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`
`
`
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`Telephone: (571) 203-2700
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
`E-mail: joseph.palys@finnegan.com
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`
`
`Paper No.
`Filed: June 17, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00486
`Patent 8,051,181
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,051,181
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`I.
`II.
`
`B.
`
`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 2
`A.
`The Petition Must Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ..................... 2
`1.
`Procedural History Relevant to § 315(b) .................................... 4
`2.
`The Plain Meaning of § 315(b) and the Board’s
`Precedent Bar the Petition ........................................................... 6
`Apple’s Untimeliness Precludes Joinder Under § 315(c) ........... 6
`3.
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 9
`C. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ..........16
`D.
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds .............................................................................18
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................21
`A. Overview of the ’181 Patent ................................................................22
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................23
`C.
`“Secure Name Service” (Claims 2 and 28) .........................................25
`D.
`“Secure Name” (Claims 1-5, 8, 10, 11, and 22-29) ............................28
`E.
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claim 3) .....................................................30
`F.
`“Unsecured Name” (Claims 1, 21, 26, and 27) ...................................30
`G.
`“Secure Communication Link” (Claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14,
`25, and 28) ...........................................................................................31
`“Client Computer” (Claim 20) ............................................................36
`H.
`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................39
`
`IV.
`
`i
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`

`

`
`
`V.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 40
`
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................40
`
`
`
`ii
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`ii
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`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ........................................ 10, 15, 16
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................. 10
`In re Bigio,
`381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 33
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) ............................................ 11, 14
`Dell, Inc. v. Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00071, Paper No. 17 (July 29, 2013) .................................................... 8
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) .............................................. 19, 20
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 (Jan. 9, 2013) ..................................................... 34
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .................................. 10, 14, 15, 16
`Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg Indus. LLC,
`IPR2013-00552, Paper No. 6 (May 7, 2014) .......................................... 14, 15, 16
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................. 19
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 (Nov. 21, 2013) ........................................... 16, 17
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) ...................................... 18, 19, 20
`Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`486 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 22
`
`iii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`
`
`Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 (Apr. 29, 2013) .................................................. 34
`Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist.,
`946 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ............................................................................ 22
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ........................................... 19, 21
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................. 10
`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) .................................................... 10
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................. 10
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 (June 27, 2013) .................................................. 34
`ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (June 19, 2013) .................................................. 34
`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 311 .................................................................................................. 6, 8, 9
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ..................................................................................................... 9
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ........................................................................................... 1, 10
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ........................................................................................... 1, 10
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .......................................................................................................... 6
`35 U.S.C. § 315 .......................................................................................................... 7
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ............................................................................................passim
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ............................................................................................passim
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 39
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ............................................................................................passim
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 10
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 10
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`Other Authorities
`154 Cong. Rec. S9988 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008) ....................................................... 8
`157 Cong. Rec. S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) ................................................. 16
`77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012)........................................................................ 16
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012)........................................................................ 16
`
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`v
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`
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`I.
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`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`Introduction
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
`
`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple Inc. against
`
`VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 8,051,181 (“the ’181 patent”). VirnetX requests that the
`
`Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
`
`First, VirnetX served Apple with a complaint alleging infringement of the
`
`’181 patent in 2011, which is more than one year before Apple filed its Petition.
`
`Thus, Apple’s Petition is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) for the same reasons the
`
`Board previously found that Apple’s other petitions against VirnetX’s patents were
`
`barred. See, e.g., IPR2013-00348, Paper No. 14 (Dec. 13, 2013) and Paper No. 18
`
`(Feb. 12, 2014).
`
`Second, the Petition fails to identify where the prior art discloses each
`
`claimed feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
`
`(4) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
`
`Third, this proceeding is duplicative of other actions before the Office and
`
`should be dismissed under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Office currently has an inter
`
`partes reexamination proceeding against the ’181 patent (Control No. 95/001,949).
`
`Apple initiated that proceeding and continues to participate in it. In that
`
`reexamination, the Office has already addressed the two primary references Apple
`
` 1
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`asserts in its Petition. Allowing Apple yet another set of challenges to the ’181
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
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`patent, as Apple requests here, is unnecessary and burdens both the Office and
`
`VirnetX. Section 325(d) was designed to avoid the type of serial challenge Apple
`
`requests here.
`
`Fourth, Apple proposes redundant grounds without addressing redundancy at
`
`all, let alone identifying how any one ground improves on any other, as required by
`
`Board precedent.
