throbber
Trials@uspto.gov Paper 16
`Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: January 13, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, BARBARA A. PARVIS, and
`GREGG I. ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 1
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`On July 8, 2013, Toyota Motor Corporation (“Toyota” or
`
`“Petitioner”) filed a petition (Paper 3, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes
`
`review of claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`6,738,697 (Ex. 1101, “the ‟697 patent”). American Vehicular Sciences LLC
`
`(“AVS” or “Patent Owner”) filed a preliminary response (Paper 15, “Prelim.
`
`Resp.”) on October 17, 2013. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`
`The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) which provides as follows:
`
`THRESHOLD -- The Director may not authorize an inter partes
`review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
`information presented in the petition filed under section 311
`and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
`
`Upon consideration of Toyota‟s petition and AVS‟s preliminary
`
`response, we determine that Toyota has established a reasonable likelihood
`
`that Toyota would prevail in showing the unpatentability of each of claims 1,
`
`2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61 of the ‟697 patent. Accordingly,
`
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we institute an inter partes review as to claims
`
`1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61 of the ‟697 patent.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`
`
`
`Toyota indicates that the ‟697 patent has been asserted by AVS in the
`
`following district court cases: (1) American Vehicular Sciences LLC v.
`
`Toyota Motor Corp., et al., No. 6:12-CV-405 (E.D. Tex. filed June 25,
`
`2012) (hereinafter, “the ‟405 Litigation”); (2) American Vehicular Sciences
`
`LLC v. BMW Grp. A/K/A BMW AG et al., No. 6:12-CV-412 (E.D. Tex. filed
`
`2
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 2
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`June 25, 2012); (3) American Vehicular Sciences LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co.
`
`et al., No. 6:12-CV-776 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 15, 2012); (4) American
`
`Vehicular Sciences LLC v. Kia Motors Corp., No. 6:13-CV-148 (E.D. Tex.
`
`filed Feb. 13, 2013); (5) American Vehicular Sciences LLC v. American
`
`Honda Motor Co., Inc. et al., No. 6:13-CV-226 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 8,
`
`2013); and (6) American Vehicular Sciences LLC v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.
`
`Intl., Inc., No. 6:13-CV-310 (E.D. Tex. filed Apr. 3, 2013). Pet. 1-2. Toyota
`
`further indicates that its petition was filed “simultaneously” with a petition
`
`in IPR2013-00412, which also involves the ‟697 patent. Pet. 2.
`
`B. The ’697 Patent Disclosure
`
`
`
`The disclosed invention of the ‟697 patent is directed to a vehicle
`
`diagnostic system that diagnoses the state of a vehicle or the state of a
`
`component of the vehicle, and generates an output indicative or
`
`representative of that diagnosed state. Ex. 1101, Abstract. A
`
`communications device transmits that output to a remote location, possibly
`
`via a satellite or the Internet. Ex. 1101, Abstract. In that regard, the
`
`specification further states:
`
`Transmission of the output to a remote location may entail
`arranging a communications device comprising a cellular
`telephone system including an antenna on the vehicle. The
`output may be to a satellite for transmission from the satellite to
`the remote location. The output could also be transmitted via
`the Internet to a web site or host computer associated with the
`remote location.
`
`Ex. 1101, 14:20-26.
`
`
`
`The Field of the Invention portion of the disclosure states that the
`
`invention relates to methods and apparatus for diagnosing components in a
`
`vehicle and transmitting data relating to the diagnosis, and other information
`
`3
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 3
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`relating to the operating conditions of the vehicle, to one or more remote
`
`locations via a telematics link. Ex. 1101, 1:37-42.
`
`
`
`The Objects of the Invention portion of the disclosure states that it is
`
`an object of the invention to provide a new and improved method and
`
`system for diagnosing components in a vehicle and the operating status of
`
`the vehicle, and for alerting the vehicle‟s dealer, or another repair facility,
`
`via a telematics link, that a component of the vehicle is functioning
`
`abnormally and may be in danger of failing. Ex. 1101, 11:26-31.
