UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`CONOPCO, INC. dba UNILEVER
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`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`THE PROCTOR & GAMBLE COMPANY
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00507
`
`Patent 6,451,300
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING BY AN EXPANDED PANEL
`INCLUDING THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGE
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-(d)
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`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`CONOPCO, INC. dba UNILEVER
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`THE PROCTOR & GAMBLE COMPANY
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00507
`
`Patent 6,451,300
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING BY AN EXPANDED PANEL
`INCLUDING THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGE
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
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`Table of Contents
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 1
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................... 4
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`A. The Standard Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)........................................................4
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`B. The Standard of Review for Rehearing by an Expanded Panel ....................5
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`IV. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 5
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`A. The Decision Should Be Reheard by an Expanded Panel .............................5
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`1. Inconsistent Analyses under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to Date ...........................6
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`2. The Proper Scope of Analysis under § 325(d) ...........................................7
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`B. The Decision Relies on Erroneous Factual Findings and a Misapprehension
`of Relevant Law ...................................................................................................8
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`1. Improper Reliance on Estoppel Considerations .........................................9
`
`2. There Is No Statutory, Rule, or Policy Basis for Precluding a Petitioner
`from Filing a Second, Improved Petition ........................................................10
`
`3. The Board Committed Legal Error by Neglecting Substantial Differences
`in the Prior Art ................................................................................................11
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`C. The 507 Petition Arguments are Not the Same or Substantially the Same .13
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`V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 15
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`i
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`Tafas v. Dudas
`541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) ................................................................. 9
`
`In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
`800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .................................................................... 7, 11
`
`Renda Marine, Inc. v. U.S.,
`509 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 5
`
`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ....................................................................................... 1, 10, 15
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) .............................................................................................. 9
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`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ......................................................................................... passim
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) ...................................................................................... 1, 5, 17
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) .......................................................................................... 1, 17
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`ii
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`
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-(d), Petitioner Conopco, Inc. dba Unilever
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`(“Unilever”) respectfully requests rehearing by an expanded panel—including the
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`Chief Administrative Patent Judge—of the decision rejecting Unilever’s petition in
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`this proceeding (“507 Petition”) under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Patent policy dictates
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`rehearing by an expanded panel to address inconsistent panel interpretations of
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`§ 325(d), including the proper scope and requirements for a panel’s analysis
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`thereunder. See Board SOP (Revision 13) 2009, Section III(A)(2). Rehearing is
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`also requested to address the mistakes of fact and law in the panel’s decision where
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`the 507 Petition advanced numerous prior art references and arguments that were
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`not the same or substantially the same as in Unilever’s previous petition. The
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`Board abused its discretion in rejecting Unilever’s current petition, which
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`specifically addressed the purported deficiencies of the first petition. The statutory
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`framework and rules implementing inter partes reviews contemplate that a
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`petitioner may file more than one petition during the statutory period, and § 325(d)
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`should not amount to a de facto estoppel. Petitioner therefore seeks reconsideration
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`of the 507 Petition on its merits under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and requests institution
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`of trial on all proposed grounds of invalidity.
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`II. BACKGROUND
`On August 14, 2013, Unilever filed a petition in IPR2013-00509 seeking
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`1
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`
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`inter partes review of claims 1-25 of U.S. Patent No. 6,451,300 (“509 Petition”).
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`On February 12, 2014, the Board entered a decision instituting trial as to claims 1-5,
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`11-13, 16-20, 24, and 25 of the '300 patent, but not as to claims 6-10, 14, 15, and
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`21-23 (“non-instituted claims”). IPR2013-00509, Paper 10 at 2, 12-16 (“509
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`Decision”). As to certain non-instituted claims, the Board found that the
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`information presented did not sufficiently show obviousness over a single reference
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`(Kanebo) or a combination of references (Bowser and Evans), and failed to
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`articulate “an adequate reason why a skilled artisan would have thought to
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`incorporate the elements required by the claims.” Id. at 12, 15-16. Unilever sought
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`rehearing (IPR2013-00509, Paper 12), but the Board reiterated that the 509 Petition
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`did not contain sufficient support for the obviousness arguments advanced (id.,
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`Paper 25 at 3-4).
