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`
`
`
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`Telephone: (571) 203-2700
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
`E-mail: joseph.palys@finnegan.com
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`
`
`Paper No.
`Filed: June 17, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00485
`Patent 8,051,181
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,051,181
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`I.
`II.
`
`B.
`
`E.
`
`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 2
`A.
`The Petition Must Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ..................... 2
`1.
`Procedural History Relevant to § 315(b) .................................... 4
`2.
`The Plain Meaning of § 315(b) and the Board’s
`Precedent Bar the Petition ........................................................... 6
`Apple’s Untimeliness Precludes Joinder Under § 315(c) ........... 6
`3.
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 9
`C. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ..........16
`D.
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds .............................................................................18
`Apple Asserts an Anticipation Ground Based on Three
`Documents, Contrary to Basic Anticipation Law ...............................21
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................23
`A. Overview of the ’181 Patent ................................................................24
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................25
`C.
`“Secure Name Service” (Claims 2 and 28) .........................................27
`D.
`“Secure Name” (Claims 1-5, 8, 10, 11, and 22-29) ............................30
`E.
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claim 3) .....................................................32
`F.
`“Unsecured Name” (Claims 1, 21, 26, and 27) ...................................32
`G.
`“Secure Communication Link” (Claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14,
`25, and 28) ...........................................................................................33
`
`i
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`

`

`
`
`
`IV.
`V.
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`H.
`“Client Computer” (Claim 20) ............................................................38
`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................41
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................42
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`
`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ.,
`212 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 22
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ........................................ 11, 14, 15
`Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`725 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 21, 22
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................. 11
`In re Bigio,
`381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................................................... 35
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) .................................................. 13
`Dell, Inc. v. Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00071, Paper No. 17 (July 29, 2013) .................................................... 9
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) .............................................. 19, 21
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
`IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 15 (Jan. 9, 2013) ..................................................... 36
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .............................................. 10, 14
`Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg Indus. LLC,
`IPR2013-00552, Paper No. 6 (May 7, 2014) ...................................................... 14
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) ................................................. 19
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 (Nov. 21, 2013) ........................................... 16, 17
`
`iii
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`

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`
`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`
`
`
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`545 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................ 22
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) ...................................... 18, 19, 20
`Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`486 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 23
`Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Mobile Scanning Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00093, Paper No. 28 (Apr. 29, 2013) .................................................. 36
`Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist.,
`946 F.2d 870 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ............................................................................ 23
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ........................................... 19, 21
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................. 11
`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) .................................................... 11
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................. 11
`Xilinx, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC,
`IPR2013-00112, Paper No. 14 (June 27, 2013) .................................................. 36
`ZTE Corp. & ZTE (USA) Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00134, Paper No. 12 (June 19, 2013) .................................................. 36
`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 311 .................................................................................................. 7, 8, 9
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ..................................................................................................... 9
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ........................................................................................... 1, 10
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ........................................................................................... 1, 10
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`35 U.S.C. § 315 .......................................................................................................... 7
`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) ............................................................................................passim
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ............................................................................................passim
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 40
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ............................................................................................passim
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 40
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 40
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 10
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) .......................................................................................... 10
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`Other Authorities
`154 Cong. Rec. S9988 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008) ....................................................... 8
`157 Cong. Rec. S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) ................................................. 16
`77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012)........................................................................ 16
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012)........................................................................ 16
`
`
`
`
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`
`v
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`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`Introduction
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
`
`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple Inc. against
`
`VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 8,051,181 (“the ’181 patent”). VirnetX requests that the
`
`Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
`
`First, VirnetX served Apple with a complaint alleging infringement of the
`
`’181 patent in 2011, which is more than one year before Apple filed its Petition.
`
`Thus, Apple’s Petition is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) for the same reasons the
`
`Board previously found that Apple’s other petitions against VirnetX’s patents were
`
`barred. See, e.g., IPR2013-00348, Paper No. 14 (Dec. 13, 2013) and Paper No. 18
`
`(Feb. 12, 2014).
`
`Second, the Petition fails to identify where the prior art discloses each
`
`claimed feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
`
`(4) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
`
`Third, this proceeding is duplicative of other actions before the Office and
`
`should be dismissed under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Office currently has an inter
`
`partes reexamination proceeding against the ’181 patent (Control No. 95/001,949).
`
`Apple initiated that proceeding and continues to participate in it. In that
`
`reexamination, the Office has already addressed the two primary references Apple
`
` 1
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`
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`asserts in its Petition. Allowing Apple yet another set of challenges to the ’181
`
`
`
`patent, as Apple requests here, is unnecessary and burdens both the Office and
`
`VirnetX. Section 325(d) was designed to avoid the type of serial challenge Apple
`
`requests here.
