throbber
Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
`INTERDIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,
`IPR LICENSING, INC.,
`Appellants
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
`COMMISSION,
`Appellee
`
`NOKIA, INC., MICROSOFT MOBILE OY,
`Intervenors
`
`ZTE CORPORATION, ZTE (USA) INC.,
`Intervenors
`______________________
`
`2014-1176
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States International Trade
`Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-800.
`______________________
`
`Decided: February 18, 2015
`______________________
`
`RICHARD P. BRESS, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for appellants. Also represented by
`
` Ex. 2023-0001
`
`IPR Licensing, Inc.
`Exhibit 2023
`ZTE Corp v. IPR Licensing, Inc.
`IPR2014-00525
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 2 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`2
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`MAXIMILIAN A. GRANT, BERT C. REISER, GABRIEL BELL,
`RON E. SHULMAN; MICHAEL BRETT LEVIN, DAVID S.
`STEUER, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, PC, Palo
`Alto, CA.
`
`PANYIN HUGHES, Office of the General Counsel, Inter-
`national Trade Commission, Washington, DC argued for
`appellee. Also represented by WAYNE W. HERRINGTON.
`
`PATRICK J. FLINN, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Geor-
`gia, argued for intervenors Nokia Inc., Microsoft Mobile
`Oy. Also represented by JOHN D. HAYNES, SCOTT
`BENJAMIN PLEUNE, ROSS RITTER BARTON.
`
`JAY H. REIZISS, Brinks Gilson & Lione, Washington,
`DC, for intervenor ZTE Corporation, ZTE (USA) Inc. Also
`represented by CYNTHIA A. HOMAN, CHARLES M.
`MCMAHON, DAVID LINDNER, LAURA A. LYDIGSEN.
`______________________
`
`Before PROST, Chief Judge, MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`
`
`PROST, Chief Judge.
`InterDigital Communications, Inc., InterDigital Tech-
`nology Corporation, and IPR Licensing, Inc. (collectively,
`“InterDigital”) appeal from the final determination of the
`United States International Trade Commission (“Com-
`mission”) finding no violation of Section 337 of the Tariff
`Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. See Certain
`Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and Components
`thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-800 (Dec. 19, 2013) (“Commission
`Decision”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
`BACKGROUND
`The patents at issue are directed to cellphone technol-
`ogy, and in particular, code division multiple access
`(“CDMA”) networks. For purposes of this appeal, the
`
` Ex. 2023-0002
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 3 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`3
`
`following simplified overview of the technology is suffi-
`cient.1
`A CDMA network allows multiple cellphones, referred
`to in the patents as subscriber units, to use the same
`radio frequencies for multiple simultaneous communica-
`tions. A CDMA system is able to do this by modulating
`the data with unique codes. One problem with CDMA
`systems is that signals within the same geographical area
`can interfere with one another, and that problem is exac-
`erbated as transmission power levels are increased.
`A. Patents at Issue
`This appeal involves U.S. Patent Nos. 7,706,830 (“’830
`patent”), 8,009,636 (“’636 patent”), 7,502,406 (“’406 pa-
`tent”), 7,706,332 (“’332 patent”), and 7,616,970 (“’970
`patent”). Throughout this case, the patents have been
`grouped as follows: (1) the Power Ramp-Up Patents (the
`‘830 and ’636 patents), (2) the Power Control Patents
`(the ’406 and ’332 patents), and (3) the Dual Mode Patent
`(the ’970 patent). We address each patent group below.
`1. The Power Ramp-Up Patents
`The Power Ramp-Up Patents address the way a sub-
`scriber unit establishes a connection with a base station
`in order to initiate a communication such as a voice call.
`In particular, these patents describe a subscriber unit
`that, in order to avoid unnecessary power usage and
`minimize interference with other connections, gradually
`ramps up the power level of its transmissions before
`initiating a call. See ’830 patent col. 6 ll. 55–67. The
`subscriber unit starts transmitting at a low power level
`
`
`1 We provided a more detailed description of this
`technology in InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade
`Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2012), an
`appeal involving related patents and technology.
`
` Ex. 2023-0003
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 4 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`4
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`and then repeatedly sends transmissions—called “short
`codes”—at increasing power levels until the base station
`detects the transmissions and sends back an acknowl-
`edgement to the subscriber unit. Id. The transmissions
`are called “short codes” because they are shorter than a
`regular length code. Id. col. 7 ll. 40–41. Once the
`acknowledgement is received, a substantive communica-
`tion such as a voice call can be initiated. Id. col. 6 ll. 63–
`67.