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`Unilever subsequently filed the 507 Petition as to all non-instituted claims,
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`specifically “address[ing] the concerns expressed previously by the Board.” Id. at
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`1-2. As the below chart illustrates, while relying partially on two references
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`(Kanebo and Evans) cited in the 509 Petition, the 507 Petition: (i) cited eight new
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`references in proposed combination with Kanebo or Evans; and (ii) detailed eight
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`new grounds of unpatentability demonstrating that all claim elements were known
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`in the prior art and that a rationale existed for combining the references. A new
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`expert declaration also supported the 507 Petition. Ex. 1043 (“507 Decl.”).
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`2
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`
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`509 Petition
`Grounds
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`507 Petition
`Grounds
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`New Prior Art
`Reference(s)
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`Ground 2: Kanebo
`(§103)
`Claims 6-7
`
`Ground 1: Kanebo
`and Cothran
`Claims 6-10
`
`Ground 2: Kanebo,
`Cseh, c261SPEC
`Claim 6
`Ground 3: Kanebo,
`Reid and Bartolo
`Claims 6, 8, 9
`
`Ground 4: Kanebo,
`Cseh, Sime and
`c261SPEC
`Claim 6
`Ground 5: Kanebo,
`Cardin, and Kalla
`Claims 14, 15, 22
`Ground 6: Kanebo
`and Bar-Shalom
`Claims 21 and 23
`
`Ground 2: Kanebo
`(§103)
`Claims 6-7
`Ground 2: Kanebo
`Claims 6-7
`Ground 7: Evans
`and Coffindaffer
`Claims 8-10
`Ground 2: Kanebo
`(§103)
`Claims 6-7
`
`Ground 3: Kanebo
`and Cardin
`Claims 14, 15, 22
`Ground 4: Kanebo,
`Schwen and
`Gibson
`Claims 21 and 23
`Ground 5: Bowser
`and Evans
`Claims 6, 7
`Ground 7: Evans
`and Coffindaffer
`Claims 8-10
`Ground 5: Bowser
`and Evans
`Claim 6
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`New Arguments/
`Rationale to
`Combine
`507 Pet. at 12-13,
`15-20; 507 Decl. at
`¶¶ 58-61, 64-65, 68-
`69, 72-73.
`507 Pet. at 22-24;
`507 Decl. at ¶¶ 78-
`82.
`507 Pet. at 26-28,
`29-31; 507 Decl. at
`¶¶ 89-91, 96-98.
`
`Cothran
`(completely new
`as to claims 8-
`10)
`Cseh, and
`c261SPEC
`
`Reid and Bartolo
`(completely new
`as to claims 8-9)
`
`Cseh, Sime and
`c261SPEC
`
`507 Pet. at 33-34;
`507 Decl. at ¶ 101.
`
`Kalla
`
`Bar-Shalom
`
`507 Pet. at 35-38;
`507 Decl. at ¶¶ 106-
`111.
`507 Pet. at 39-41;
`507 Decl. at ¶¶ 115-
`119.
`
`507 Pet. at 45-54;
`507 Decl. at ¶¶ 127-
`131, 134-135, 138-
`139, 141-142.
`
`Ground 7: Evans
`and Cothran
`Claims 6-10
`
`Cothran
`
`
`Ground 8: Evans,
`Cseh, c261SPEC
`Claims 6, 8, 9
`
`Cseh and
`c261SPEC
`
`507 Pet. at 56-59;
`507 Decl. at ¶¶ 150-
`154.
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`3
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`On July 7, 2014, the Board rejected the 507 Petition under § 325(d) as
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`presenting “the same or substantially the same” prior art and arguments as
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`previously raised. Decision at 2, 6-8. Specifically, the Decision found that: (i)
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`Unilever presented no argument or evidence that the newly cited references were
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`not known or available to it at the time of filing of the 509 Petition; (ii) all proposed
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`grounds relied at least in part on references (Kanebo and Evans) previously cited,
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`notwithstanding the seven1 newly-cited references; (iii) both Unilever petitions
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`argued obviousness over the primary reference “in view of other art”; and (iv) the
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`second petition used the 509 Decision “to bolster challenges that were advanced,
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`unsuccessfully, in the 509 Petition.” Id. at 6-8.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`A. The Standard Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`Section 325(d) provides:
`
`In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding . . . the
`Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or
`request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or
`arguments previously were presented to the Office.
