against Zoll Lifecor. Id. at 12.
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`We have no such evidence in this proceeding. ION and Petitioner are
`not related corporate entities. The evidence of record shows that Petitioner
`and ION preliminarily discussed potential remedies, relating to the product
`itself, not indemnification from litigation. Exs. 2022, 2027. As discussed
`above in section III.B.(1), absent specific facts evidencing the contractual
`obligations of the parties, we are not apprised of any evidence indicative of
`control, or potential to control this inter partes proceeding by ION.
`We, therefore, decline to deny the Petition for failure to comply with
`the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) for instituting an inter partes
`review.
`
`C. Privity Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), institution of an inter partes review is
`barred “if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year
`after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the
`petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent”
`(emphasis added). Patent Owner contends that ION is a privy of Petitioner
`by virtue of shared interests regarding the validity of the ’607 patent, the
`indemnity relationship between ION and Petitioner, the common interest
`privilege asserted by Petitioner and ION with respect to their
`communications in the ION lawsuit, and because Petitioner is essentially
`arguing that remand or reversal of the ION lawsuit on appeal should also
`extinguish Petitioners liability for infringement of the ’607 patent. Prelim.
`Resp. 18.
`We note that “[t]he notion of ‘privity’ is more expansive,
`encompassing parties that do not necessarily need to be identified in the
`petition as a ‘real party-in-interest.’” 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759. It is
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`undisputed that service was effected on ION as a named defendant in the
`ION lawsuit on June 12, 2009, more than one year before the filing date of
`this Petition. Patent Owner has not, however, provided evidence showing
`that Petitioner was a privy of ION on June 12, 2009 when ION was served
`with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’607 patent, nor a privy upon
`service of the amended complaint on March 14, 2011.
`The nature of shared interests in invalidating the ’607 patent,
`undertaking a joint defense, and assertion of a common interest privilege
`does not, without more, indicate privity between Petitioner and ION. See
`Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,760 (“[I]f Party A is part of a Joint
`Defense Group with Party B in a patent infringement suit, and Party B files a
`PGR petition, Party A is not a ‘real party-in-interest’ or a ‘privy’ for the
`purposes of the PGR petition based solely on its participation in that
`Group.”). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner and ION have spun a “web
`of interlaced interests and unified legal efforts regarding the ’607 patent,
`infringement liability therefor and the validity thereof,” but collaboration, by
`itself, is not evidence that ION has any involvement, either by way of
`control or funding the filing of this Petition. Prelim. Resp. 15.
`Patent Owner has not provided evidence, or facts, that give rise to a
`showing of privity between ION and Petitioner. None of the evidence cited
`by Patent Owner, on the record before us, is indicative of the existence,
`much less consummation, of an indemnification agreement for patent
`infringement litigation, or IPR proceedings, between ION and Petitioner.
`Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner was never served as a party
`defendant in the ION lawsuit. Indemnification to fund or defend a lawsuit,
`arises only upon service of the lawsuit upon the defendant. See Atlanta Gas
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`Light Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc., Case IPR2013-00453, slip op.
`at 16 (PTAB Jan. 22, 2014) (Paper 31) (“Patent Owner’s privity theory relies
`fundamentally on [Indemnitor] having the right to control Petitioner’s
`involvement in this proceeding—a right that, at best, arises from Petitioner
`having been served with the complaint in the district court proceeding.”).
`Because Petitioner was never served as a defendant in the ION lawsuit, no
`indemnity impacting funding or control of such a defense could have arisen
`in that proceeding.
`The fact that Petitioner has argued in district court that judgment
`against ION (in the ION lawsuit) would, if affirmed, render the recovery
`against Petitioner duplicative, or upon reversal or remand, eliminate Patent
`Owner’s patent claims against Petitioner, also does not implicate specific
`control or funding by ION. Patent Owner has failed to explain why such an
`argument, while indicative of a customer-client relationship, establishes
`privity between ION and Petitioner. Specifically, Patent Owner does not
`describe how either scenario is determinative of control or funding of this
`proceeding. The outcome in both scenarios could be potentially applicable
`to ION’s customers regardless of privity.
`Therefore, we conclude that institution of an inter partes review is not
`barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`We turn now to Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability, and
`Patent Owner’s arguments in its Preliminary Response, to determine
`whether Petitioner has met the threshold standard of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`D. Claims 1 and 15 – Anticipation by Workman
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1 and 15 are anticipated by Workman.
`Pet. 10. Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on
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`its assertion that claims 1 and 15 are anticipated by Workman for the reasons
`explained below.
`1. Overview of Workman
`Workman discloses a method for controlling the