`InterDigital asserts independent claim 1 and depend-
`ent claims 2, 3, and 5 of the ’830 patent and independent
`claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4, and 6–8 of the ’636
`patent. Claim 1 of the ’830 patent, which is representa-
`tive for purposes of this appeal, provides in relevant part:
`1. A wireless code division multiple access
`(CDMA) subscriber unit comprising:
` a transmitter configured such that, when the
`subscriber unit is first accessing a CDMA
`network and wants to establish communi-
`cations with a base station associated with
`the network over a communication channel
`to be indicated by the base station, the
`transmitter successively sends transmis-
`sions prior to the subscriber unit receiving
`from the base station an indication that at
`least one of the successively sent transmis-
`sions has been detected by the base station;
`wherein each of the successively sent trans-
`missions is produced using a sequence of
`chips, wherein the sequence of chips is not
`used to increase bandwidth;
`. . . .
`wherein each of the successively sent trans-
`missions is shorter than the message;
`
` Ex. 2023-0004
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`5
`
`. . . .
`Id. col. 10 l. 54–col. 11 l. 16 (emphases added).
`2. The Power Control Patents
`The Power Control Patents relate to how the sub-
`scriber unit and the base station adjust their transmis-
`sion power level after a connection is established.
`See ’406 patent col. 5 ll. 46–66. In particular, the patents
`describe sending messages back and forth indicating
`whether the power level should be increased or decreased.
`Id. These messages are known as “adaptive,” id. col. 2 ll.
`29–30, or “automatic power control” information (“APC
`information”), id. col. 5 ll. 48–50.
`For the ’406 patent, InterDigital asserts dependent
`claims 6, 13, 20, and 26 (which depend, respectively, from
`independent claims 1, 7, 15, and 21) and independent
`claim 29. For the ’332 patent, InterDigital asserts claims
`2–4, 7–11, 14, 22–24 and 27. Claims 1 and 7 of the ’406
`patent, which InterDigital asserts are representative for
`present purposes, provide:
`1. A method for controlling transmission pow-
`er levels of a code division multiple access
`(CDMA) subscriber unit, the method comprising:
`receiving by the subscriber unit a power con-
`trol bit on a downlink control channel, the
`power control bit indicating either an in-
`crease or decrease in transmission power
`level;
`transmitting a plurality of channels by the
`subscriber unit, the plurality of channels
`including a traffic channel and a reverse
`control channel;
`in response to the received power control bit,
`adjusting a transmission power level of
`both the traffic channel and the reverse
`
` Ex. 2023-0005
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 6 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`6
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`control channel, wherein the transmission
`power level of the traffic channel and the
`reverse control channel are different; and
`transmitting the traffic channel and the re-
`verse control channel at their respective ad-
`justed transmit power levels.
`’406 patent col. 14 l. 57–col. 15 l. 9 (emphases added).
`7. A method for controlling transmission pow-
`er levels of a code division multiple access
`(CDMA) subscriber unit, the method comprising:
`receiving by the subscriber unit a series of
`power control bits on a downlink channel,
`each power control bit indicating either an
`increase or decrease in transmission power
`level;
`transmitting a plurality of channels by the
`subscriber unit, the plurality of channels
`including a traffic channel and a reverse
`control channel;
`adjusting a transmission power level of both
`the traffic channel and the reverse control
`channel in response to the same bits in the
`received series of power control bits, where-
`in the transmission power level of the traf-
`fic channel and the reverse control channel
`are different; and
`transmitting the traffic channel and the re-
`verse control channel at their respective ad-
`justed transmit power levels.
`Id. col. 15 ll. 28–45 (emphases added).
`3. The Dual Mode Patent
`The Dual Mode Patent relates generally to subscriber
`units that can switch between different types of networks,
`
` Ex. 2023-0006
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 7 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`7
`
`such as CDMA cellular networks and local wireless net-
`works, to transfer data. ’970 patent abstract. According
`to InterDigital, the patented innovation describes a way
`for the subscriber unit itself to make the CDMA commu-
`nication channels available for use rather than waiting
`for the base station to allocate a channel.