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`Logically, arguments based on new prior art should not be considered substantially
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`the same. Nor was § 325(d) intended to estop a petitioner from correcting
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`deficiencies that may be raised with respect to an initial petition. Yet, the Board has
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`not provided clear guidance on the standards governing what prior art or arguments
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`1
` Petitioner contends that actually eight references were newly cited, as Bartolo was
`not cited in any ground of the 509 Petition.
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`4
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`qualify as “the same or substantially the same,” resulting in conflicting panel
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`decisions.
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`The Standard of Review for Rehearing by an Expanded Panel
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`B.
`The Board’s own procedures expressly allow for rehearing by a merits or
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`motions panel where there are conflicting decisions by different panels of the
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`Board. Board SOP (Revision 13) 2009, Section III(A)(2). Under 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision
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`for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion “occurs when a court
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`misunderstands or misapplies the relevant law or makes clearly erroneous findings
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`of fact.” Renda Marine, Inc. v. U.S., 509 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`A. The Decision Should Be Reheard by an Expanded Panel
`The Board’s discretion under § 325(d) should be exercised in a uniform and
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`predictable manner to allow practitioners to reasonably expect that similar
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`circumstances will lead to similar outcomes. This case presents an opportunity to
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`set clear guidelines on what qualifies as the “same or substantially the same” prior
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`art and/or arguments, and the appropriate factors for a § 325(d) analysis. Moreover,
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`rehearing the Decision will allow the Board to provide appropriate guidance
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`regarding a petitioner’s ability to correct a petition through a subsequent filing
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`where deficiencies have been expressly pointed out by the Board. Absent clear
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`guidance, § 325(d) decisions will remain highly panel-dependent and unpredictable.
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`5
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`
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`Inconsistent Analyses under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to Date
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`1.
`Despite Unilever’s reliance on new art and new arguments supporting
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`obviousness, the Board summarily dismissed the 507 Petition without a merits
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`analysis. This is in sharp contrast to other panel approaches where § 325(d)
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`challenges were raised. For example, in IPR2013-00368, the panel focused on the
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`merits and declined to address the § 325(d) argument where petitioner had
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`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were unpatentable.
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`Paper 8 at 13. Similarly, in IPR2013-00100, despite the petitioner’s reliance on
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`both an identical and similar prior art reference previously presented to the Office,
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`the Board declined to reject the petition under § 325(d), instead finding that the
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`petitioner presented “different arguments and new supporting evidence that were
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`not before the examiner, [thus] shedding a different light.” Paper 8 at 20.
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`By way of contrast, in IPR2013-00581, petitioner filed a second petition
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`proposing new grounds of unpatentability based on combinations of references
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`partially overlapping with combinations on which an inter partes review had
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`already been instituted. Paper 15 at 21-22. Despite the newly proposed grounds
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`being partially based on previously-asserted references, the panel analyzed most of
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`the proposed grounds on their merits. Id. at 9-20. The panel decided only the
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`remaining grounds under § 325(d), but specifically noted that similar grounds of
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`rejection had already been adopted and were being adjudicated as part of the
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`6
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`earlier-instituted trial as to those claims. Id. at 21-22. These conflicting approaches
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`and results under § 325(d) highlight important issues that should be addressed and
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`clarified by an expanded panel here.
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`The Proper Scope of Analysis under § 325(d)
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`2.
`Rehearing by an expanded panel is also warranted in order to clarify and set
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`forth the proper scope of a § 325(d) analysis. Namely, the Office should address
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`whether and to what extent a proposed obviousness combination that relies on both
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`a new and a previously-cited reference can serve as a basis for rejection under
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`§ 325(d), irrespective of the differences in the art and arguments that might fairly
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`stem from consideration of the proposed obviousness combination as a whole.
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`Such summary dismissals appear to contradict Federal Circuit law mandating that
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`obviousness determinations consider the prior art “as a whole.” In re Merck & Co.,
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`Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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`The Office should likewise address what constitutes “the same or
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`substantially the same” argument under § 325(d). The Board rejected the 507
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`Petition because a proposed obviousness ground was based on a previously cited
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`reference “in view of other art.” Decision at 7. However, the panel declined to
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`consider what the “other prior art” taught, as well as the newly proffered reasons for
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`combining the prior art disclosures to arrive at the invention. Id.
