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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0496
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`Paper No.
`Filed: July 17, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
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`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`MICROSOFT CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00610
`Patent 7,490,151
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151
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`
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`
`

`

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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`Table of Contents
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii) .............. 2
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 3
`
`C. Microsoft’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. §
`325(d) .................................................................................................... 9
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds .............................................................................11
`
`The Two Documents Dubbed “Aventail” Cannot Anticipate
`Any Claim ...........................................................................................14
`
`The Petition Fails to Present Any Cognizable Obviousness
`Position Based on the Aventail Documents ........................................16
`
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................17
`
`A. Overview of the ’151 Patent ................................................................18
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................19
`
`“Domain Name” (Not a Separate Claim Term) ..................................21
`
`“DNS Request” (Claims 1, 7, and 13) .................................................22
`
`“Secure Server” (Claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14) ...................................23
`
`“Automatically Initiating/Creating an Encrypted/Secure
`Channel” (Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, and 13) .................................................24
`
`“Client” (Claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14) ................................................25
`
`“Between [A] and [B]” (Claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14) ........................29
`
`i
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`IV.
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`V.
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`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................29
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`Conclusion .....................................................................................................30
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`ii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ...................................................... 4
`
`Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`725 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 14, 15
`
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................... 4
`
`Boku, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.,
`CBM2014-00140, Paper No. 4 (June 12, 2014) ............................................... 2, 3
`
`CallCopy, Inc. v. Verint Ams., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00486, Paper No. 11 (Feb. 5, 2014) .................................................... 16
`
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) .................................................... 5
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 28
`
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. Autoalert, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00220, Paper No. 13 (Oct. 10, 2013) .................................................. 17
`
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) .............................................. 12, 14
`
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .................................................. 4, 8
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .......................................................................................... 16, 17
`
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................. 12
`
`iii
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`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 (Nov. 21, 2013) ................................................. 10
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`
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`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) ............................................ 12, 13
`
`Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00436, Paper No. 17 (June 19, 2014) .................................................. 10
`
`Prism Pharma Co., Ltd., v. Choongwae Pharma Corp.,
`IPR2014-00315, Paper No. 14 (July 8, 2014) ...................................................... 9
`
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., Case
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ................................................. 12
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................... 5
`
`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) ...................................................... 4
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`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................... 4
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ............................................................................................. 16, 17
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`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) ................................................................................................... 15
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`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ..................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 8
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`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ......................................................................................... 3, 4, 8
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 30
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ....................................................................................... 1, 2, 9, 11
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`iv
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`Regulations
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`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii) ................................................................................... 1, 2, 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 30
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 30
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ............................................................................................ 1, 3
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................ 4, 8
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ........................................................................................ 4, 8
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`Other Authorities
`
`157 Cong. Rec. S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) ................................................... 9
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012).......................................................................... 9
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`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012).......................................................................... 9
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`v
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`I.
`
`Introduction
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`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
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`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Microsoft Corporation
`
`against VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 7,490,151 (“the ’151 patent”). VirnetX requests
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`that the Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
`
`First, the Petition fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii) because it
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`uses a font that the Board has deemed noncompliant for being too narrow. The
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`result is that Microsoft’s Petition contains additional arguments that it could not
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`otherwise have made if written in a compliant font.
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`Second, Microsoft fails to identify where the prior art discloses each claimed
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`feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
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`Third, this proceeding is duplicative of other actions before the Office and
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`should be dismissed under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Office currently has two inter
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`partes reexamination proceedings against the ’151 patent. Another set of Office
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`proceedings against the ’151 patent, as Microsoft requests here, is unnecessary and
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`burdens both the Office and VirnetX. In addition, the primary prior art references
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`Microsoft relies on here are already being considered by the Office in the ongoing
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`reexaminations of the ’151 patent. Section 325(d) was designed to avoid the type
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`of serial challenge Microsoft requests.
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`Fourth, Microsoft proposes redundant grounds without identifying how any
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`one ground improves on any other, violating Board precedent requiring petitioners
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`to identify differences in the proposed rejections.
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`Fifth, Microsoft attempts to combine two references in an anticipation
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`analysis, in violation of Federal Circuit case law.
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`Sixth, Microsoft presents backup obviousness arguments that lack any
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`analysis, in violation of Supreme Court precedent.
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`Finally, Microsoft proposes incorrect claim constructions. Because its
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`unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Microsoft
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`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
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`unpatentability of any ’135 patent claim.
`
`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Fails to Comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii)
`The Board has held that Arial Narrow font does not comply with the
`
`requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii). See, e.g., Boku, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.,
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`CBM2014-00140, Paper No. 4 at 2 (June 12, 2014). Microsoft’s Petition uses this
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`font, so it fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(2)(ii). This is not merely a
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`procedural defect, but instead affects the substance of the Petition. In Boku, the
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`2
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`petitioner had to drop an entire seven-page argument to ensure that its petition was
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`page-compliant when converted to an appropriate font. Boku, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.,
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`CBM2014-00140, Paper No. 5 at 1 (June 16, 2014) (“The font change has caused
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`Petitioners to remove all arguments with respect to claim 17 and to submit them in
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`a second petition.”). Microsoft’s Petition is already 60 pages long in Arial Narrow,
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`so Microsoft would similarly need to remove content to comply with 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.6(a)(2)(ii). Like in Boku, the Board should find that Microsoft’s Petition is
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`defective. Accordingly, the Board should not institute Microsoft’s defective
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`Petition. If the Board sees fit to allow Microsoft to file a corrected petition, it
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`should only permit Microsoft to remove arguments and not make other substantive
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`changes.
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`B.
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`Microsoft’s Petition fails to identify where in Kiuchi or the Aventail
`
`documents1 all of the elements of the challenged claims are allegedly found. For
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`Kiuchi, the Petition and accompanying declaration attempt to add a “determining”
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`feature to Kiuchi’s “client-side proxy” that Kiuchi itself does not disclose. But the
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`Petition itself expressly states that the “determining” it points to occurs at the “C-
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`1 As discussed below, the Aventail documents consist of two separate
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`documents, merged by Microsoft into a single PDF file.
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`3
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`HTTP name server,” not the client-side proxy. And for the Aventail documents,
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`the Petition’s anticipation theory directly conflicts with the portions of the
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`references it cites. The Petition should be denied under 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
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`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)-(5) based on these substantive defects.
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`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
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`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
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`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
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`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
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`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
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`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
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`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
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`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
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`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
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`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
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`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
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`prior art); Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054,
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`Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103,
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`Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc., IPR2013-
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`4
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`00186, Paper No. 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`Corp., IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013). As the Board has
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`explained, it will not “search the record and piece together any evidence or
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`arguments that may support Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” CaptionCall, LLC
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`v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014).
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`Here, the Petition asserts that Kiuchi’s “client-side proxy is a domain name
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`server (DNS) proxy module,” as recited in claim 1. (Pet. at 18.) For this assertion
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`to be valid, Kiuchi’s “client-side proxy” would have to perform the step of
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`“determining whether the intercepted DNS request corresponds to a secure server,”
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`as claim 1 also recites. Kiuchi does not disclose this, as even the Petition and
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`accompanying declaration indicate.
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`In particular, the Petition contends that a “DNS request corresponds to a
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`secure server” when, in Kiuchi, a “hostname corresponds to an origin server behind
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`a server-side proxy.” (Id. at 19.) As the Petition explains, Kiuchi’s client-side
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`proxy “ask[s] ‘the C-HTTP name server whether it can communicate with the host
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`specified in a given URL.’” (Id. at 21 (emphases added).) The C-HTTP name
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`server, not the client-side proxy, then determines whether the hostname
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`corresponds to an origin server behind the server-side proxy.
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`According to Kiuchi, “the [C-HTTP] name server confirms that the query is
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`legitimate, it examines whether the requested server-side proxy is registered in the
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`closed network and is permitted to accept the connection from the client-side
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`proxy.” (Ex. 1018, p. 65, § 2.3(2).) Even the cited portions of the accompanying
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`declaration describe how the C-HTTP name server determines whether the
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`hostname corresponds to a server-side proxy within the closed network. (See
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`Ex. 1003 ¶ 62 (“the C-HTTP name server further determines ‘whether the
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`requested server-side proxy is registered in the closed network and is permitted to
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`accept the connection from the client-side proxy.’”).) And while the declarant also
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`states that “the client-side proxy determines that the hostname corresponds to a
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`secure server,” this statement merely parrots the claim language, and is supported
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`only by a general citation to Section 2.3 of Kiuchi which, as described above,
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`explains the determination process of the C-HTTP server, not the client-side proxy.
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`Accordingly, the decision-making step that the Petition points to as the purported
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`“determining” in claim 1 occurs at the C-HTTP name server, not at the client-side
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`proxy (the purported “DNS proxy module”).
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`As further confirmation, the Petition itself later expressly states that “the C-
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`HTTP name server determines whether the request from the client side proxy
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`corresponds to a secure server.” (Pet. at 37 (emphasis added).) Here, the Petition
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`cites the very same paragraph of the accompanying declaration it did when
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`contending that the client-side proxy performs this “determining.” (Id. (citing
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`Ex. 1003 ¶ 65).) And the Petition further repeats this characterization of Kiuchi,
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`6
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`citing Kiuchi itself. (See id. (“the C-HTTP name server determines whether the
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`request corresponds to a secure server.”) (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1018, p. 65,
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`§ 2.3).)
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`The Petition relies on the same deficient application of Kiuchi to
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`independent claims 7 and 13 as it does for independent claim 1. (Pet. at 23-26.)
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`Accordingly, for each independent claim, the Petition both fails to explain how the
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`client-side proxy performs the recited “determining” step, and expressly describes
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`this step as being performed by a different feature of Kiuchi, namely the C-HTTP
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`name server.
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`For the Aventail documents, the Petition’s application of the references to
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`the claimed features of “automatically initiating an encrypted channel between the
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`client and the secure server” directly conflicts with what the references actually
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`state. According to the Petition, a process of creating an encrypted channel “is
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`performed without the involvement of a user” and “[a]s such, this channel is
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`automatically initiated, under that term’s broadest reasonable construction.” (Pet.
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`at 51 (emphasis added).) The portion of the Aventail documents that Microsoft
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`cites for this conclusion (Ex. 1007 at 7) teaches the oppositethat users are
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`involved in creating the channel. Specifically, the Aventail documents state: “In
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`most cases, users will interact with Aventail Connect only when it prompts them to
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`enter authentication credentials for a connection to a secure extranet (SOCKS)
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`7
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`server.” (Ex. 1007 at 7 (emphases added).) Accordingly, Microsoft’s citation for
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`its conclusion about “automatically initiating an encrypted channel is not only
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`unsupported by the portion of the Aventail documents it cites; this portion of the
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`references contradicts Microsoft’s conclusion.
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`The Petition’s deficient application of
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`the Aventail documents
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`to
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`independent claim 1 is repeated for independent claims 7 and 13. (Pet. at 52-54.)
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`Notably, for independent claim 13, the Petition further cites three paragraphs of
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`declarant testimony to support its position on “automatically creating a secure
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`channel,” as recited in that claim. (See id. at 54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22, 27, 45).)
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`Yet none of these paragraphs even purport to address this feature in claim 13.
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`Accordingly, the Petition fails to demonstrate where every feature of any
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`challenged independent claim is found in Kiuchi or the Aventail documents. The
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`Petition lacks the “particularity” required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4), and fails
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`to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or
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`printed publications relied upon” and identify “specific portions of the evidence
`
`that support the challenge,” as required by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4) and
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`42.104(b)(5)). See, e.g., Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347,
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`Paper No. 9 at 19 (May 22, 2014) (finding that petitioners’ “brief summary, and
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`quotations, citations and reproduced figures from” the prior art failed to “(1)
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`specify sufficiently where each element of independent claim 1 is found in [the
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`prior art], and (2) constitute a detailed explanation of the significance of the
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`quotations, citations, and figures from [the prior art].”). Microsoft’s Petition
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`should be denied based on its similar substantive defects.
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`C. Microsoft’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`The Office may deny institution of an IPR if the same or similar prior art has
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`already been presented in another Office proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (“In
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`determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under . . . chapter 31
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`[addressing IPR, among other things], the Director may take into account whether,
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`and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior
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`art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” (emphases added)); see
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`also 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48765 (Aug. 14, 2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 48680, 48685,
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`48702 (Aug. 14, 2012). The purpose of this provision is to avoid “serial
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`challenges” and the resulting burden on the patent owner and Office in managing
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`multiple proceedings involving the same patent. (Ex. 2022 (157 Cong. Rec.
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`S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).)
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`The Board has followed 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny IPR petitions where the
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`same prior art or arguments were presented during examination of the challenged
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`patent or during a prior IPR. See, e.g., Prism Pharma Co., Ltd., v. Choongwae
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`Pharma Corp., IPR2014-00315, Paper No. 14 at 12-13 (July 8, 2014) (denying IPR
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`petition where “[t]he same prior art . . . and arguments” were “previously presented
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`to the Office” during examination); Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`Sys., Inc., IPR2014-00436, Paper No. 17 at 11-12 (June 19, 2014) (denying IPR
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`petition because repetitive arguments and prior art references were raised in
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`petition vis-à-vis earlier IPR proceeding); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
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`Cambridge Ltd., IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 at 6-7 (Nov. 21, 2013) (denying
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`IPR petition where three prior art references were raised in earlier IPR and three
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`were newly raised).
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`Like the petitions in Prism Pharma (involving prior examination) and
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`Medtronic and Intelligent Bio-Systems (involving prior IPRs), Microsoft’s Petition
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`relies on prior art and arguments already presented to the Office. Both primary
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`references asserted
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`in Microsoft’s PetitionKiuchi and
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`the Aventail
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`documentsare involved in ongoing inter partes reexaminations of the ’151
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`patent (Control Nos. 95/001,714 and 95/001,697, which the Office merged).
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`(Ex. 1027 at 109-235.) In fact, both references are presented in a nearly identical
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`manner.
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`The Petition asserts that Kiuchi anticipates claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14, and
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`in the merged reexamination proceedings, a requester alleges that Kiuchi
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`anticipates claims 1-4, 6-10, and 12-16. The Petition also asserts that claims 1, 2,
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`6-8, and 12-14 are anticipated by the Aventail documents, and in the merged
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`reexamination proceedings, a requester alleges that certain Aventail documents
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`10
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`anticipate claims 1-16. (Compare Pet. at 4 with Ex. 1027 at 122, 167.) The
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`similarities also extend to the declarants in each proceeding. Two of the three
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`declarants relied on in the Petitionsee Exs. 1005, 1006also submitted
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`declarations in the merged reexamination proceedings. (See Ex. 1027 at 4 (citing
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`declarations from “Mssrs. Hopen, Fratto, and Chester.”).)
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`Given the duplicative nature of Microsoft’s Petition, this is precisely the
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`type of serial challenge Congress
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`intended
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`to
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`forestall by enacting
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Neither the Board nor VirnetX should be forced to assume the
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`burden of handling duplicative proceedings challenging the ’151 patent involving a
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`common set of prior art references and overlapping declarant testimony.
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`Accordingly, the Board should exercise its discretion and deny the Petition under
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
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`D. The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds
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`The Petition
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`includes numerous
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`redundant grounds of alleged
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`unpatentability. For claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14, the Petition proposes seven
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`different grounds. These grounds demonstrate both horizontal and vertical
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`redundancy. In accordance with Board precedent, the redundant grounds should be
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`denied.
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`The Board does not consider redundant grounds of rejection because it must
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`issue a final written decision within one year of institution (or 18 months for good
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`cause). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003,
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`Case No. IPR2014-00610
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`Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012). Redundant grounds place a significant burden on the
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`Board and the patent owner, and cause unnecessary delay that jeopardizes meeting
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`the statutory deadline for final written decisions. Id.
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`Because “[t]he Board seeks to streamline and converge issues at all phases
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`of the proceeding . . . at [the] time of institution the Board analyzes the petition on
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`a claim-by-claim, ground-by-ground basis, to eliminate redundant grounds.” Idle
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`Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 3 (June 11,
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`2013). The redundancy inquiry does not focus on “whether the applied prior art
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`disclosures have differences, for it is rarely the case that the disclosures of different
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`prior art references, will be literally identical.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web
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`Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3 (June 5, 2013). Instead, the Board
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`considers “whether the petitioner articulated a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” Id. at 3-4. The petitioner carries the
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`burden of articulating that “meaningful distinction.” ScentAir Techs., Inc. v.
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`Prolitec, Inc., Case IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
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`In Liberty Mutual, the Board identified two types of redundant rejections:
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`(1) “horizontally” redundant rejections and (2) “vertically” redundant rejections.
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`Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 at 3. The Board explained that
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`horizontally redundant rejections apply “a plurality of prior art references . . . not
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`in combination to complement each other but as distinct and separate alternatives.”
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`Id. Vertical redundancy “exists when there is assertion of an additional prior art
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`reference to support another ground of unpatentability when a base ground already
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`has been asserted against the same claim without the additional reference and the
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`Petitioner has not explained what are the relative strength and weakness of each
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`ground.” Id. at 12.
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`Here, Microsoft’s grounds based on Kiuchi are horizontally redundant in
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`view of its grounds based on the Aventail documents. In particular, Microsoft
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`contends that claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14 are anticipated by both Kiuchi and the
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`Aventail documents. In addition, each of the five obviousness grounds based on
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`these two references and the same claims is redundant in view of the anticipation
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`grounds and the other obviousness grounds.
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`The Petition also involves vertical redundancy. In particular, the Petition
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`proposes an anticipation ground for claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14 based on Kiuchi,
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`but also proposes three obviousness grounds for the same claims using Kiuchi as
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`the lead reference. Likewise, the Petition proposes an anticipation ground for
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`claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14 based on the Aventail documents, yet also proposes two
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`obviousness grounds for the same claims that also involve the Aventail documents.
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`Microsoft does not “articulate[] a meaningful distinction in terms of relative
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`strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art disclosures to
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`one or more claim limitations” for each of its redundant grounds. EMC Corp. v.
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`Personal Web Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3-4 (June 5, 2013)
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`(emphases added). Instead, the Petition speculates about arguments that VirnetX
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`may make, or arguments that non-parties to this proceeding have made, and
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`proposes additional grounds to supposedly address those arguments. (See, e.g.,
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`Pet. at 28, 31, 43, 44, 56, 57.) Given the large number of redundant grounds
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`proposed by Microsoft, and the fact that each ground relates to the same set of
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`challenged claims, Microsoft’s redundant grounds should be denied.
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`E.
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`The Two Documents Dubbed “Aventail” Cannot Anticipate Any
`Claim
`Aventail is not a single document. It consists of two documents:
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`(1) “Aventail Connect v3.01/v2.51 Administrator’s Guide” (Ex. 1007 at 1-120),
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`and (2) “Aventail ExtraNet Center v3.0 Administrator’s Guide” (id. at 121-94).
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`Microsoft merged these two separate documents into a single PDF file, labeled it
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`“Aventail,” and argues that the merged PDF anticipates claims 1, 2, 6-8, and 12-14.
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`Microsoft disregards the fundamental principle that, “[f]or a prior art reference to
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`anticipate a claim, the reference must disclose each claim limitation in a single
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`document.” Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013).
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`Microsoft contends that the two documents reference each other and
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`“describe the configuration and operation of client and server parts of a single
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`Aventail VPN system.” (Pet. at 45.) If Microsoft seeks to rely on a “system” to
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`challenge claims of the ’151 patent, its challenge is prohibited by statute.
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`35 U.S.C. § 311(b). And to the extent Microsoft contends that “the Aventail
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`Connect document . . . incorporates by reference specific portions of the Aventail
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`Extranet Center document,” it fails to set forth any plausible basis for
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`incorporation-by-reference. Neither document Microsoft seeks to combine
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`contains any incorporation-by-reference language regarding the other document.
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`Microsoft’s only support for its incorporation-by-reference argument is a
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`paragraph in a declaration, which merely states that the documents relate to and
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`reference each other, but does not identify any specific basis for incorporation-by-
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`reference or identify where in the documents such incorporation is invoked. (See
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`Pet. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29; Ex. 1005 ¶ 29).)
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`Microsoft has not met the standard for incorporation by reference. See
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`Apple Inc., 725 F.3d at 1362 (“To incorporate material by reference, the host
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`document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it
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`incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various
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`documents.”); see also Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d
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`1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (treating specifications related the same standard as
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`different documents for purposes of anticipation). Accordingly, Microsoft’s
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`anticipation grounds based on the Aventail documents must be rejected.
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`F.
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`The Petition Fails to Present Any Cognizable Obviousness
`Position Based on the Aventail Documents
`Perhaps recognizing the weakness in its anticipation grounds based on the
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`Aventail documents, Microsoft presents backup obviousness positions that purport
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`to combine the two documents. (