`For the Dual Mode Patent, InterDigital asserts inde-
`pendent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–9. Claim 1
`states in relevant part:
`1. A subscriber unit comprising:
`a cellular transceiver configured to communi-
`cate with a cellular network via a cellular
`layered communication protocol;
`. . . .
`wherein the cellular layered communication
`protocol includes a plurality of layers above
`a physical layer, and a plurality of physical
`layer channels are available for assignment
`for communication with the cellular net-
`work and a communication session above
`the physical layer is maintained when all
`assigned physical layer channels have been
`released.
`Id. col. 11 ll. 5–24 (emphasis added).
`B. Commission Proceedings
`In 2011, InterDigital filed a complaint with the Com-
`mission, alleging that several importers were violating
`Section 337 by importing, selling for importation, or
`selling after importation into the United States wireless
`devices that infringe InterDigital’s patents. The Commis-
`sion instituted an investigation and named several re-
`spondents,
`including
`intervenors Nokia Inc., Nokia
`
` Ex. 2023-0007
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 8 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`8
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`Corporation,2 ZTE Corporation, and ZTE (USA) Inc.
`(collectively, “Intervenors”). 76 Fed. Reg. 54,252 (Aug. 31,
`2011). After a seven-day hearing, the Administrative Law
`Judge (“ALJ”) issued a 448-page initial determination.
`Certain Wireless Devices with 3G Capabilities and Com-
`ponents thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-800 (June 28, 2013)
`(“Initial Determination”). The ALJ found the Power
`Ramp-Up Patents and the Power Control Patents not
`infringed and held the Dual Mode Patent invalid as
`obvious. After making a few modifications, the Commis-
`sion upheld the rulings. InterDigital appealed, challeng-
`ing the construction of a single claim term in each of the
`patent groups at issue.
`DISCUSSION
`We review the Commission’s legal rulings de novo and
`its findings of fact for substantial evidence. Osram GmbH
`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
`2007). In construing claims, we rely primarily on the
`claim language, the specification, and the prosecution
`history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–17
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We may also seek guidance
`from extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, diction-
`aries, and treatises. Id. at 1317–18.
`A. The Power Ramp-Up Patents
`At issue concerning the Power Ramp-Up Patents is
`the construction of “successively sends [or sent] transmis-
`sions.” The ALJ construed the term to mean “transmits
`
`2 Nokia Corporation subsequently transferred its
`Devices & Services Business to Microsoft Mobile Oy.
`Microsoft Mobile Oy was correspondingly substituted as
`an intervenor in this appeal. InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC
`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1176 (Fed. Cir. July 11,
`2014) (order granting motion to substitute intervenor).
`
`
` Ex. 2023-0008
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 9 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`9
`
`to the base station, one after the other, codes that are
`shorter than a regular length code,” and the Commission
`adopted that construction. Commission’s Decision at 19.
`The Commission also adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that
`the patents “disclose that the codes successively transmit-
`ted during the random access process (i.e., the short
`codes) are neither modulated with data, nor used to
`modulate data.” Id. at 26. In so holding, the Commission
`relied on the fact that previously, when discussing a
`patent with the same specification as the Power Ramp-Up
`Patents, the Federal Circuit determined that:
`the specification describes various codes, such as
`pilot codes and short codes, as “spreading codes”
`even though they carry no data and are not in-
`tended to do so.
`InterDigital Commc’ns, 690 F.3d at 1326 (emphases
`added).
`
`The Commission also cited the following from the
`specification:
`The preferred embodiment of the present inven-
`tion utilizes “short codes” and a two-stage com-
`munication
`link establishment procedure
`to
`achieve fast power ramp-up without large power
`overshoots. The spreading code transmitted by the
`subscriber unit 16 is much shorter than the rest of
`the spreading codes (hence the term short code),
`so that the number of phases is limited and the
`base station 14 can quickly search through the
`code. The short code used for this purpose carries
`no data.
`’830 patent col. 7 ll. 36–44 (emphases added).
`Finally, the Commission relied on InterDigital’s ex-
`pert, who testified as follows:
`
` Ex. 2023-0009
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 10 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`10
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`Q. All right. Now the successively sent transmis-
`sions of claim 1, those are the short codes de-
`scribed in the 830 patent, correct?
`A. Yes, the repeated transmissions of the short
`code are the successively sent transmissions.
`Q. And in the power ramp-up patents, the short
`code is not applied to a data signal, correct?