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`In the broadest sense, any second petition challenging the same claims will
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`7
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`necessarily be asserting that the claims are invalid, whether under obviousness or
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`anticipation grounds. If § 325(d) is interpreted to preclude a second obviousness
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`argument with some minimal commonality with an earlier argument, the result is
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`effectively an estoppel. Congress clearly could have designed the statutory
`
`framework to preclude second, follow-on petitions by the same petitioner, yet chose
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`not to, and instead opted for a more limited estoppel provision under § 315(e).
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`Given that subsequent petitions carry the same fees and statutory
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`requirements as an initial petition, petitioners should have the benefit of their latter
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`petition being decided on the merits—especially where, as here, the second petition
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`expressly addresses alleged deficiencies in an earlier-filed petition. Clarification of
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`this “estoppel” issue will minimize similar issues in the future, and will provide fair
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`notice to petitioners.
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`B.
`
`The Decision Relies on Erroneous Factual Findings and a
`Misapprehension of Relevant Law
`
`The Board abused its discretion under § 325(d), making both legal and
`
`factual errors, including: i) impermissibly relying on estoppel considerations as
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`part of its analysis; ii) without legal basis, precluding a petitioner from filing a
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`second, improved petition with new prior art and arguments; and iii) disregarding
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`teachings in the newly-cited references and combinations of references that were
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`not presented previously.
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`8
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`
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`Improper Reliance on Estoppel Considerations
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`1.
`The Board refused to address Unilever’s references, claiming there was “no
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`argument or evidence that the seven newly cited references were not known or
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`available to [Unilever] at the time of [the first] filing.” Decision at 6. However,
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`§ 325(d) does not require Unilever to show that the newly cited references were
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`unknown or unavailable to it at the time of filing the 509 Petition. Nor does the
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`Board point to any other statute, rule, or case law supporting such a consideration.
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`Instead, the estoppel effect of a ground of invalidity is governed by 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 315(e)(1). This provision requires that a final written decision must issue in the
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`inter partes review before the petitioner is estopped. Only then is the petitioner
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`barred from requesting a proceeding before the Office on any ground that was
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`raised or “reasonably could have been raised.” Id. Because no final written
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`decision has been issued in IPR2013-00509, neither § 315(e)(1) nor § 325(d) permit
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`the Board to consider whether newly cited references in the 507 Petition could have
`
`been raised previously.
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`Put simply, the form of estoppel applied by the Board is not authorized by
`
`statute and is therefore improper. C.f. Tafas v. Dudas 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814
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`(E.D. Va. 2008) (finding that USPTO does not have statutory authority to engage in
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`substantive rulemaking). For this reason alone, the Board abused its discretion and
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`should reconsider the 507 Petition in accordance with the standard set forth at 35
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`9
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`2.
`
`There Is No Statutory, Rule, or Policy Basis for Precluding
`a Petitioner from Filing a Second, Improved Petition
`
`An expanded panel should review the Decision because it precludes a
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`petitioner in most cases from ever filing a second petition, regardless of its merits.
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`Nothing in the statutory framework or rules governing inter partes reviews suggests
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`that a petitioner is barred from filing a second, follow-on petition that expressly
`
`attempts to correct deficiencies noted in a first petition, or that such petitions are
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`subject to summary rejection under § 325(d) as presenting the “same or
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`substantially the same” art and argument.
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`Nor is such an approach good policy. Given the existing page limits and
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`format requirements that constrain a petitioner’s ability to raise all known prior art
`
`and arguments, the position adopted by the panel in this case will burden the Board
`
`and patent owners with a flood of “initial” petitions attempting to leave no stone
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`unturned. See, e.g., IPR2014-00535 to 00537 (three petitions filed as to the same
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`claims of the same patent, each raising different grounds of unpatentability);
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`IPR2014-00494 to 00498 (five petitions filed as to same patent, each challenging a
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`subset of the 40 patent claims total). In contrast, a second petition that clearly
`
`addresses alleged deficiencies in a first petition is likely to be a far more efficient
`
`approach for the Board to adequately address legitimate unpatentability issues, yet
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`would be no more prejudicial to patent owners who are otherwise likely to face
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`10
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`
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`multiple, concurrently-filed petitions presenting an even larger number of grounds
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`of unpatentability.
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`The panel’s refusal to consider a second petition that expressly fills alleged
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`gaps noted in prior decisions on an earlier petition (e.g., Paper 10 at 14-16; Paper 25
`
`at 3-4) finds no basis in the rules or statutory scheme, thereby warranting
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`consideration by an expanded panel to fairly address this weighty issue.
`
`3.
`
`The Board Committed Legal Error by Neglecting
`Substantial Differences in the Prior Art
`
`The Board also abused its discretion by making factual errors in determining
`
`that the prior art cited in the 507 Petition is the same or substantially the same.
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`The Board acknowledged seven of the 507 Petition’s eight newly-cited references,
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`yet dismissed the petition because each ground included a previously presented
`
`reference (Kanebo or Evans). Decision at 6. The Board erred in not considering
`
`the teachings of the new references/combinations, notwithstanding their partial
`
`reliance on Kanebo or Evans.
`
`In an obviousness analysis based on a combination of references, the
`
`teachings of the references must be considered as a whole; references may not be
`
`attacked individually. Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. As shown in the table in Section
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`II above, each of the 507 Petition grounds relied at least partially on one or more
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`newly-cited references. And as detailed in the Petition and supporting declaration,
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`each of these combinations, when considered as a whole, presented a new set of
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`11
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`teachings not present in the original petition—which was the express purpose of
`
`the newly-proposed grounds. The Board therefore committed factual error by not
`
`considering these new teachings to support unpatentability.
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`The deficiency in the Board’s approach is illustrated by its analysis of claim
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`10. Claim 10 requires all of the limitations of claims 1 and 2, but recites cellulose
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`derivatives within a specified charge density range. While the earlier 509 Petition
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`proposed an obviousness ground based on Evans over Coffindaffer, the 507
`
`Petition argued that claim 10 was obvious in view of Evans over Cothran. Despite
`
`being set forth in the 507 Petition, however, the Decision disregards the teachings
`
`of Cothran—which are not found in Coffindaffer—that: “cationic polymers form a
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`net-like suspension by bridging miscelles [sic] of the anionic surfactant. The
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`droplets of insoluble silicone become suspended within this network. …[L]ow
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`levels of cationic polymer can be highly effective for providing stability.” 507
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`Petition at 46.
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`Unilever submits that there is no basis for ignoring teachings that provide a
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`motivation to combine references and therefore result in substantially different
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`arguments in comparison to previously proposed grounds of invalidity. Since
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`Cothran provides a new teaching not found in Coffindaffer, it was factual error for
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`the Board to find this prior art combination “substantially the same” as the
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`previously-presented Evans and Coffindaffer combination.
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`12
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`Furthermore, the Decision fails to even acknowledge let alone address the
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`fact that no overlap exists for certain grounds as to certain claims. For example,
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`the 507 Petition proposes that claims 8-10 would have been obvious in view of
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`Kanebo and Cothran (see Ground 1), yet neither Kanebo nor Cothran was applied
`
`against claims 8-10 in the earlier 509 Petition. It was therefore error for the panel
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`to dismiss this aspect of Ground 1 in the 507 Petition under § 325(d). Such a result
`
`is also inconsistent with other Board decisions that a reference applied against
`
`different claims in the same patent was not “substantially the same.” See, e.g.,
`
`IPR2012-00041, Paper 19 at 8 (declining to reject a petition under § 325(d) where
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`the same reference was cited against different claims in the same patent).
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`To fulfill its duty to identify each matter Unilever believes the Board
`
`misapprehended or overlooked, Unilever directs the Board’s attention to the table
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`in Section II above, which shows that at least one reference in each new
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`combination provides new teachings addressing claim elements and/or providing a
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`rationale to combine the cited references. As such, the table shows each matter
`
`where the Board abused its discretion in refusing to substantively consider the
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`teachings from the newly-cited prior art that differ from those previously asserted.
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`C. The 507 Petition Arguments are Not the Same or Substantially the
`Same
`
`The Board also abused its discretion in finding the 507 Petition arguments to
`
`be the same or substantially the same. In reviewing only the invalidity arguments
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`13
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`of Grounds 5 and 8 against claims 15 and 10, respectively (Decision at 6-7), the
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`Board erred by not considering all of the new arguments in the newly proposed
`
`grounds and disregarding material differences in the arguments it did review.
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`For example, the Board asserted that Unilever advanced substantially the
`
`same argument as to claim 10, “namely that claim 10 would have been obvious
`
`over Evans in view of other prior art disclosing cellulose derivatives that overlap or
`
`fall within the specified charge density range.” Id. at 10. As noted in the previous
`
`section, this broad generalization disregards Cothran’s teaching of the role of
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`cationic polymers in suspending silicone, which in turn provides a rationale for
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`arriving at the claimed subject matter. See Petition at 46. Given the Board’s
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`express finding that the earlier-filed 509 Petition lacked an articulated rationale for
`
`combining the elements required by claim 10 (see 509 Decision at 16), the
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`argument in the 507 Petition providing this allegedly missing rationale simply
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`cannot be the same or substantially the same as that offered in the 509 Petition.
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`Likewise, the Board similarly erred in not considering the new arguments
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`presented with respect to claim 15 based on Kanebo, Cardin and Kalla. As with
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`claim 10, the Board determined that the 509 Petition’s argument based only on
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`Kanebo and Cardin failed to provide a rationale for combining the prior art. 509
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`Decision at 16. As a result, the 507 Petition addressed this deficiency by relying
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`on the teachings of a third reference, Kalla, which expressly teaches that an
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`14
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`antidandruff shampoo preferably contains the claimed form of ZPT in combination
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`with cationic polymers, such as those taught in Kanebo, for enhancing the
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`deposition of antidandruff agents. 507 Petition at 34-35. This new argument in the
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`507 Petition thus addresses the alleged deficiency in the earlier petition by
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`providing a clear rationale for combining the ZPT particle size taught by Cardin
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`with the composition of Kanebo. Id. at 36. Given that this argument was allegedly
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`missing from the 509 Petition, its inclusion in the 507 Petition thus cannot be the
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`same or substantially the same as what was previously presented, and it was error
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`for the Board to have concluded otherwise.
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`V. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Unilever respectfully requests that the Board
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`withdraw the rejection of the 507 Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), consider the
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`prior art and arguments set forth in the 507 Petition on its merits under 35 U.S.C. §
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`314(a), and authorize inter partes review of claims 6-10, 14, 15, and 21-23 of the
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`'300 patent.
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`15
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`Case IPR2014-00507
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Date: August 6, 2014
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`Edward A. Squillante, Jr.
`Reg. No. 38,319
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`
`Ronald Koatz
`
`
`Reg. No. 31,774
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`Conopco Inc. dba Unilever
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`By:
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`Jeanne M. Gills
`Reg. No. 44,458
`Joseph P. Meara
`Reg. No. 44,932
`Michael R. Houston
`Reg. No. 58,486
`
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`16
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`
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`Case IPR2014-00507
`Patent 6,451,300
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR
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`RECONSIDERATION BY AN EXPANDED PANEL INCLUDING THE
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`CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-
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`(d) are being served by electronic mail this 6th day of August, 2014 on counsel for
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`
`
`Steven W. Miller
`Kim W. Zerby
`Carl J. Roof
`Angela K. Haughey
`THE PROCTOR & GAMBLE
`COMPANY
`299 E. Sixth Street
`Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
`Telephone (513) 983-1246
`Facsimile (513) 945-2729
`miller.sw@pg.com
`zerby.kw@pg.com
`roof.cj@pg.com
`haughey.a@pg.com
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Patent Owner as follows:
`
`David M. Maiorana
`John V. Biernacki
`Michael S. Weinstein
`JONES DAY
`North Point
`901 Lakeside Avenue
`Cleveland, Ohio 44114
`Telephone (216) 586-3939
`Facsimile (216) 579-0212
`dmaiorana@jonesday.com
`jvbiernacki@jonesday.com
`msweinstein@jonesday.com
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`Dated: August 6, 2014
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`
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`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`/Joseph P. Meara/
`Joseph P. Meara
`Reg. No. 44,932
`Foley & Lardner LLP
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`17
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`
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