`
`C. Exemplary Claims
`
`
`
`Of the challenged claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61,
`
`only claims 1 and 21 are independent claims. Claims 2, 5, 10, and 17-20
`
`each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1, and claims 26, 27, 32, 40,
`
`and 61 each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 21. Claims 1 and 21
`
`are reproduced below:
`
`1.
`
`A vehicle, comprising:
`
`
`
`a diagnostic system arranged on the vehicle to diagnose
`the state of the vehicle or the state of a component of the
`vehicle and generate an output indicative or representative
`thereof; and
`
`
`
`a communication device coupled to said diagnostic
`system and arranged to automatically establish a
`communications channel between the vehicle and a remote
`facility without manual intervention and wirelessly transmit the
`output of said diagnostic system to the remote facility.
`
`
`21. A method for monitoring a vehicle, comprising the steps
`of:
`
`
`
`
`diagnosing the state of the vehicle or the state of a
`
`4
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 4
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`
`component of the vehicle by means of a diagnostic system
`arranged on the vehicle;
`
`
`
`generating an output indicative or representative of the
`diagnosed state of the vehicle or the diagnosed state of the
`component of the vehicle; and
`
`
`
`transmitting the output indicative or representative of the
`diagnosed state of the vehicle or the diagnosed state of the
`component of the vehicle from the vehicle to a remote location.
`
`(emphasis added).
`
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`
`Simms
`DiLullo
`
`Patent 5,334,974 Aug. 2, 1994
`Patent 4,897,642
`Jan. 30, 1990
`
`Ex. 1102
`Ex. 1103
`
`E. Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`
`
`
`Claims
`
`Ground
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26,
`27, 32, 40, and 61
`Claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17, 18, 19,
`21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61
`Claims 5, 18, 20, 26, and 27
`
`§§ 102(a) and
`102(e)
`§ 102(b)
`
`Simms
`
`DiLullo
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Simms and DiLullo
`
`
`In support of the grounds above, Toyota also presents a Declaration
`
`by Mr. Scott Andrews (Ex. 1106).
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`Principles of Law
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`
`5
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 5
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14,
`
`2012). The terms also are given their ordinary and customary meaning as
`
`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the
`
`disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007). If an inventor acts as his or her own lexicographer, the definition
`
`must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness,
`
`and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d
`
`1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`
`
`An extraneous limitation should not be read into the claims from the
`
`specification. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
`
`Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is one
`
`the presence of which in a claim is unnecessary for the purpose of making
`
`sense of the claim. See, e.g., In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1994); Renishaw PLC, 158 F.3d at 1249. The construction that stays true to
`
`the claim language and most naturally aligns with the inventor‟s description
`
`is likely the correct interpretation. See Renishaw PLC, 158 F.3d at 1250.
`
`
`
` “Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language, which means
`
`that the named elements are essential, but other elements also may be
`
`included to constitute additional components within the scope of the claim.
`
`Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`“component”
`
`
`
`Independent claims 1 and 21 both recite the term “component.”
`
`According to Toyota, “component” means “any part or assembly of parts
`
`which is mounted to or a part of a motor vehicle and which is capable of
`
`emitting a signal representative of its operating state.” Pet. 5. Toyota cites
`
`6
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 6
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`the specification, which states:
`
`The term “component” refers to any part or assembly of
`
`parts which is mounted to or a part of a motor vehicle and
`which is capable of emitting a signal representative of its
`operating state.
`
`Ex. 1101, 30:58-61.
`
`
`
`Toyota does not contend that the named inventor of the ‟697 patent
`
`acted as his own lexicographer and coined a new meaning for the term
`
`“component” different from the ordinary and customary meaning, as would
`
`be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. Neither does AVS.
`
`Also, the above-quoted language does not appear to be in the form of a
`
`definition. Rather, the text is a portion of the description of preferred
`
`embodiments, and uses the words “refers to” after the term “component.”
`
`The evidence falls short of the standard required for recognizing a new
`
`definition, i.e., reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. We do not
`
`regard the above-quoted text as setting forth the inventor‟s special definition
`
`for the term “component.” Instead, the text describes how components
`
`operate and interact with other elements in an operative environment.