`
`Fourth, Apple proposes redundant grounds without addressing redundancy at
`
`all, let alone identifying how any one ground improves on any other, as required by
`
`Board precedent.
`
`Fifth, Apple proposes anticipation based on RFC 2543 in combination with
`
`two other references. RFC 2543 does not incorporate by reference the other
`
`references, and Apple does not even attempt to show that it does. Apple’s multi-
`
`reference anticipation ground violates basic anticipation principles, so it should be
`
`rejected.
`
`Finally, Apple proposes a series of incorrect claim constructions. Because
`
`its unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Apple
`
`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
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`unpatentability of any ’181 patent claim.
`
`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Must Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`Apple admits that it was served with “a complaint” alleging infringement of
`
`the ’181 patent more than one year before the Petition was filed. (Pet. at 1-2.)
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`2
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`Thus, the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) compels dismissal of the Petition,
`
`
`
`as it prohibits instituting inter partes review of a patent based on a petition filed
`
`more than one year after the petitioner has been served with “a complaint” alleging
`
`infringement of the patent.
`
`The Board recently decided this issue against Apple in other proceedings
`
`involving related patents. In each proceeding, the Board denied Apple’s petition
`
`under § 315(b). (See IPR2013-00348, Paper No. 14 (Dec. 13, 2013); IPR2013-
`
`00349, Paper No. 15 (Dec. 13, 2013); IPR2013-00354, Paper No. 20 (Dec. 13,
`
`2013); IPR2013-00393 Paper No. 17 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00394 Paper No.
`
`15 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00397 Paper No. 15 (Dec. 18, 2013); IPR2013-00398
`
`Paper No. 16 (Dec. 18, 2013).)1 The facts here require the same result. Unlike the
`
`other proceedings, in which Apple offered numerous arguments that its petitions
`
`were not time barred, here, Apple does not refute that its Petition would be barred
`
`under § 315(b). Instead, Apple argues that § 315(b) does not apply to its Petition
`
`because it is accompanied by a request for joinder under § 315(c). As discussed
`
`
`1 The Board denied Apple’s rehearing requests in each of those proceedings
`
`on February 12, 2014.
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`3
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`below, however, § 315(c) only applies to timely petitions, and cannot be used to
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`
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`obviate the time bar under § 315(b).2
`
`1. Procedural History Relevant to § 315(b)
`On November 1, 2011, VirnetX filed a complaint against Apple in district
`
`court, alleging infringement of claims 1, 2, 4-12, 17, 19, 21, 22, and 24-29 of the
`
`’181 patent. (Ex. 2001, VirnetX Inc.’s Original Complaint, VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple,
`
`Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2011).) The next day, VirnetX served the
`
`complaint on Apple. (Ex. 2020 at 2, Proof of Service, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-cv-
`
`00563 (E.D. Tex. entered Nov. 10, 2011).) The court statutorily stayed the case
`
`pending a final determination in a corresponding action VirnetX filed against
`
`Apple at the International Trade Commission (“ITC”). (Ex. 2021, Order, VirnetX,
`
`Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2011).) In the ITC action, VirnetX
`
`accused Apple of infringing the same claims of the ’181 patent that it had asserted
`
`in
`
`the district court action.
`
` (Ex. 2022, Certain Devices with Secure
`
`Communication Capabilities, Components Thereof, and Products Containing the
`
`Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-818, Complaint (Nov. 4, 2011)).
`
`
`2 The parties separately briefed the joinder issue, and Apple’s Petition
`
`should not be joined for the reasons discussed in VirnetX’s Opposition to Apple’s
`
`Motion for Joinder, filed April 10, 2014. (Paper No. 6).
`
`4
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`The ITC action was terminated on July 20, 2012, for lack of standing. (Ex.
`
`
`
`2023, Certain Devices with Secure Communication Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-
`
`818, Initial Determination (July 18, 2012).) VirnetX filed a second ITC complaint
`
`against Apple on September 14, 2012, alleging infringement of claims 1, 2, 5-9,
`
`14, 15, 17-19, 22, 24, and 26-29 of the ’181 patent. (Ex. 2024, Certain Devices
`
`with Secure Communication Capabilities, Components Thereof, and Products
`
`Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-858, Complaint (Sep. 13, 2012).) VirnetX
`
`later withdrew this complaint.