`
`Finally, Apple proposes a series of incorrect claim constructions. Because
`
`its unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Apple
`
`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
`
`unpatentability of any ’181 patent claim.
`
`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Must Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`Apple admits that it was served with “a complaint” alleging infringement of
`
`the ’181 patent more than one year before the Petition was filed. (Pet. at 1-2.)
`
`Thus, the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) compels dismissal of the Petition,
`
`as it prohibits instituting inter partes review of a patent based on a petition filed
`
`more than one year after the petitioner has been served with “a complaint” alleging
`
`infringement of the patent.
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`2
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`The Board recently decided this issue against Apple in other proceedings
`
`involving related patents. In each proceeding, the Board denied Apple’s petition
`
`under § 315(b). (See IPR2013-00348, Paper No. 14 (Dec. 13, 2013); IPR2013-
`
`00349, Paper No. 15 (Dec. 13, 2013); IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 20 (Dec. 13,
`
`2013); IPR2013-00393 Paper No. 17 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00394 Paper No.
`
`15 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00397 Paper No. 15 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00398
`
`Paper No. 16 (Dec. 18, 2013).)1 The facts here require the same result. Unlike the
`
`other proceedings, in which Apple offered numerous arguments that its petitions
`
`were not time barred, here, Apple does not refute that its Petition would be barred
`
`under § 315(b). Instead, Apple argues that § 315(b) does not apply to its Petition
`
`because it is accompanied by a request for joinder under § 315(c). As discussed
`
`below, however, § 315(c) only applies to timely petitions, and cannot be used to
`
`obviate the time bar under § 315(b).2
`
`
`1 The Board denied Apple’s rehearing requests in each of those proceedings
`
`on February 12, 2014.
`
`2 The parties separately briefed the joinder issue, and Apple’s Petition
`
`should not be joined for the reasons discussed in VirnetX’s Opposition to Apple’s
`
`Motion for Joinder, filed April 10, 2014. (Paper No. 6).
`
`3
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`1. Procedural History Relevant to § 315(b)
`On November 1, 2011, VirnetX filed a complaint against Apple in district
`
`court, alleging infringement of claims 1, 2, 4-12, 17, 19, 21, 22, and 24-29 of the
`
`’181 patent. (Ex. 2001, VirnetX Inc.’s Original Complaint, VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple,
`
`Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2011).) The next day, VirnetX served the
`
`complaint on Apple. (Ex. 2020 at 2, Proof of Service, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-cv-
`
`00563 (E.D. Tex. entered Nov. 10, 2011).) The court statutorily stayed the case
`
`pending a final determination in a corresponding action VirnetX filed against
`
`Apple at the International Trade Commission (“ITC”). (Ex. 2021, Order, VirnetX,
`
`Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2011).) In the ITC action, VirnetX
`
`accused Apple of infringing the same claims of the ’181 patent that it had asserted
`
`in
`
`the district court action.
`
` (Ex. 2022, Certain Devices with Secure
`
`Communication Capabilities, Components Thereof, and Products Containing the
`
`Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-818, Complaint (Nov. 4, 2011)).
`
`The ITC action was terminated on July 20, 2012, for lack of standing. (Ex.
`
`2023, Certain Devices with Secure Communication Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-
`
`818, Initial Determination (July 18, 2012).) VirnetX filed a second ITC complaint
`
`against Apple on September 14, 2012, alleging infringement of claims 1, 2, 5-9,
`
`14, 15, 17-19, 22, 24, and 26-29 of the ’181 patent. (Ex. 2024, Certain Devices
`
`with Secure Communication Capabilities, Components Thereof, and Products
`
`4
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`

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`Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-858, Complaint (Sep. 13, 2012).) VirnetX
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`later withdrew this complaint.
`
` (Ex. 2025, Certain Devices with Secure
`
`Communication Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-858, Initial Determination (Apr. 22,
`
`2013)).
`
`After the ITC actions concluded, on June 17, 2013, the district court lifted
`
`the stay. (Ex. 2026, Order, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. June 17,
`
`2013).) The next day, the district court consolidated the original district court
`
`action with Civil Action No. 6:12-cv-855. (Ex. 2027, Order, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-
`
`cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2013).) The consolidated actions remain pending.