`
`
`
`The Board construes “component” as “a part or an assembly of parts,
`
`less than the whole.” Based on the term itself, “component” does not have
`
`to relate to a motor vehicle; nor does it have to be capable of emitting a
`
`signal representative of its operating state.
`
`“part”
`
`
`
`Claim 17 recites the term “part.” According to Toyota, “part” means
`
`“any component, sensor, system or subsystem of the vehicle such as the
`
`steering system, braking system, throttle system, navigation system, airbag
`
`system, seatbelt retractor, air bag inflation valve, air bag inflation controller
`
`7
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 7
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`and air bag vent valve, as well as those listed below in the definitions of
`
`„component‟ and „sensor.‟” Pet. 6. Toyota cites the specification, which
`
`states:
`
`As used herein, a “part” of the vehicle includes any
`
`component, sensor, system or subsystem of the vehicle such as
`the steering system, braking system, throttle system, navigation
`system, airbag system, seatbelt retractor, air bag inflation valve,
`air bag inflation controller and airbag vent valve, as well as
`those listed below in the definitions of “component” and
`“sensor”.
`
`Ex. 1101, 10:51-57.
`
`
`
`Toyota does not contend that the named inventor of the ‟697 patent
`
`acted as his own lexicographer and coined a new meaning for the term
`
`“part” different from the ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
`
`understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. Neither does AVS. Also,
`
`the above-quoted language does not appear to be in the form of a definition
`
`for the word “part.” Rather, the text is about what would be regarded as a
`
`part of the vehicle that is described in the specification.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, we do not regard the above-quoted text as setting forth
`
`the inventor‟s special definition for the term “part.” On this record, the term
`
`“part” does not require express construction. The record does not indicate
`
`that the ordinary and customary meaning of the word, from the perspective
`
`of one with ordinary skill in the art, is different from the word‟s plain and
`
`ordinary usage in the English language.
`
`“sensor system”
`
`
`
`Claim 10 recites the term “sensor system.” According to Toyota,
`
`“sensor system” means “any of the sensors listed below in the definition of
`
`„sensor‟ as well as any type of component or assembly of components which
`
`8
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 8
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`detect, sense or measure something.” Pet. 7. In that regard, the
`
`specification states:
`
`As used herein, a “sensor system” includes any of the
`
`sensors listed below in the definition of “sensor” as well as any
`type of component or assembly of components which detect,
`sense, or measure something.
`
`Ex. 1101, 10:58-61.
`
`The cited portion of the specification does not support adequately
`
`Toyota‟s proposed construction. Toyota has not contended that the inventor
`
`acted as his own lexicographer in coining a special meaning for a common
`
`term “sensor system.” Neither has AVS. Also, the above-reproduced text
`
`refers to what a sensor system includes, not what it is.
`
`Moreover, with regard to the phrase “as well as any type of
`
`component or assembly of components which detect, sense, or measure
`
`something,” we note that it amounts to impermissible functional claiming.
`
`The language does not invoke means-plus-function treatment under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.1
`
`
`
`Furthermore, the above-quoted text is circular, in that it uses the term
`
`sense to describe a sensor system. It also is unclear in what ways “measure”
`
`and “detect” differ from “sense.”
`
`
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, we do not regard the above-quoted
`
`text as setting forth the inventor‟s special definition for the term “sensor
`
`system.” On this record, the term “sensor system” does not require an
`
`1 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
`29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (“AIA”), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,
`as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ‟697 patent has a filing date before
`September 16, 2012 (effective date of AIA), we use the citation “§ 112, ¶ 6.”
`
`
`
`9
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 9
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`express construction. We agree, however, that under the rule of broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation, the term “sensor system” includes each of the
`
`sensors particularly identified in the specification of the ‟697 patent.
`
`“sensor”
`
`Dependent claims 2, 10, and 32 each recite the term “sensor.”