`
` (Ex. 2025, Certain Devices with Secure
`
`Communication Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-858, Initial Determination (Apr. 22,
`
`2013)).
`
`After the ITC actions concluded, on June 17, 2013, the district court lifted
`
`the stay. (Ex. 2026, Order, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. June 17,
`
`2013).) The next day, the district court consolidated the original district court
`
`action with Civil Action No. 6:12-cv-855. (Ex. 2027, Order, VirnetX, Inc., 6:11-
`
`cv-00563 (E.D. Tex. June 18, 2013).) The consolidated actions remain pending.
`
`Concurrent with these litigations, Apple has also challenged the validity of
`
`the ’181 patent in the Office by initiating an inter partes reexamination (Control
`
`No. 95/001,949), which remains pending. Although Apple has availed itself of
`
`several opportunities to challenge the validity of the ’181 patent in litigation and
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`before the Office, it now seeks two more opportunities by filing the Petition at
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`5
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`
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`issue here and a separate petition for inter partes review in Case No. IPR2014-
`
`
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`00486. These two petitions were filed in March 2014, long after Apple was first
`
`served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’181 patent in November
`
`2011.
`
`2. The Plain Meaning of § 315(b) and the Board’s Precedent Bar
`the Petition
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if
`
`the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on
`
`which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
`
`complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The language
`
`“a complaint” is not restrictive. Thus, the directive of § 315(b) is clear: if a
`
`petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner is served with any
`
`complaint, inter partes review may not be instituted. Here, Apple filed its Petition
`
`in March 2014, more than one year after it was served with the November 2011
`
`complaint. Under the plain language of § 315(b), therefore, an inter partes review
`
`may not be instituted and Apple’s Petition must be dismissed.
`
`3. Apple’s Untimeliness Precludes Joinder Under § 315(c)
`Institution of Apple’s Petition is barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because
`
`Apple was served with a complaint more than one year before it filed its Petition.
`
`The fact that the Petition is accompanied by a request for joinder is irrelevant.
`
`Joinder is only permitted if the Board first determines that the Petition warrants
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`6
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`
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`institution. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“the Director, in his or her discretion, may join . . .
`
`
`
`any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . .
`
`determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”).
`
`Because Apple’s untimeliness precludes institution under § 315(b), it also
`
`precludes joinder under § 315(c).
`
`The last sentence of § 315(b) states that “[t]he time limitation set forth in the
`
`preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).”
`
`However, the AIA, and indeed § 315 itself, distinguishes between petitions for
`
`inter partes review and requests for joinder. Specifically, the last sentence of 35
`
`U.S.C. § 315(b) states that “[t]he time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence
`
`shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” In other words,
`
`§ 315(b) provides an exception to the one-year bar only for a request for joinder,
`
`not for a petition for inter partes review. Thus, the one-year bar continues to apply
`
`to all petitions, even if accompanied by a request for joinder.
`
`The request-for-joinder exception of § 315(b) applies only when two timely
`
`petitions are filed but the request for joinder is made more than a year after being
`
`served with a complaint. This reading makes sense because joinder is not available
`
`until after an IPR has been instituted. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Since it can take up to
`
`six months for an institution decision, it is likely that many requests for joinder will
`
`occur more than one year after being served with a complaint. The statutory
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`7
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`
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`language addresses this concern. It does not, however, provide a backdoor for
`
`
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`time-barred petitions to be instituted through joinder. Such a view is contrary to
`
`Congress’s intent to avoid serial harassment of patent owners, which particularly
`
`applies to parties like Apple who have already had ample opportunity to present
`
`validity challenges in both district court and reexamination. Ex. 2003 at 72 (a goal
`
`of the inter partes review laws is to “prevent[ ] the serial harassment of patent
`
`holders.”).
`
`Permitting untimely petitions to be instituted through joinder is also contrary
`
`to the joinder statute. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), “the Director, in his or her
`
`discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly
`
`files a petition under section 311.” (Emphasis added.) Senator Kyl addressed the
`
`meaning of the term “properly files,” stating that “time deadlines for filing
`
`petitions must be complied with in all cases.” Ex. 2004, 154 Cong. Rec. S9988
`
`(daily ed. Sep. 27, 2008). Section 315(c) is consistent with this view because it
`
`requires compliance with § 311, which in turn requires compliance with the other
`
`provisions of Title 35, Chapter 31 of the U.S. Code, including the timeliness
`
`provisions. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person
`
`who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an
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`inter partes review of the patent,” emphasis added).