`
`Concurrent with these litigations, Apple has also challenged the validity of
`
`the ’181 patent in the Office by initiating an inter partes reexamination (Control
`
`No. 95/001,949), which remains pending. Although Apple has availed itself of
`
`several opportunities to challenge the validity of the ’181 patent in litigation and
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`before the Office, it now seeks two more opportunities by filing the Petition at
`
`issue here and a separate petition for inter partes review in Case No. IPR2014-
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`00486. These two petitions were filed in March 2014, long after Apple was first
`
`served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’181 patent in November
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`2011.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`2. The Plain Meaning of § 315(b) and the Board’s Precedent Bar
`the Petition
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if
`
`the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on
`
`which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
`
`complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The language
`
`“a complaint” is not restrictive. Thus, the directive of § 315(b) is clear: if a
`
`petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner is served with any
`
`complaint, inter partes review may not be instituted. Here, Apple filed its Petition
`
`in March 2014, more than one year after it was served with the November 2011
`
`complaint. Under the plain language of § 315(b), therefore, an inter partes review
`
`may not be instituted and Apple’s Petition must be dismissed.
`
`3. Apple’s Untimeliness Precludes Joinder Under § 315(c)
`Institution of Apple’s Petition is barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because
`
`Apple was served with a complaint more than one year before it filed its Petition.
`
`The fact that the Petition is accompanied by a request for joinder is irrelevant.
`
`Joinder is only permitted if the Board first determines that the Petition warrants
`
`institution. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“the Director, in his or her discretion, may join . . .
`
`any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . .
`
`determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”).
`
`6
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`Because Apple’s untimeliness precludes institution under § 315(b), it also
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
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`precludes joinder under § 315(c).
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`The last sentence of § 315(b) states that “[t]he time limitation set forth in the
`
`preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).”
`
`However, the AIA, and indeed § 315 itself, distinguishes between petitions for
`
`inter partes review and requests for joinder. Specifically, the last sentence of 35
`
`U.S.C. § 315(b) states that “[t]he time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence
`
`shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” In other words,
`
`§ 315(b) provides an exception to the one-year bar only for a request for joinder,
`
`not for a petition for inter partes review. Thus, the one-year bar continues to apply
`
`to all petitions, even if accompanied by a request for joinder.
`
`The request-for-joinder exception of § 315(b) applies only when two timely
`
`petitions are filed but the request for joinder is made more than a year after being
`
`served with a complaint. This reading makes sense because joinder is not available
`
`until after an IPR has been instituted. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Since it can take up to
`
`six months for an institution decision, it is likely that many requests for joinder will
`
`occur more than one year after being served with a complaint. The statutory
`
`language addresses this concern. It does not, however, provide a backdoor for
`
`time-barred petitions to be instituted through joinder. Such a view is contrary to
`
`Congress’s intent to avoid serial harassment of patent owners, which particularly
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`7
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`

`
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`applies to parties like Apple who have already had ample opportunity to present
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
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`validity challenges in both district court and reexamination. Ex. 2003 at 72 (a goal
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`of the inter partes review laws is to “prevent[ ] the serial harassment of patent
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`holders.”).
`
`Permitting untimely petitions to be instituted through joinder is also contrary
`
`to the joinder statute. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), “the Director, in his or her
`
`discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly
`
`files a petition under section 311.” (Emphasis added.) Senator Kyl addressed the
`
`meaning of the term “properly files,” stating that “time deadlines for filing
`
`petitions must be complied with in all cases.” Ex. 2004, 154 Cong. Rec. S9988
`
`(daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008). Section 315(c) is consistent with this view because it
`
`requires compliance with § 311, which in turn requires compliance with the other
`
`provisions of Title 35, Chapter 31 of the U.S. Code, including the timeliness
`
`provisions. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person
`
`who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an
`
`inter partes review of the patent,” emphasis added).
`
`The Board has recognized that § 311 limits joinder under § 315(c), but
`
`disregards the portion of § 311 that also requires compliance with other provisions
`
`of Chapter 31. Dell, Inc. v. Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc., IPR2013-00071, Paper
`
`No. 17 at 5 (July 29, 2013) (“Section 315(c) refers only to ‘section 311,’ not to any
`
`8
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`

`
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`other portions of the statute or portions of the statute referenced in Section 311.”).
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
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`This interpretation is incorrect, as it disregards the plain statutory language. The
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`Board’s interpretation would also mean that other provisions of Chapter 31 do not
`
`apply to petitions when joinder is requested, such as the petition requirements of §
`
`312(a). The statute does not permit this, so the Board’s interpretation is incorrect.