`
`According to Toyota, the term “sensor” means “any measuring or sensing
`
`device mounted on a vehicle or any of its components including new sensors
`
`mounted in conjunction with the diagnostic module in accordance with the
`
`invention.” Pet. 6. Toyota cites to the specification, which states in part:
`
`The term “sensor” refers to any measuring or sensing device
`mounted on a vehicle or any of its components including new
`sensors mounted in conjunction with the diagnostic module in
`accordance with the invention. A partial, non-exhaustive list of
`common sensors mounted on an automobile or truck is: . . . .
`
`Ex. 1101, 31:23-29.
`
`Neither Toyota nor AVS contends that the named inventor of the ‟697
`
`patent acted as his own lexicographer and coined a new meaning for the
`
`term “sensor” different from the ordinary and customary meaning as would
`
`be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. The above-referenced
`
`excerpt does not give one of ordinary skill adequate notice of a change in the
`
`meaning of a common term or intent to redefine the term. See In re Paulsen,
`
`30 F.3d at 1480. Also, the text is in a portion of the description of preferred
`
`embodiments, uses the words “refers to,” and is followed by “a non-
`
`exhaustive list” of more than forty exemplary automobile or truck sensors.
`
`Regarding the portion of Toyota‟s proposed construction defining
`
`“sensor” as a “measuring or sensing device,” neither Toyota nor AVS
`
`explains how a “sensor” measures without also sensing. Additionally,
`
`10
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 10
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`defining “sensor” to mean a “sensing device” is circular and, thus, not
`
`meaningful.
`
`Concerning the portion of Toyota‟s proposed construction defining
`
`“sensor” as “any . . . device mounted on a vehicle or any of its components,”
`
`we note that the requirement of being mounted on a vehicle is extraneous as
`
`far as the claimed subject matter is concerned. Toyota has not provided a
`
`persuasive reason for reading into the ordinary meaning of “sensor” the
`
`requirement of being mounted on a vehicle.
`
`For all the foregoing reasons, we do not regard the above-quoted text
`
`as setting forth AVS‟s special definition for “sensor.” The term possesses
`
`its ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one with
`
`ordinary skill, and does not require an express construction. We agree,
`
`however, that the term “sensor” includes each of the sensors particularly
`
`identified in the specification of the ‟697 Patent.
`
`“state of the vehicle”
`
`
`
`Independent claims 1 and 21 both recite the term “state of the
`
`vehicle.” According to Toyota, “state of the vehicle” means “diagnosis of
`
`the condition of the vehicle with respect to its stability and proper running
`
`and operating condition.” Pet. 7. Toyota cites to the specification, which
`
`states:
`
`As used herein, a diagnosis of the “state of the vehicle”
`
`means a diagnosis of the condition of the vehicle with respect to
`its stability and proper running and operating condition.
`
`Ex. 1101, 10:29-32.
`
`
`
`The cited portion of the specification does not support adequately
`
`Toyota‟s proposed construction. The above-quoted text refers to and
`
`11
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 11
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`explains “a diagnosis” of the state of a vehicle, not what constitutes “state of
`
`the vehicle.” On this record, the term “state of the vehicle” does not require
`
`an express construction.
`
`“diagnosis of the state of the vehicle”
`
`
`
`Claim 1 recites “to diagnose the state of the vehicle or the state of a
`
`component of the vehicle.” Claim 21 recites “diagnosing the state of the
`
`vehicle or the state of a component of the vehicle.” AVS contends that
`
`“diagnosis of the state of the vehicle” means “diagnosis of the condition of
`
`the vehicle with respect to its stability and proper running and operating
`
`condition.” Prelim. Resp. 8-9. The contention is supported by the above-
`
`quoted portion of the specification. Ex. 1101, 10:29-32. On this record, we
`
`are persuaded that AVS‟s proposed construction applies to “diagnose the
`
`state of the vehicle,” as recited in claim 1, and “diagnosing the state of the
`
`vehicle,” as recited in claim 21.
`
`AVS proposes similar constructions for the following related terms:
`
`“output indicative or representative of the diagnosed state of the vehicle or
`
`the diagnosed state of the component of the vehicle,” recited in claim 21,
`
`and “output indicative or representative thereof,” recited in claim 1.
`
`Prelim. Resp. 9. On this record, these related terms do not require any
`
`additional construction.