`A. Correct.
`Commission Decision at 28.
`The Commission then affirmed the ALJ’s finding that
`the accused products do modulate data and thus do not
`meet the “successively sends transmissions” limitation.
`InterDigital now presents several arguments as to
`why “the Commission erred in limiting the successively
`transmitted short codes to codes ‘not modulated by data.’”
`Appellants’ Br. 33. First, InterDigital argues that the
`Commission improperly limited the claim term by relying
`on statements concerning only a preferred embodiment.
`This argument is not without weight. The limitation
`that short codes carry no data does follow a description of
`the preferred embodiment. And, as InterDigital argues,
`the contested limitation is not found in the only other
`places that short codes are mentioned, the Abstract and
`Summary of the Invention. See ’830 patent abstract (“The
`short code is a sequence for detection by the base station
`which has a much shorter period than a conventional
`access code.”); id. col. 3 ll. 22–24 (“The short code is a
`sequence for detection by the base station which has a
`much shorter period than a conventional spreading
`code.”).
`But the argument does not carry sufficient weight.
`Given that the entire invention is described by reference
`to a preferred embodiment, the argument that the limita-
`tion is raised in the context of the preferred embodiment
`
` Ex. 2023-0010
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 11 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`11
`
`is less persuasive. And the fact that the carries-no-data
`limitation is expressly tied to the purpose of the short
`codes, which InterDigital does not dispute is universal to
`the invention, also undermines this argument.
`And we do not think that the summary statements
`about “short codes” in the Abstract and Summary of the
`Invention—where full explanations of the term are not
`expected—are sufficient to justify a broader reading of
`short codes. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (“The purpose of the
`abstract is to enable the Office and the public generally to
`determine quickly from a cursory inspection the nature
`and gist of the technical disclosure.”).
`In the end, InterDigital’s argument that the carries-
`no-data limitation applies only to a preferred embodi-
`ment, although not trivially dismissed, is insufficient to
`overcome this court’s prior conclusions, a proper reading
`of the specification, and InterDigital’s own expert testi-
`mony.
`Second, InterDigital argues that “the Commission’s
`construction improperly excludes an express preferred
`embodiment.” Appellants’ Br. 44. The Power Ramp-Up
`Patents’ specification expressly incorporates by reference
`U.S. Patent No. 5,799,010 (“’010 patent”). According to
`InterDigital, in the ’010 patent “the short codes are modu-
`lated by ‘data’ in the sense that the selection from among a
`known set of short codes could indicate [information].” Id.
`at 45 (emphasis added). InterDigital then argues that, in
`that sense, the accused products do the same thing, and
`should be found to infringe.
`As an initial matter, this argument would have been
`more effective at challenging the Commission’s infringe-
`ment analysis and not its claim construction. Whether
`the accused products, in some sense, do the same thing as
`disclosed in the patent sheds little light on the proper
`construction of the claim term, the only issue before us.
`Further, InterDigital’s argument hinges on conclusory
`
` Ex. 2023-0011
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 12 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`12
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`statements about what the ’010 patent discloses, and
`InterDigital fails to properly develop or support those
`conclusions. InterDigital’s citation to a single table in
`the ’010 patent is insufficient. Ultimately, InterDigital’s
`argument concerning the ’010 patent is unpersuasive.
`Third, InterDigital argues that “[t]he Commission’s
`supporting citations indicate that it also reasoned that
`the short codes cannot carry data because that would
`purportedly make the successively sent transmissions
`unrecognizable to the base station, rendering the system
`inoperable.” Id. at 40. InterDigital then goes on to de-
`scribe why, in its view, this rationale cannot support the
`Commission’s construction and corresponding finding of
`no infringement. In response, Intervenors and the Com-
`mission contend that InterDigital’s argument was im-
`properly raised for the first time on appeal. Ultimately,
`we need not reach these arguments and counterargu-
`ments because, at most, InterDigital’s position merely
`undermines unnecessary support for the Commission’s
`holding. The Commission’s construction can stand with-
`out this support.
`Fourth, InterDigital argues that the principles of
`claim differentiation support not limiting short codes to
`codes that do not carry data. According to InterDigital,
`other related patents confirm that short codes can include
`data. In those patents some of the independent claims
`provide that the transmitted signals “carry no data,”
`while others do not. InterDigital argues that under the
`principles of claim differentiation, the short codes in
`claims that do not have a carry-no-data limitation, can
`carry data. But, as the Commission points out, claim
`differentiation arguments are strongest when distinguish-
`ing dependent claims from their independent claims. Cf.