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`8
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`The Board has recognized that § 311 limits joinder under § 315(c), but
`
`
`
`disregards the portion of § 311 that also requires compliance with other provisions
`
`of Chapter 31. Dell, Inc. v. Network-1 Sec. Solutions, Inc., IPR2013-00071, Paper
`
`No. 17 at 5 (July 29, 2013) (“Section 315(c) refers only to ‘section 311,’ not to any
`
`other portions of the statute or portions of the statute referenced in Section 311.”).
`
`This interpretation is incorrect, as it disregards the plain statutory language. The
`
`Board’s interpretation would also mean that other provisions of Chapter 31 do not
`
`apply to petitions when joinder is requested, such as the petition requirements of §
`
`312(a). The statute does not permit this, so the Board’s interpretation is incorrect.
`
`The plain language of §§ 315(b) and (c) prohibit joinder here.
`
`B.
`
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`A trial cannot be instituted because the Petition only attempts to identify
`
`where the claimed “secure name” and “unsecured name” of independent claims 1
`
`and 29 are allegedly found in RFC 2543. (Pet. at 14-18.) For the other claimed
`
`features, the Petition alleges the general operation of RFC 2543 and then provides
`
`an unsupported conclusion that RFC 2543 “thus shows” or “consequently …
`
`shows” a claimed feature. (See id.) For the bulk of the claimed features, there is
`
`no attempt to link the claimed features to the disclosure of the reference. Likewise,
`
`the Petition’s discussion of Provino and independent claims 1 and 29 only attempts
`
`to identify where a “secure name” and “unsecure[d] name” are allegedly disclosed.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`(Id. at 38-41.) The Petition’s purported application of RFC 2543 and Provino to
`
`
`
`independent claims 2, 24, 26, and 28 is similarly unexplained.
`
`The substance of Apple’s anticipation theories is further veiled by the
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`Petition’s reliance on 100 paragraphs of declarant testimony for just the ground
`
`based on RFC 2543 and claim 1, and 48 paragraphs of declarant testimony for the
`
`ground based on Provino and claim 1. (See Pet. at 14-18 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 640-
`
`60, 663-71, 675-78, 683-97, 699-700, 703-08, 714-56); id at 38-41 (citing Ex. 1029
`
`¶¶ 1143-46, 1151-78, 1184-99).) Because the Petition’s lack of explanation and
`
`particularity violate 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4)-(5),
`
`and would result in a resulting trial having an unbounded and amorphous scope,
`
`institution should be denied.
`
`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
`
`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
`
`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
`
`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
`
`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
`
`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
`
`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
`
`10
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`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00485
`
`
`
`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
`
`
`
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
`
`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
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`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
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`prior art); Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054,
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`Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103,
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`Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc., IPR2013-
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`00186, Paper 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
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`IPR2012-00041, Paper 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013).
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`Here, the Petition fails to set forth the contentions with the required
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`particularity. In particular, it states that “[t]he callee’s SIP URL and user name [in
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`RFC 2543] are ‘secure names’.” (Pet. at 15 (emphasis added).) The Petition also
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`states that in Provino “a ‘secondary address’ which is a human-readable name
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`associated with the internal network address of the device ([is] a ‘secure name’),
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`. . . and (ii) a human-readable name associated with the firewall ([is] an
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`‘unsecure[d] name’). (Id. at 40 (emphases added).) For every other feature of
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`independent claims 1 and 29, however, the Petition fails to identify any particular
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`feature of RFC 2543 or Provino that allegedly satisfies the specific features of the
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`claims.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`Nowhere does the Petition state what Apple contends, from either reference,
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`
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`corresponds to the elements of a “first device,” “network address corresponding to
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`the secure name associated with the first device,” “message,” “second device,” and
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`“secure communication link.” (Id. at 14-18, 38-41.) Rather than point out what
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`features of RFC 2543 and Provino allegedly correspond to these claim features, the
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`Petition presents lengthy summaries of the references’ purported disclosures, and
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`thenwithout any explanationasserts the ultimate conclusion that they disclose
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`entire combinations of claim features. (Id.)
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`The Petition’s anticipation theories regarding independent claims 2, 24, 26,
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`and 28 are similarly unexplained. For claims 2 and 28, the Petition again asserts
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`that a callee’s “SIP URL and user name” in RFC 2543 are “secure names.” (Id. at
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`19.) It further asserts that a callee’s “SIP server” in RFC 2543 can be the recited
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`“secure name service,” (id. at 21), and that an “ACK message” or “session data”
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`may be the recited “message,” (id. at 23-24). For claims 24 and 26, the Petition
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`does not identify where any features of the claims are found in RFC 2543, other
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`than by referring to its earlier discussion of claims 1 and 29. (Id. at 24-27.) With
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`respect to Provino and claims 2, 24, 26, and 28, the Petition again suggests that a
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`“secondary address” of an internal device corresponds to the recited “secure
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`name,” (id. at 42, 46, 48) and that a human-readable domain name of a firewall
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`corresponds to the recited “unsecured name” (id. at 48). Beyond these minimal
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`attempts to correlate features for RFC 2543 and Provino with the features of
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`independent claims 2, 24, 26, and 28, it is unclear what specific features of the
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`references Apple is relying on in its anticipation theories.
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`The Petition’s heavy reliance on declarant testimony, rather than specific
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`citations to RFC 2543 and Provino themselves, further compounds the vagueness
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`of Apple’s asserted grounds based on those references. As noted above, the
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`Petition cites 100 paragraphs of declarant testimony for just the ground based on
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`RFC 2543 and claim 1, and 48 paragraphs of declarant testimony for the ground
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`based on Provino and claim 1. (See Pet. at 14-18, 38-41.)
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`The consequence of Apple’s unarticulated grounds of unpatentability is that
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`the Board and VirnetX are forced to parse the voluminous record and guess at
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`hypothetical grounds that Apple could be attempting to assert. This is precisely
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`what the Board has said it will not do. A “petitioner has the burden to identify and
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`explain the specific evidence that supports its arguments in the petition.”
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`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 at 5 (Apr. 28,
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`2014). “Thus, the petition itself must identify ‘[h]ow the construed claim is
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`unpatentable’ and must identify ‘specific portions of the evidence that support the
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`challenge.’” Id., emphasis in original. Therefore, a “[p]etitioner should not expect
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`the Board to search the record and piece together any evidence or arguments that
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`may support [the p]etitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” Id.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`Indeed, Apple’s Petition resembles petitions that the Board has rejected for
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`
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`lack of explanation in other proceedings. For example, in Google Inc. et al. v.
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`Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 at 17 (May 22, 2014), a petition
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`presented a “brief summary” of a prior art reference, and a “claim chart that
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`allegedly explains how [the reference] discloses the claimed subject matter” of the
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`challenged claims. The Board concluded that, “[t]o the extent that Petitioners
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`assert that the brief summary, and quotations, citations, and reproduced figures
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`from [the reference] qualify as argument, they do not: (1) specify sufficiently
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`where each element of independent claim 1 is found in [the reference], and (2)
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`constitute a detailed explanation of the significance of the quotations, citations, and
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`figures from [the reference].” Id. at 19.
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`Likewise, in Gracenote, Inc. v. Iceberg Indus. LLC, IPR2013-00552, Paper
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`No. 6 at 20-21 (May 7, 2014), the petitioner “present[ed] limited, if any, arguments
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`in its petition apart from the various citations to the references and to [an expert]
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`Declaration [] provided in the claim charts.” The Board denied institution, finding
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`that “[t]o the extent that such unexplained citations qualify as argument, they are
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`inadequate to demonstrate that elements of the challenged claims are inherent in
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`the cited references.” Id. at 21.
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`And in Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper
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`No. 8 at 17 (Apr. 24, 2014), the Board considered a petition that “refer[red]
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`Case No. IPR2014-00485
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`generally” to features of a prior art reference but did “not identify specifically what
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`Petitioner regards as the [claim element] as recited in claim 1.” The Board denied
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`institution, finding the petitioner’s discussion “vague” for “failing to identify” how
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`the claim element was satisfied by the prior art. Id.
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`Apple’s Petition suffers from the very defects that the Board highlighted in
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`Everymd.com, Gracenote, and Evolutionary Intelligence. Apple’s Petition has a
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`similar structure to that in Everymd.com, including a summary of the asserted
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`references (RFC 2543 and Provino) and many citations, but no specific
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`explanation of where each claim element is found in the references. And similar to
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`the petition in Gracenote, Apple’s Petition merely offers citations to the references
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`(by way of its many citations to the accompanying declaration) and to the
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`declaration itself. Evolutionary Intelligence involved the same petitioner and the
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`same type of general references to features of the asserted prior art, together with
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`“vague” theories of unpatentability and a lack of specific explanation. The
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`Everymd.com, Gracenote, and Evolutionary Intelligence decisions reflect the
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`principle that a petitioner carries the burden of clearly explaining where in the prior
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`art each claim element is found. Apple’s Petition fails to