`
`“control at least one part of the vehicle”
`
`
`
`Claim 17 recites the phrase “control at least one part of the vehicle.”
`
`AVS contends that the phrase means “variably directing the operation of at
`
`least one part of the vehicle.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1101, 41:9-18)..
`
`Our review of the cited portion of the specification reveals only examples of
`
`what action may be taken, not any restrictive definition. On this record, an
`
`12
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 12
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`express construction of this term is not needed. It suffices to say that the
`
`term is not limited to controlling any particular type or kind of “part” of the
`
`vehicle.
`
`“display”
`
`
`
`Claim 5 recites the term “display.” AVS contends that “display”
`
`means “a screen for showing information, as opposed to a warning lamp.”
`
`Prelim. Resp. 9-10. According to AVS, the specification clearly
`
`distinguishes a display from a warning lamp. AVS cites to the specification,
`
`which states in part: “The [output system] may be a display as mentioned
`
`above or a warning device.” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1101, 81:32-36).
`
`AVS also cites to a portion of the specification that refers to a display
`
`separately from a warning device. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1101, 13:24-
`
`33). Having considered the portions of the specification cited by AVS, we
`
`agree with AVS that, in the context of the ‟697 patent, a warning lamp or
`
`light does not constitute a “display,” and that a “display” covers a screen for
`
`showing information.
`
`“display . . . arranged to display the diagnosis”
`
`
`
`Claim 5 recites the phrase “display . . . arranged to display the
`
`diagnosis.” AVS contends that the phrase means “the display shows the
`
`diagnosis output from the diagnostic system arranged on the vehicle.”
`
`Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 1101, 13:24-28).
`
`
`
`AVS‟s contention follows from a plain reading of the phrase in the
`
`claim. Claim 5 depends from claim 1. Claim 1 recites “a diagnostic system
`
`arranged on the vehicle” that generates an output. Thus, the reference in
`
`claim 5 to “the diagnosis” refers back to a diagnosis from the diagnostic
`
`system arranged on the vehicle. On this record, an express construction of
`
`13
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 13
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`“display . . . arranged to display the diagnosis” is not needed.
`B. Alleged Anticipation of Claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21,
`26, 27, 32, 40, and 61, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(e), by
`Simms
`
`Toyota contends that claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61
`
`are anticipated, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(e), by Simms. Pet. 11-
`
`32. In light of the arguments and evidence submitted by both parties, Toyota
`
`has not established a reasonable likelihood that any of claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-
`
`21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61 is anticipated by Simms.
`
`Regarding Toyota‟s assertion of Simms as prior art under
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or, alternatively, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), Toyota
`
`submitted as Exhibit 1102 a copy of U.S. Patent No. 5,334,974 to Simms
`
`(“Simms”), which shows on the face of the patent an issue date of August 2,
`
`1994. The face of Simms also indicates that the patent granted from an
`
`application that was filed in the United States on February 6, 1992. AVS
`
`claims a priority date of June 7, 1995, for the ‟697 Patent. Prelim. Resp. 2.
`
`Thus, based on this record, Toyota has established a reasonable likelihood
`
`that Simms issued in the United States before the invention by AVS and,
`
`therefore, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Additionally, based on this
`
`record, Toyota has established a reasonable likelihood that Simms was
`
`granted on an application filed in the United States before the invention by
`
`AVS and, therefore, is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
`
`Simms
`
`Simms discloses a personal security system, an embodiment of which
`
`is illustrated in Figure 1, reproduced below:
`
`14
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 14
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, the personal security system described in
`
`Simms includes mobile security assembly 30 incorporated in automobile 20.
`
`Ex. 1102, 5:4-8. An antenna on automobile 20 establishes a communication
`
`link via satellite. Id. at 3:48-54. Once a communication link is established,
`
`mobile security assembly 30 communicates via the communication link
`
`location data as well as emergency and personal information to central
`
`dispatch station 40, which is manned by a central dispatch operator. Id. at
`
`5:12-23.