`World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 769 F.3d 1120,
`1125 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The doctrine of claim differentia-
`tion creates a presumption that distinct claims, particu-
`larly an independent claim and its dependent claim, have
`
` Ex. 2023-0012
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 13 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`13
`
`different scopes.”). Here, InterDigital is attempting to
`extract meaning by comparing independent claims that
`are distinguishable in other ways. See Andersen Corp. v.
`Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
`2007) (“A further reason for not applying the doctrine of
`claim differentiation in this case is that the [claims at
`issue] are not otherwise identical . . . . Instead, there are
`numerous other differences varying the scope of the
`claimed subject matter.”). Further, those patents, alt-
`hough related to the present patents, are not the patents
`at issue in this case. The force of claim differentiation
`here is diminished and insufficient to overcome the evi-
`dence supporting the Commission’s construction.
`We have considered InterDigital’s remaining argu-
`ments concerning these patents and find them unpersua-
`sive.
` We affirm the Commission’s construction of
`“successively sends [or sent] transmissions,” and corre-
`spondingly affirm its finding of no infringement of the
`Power Ramp-Up Patents.
`B The Power Control Patents
`At issue concerning the Power Control Patents is the
`Commission’s construction of “power control bit.” The
`ALJ construed the term to mean “single-bit power control
`information transmitted at an APC data rate equivalent
`to the APC update rate.” Initial Determination at 101.
`The Commission modified the construction to be simply
`“single-bit power control information,” and struck the
`later part of the ALJ’s construction. Commission Decision
`at 30. It then affirmed the ALJ’s finding of no infringe-
`ment based on the ALJ’s finding that the accused prod-
`ucts use only multi-bit power control commands.3 Id. at
`38–39.
`
`
`3 Having found no infringement the Commission
`did not address the ALJ’s determination that the claims
`
` Ex. 2023-0013
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 14 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`14
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`On appeal, InterDigital contends that the Commission
`erred in limiting the term to single-bit power control
`commands. InterDigital presents several arguments in
`support of its position. First, InterDigital turns to the
`language of the claims and argues that some of the ’406
`patent claims, such as claims 6 and 20, recite “the re-
`ceived power control bit,” whereas other claims, such as
`claims 13 and 26, recite “the received series of power
`control bits.” InterDigital argues that if the latter claims
`are not construed to include multi-bit power control
`commands, “the express distinction in the language of
`these claims would be meaningless.” Appellants’ Br. 51.
`But this claim differentiation argument is unpersua-
`sive. As noted above, principles of claim differentiation
`are often of limited use where, as here, one is comparing
`two independent claims and not dependent claims with
`the claims from which they depend. And ultimately, the
`latter claims are sufficiently differentiated by requiring a
`series of single-bit power control commands, and therefore
`need not rely on the inclusion of multi-bit power control
`commands for differentiation. It is not the case, as Inter-
`Digital contends, that under the Commission’s construc-
`tion “claims 13 and 26 ‘cover[] exactly the same subject
`matter’ as claims 6 and 20, respectively.” Id.
`Finally, the plain language of the claims shows that
`multi-bit power commands were not encompassed within
`the scope of those claims, even where a series of power
`
`were not invalid as anticipated. Intervenors argue that
`“[o]n de novo review, the Court should reverse this finding
`and conclude that, under the correct priority date, all
`asserted claims are anticipated by the [prior art].” Inter-
`venors’ Br. 52. Because we affirm the Commission’s
`finding of no infringement, we do not reach the merits of
`this argument or whether this issue is even properly
`before us.
`
` Ex. 2023-0014
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 15 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`15
`
`control bits is referenced. For example, the relevant part
`of asserted claim 26 of the ’406 patent states:
`a despreading and demultiplexing device config-
`ured to recover a series of power control bits from
`a downlink channel, wherein each power control
`bit has a value indicating a command to either in-
`crease or decrease transmission power level.
`’406 patent col. 16 ll. 36–40 (emphases added).
`Second, InterDigital turns to the specifications and
`argues that the portions of the specifications relied on by
`the Commission relate only to the preferred embodiment.
`As noted by the Commission, the specifications do not use
`the term “power control bit,” instead discussing APC
`information. Commission Decision at 35–36. The Com-
`mission thus looked to the discussion of APC information
`to inform its construction of “power control bit.” For
`example, the Commission relied on the following state-
`ments, among others, to conclude that APC information is
`conveyed as single-bit commands:
`APC information is always conveyed as a single
`bit of information, and the APC Data Rate is
`equivalent to the APC update rate.
`’406 patent col. 9 ll. 46–48 (emphasis added). Further,
`[t]he APC signal is transmitted as one bit signals
`on the APC Channel. The one-bit signal repre-
`sents a command to increase (signal is logic-high)
`or decrease (signal is logic-low) the associated
`transmit power. In the described embodiment, the
`64kbps APC data stream is not encoded or inter-
`leaved.
`Id. col. 6 ll. 47–52 (emphases added). Similarly, in
`the ’332 patent:
`The APC bits are transmitted as one bit up or
`down signals on the APC channel. In the de-
`
` Ex. 2023-0015
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 16 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`16
`
`
`
` INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`scribed embodiment, the 64 kbs APC data stream
`is not encoded or interleaved.
`’332 patent col. 64 ll. 12–14 (emphasis added).
`InterDigital argues that these limiting statements are
`all confined to preferred embodiments. But this argument
`is unpersuasive. These statements do appear in sections
`describing preferred embodiments. That point, however,
`carries limited weight because in both patents the entire
`invention “has been described in terms of the exemplary
`embodiment.” ’406 patent col. 14 ll. 51–52. There is no
`discussion of a broader meaning for the term other than
`boilerplate language that “it is understood by those
`skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced with
`modifications to the embodiment that are within the scope
`of the invention as defined by the following claims.” Id.
`col. 14 ll. 52–55.
`Further, and most importantly, the language of the
`excerpts shows that the concept of single-bit power control
`commands is not limited to preferred embodiments. As to
`the first excerpt, the use of “always” when referring to the
`use of “single bit of information,” but not when referring
`to the APC Data Rate, indicates that the single-bit limita-
`tion is universal to the invention, whereas the APC Data
`Rate is not. The second and third excerpts contain that
`same distinction, expressly limiting certain characteris-
`tics of the APC data stream to the “described embodi-
`ment,” but not so limiting the concept of single-bit power
`control information.
`InterDigital also argues that a skilled artisan at the
`time of the invention would have understood the term
`“power control bit” in the same way as that term was used
`in an industry standard with which the accused devices
`comply. And under that standard, a “power control bit”
`can be represented by multiple symbols and, in turn,
`multiple underlying bits.
`
` Ex. 2023-0016
`
`

`

`Case: 14-1176 Document: 101-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/18/2015
`
`INTERDIGITAL v. ITC
`
`17
`
`But InterDigital provides no intrinsic evidence to
`support its view that “power control bit” was defined the
`same way in the Power Control Patents as in the industry
`standard. And, to the extent that InterDigital is implying
`that the commission erred in its construction of “bit,” the
`argument is unpersuasive because the adopted construc-
`tion also uses the term “bit,” without restriction as to
`what constitutes a bit.
`In sum, InterDigital’s arguments that the Commis-
`sion erred in construing “power control bit” are unpersua-
`sive. We affirm the Commission’s construction and its
`corresponding finding of no infringement.
`C. The Dual Mode Patent
`The Commission adopted the ALJ’s holding that the
`claims of the Dual Mode Patent are invalid as obvious. At
`issue on appeal is the construction of “a plurality of physi-
`cal layer channels are available for assignment for com-
`munication with the cellular network.” The ALJ adopted
`InterDigital’s proposed construction of the term, constru-
`ing it to mean “two or more physical layer channels
`allocable by the subscriber unit for data communication.”
`Initial Determination at 303 (emphasis added).
`As part of the obviousness holding, the ALJ reasoned
`that (1) in the context of the ’970 patent, “allocation”
`means the same thing as “use,” (2) the prior art subscrib-
`er units use two or more channels to transmit data, and,
`thus, (3) the prior art discloses the contested limitation.
`Given that the ALJ adopted InterDigital’s proposed
`construction, InterDigital understandably does not chal-
`lenge the express construction. Instead, it argues that the
`ALJ improperly modified the construction when doing its
`obviousn

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket