USOO7490151B2
`
`(12) United States Patent
`(10) Patent No.:
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`Munger et al.
`(45) Date of Patent:
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`(54) ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE
`COMMUNICATION LINK BASED ON A
`DOMAIN NAME SERVICE (DNS) REQUEST
`
`(75)
`
`Inventors: Edward Colby Munger, Crownsville,
`MD (US); Robert Dunham Short, III,
`Leesburg, VA (US); Victor Larson,
`Fairfax VA (US) Michael Williamson
`3.
`.
`i
`South R1d1ng, VA (US)
`
`’
`
`(73) Assignee: Virnetx Inc., Scotts Valley Drive, CA
`(US)
`
`( * ) Notice:
`
`Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this
`patent is extended or adjusted under 35
`U.S.C. 154(b) by 818 days.
`
`(21) Appl. N05 10/259’494
`
`(56)
`
`References Cited
`
`U'S' PATENT DOCUMENTS
`4,933,846 A
`6/1990 Humphrey et a1.
`(Continued)
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`199 24 575
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`DE
`
`(Continued)
`
`OTHER PUBLICATIONS
`Search Report (dated Aug. 23, 2002), International Application No.
`PcTflJSO 1/ 13260.
`
`(Continued)
`Primary ExamineriKrisna Lim
`(74) Attorney, Agent, or FirmiMcDermott Will & Emery
`
`(22)
`
`Filed:
`
`Sep. 30, 2002
`
`(57)
`
`ABSTRACT
`
`(65)
`
`Prior Publication Data
`US 2003/0037142 A1
`Feb. 205 2003
`
`Related US. Application Data
`
`(60) Division of application No. 09/504,783, filed on Feb.
`15, 2000, now Pat. No. 6,502,135, which is a continu-
`.
`.
`.
`.
`31011;;11333901“ application 171%.1896/342195643, filed on
`Ct’
`’
`’ now at.
`0’
`’
`’
`‘
`(60) Provisional application No. 60/137,704, filed on Jun.
`7, 1999, provisional application No. 60/106,261, filed
`on Oct. 305 1998.
`
`(51)
`
`Int. Cl.
`(2006.01)
`G06F 15/1 73
`(52) US. Cl.
`....................................... 709/225; 709/229
`(58) Field of Classification Search ......... 709/2177225,
`709/229; 713/201
`See application file for complete search history.
`
`A plurality of computer nodes communicate using seemingly
`random Internet Protocol source and destination addresses.
`Data packets matching criteria defined by a moving window
`of valid addresses are accepted for further processing, while
`those that do not meet the criteria are quickly rejected.
`Improvements to the basic design include (1) a load balancer
`that distributes packets across different transmission paths
`according to transmission path quality; (2) a DNS proxy
`server that transparently creates a virtual private network in
`response to a domain name inquiry; (3) a large-to-small link
`bandwidth management feature that prevents denial-of—ser-
`vice attacks at system chokepoints; (4) a trafiic limiter that
`regulates incoming packets by limiting the rate at which a
`transmitter can be synchronized with a receiver; and (5) a
`signaling synchronizer that allows a large number of nodes to
`communicate with a central node by partitioning the commu-
`nication function between tWO separate entities
`
`16 Claims, 35 Drawing Sheets
`
`100
`ORIGINATING
`TERMINAL
`
` IP
`ROUTER
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`A 4°
`
`
`
`
`
`29
`
`25
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`INTERNET
`
`
`o.“ENCRYPTION KEY
`
`
`110
`DESTINATION
`TERMINAL
`
`
`
`1
`
`MICROSOFT 1001
`
`1
`
`MICROSOFT 1001
`
`

`

`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`Page 2
`
`US. PATENT DOCUMENTS
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`.............. 709/225
`
`....... 370/401
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`........... 713/165
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`FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
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`EP
`EP
`EP
`EP
`EP
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`GB
`GB
`GB
`GB
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`W0
`
`0 814 589
`0814 589 A
`0 838 930
`0 838 930 A
`836306 A1
`0858189
`2 317 792
`2317 792 A
`2334181 A
`2334181 A
`9827783 A
`WO 98/27783
`W0 9827783 A
`W0 98 55930
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`W0 99 38081
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`WO 00/17775
`WO 00/70458
`W00150688
`
`””997
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`.................. 713/201
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`.......... 709/227
`
`~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 709/219
`
`............... 709/223
`
`2
`
`

`

`US 7,490,151 B2
`Page 3
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`
`* cited by examiner
`
`3
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 1 0135
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`100
`
`ORKHNAHNG
`TERMINAL
`
`A 40
`IP PACKET
`
`23
`
`IP
`
`ROUTER
`
`
`
`
`
`107
`
`
`22
`
`
`IP
`
`ROUTER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IP
`
`ROUTER
`
`29
`
`25
`
`INTERNET
`
`ROUTER
`
`IP
`
`
`
`
`
`32
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`110
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`27
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`Ip
`ROUTER
`
`26
`
`ROUTER
`
`ENCRYPTION KEY
`
`DESTINATION
`TERMINAL
`
`FIG. 1
`
`4
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 2 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`107
`
`131
`
`122
`
`100
`
`TERMINAL
`
`A 140
`
`TARP PACKET
`
`145
`
`’11
`LINK KEY
`
`TARP
`
`ROUTER
`
`129
`
`ROUTER
`
`123 ’11
`LINK KEY
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`TARP
`ROUTER h
`LINK KEY
`
`
`
`
`
`124
`
`128
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`TARP
`ROUTER
`
`132
`
`IP
`ROUTER
`
`127
`
`126
`
`TARP
`
`143
`
`RITA
`
`om
`LINK KEY
`
`
`
`
`
`h
`'
`SESSION KEY
`
`FIG. 2
`
`’11
`LINK KEY
`TARP PACKET
`
`
`
`110
`
`TARP
`
`TERMINAL
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 3 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`
`
`
`DATA STREAM M
`
`INTERLEAVED
`
`SESSION-KEY—ENCRYPTED
`PAYLOAD DATA@
`
`TARP PACKET WITH
`ENCRYPTED PAYLOADS 142
`
`TARP PACKETS 159
`
`‘-
`
`
`
`
`LINK-KEY-ENCRYPTED
`
`lP PACKETS wz ENCRYPTED
`TARP PACKETS AS
`PAYLOADfiQ
`
`TARP
`ROUTER 1
`
`TARP
`
`
`
`ROUTER 2
`
`TARP
`
`ROUTER 4
`
`
`
`TARP
`
`DESTINATION
`
`6
`
`

`

`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet40f35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`
`
`8035x003omEEozm
`
`
`
`mummlom><mém2mo<9><mon_
`
`omoo<mm><s_
`
`<29mo$50.5>228
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`Ola002008023:;
`
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`
`
`$02000300053020
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`
`...IIIIEIEIE
`
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`
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`
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`mfidmzqmémhzmm<o._><n_o._.z_
` Mm>502;WEE:
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`
`

`

`2Bm
`
`0,
`
`IMBEE/E;mgooeofixzjsgU/
`
`v.GE
`
`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 5 of 35
`
`
`
`o._.m>:.<zmm.:<mzo
`
`wz_mmwoomn_mms.
`
`mzazoo
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`8
`
`
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 6 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`BACKGROUND LOOP-DECOY
`GENERATION
`
`SO
`
`AUTHENTICATE TARP PACKET
`
`$2
`
`36
`
`
`
`DUMP DECOY
`
`
`
`
`
`
`OUTER LAYER DECRYPTION OF
`TARP PACKET USING LINK KEY
`
`CHECK FOR DECOY AND
`INCREMENT PERISHABLE DECOY
`COUNTER AS APPROPRIATE
`
`TRANSMIT DECOY?
`
`YES
`
`
`
`
`
`DECREMENT
`TTLTTL>0?
`
`39
`
`
`DETERMINE DESTINATION TARP
`GENERATE NEXT-HOP TARP
`ADDRESS AND STORE LINK KEY
`ADDRESS AND STORE LINK KEY
`
`AND IPADDRESS
`AND IPADDRESS
`
`
`GENERATE NEXT-HOP TARP
`ADDRESS AND STORE LINK KEY
`AND IP ADDRESS
`
`GENERATE IP HEADER
`AND TRANSMIT
`
`FIG. 5
`
`S3
`
`S4
`
`35
`
`S7
`
`38
`
`SI 0
`
`311
`
`9
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 7 Of 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`BACKGROUND LOOP-DECOY
`GENERATION
`
`320
`
`GROUP RECEIVED IP PACKETS
`INTO INTERLEAVE WINDOW
`
`821
`
`DETERMINE DESTINATION TARP
`ADDRESS, INITIALIZE TTL, STORE
`IN TARP HEADER
`
`RECORD WINDOW SEQ. NOS. AND
`INTERLEAVE SEQ. NOS IN TARP
`HEADERS
`
`CHOOSE FIRST HOP TARP
`
`OUTER LAYER ENCRYPT
`
`ROUTER, LOOK UP IP ADDRESS
`AND STORE IN CLEAR IP HEADER,
`
`822
`
`323
`
`324
`
`INSTALL CLEAR IP HEADER
`AND TRANSMIT
`
`325
`
`FIG. 6
`
`10
`
`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 8 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`S40
`
`AGBCKROUND LOOP-DECOY
`
`GENERATION
`
`S42
`
`AUTHENTICATE TARP PACKET
`RECEIVED
`
`S49
`
`DIVIDE BLOCK INTO PACKETS S43
`
`USING WINDOW SEQUENCE DATA,
`ADD CLEAR IP HEADERS
`
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`U.S. Patent
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`Sheet 9 of 35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet120f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10
`
`9
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`2009
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet150f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet160f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet170f35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet180f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
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`Sheet 19 0135
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 20 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 21 0135
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`

`

`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet220f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 23 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 24 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`

`

`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
`
`Sheet 25 0f 35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
`
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`

`

`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet260f35
`
`US 7,490,151 B2
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`8mm
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet270f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet280f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet290f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`US. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
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`Sheet 30 0f 35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`

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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb.10,2009
`
`Sheet310f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet320f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
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`Feb.10,2009
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`Sheet330f35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`US. Patent
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`Feb. 10, 2009
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`U.S. Patent
`
`Feb. 10, 2009
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`Sheet 35 of 35
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`CLIENT
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`38
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`

`

`US 7,490,151 B2
`
`1
`ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE
`COMMUNICATION LINK BASED ON A
`
`DOMAIN NAME SERVICE (DNS) REQUEST
`
`CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED
`APPLICATIONS
`
`This application is a divisional application of 09/504,783
`(filed Feb. 15, 2000), now US. Pat. No. 6,502,135, issued
`Dec. 31, 2002, which claims priority from and is a continua-
`tion-in-part of previously filed US. application Ser. No.
`09/429,643 (filed Oct. 29, 1999) now US. Pat. No. 7,010,604.
`The subject matter of the ’643 application, which is bodily
`incorporated herein, derives from provisional U.S. applica-
`tion No. 60/106,261 (filed Oct. 30, 1998) and 60/137,704
`(filed Jun. 7, 1999).
`
`GOVERNMENT CONTRACT RIGHTS
`
`This invention was made with Government support under
`Contract No. 360000-1999-000000-QC-000-000 awarded by
`the Central Intelligence Agency. The Government has certain
`rights in the invention.
`
`BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
`
`A tremendous variety of methods have been proposed and
`implemented to provide security and anonymity for commu-
`nications over the Internet. The variety stems, in part, from the
`different needs of different Internet users. A basic heuristic
`
`framework to aid in discussing these different security tech-
`niques is illustrated in FIG. 1. Two terminals, an originating
`terminal 100 and a destination terminal 110 are in communi-
`cation over the Internet. It is desired for the communications
`
`to be secure, that is, immune to eavesdropping. For example,
`terminal 100 may transmit secret information to terminal 110
`over the Internet 107. Also, it may be desired to prevent an
`eavesdropper from discovering that terminal 100 is in com-
`munication with terminal 1 10. For example, ifterminal 1 00 is
`a user and terminal 110 hosts a web site, terminal 100’s user
`may not want anyone in the intervening networks to know
`what web sites he is “visiting.” Anonymity would thus be an
`issue, for example, for companies that want to keep their
`market research interests private and thus would prefer to
`prevent outsiders from knowing which web-sites or other
`Internet resources they are “visiting.” These two security
`issues may be called data security and anonymity, respec-
`tively.
`Data security is usually tackled using some form of data
`encryption. An encryption key 48 is known at both the origi-
`nating and terminating terminals 100 and 110. The keys may
`be private and public at the originating and destination termi-
`nals 100 and 110, respectively or they may be symmetrical
`keys (the same key is used by both parties to encrypt and
`decrypt). Many encryption methods are known and usable in
`this context.
`
`To hide traffic from a local administrator or ISP, a user can
`employ a local proxy server in communicating over an
`encrypted channel with an outside proxy such that the local
`administrator or ISP only sees the encrypted trafiic. Proxy
`servers prevent destination servers from determining the
`identities of the originating clients. This system employs an
`intermediate server interposed between client and destination
`server. The destination server sees only the Internet Protocol
`(IP) address ofthe proxy server and not the originating client.
`The target server only sees the address of the outside proxy.
`This scheme relies on a trusted outside proxy server. Also,
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`proxy schemes are vulnerable to traffic analysis methods of
`determining identities of transmitters and receivers. Another
`important limitation of proxy servers is that the server knows
`the identities of both calling and called parties. In many
`instances, an originating terminal, such as terminal A, would
`prefer to keep its identity concealed from the proxy, for
`example, ifthe proxy server is provided by an Internet service
`provider (ISP).
`To defeat traffic analysis, a scheme called Chaum’s mixes
`employs a proxy server that transmits and receives fixed
`length messages, including dummy messages. Multiple origi-
`nating terminals are connected through a mix (a server) to
`multiple target servers. It is difficult to tell which of the
`originating terminals are communicating to which ofthe con-
`nected target servers, and the dummy messages confuse
`eavesdroppers’ efforts to detect communicating pairs by ana-
`lyzing traffic. A drawback is that there is a risk that the mix
`server could be compromised. One way to deal with this risk
`is to spread the trust among multiple mixes. If one mix is
`compromised, the identities of the originating and target ter-
`minals may remain concealed. This strategy requires a num-
`ber of alternative mixes so that the intermediate servers inter-
`
`posed between the originating and target terminals are not
`determinable except by compromising more than one mix.
`The strategy wraps the message with multiple layers of
`encrypted addresses. The first mix in a sequence can decrypt
`only the outer layer of the message to reveal the next desti-
`nation mix in sequence. The second mix can decrypt the
`message to reveal the next mix and so on. The target server
`receives the message and, optionally, a multi-layer encrypted
`payload containing return information to send data back in
`the same fashion. The only way to defeat such a mix scheme
`is to collude among mixes. If the packets are all fixed-length
`and intermixed with dummy packets, there is no way to do
`any kind of traffic analysis.
`Still another anonymity technique, called ‘crowds,’ pro-
`tects the identity of the originating terminal from the inter-
`mediate proxies by providing that originating terminals
`belong to groups ofproxies called crowds. The crowd proxies
`are interposed between originating and target terminals. Each
`proxy through which the message is sent is randomly chosen
`by an up stream proxy. Each intermediate proxy can send the
`message either to another randomly chosen proxy in the
`“crowd” or to the destination. Thus, even crowd members
`cannot determine if a preceding proxy is the originator of the
`message or if it was simply passed from another proxy.
`ZKS (Zero-Knowledge Systems) Anonymous IP Protocol
`allows users to select up to any of five different pseudonyms,
`while desktop software encrypts outgoing traffic and wraps it
`in User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. The first server in
`a 2+-hop system gets the UDP packets, strips off one layer of
`encryption to add another, then sends the traffic to the next
`server, which strips off yet another layer of encryption and
`adds a new one. The user is permitted to control the number of
`hops. At the final server, traffic is decrypted with an untrace-
`able IP address. The technique is called onion-routing. This
`method can be defeated using traffic analysis. For a simple
`example, bursts of packets from a user during low-duty peri-
`ods can reveal the identities of sender and receiver.
`
`Firewalls attempt to protect LANs from unauthorized
`access and hostile exploitation or damage to computers con-
`nected to the LAN. Firewalls provide a server through which
`all access to the LAN must pass. Firewalls are centralized
`systems that require administrative overhead to maintain.
`They can be compromised by virtual-machine applications
`(“applets”). They instill a false sense of security that leads to
`security breaches for example by users sending sensitive
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`US 7,490,151 B2
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`3
`information to servers outside the firewall or encouraging use
`of modems to sidestep the firewall security. Firewalls are not
`useful for distributed systems such as business travelers,
`extranets, small teams, etc.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
`
`A secure mechanism for communicating over the intemet,
`including a protocol referred to as the TunneledAgile Routing
`Protocol (TARP), uses a unique two-layer encryption format
`and special TARP routers. TARP routers are similar in func-
`tion to regular lP routers. Each TARP router has one or more
`IP addresses and uses normal IP protocol to send lP packet
`messages
`(“packets” or “datagrams”). The IP packets
`exchanged between TARP terminals Via TARP routers are
`actually encrypted packets whose true destination address is
`concealed except to TARP routers and servers. The normal or
`“clear” or “outside” lP header attached to TARP IP packets
`contains only the address of a next hop router or destination
`server. That is, instead of indicating a final destination in the
`destination field of the 1P header, the TARP packet’s lP
`header always points to a next-hop in a series of TARP router
`hops, or to the final destination. This means there is no overt
`indication from an intercepted TARP packet of the true des-
`tination of the TARP packet since the destination could
`always be next-hop TARP router as well as the final destina-
`tion.
`
`Each TARP packet’s true destination is concealed behind a
`layer of encryption generated using a link key. The link key is
`the encryption key used for encrypted communication
`between the hops intervening between an originating TARP
`terminal and a destination TARP terminal. Each TARP router
`
`can remove the outer layer of encryption to reveal the desti-
`nation router for each TARP packet. To identify the link key
`needed to decrypt the outer layer of encryption of a TARP
`packet, a receiving TARP or routing terminal may identify the
`transmitting terminal by the sender/receiver IP numbers in the
`cleartext lP header.
`
`Once the outer layer of encryption is removed, the TARP
`router determines the final destination. Each TARP packet
`140 undergoes a minimum number of hops to help foil traffic
`analysis. The hops may be chosen at random or by a fixed
`value. As a result, each TARP packet may make random trips
`among a number of geographically disparate routers before
`reaching its destination. Each trip is highly likely to be dif-
`ferent for each packet composing a given message because
`each trip is independently randomly determined. This feature
`is called agile routing. The fact that different packets take
`different routes provides distinct advantages by making it
`difficult for an interloper to obtain all th