`
`The plain language of §§ 315(b) and (c) prohibit joinder here.
`
`B.
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`A trial cannot be instituted, because the Petition only attempts to identify
`
`where some, but not all, of the elements recited in independent claims 1, 2, 24, 26,
`
`28, and 29 are found in Beser. (Pet. at 14-26.) And for the features the Petition
`
`does attempt to identify in Beser, the Petition’s anticipation theory is internally
`
`inconsistent. Likewise, the Petition’s discussion of Kiuchi and independent claims
`
`1, 2, 24, 26, 28, and 29 fails to correlate features of Kiuchi with each of the claim
`
`features. (Id. at 44-54.) Moreover, the substance of Apple’s purported anticipation
`
`theories is further shrouded by the Petition’s reliance on 100 paragraphs of
`
`declarant testimony for just the ground based on Beser and claim 1, and 52
`
`paragraphs of declarant testimony for the ground based on Kiuchi and claim 1.
`
`(See Pet. at 14-18 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 277-286, 282-287, 289-299, 302-309, 314-
`
`353, 372-395, 551); id. at 44-48 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 91-110, 127-133, 975, 978-
`
`980, 982-996, 995-996, 999-1012).) Because the Petition’s lack of explanation and
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`9
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`particularity, as well as its internal inconsistencies, violate 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`
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`(4) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4)-(5), it should be denied.
`
`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
`
`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
`
`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
`
`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
`
`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
`
`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
`
`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
`
`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
`
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
`
`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
`
`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
`
`prior art); see also Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-
`
`00054, Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-
`
`00103, Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`
`IPR2013-00186, Paper 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
`
`Corp., IPR2012-00041, Paper 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013). As the Board has
`
`10
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`

`
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`explained, it will not “search the record and piece together any evidence or
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00486
`
`
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`arguments that may support Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” CaptionCall, LLC
`
`v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00549, Paper 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014).
`
`Here, Apple’s Petition only attempts to identify where certain elements of
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`independent claims 1, 2, 24, 26, 28, and 29 are allegedly found in Beser. For
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`example, the Petition contends that Beser’s “terminating end device has a secure
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`name (e.g., the phone number that is registered with the trusted-third-party network
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`device) and an unsecured name (e.g., its domain name).” (Pet. at 15.) Apple thus
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`appears to imply that Beser’s “terminating end device” corresponds to the “first
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`device” recited in claims 1 and 29, which is “associated with a secure name and an
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`unsecured name.” (See id.) The Petition also contends that messages “transmitted
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`from the first network device to the second network device” in Beser are each “a
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`message indicating the originating device desires to communicate securely with the
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`terminating device.” (Id. at 17.) Here, Apple appears to imply that Beser’s “first
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`network device” corresponds to the “second device” recited in claims 1 and 29.
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`(See id.) Merely implying how the claims allegedly map to the prior art is not
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`sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for particularity.
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`Moreover, the Petition fails to even imply what features of Beser it contends
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`correspond to other elements in claims 1 and 29, such as “a network address
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`corresponding to the secure name associated with the first device” or a “sending a
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`message over a secure communication link from the first device to the second
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`device.” (See id. at 16-18.) The Petition is similarly deficient for independent
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`claims 2, 24, 26, and 28. (See id. at 18-26.)
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`In addition, the Petition’s apparent interpretation of Beser is contradictory.
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`As noted above, the Petition implies that Beser’s “terminating end device”
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`corresponds to the “first device” of claims 1 and 29, and Beser’s “first network
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`device” corresponds to the “second device” of these claims. Yet for the feature of
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`claims 1 and 29 of “sending a message . . . from the first device to the second
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`device,” the Petition does not assert that Beser discloses sending any message from
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`the “terminating end device” (the purported “first device”) to the “first network
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`device” (the purported “second device”). Instead, the Petition asserts that Beser
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`discloses the “terminating device” communicating with the “originating device.”
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`(Id. at 18.) Accordingly, the Petition’s theory of anticipation based on Beser is
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`internally inconsistent and must be rejected. Further, the Petition’s similar
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`anticipation theories for independent claims 2, 24, 26, and 28 based on Beser are
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`also contradictory. (See id. at 18-26.)
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`The Petition’s discussion of Kiuchi is also deficient for independent claims
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`1, 2, 24, 26, 28, and 29. As with Beser, the Petition presents lengthy summaries of
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`the purported operation of Kiuchi, and then abruptly concludeswithout
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`explanationthat Kiuchi discloses entire combinations of claim features. (See id.
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`at 44-54.) For example, the Petition contends that Kiuchi discloses “a network
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`address corresponding to the secure name associated with the first device,” as
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`recited in claims 1 and 29, but the Petition offers no explanation for this conclusion
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`and fails to particularly point to a specific “network address” in Kiuchi that it relies
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`on. (See id. at 46-47.) Instead, the Petition presents a general summary of a
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`“client-side proxy” communicating with a “server-side proxy,” as well as messages
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`sent to a “C-HTTP name server.” (Id.) Nowhere, however, does the Petition
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`specifically identify what feature of Kiuchi it regards as disclosing “a network
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`address corresponding to the secure name associated with the first device,” as
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`recited in claims 1 and 29. The Petition is similarly deficient for independent
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`claims 2, 24, 26, and 28. (See id. at 48-54.)
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`The Petition’s heavy reliance on declarant testimony, rather than specific
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`citations to Beser and Kiuchi themselves, further compounds the vagueness of
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`Apple’s asserted grounds based on those references. As noted above, the Petition
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`cites 100 paragraphs of declarant testimony for just the ground based on Beser and
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`claim 1, and 52 paragraphs of declarant testimony for the ground based on Kiuchi
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`and claim 1. (See Pet. at 14-18, 44-48.)
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`The consequence of Apple’s unarticulated and contradictory grounds of
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`unpatentability is that the Board and VirnetX are forced to parse the voluminous
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`record and guess at hypothetical grounds that Apple could be attempting to assert.
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`This is precisely what the Board has said it will not do. A “petitioner has the
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`burden to identify and explain the specific evidence that supports its arguments in
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`the petition” and “[t]hus, the petition itself must identify ‘[h]ow the construed
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`claim is unpatentable’ and must identify ‘specific portions of the evidence that
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`support the challenge.’” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00549,
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`Paper No. 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a “[p]etitioner
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`should not expect the Board to search the record and piece together any evidence
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`or arguments that may support [the p]etitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” Id.
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`Indeed, Apple’s Petition resembles petitions that the Board has rejected for
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`lack of explanation in other proceedings. For example, in Google Inc. et al. v.
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`Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 at 17 (May 22, 2014), a petition
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`presented a “brief summary” of a prior art reference, and a “claim chart that
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`allegedly explains how [the reference] discloses the claimed subject matter” of the
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`challenged claims.” The Board concluded that, “[t]o the extent that Petitioners
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`assert that the brief summary, and quotations, citations, and reproduced figures
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`from [the reference] qualify as argument, they do not: (1) specify sufficiently
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`where each element of independent claim 1 is found in [the reference], and (2)
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`constitute a detailed explanation of the significance of the quotations, citations, and
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`figures from [the reference].” Id. at 19. Likewise, in Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg
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`Indus. LLC, IPR2013-00552, Paper No. 6 at 20-21 (May 7, 2014), the petitioner
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`“present[ed] limited, if any, arguments in its petition apart from the various
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`Case No. IPR2014-00486
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`citations to the references and to [an expert] Declaration [] provided in the claim
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`charts.” The Board denied institution, finding that “[t]o the extent that such
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`unexplained citations qualify as argument, they are inadequate to demonstrate that
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`elements of the challenged claims are inherent in the cited references.” Id. at 21.
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`And in Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8
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`at 17 (Apr. 24, 2014), the Board considered a petition that “refer[red] generally” to
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`features of a prior art reference but did “not identify specifically what Petitioner
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`regards as the [claim element] as recited in claim 1.” The Board denied institution,
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`finding the petitioner’s discussion “vague” for “failing to identify” how the claim
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`element was satisfied by the prior art. Id.
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`Apple’s Petition is defective for reasons similar to those that the Board
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`highlighted in Everymd.com, Gracenote, and Evolutionary Intelligence. Apple’s
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`Petition has a similar structure to that in Everymd.com, including a summary of the
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`asserted references (Beser and Kiuchi) and many citations, but no specific
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`explanation of where each claim element is found in the references. And similar to
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`the petition in Gracenote, Apple’s Petition merely offers citations to the references
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`(by way of its many citations to the accompanying declaration) and to the
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`declaration itself. Evolution