`
`Central dispatch station 40 comprises touch-tone telephone 48
`
`connected to communications console 42, which in turn is connected to one
`
`or more display consoles 49. Ex. 1102, col. 12:51-56. An incoming call is
`
`received by communication console 42 via touch-tone telephone 48 and
`
`modem 46. Id. at 12:59-63. One or more display consoles 49 are connected
`
`via a network to communication console 42 so that incoming personal
`
`security messages may be allocated as appropriate to one or more display
`
`15
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 15
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`consoles 49, for example, to accommodate a high frequency of incoming
`
`calls. Id. at 12:63-68.
`
`Whether Simms Anticipates Any of
`Claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 17-21, 26, 27, 32, 40, and 61
`
`The independent claims are 1 and 21. Each of claims 2, 5, 10, and 17
`
`through 20 depends, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Each of claims 26,
`
`27, 32, 40, and 61 depends directly from claim 21.
`
`Apparatus claim 1 recites a vehicle, comprising a diagnostic system,
`
`arranged on the vehicle, to diagnose the state of the vehicle or the state of a
`
`component of the vehicle, and to generate an output indicative or
`
`representative of that state. Method claim 21 recites a method for
`
`monitoring a vehicle, comprising the steps of (1) diagnosing the state of the
`
`vehicle or the state of a component of the vehicle by means of a diagnostic
`
`system arranged on the vehicle, and (2) generating an output indicative or
`
`representative of that diagnosed state.
`
`AVS asserts that Simms does not teach diagnosis being performed
`
`onboard a vehicle, as required by claims 1 and 21. Prelim. Resp. 14. AVS
`
`asserts that “it is not enough for an on-board vehicle processor to merely
`
`collect sensor data—it must actually diagnose the state of the vehicle or
`
`components.” Id. As discussed above, claims 1 and 21 each recite “a
`
`diagnostic system arranged on the vehicle.” It follows from this recitation
`
`that the components that actually perform the substantive diagnostic
`
`processing must be located on the vehicle.
`
`Toyota asserts that this limitation of claims 1 and 21 is met by a
`
`microcontroller that monitors signals from various sensors. Pet. 15. Toyota
`
`supports its assertion by citing to description in Simms of mobile security
`
`assembly 30, including mobile unit 32 and a plurality of remote sensors 41.
`
`16
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 16
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`Pet. 17-19 (citing Ex. 1102, 4:4-18; 6:7-11, 19-30; 7:5-8, 23-25; 8:16-25;
`
`11:65-12:11; Figs. 4, 6A).
`
`Toyota notes that the system described in Simms monitors a variety of
`
`remote sensors. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1102, 6:19-30; 1:33-34); see also Pet. 17
`
`(citing Ex. 1102, 6:19-30). Toyota‟s assertion is supported by the record.
`
`Simms describes that mobile security assembly 30 includes remote sensors
`
`41. Ex. 1102, 6:7-11. Simms also describes that remote sensors 41
`
`automatically initiate specific help requests upon detecting various alarm
`
`conditions. Id. at 6:19-20. Exemplary remote sensors identified in Simms
`
`include: (1) “smoke or heat detectors for detecting a fire within the vehicle”
`
`(Ex. 1102, 6:21-22); (2) “a tamper switch or motion detector for detecting
`
`possible theft of the vehicle” (Id. at 6:23-24); (3) “an impact detector for
`
`detecting a collision” (Id. at 6:24-25); and (4) “a sensor for detecting
`
`activation of a vehicle air-bag” (Id. at 6:25-26).
`
`Toyota further asserts that these remote sensors diagnose “various
`
`vehicle emergencies (such as fire, theft, collision, airbag activation, vehicle
`
`breakdown, or the like).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1102, 6:19-30; 1:33-34).
`
`However, as described in Simms, these remote sensors provide raw sensor
`
`data. Smoke and heat detectors detect smoke and heat nearby. Similarly,
`
`tamper switches, motion detectors, and impact detectors detect interference,
`
`detect motion, and detect impact, respectively.
`
`Toyota further supports its assertion with the declaration of an expert,
`
`Mr. Andrews. Ex. 1106 ¶¶ 44-46, 56-58. Mr. Andrews states that Simms
`
`describes that “[v]arious vehicle conditions can be diagnosed, including an
`
`„accident‟ or „vehicle breakdown.‟” Ex. 1106 ¶ 45. Mr. Andrews cites to a
`
`portion of Simms that states: “[e]mergency situations may arise as the result
`
`17
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 17
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`of an accident or vehicle breakdown.” Ex. 1102, 1:33-34. This sentence is
`
`found in a section describing background. Ex. 1102, 1:25. The excerpt
`
`describes situations that may arise, rather than a diagnosis performed by the
`
`system described in Simms.
`
`Mr. Andrews also states that the microcontroller illustrated in Figure 4
`
`of Simms receives input from remote sensors and generates diagnostic
`
`outputs as a result. Ex. 1106 ¶ 45. Mr. Andrews follows the statement with
`
`a reproduction of Figure 4 of the Simms patent showing microcontroller 310
`
`and remote sensors 41 shaded in gray. Id.
`
`Simms describes the operation of microcontroller 310 shown in
`
`Figure 4 as follows. After mobile security assembly 30 is activated (Ex.
`
`1102, 10:53-55) and microcontroller 310 reads identification information
`
`and requests new position information (Id. at 10:55-62), microcontroller 310
`
`polls remote sensors 41 and push button switches 33 to determine whether a
`
`personal security situation exists. Id. at 11:65-67. Thus, the components
`
`identified by Mr. Andrews in Figure 4, microcontroller 310 and remote
`
`sensors 41, merely involve microprocessor 310 polling raw sensor data from
`
`remote sensors 41.
`
`The description in Simms continues: “if a personal security situation
`
`is detected . . . microcontroller 310 attempts to transmit the personal
`
`security system message.” Ex. 1102, 12:7-11. In the claim chart for this
`
`element, Toyota also cites to additional description that Simms provides of
`
`the message: “[t]he processor is activated upon occurrence of an alarm
`
`condition to input position coordinates from the LORAN-C receiver, and to
`
`compose a digital code corresponding to the alarm condition, to the
`
`identification information, and to the position coordinates.” Pet. 17 (citing
`
`18
`
`Honda Exhibit 1013
`Page 18
`
`

`
`Case IPR2013-00413
`Patent 6,738,697
`
`Id. at 4:14-18 (emphasis added)). However, the code corresponding to an
`
`alarm simply identifies an activated sensor. Toyota has not shown
`
`adequately how substantive diagnostic processing is performed on the
`
`vehicle.
`
`Additional description in Simms further indicates that substantive
`
`diagnostic processing is not performed on the vehicle. The various vehicle
`
`emergencies must be confirmed by a person: “six push buttons 33 which are
`
`mounted on the face . . . allow the mobile person to manually enter and
`
`confirm that a personal security situation has arisen.” Ex. 1102, 6:31-35.
`
`Confirmation by a mobile person completes a call for help: “[f]our of the
`
`push buttons 33 are dedicated to each of four common types of emergency
`
`assistance, i.e., fire, paramedics, police, and roadside service . . . .” Ex.
`
`1102, 6:36-39. Thus, we are not persuaded that Simms describes substantive
`
`diagnostic processing that is performed on the vehicle.
`
`AVS also argues that Simms is concerned with monitoring the
`
`personal security of a passenger, rather than the operating state of the vehicle
`
`and its components. Prelim. Resp. 14. As discussed above, under the
`
`Board‟s construction, the diagnosis of the state of the vehicle, as required by
`
`each of claims 1 and 21, must be of “the condition of the vehicle with
`
`respect to its stability and proper running and operating condition.”
`
`The mobile security assembly described in Simms is part of a personal
`
`security system. Ex. 1102, Abstract. The personal security system need not
`
`be used in connection with a vehicle, but, instead, “may be hand-carried by a
`
`pedestrian” (Ex. 1102, 5:10-11) or used “wherever the personal security of a
`
`mobile person is compromised” (Ex. 1102, 1:11-12). Nonetheless, because
`
`the system simply passes along the identity o

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket