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`Transmitted herewith for filing under 35 USC. 111(a) and 37 CFR. 1.53(b) is a new utility patent application for an
`invention entitled:
`
`METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING SECURE COMMUNICATION LINK BETWEEN COMPUTERS OF VIRTUAL
`PRIVATE NETWORK
`
`d invented by:
`
`Victor Larson, Robert Dunham Short III, Edmund Colby Munger and Michael Williamson
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`If a CONTlNUATlON APPLICATION, check appropriate box and supply the requisite information:
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`Continuation
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`:1 Divisional
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`Cl Continuation-in-part (CIP)
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`Which is a:
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`Z Continuation 3 Divisional
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`10/702,486
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`Descriptive Title of the invention
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`Cross References to Related Applications (if applicable)
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`Statement Regarding Federally-sponsored Research/Development (if applicable)
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`Reference to Sequence Listing, a Table, or a Computer Program Listing Appendix
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`Abstract of the Disclosure
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`I>_<J|xJI>_<JI§JI§JI§JI_JI_J|zJI&
`
`Page] of4
`
`PO1ULRGIREVil
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 1
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 1
`
`

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`77580-066 (VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`see 37 CNFHRI 1.63(d)(2) and 1.33(b).
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`incorporation By Reference (usable if Box 4b is checked)
`The entire disclosure of the prior application, from which a copy of the oath or declaration is supplied under
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`CD ROM or CD-R in duplicate, large table or Computer Program (Appendix)
`wt]
`>1.
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`Application Data Sheet (See 37 CFR 1.76)
`@
`
`,U'.°’U
`
`
`
`
`Nucleotide andlor Amino Acid Sequence Submission (if applicable, all must be included)
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`D Computer Readable Form (CRF)
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`Cl
`
`Specification Sequence Listing on:
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`ii. Cl
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`Paper
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`Page 2 of4
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`P01ULRG/REVH
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 2
`
`

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`Accompanying Application Parts (Continued)
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`published pursuant to 35 U,S.C. ‘l22(b)(‘l). Applicant hereby certifies that the invention disclosed in
`this application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in another country, or under
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`19. C] Other:
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`Page 3 of4
`
`PO1ULRGlREV11
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 3
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 3
`
`

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`CLAIMS AS FILED
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`1
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`lndep. Claims
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`Total # of Pages in Specification
`78
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`Total # of Sheets
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`118
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`TOTAL FILING FEE
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`Page 4 Of 4
`
`P01ULRG/REV11
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 4
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 4
`
`

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`Petitioner Apple Inc. —
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`Initial 8/16/2007
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 6
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 6
`
`

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`Page 3 of4
`
`Initial 8/16/2007
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 7
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 7
`
`

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`Page 4 of4
`
`Initial 8/16/2007
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 8
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 8
`
`

`
`Attorney Docket No. 077S80—0066 (VRNKJCPZDVCNZ)
`
`METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING SECURE COMMUNICATION LINK BETWEEN
`COMPUTERS OF VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK
`
`CROSS~REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
`
`[0001]
`
`This application claims priority from and is a continuation of co—pending US.
`
`application seriai number 11/679,416, filed February 27, 2007, which is a continuation of U.S,.
`
`application serial number 10/702,486, filed November 7, 2003, now US, Patent No. 7,188,180,
`
`issued March 06, 2007, which is a divisional patent application of US. application serial number
`
`09/558,209,
`
`filed April 26, 2000, now abandoned, which is a continuation—in—part patent
`
`application of previously—filed US. application serial number 09/504,783, filed on February 15,
`
`2000, now US, Patent No. 6,502,135, issued December 31, 2002, which claims priority from
`
`and is a continuation—in-part patent application of previously/—t'1led US. application serial number
`
`09/429,643, filed on October 29, 1999, now US, Patent No. 7,010,604, issued March 03, 2006.
`
`The subject matter of US, application serial number 09/429,643, which is bodily incorporated
`
`herein, derives from provisional US. application numbers 60/ 106,261 (filed October 30, 1998)
`
`and 60/137,704 (filed June 7, 1999). The present application is also related to US. application
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`serial number 09/558,210, filed April 26, 2000, now abandoned, and which is incorporated by
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`reference herein.
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`BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
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`[0002]
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`A tremendous variety of methods have been proposed and implemented to
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`provide security and anonymity for communications over the Internet. The variety stems, in part,
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`fi'om the different needs of different Internet users, A basic heuristic framework to aid in
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`discussing these different security techniques is
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`illustrated in FIG.
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`1, Two terminals, an
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`originating terminal 100 and a destination terminal 110 are in communication over the Internet.
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`It
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`is desired for the communications to be secure,
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`that
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`is,
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`immune to eavesdropping. For
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`example, terminal 100 may transmit secret information to terminal 110 over the Internet 107,
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`Also, it may be desired to prevent an eavesdropper from discovering that terminal 100 is in
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`communication with terminal 110. For example, if terminal 100 is a user and terminal 1 l0 hosts
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`a web site, terminal 100’s user may not want anyone in the intervening networks to know what
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`web sites he is “visiting.” Anonymity would thus be an issue, for exampie, for companies that
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`want to keep their market research interests private and thus would prefer to prevent outsiders
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`BST99 15-173-17-1 077580 0066
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 9
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 9
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 (VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`from knowing which websites or other Internet resources they are “visiting.” These two security
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`issues may be called data security and anonymity, respectively.
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`[0003]
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`Data security is usually tackled using some form of data encryption. An
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`encryption key 48 is known at both the originating and terminating terminals 100 and H0. The
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`keys may be private and public at
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`the originating and destination terminals 100 and 110,
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`respectively or they may be symmetrical keys (the same key is used by both parties to encrypt
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`and decrypt). Many encryption methods are known and usable in this context.
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`[0004]
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`To hide traffic from a local administrator or ISP, a user can employ a local
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`proxy server in communicating over an encrypted channel with an outside proxy such that the
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`local administrator or ISP only sees the encrypted traffic. Proxy servers prevent destination
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`servers from determining the identities of the originating clients. This system employs an
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`intermediate server interposed between client and destination server. The destination server sees
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`only the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the proxy server and not the originating client. The
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`target server only sees the address of the outside proxy. This scheme relies on a trusted outside
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`proxy server. Also, proxy schemes are vulnerable to traffic analysis methods of determining
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`identities of transmitters and receivers. Another important limitation of proxy servers is that the
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`server knows the identities of both calling and called parties. In many instances, an originating
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`terminal, such as terminal A, would prefer to keep its identity concealed from the proxy, for
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`example, if the proxy server is provided by an Internet service provider (ISP).
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`[0005]
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`To defeat traffic analysis, a scheme called Chaum’s mixes employs a proxy
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`server that transmits and receives fixed length messages, including dummy messages. Multiple
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`originating terminals are connected through a mix (a server) to multiple target servers. It is
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`difficult to tell which of the originating terminals are communicating to which of the connected
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`target servers, and the dummy messages confuse eavesdroppers’ efforts to detect communicating
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`pairs by analyzing traffic. A drawback is that there is a risk that the mix server could be
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`compromised. One way to deal with this risk is to spread the trust among multiple mixes. If one
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`mix is compromised, the identities of the originating and target terminals may remain concealed.
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`This strategy requires a number of alternative mixes so that the intermediate servers interposed
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`between the originating and target terminals are not determinable except by compromising more
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`than one mix. The strategy wraps the message with multiple layers of encrypted addresses. The
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`BST99 l547347—l 077580 0066
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`- 2 ..
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 10
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 10
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 [VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`first mix in a sequence can decrypt only the outer layer of the message to reveal
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`the next
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`destination mix in sequence. The second mix can decrypt the message to reveal the next mix and
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`so on. The target server receives the message and, optionally, a multi-«layer encrypted payload
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`containing return information to send data back in the same fashion. The only way to defeat such
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`a mix scheme is to collude among mixes. If the packets are all fixed~length and intermixed with
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`dummy packets, there is no way to do any kind of traffic analysis.
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`{(3006}
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`Still another anonymity technique, called ‘crowds,’ protects the identity of the
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`originating terminal from the intermediate proxies by providing that originating terminals belong
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`to groups of proxies called crowds. The crowd proxies are interposed between originating and
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`target terminals. Each proxy through which the message is sent
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`is randomly chosen by an
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`upstream proxy. Each intermediate proxy can send the message either to another randomly
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`chosen proxy in the “crowd” or to the destination. Thus, even crowd members cannot determine
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`if a preceding proxy is the originator of the message or if it was simply passed from another
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`proxy.
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`[0007]
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`ZKS (Zero—Knowledge Systems) Anonymous IP Protocol allows users to
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`select up to any of five different pseudonyms, while desktop software encrypts outgoing traffic
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`and wraps it in User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. The first server in a 2+«-hop system gets
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`the U1)? packets, strips off one layer of encryption to add another, then sends the traffic to the
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`next server, which strips off yet another layer of encryption and adds a new one. The user is
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`permitted to control
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`the number of hops. At
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`the final server,
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`traffic is decrypted with an
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`untraceable IP address. The technique is called onion—routing. This method can be defeated using
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`traffic analysis. For a simple example, bursts of packets from a user during low-duty periods can
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`reveal the identities of sender and receiver.
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`[0008]
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`Firewalls attempt
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`to protect LANS from unauthorized access and hostile
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`exploitation or damage to computers connected to the LAN. Firewalls provide a server through
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`which all access to the LAN must pass. Firewalls are centralized systems that
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`require
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`administrative overhead to maintain. They can be compromised by virtualumachine applications
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`(“applets”). They instill a false sense of security that leads to security breaches for example by
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`users sending sensitive information to servers outside the firewall or encouraging use of modems
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`i3SI'99 15473474 077580 0056
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 11
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 11
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 (VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`to sidestep the firewall security. Firewalls are not useful for distributed systems such as business
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`travelers, extranets, small teams, etc.
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`SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
`
`[0009]
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`A secure mechanism for communicating over the internet,
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`including a
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`protocol referred to as the Tunneled Agile Routing Protocol (TARP), uses a unique two~layer
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`encryption format and special TARP routers. TARP routers are similar in function to regular IP
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`routers. Each TARP router has one or more IP addresses and uses normal IP protocol to send IP
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`packet messages (“pacl<ets” or “datagrams”), The IP packets exchanged between TARP
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`terminals via TARP routers are actually encrypted packets whose true destination address is
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`concealed except to TARP routers and sewers. The normal or “clear” or “outside” IP header
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`attached to TARP IP packets contains only the address of a next hop router or destination server.
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`That is, instead of indicating a final destination in the destination field of the IP header, the
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`TARP packet’s IP header always points to a next~hop in a series of TARP router hops, or to the
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`final destination. This means there is no overt indication from an intercepted TARP packet of the
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`true destination of the TARP packet since the destination could always be next—hop TARP router
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`as well as the final destination.
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`[0010]
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`Each TARP pacl<et’s
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`true destination is concealed behind a layer of
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`encryption generated using a link key. The link key is the encryption key used for encrypted
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`communication between the hops intervening between an originating TARP terminal and a
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`destination TARP terminal. Each TARP router can remove the outer layer of encryption to reveal
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`the destination router for each TARP packet. To identify the link key needed to decrypt the outer
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`layer of encryption of a TARP packet, a receiving TARP or routing terminal may identify the
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`transmitting terminal by the senderfreceiver IP numbers in the cleartext IP header,
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`[0011]
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`Once the outer layer of encryption is removed, the TARP router determines
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`the final destination, Each TARP packet 140 undergoes a minimum number of hops to help foil
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`traffic analysis. The hops may be chosen at random or by a fixed value. As a result, each TARP
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`packet may make random trips among a number of geographically disparate routers before
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`reaching its destination. Bach trip is highly likely to be different for each packet composing a
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`given message because each trip is independently randomly determined. This feature is called
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`agile roaring. The fact that different packets take different routes provides distinct advantages by
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`BST99 l5-57347~l 077580 0066
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 12
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 12
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 (VRNK«-1 CPZDVCNZ)
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`making it difficult for an interloper to obtain all
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`the packets forming an entire rnulti~packet
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`message. The associated advantages have to do with the inner layer of encryption discussed
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`below. Agile routing is combined with another feature that furthers this purpose; a feature that
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`ensures that any message is broken into multiple packets.
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`[0012]
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`The IP address of a TARP router can be changed, a feature called 1}’ agility.
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`Each TARP router, independently or under direction from another TARP terminal or router, can
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`change its IP address. A separate, unchangeable identifier or address is also defined. This
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`address, called the TARP address, is known only to TARP routers and terminals and may be
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`correlated at any time by a TARP router or a TARP terminal using a Lookup Table (LUT). When
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`a TARP router or terminal changes its IP address,
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`it updates the other TARP routers and
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`terminals which in turn update their respective LU Ts.
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`[0013]
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`The message payload is hidden behind an inner layer of encryption in the
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`TARP packet that can only be unlocked using a session key. The session key is not available to
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`any of the intervening TARP routers. The session key is used to decrypt the payloads of the
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`TARP packets permitting the data stream to be reconstructed.
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`[0014]
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`Communication may be made private using link and session keys, which in
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`turn may be shared and used according to any desired method. For example, public/private keys
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`or symmetric keys may be used,
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`[0015]
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`To transmit a data stream, a TARP originating terminal constructs a series of
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`TARP packets from a series of IP packets generated by a network (IP) layer process. (Note that
`H {J
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`the terms “network layer,” “data link layer,
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`application layer,” etc. used in this specification
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`correspond to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network terminology.) The payloads of"
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`these packets are assembled into a block and chain-block encrypted using the session key. This
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`assumes, of course, that all the IP packets are destined for the same TARP terminal. The block is
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`then interleaved and the interleaved encrypted block is broken into a series of payloads, one for
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`each TARP packet to be generated, Special TARP headers IP1 are then added to each payload
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`using the IP headers from the data stream packets. The TARP headers can be identical to normal
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`IP headers or customized in some way. They should contain a formula or data for deinterleaving
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`the data at the destination TARP terminal, a time-to—live (TTL) parameter to indicate the number
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`of hops still to be executed, a data type identifier which indicates whether the payload contains,
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`BST99 lS47347-l 077580 0066
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 13
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 13
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 (VRNK-1CI’2DVCN2)
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`for example, TCP or UDP data, the sender's TARP address, the destination TARP address, and
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`an indicator as to whether the packet contains real or decoy data or a formula for filtering out
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`decoy data if decoy data is spread in some way through the TARP payload data.
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`[0016]
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`Note that although chain-block encryption is discussed here with reference to
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`the session key, any encryption method may be used, Preferably, as in chain block encryption, a
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`method should be used that makes unauthorized decryption difficult without an entire result of
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`the encryption process, Thus, by separating the encrypted block among multiple packets and
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`making it difficult for an interloper to obtain access to all of such packets, the contents of the
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`communications are provided an extra layer of security”
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`[0017]
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`Decoy or dummy data can be added to a stream to help foil traffic analysis by
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`reducing the peak»to—average network load. It may be desirable to provide the TARP process
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`with an ability to respond to the time of day or other criteria to generate more decoy data during
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`low traffic periods so that communication bursts at one point in the Internet cannot be tied to
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`communication bursts at another point to reveal the communicating endpoints.
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`[0018]
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`Dummy data also helps
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`to break the data into a larger number of
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`inconspicuously~sized packets permitting the interleave window size to be increased while
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`maintaining a reasonable size for each packet. (The packet size can be a single standard size or
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`selected from a fixed range of sizes.) One primary reason for desiring for each message to be
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`broken into multiple packets is apparent if a chain block encryption scheme is used to form the
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`first encryption layer prior to interleaving. A single block encryption may be applied to portion,
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`or entirety, of a message, and that portion or entirety then interleaved into a number of separate
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`packetsi Considering the agile IP routing of the packets, and the attendant difficulty of
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`reconstructing an entire sequence of packets to form a single block—encrypted message element,
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`decoy packets can significantly increase the difficulty of reconstructing an entire data stream.
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`[0019]
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`The above scheme may be implemented entirely by processes operating
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`between the data link layer and the network layer of each server or terminal participating in the
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`TARP system. Because the encryption system described above is insertable between the data link
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`and network layers, the processes involved in supporting the encrypted communication may be
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`completely transparent to processes at the IP (network) layer and above. The TARP processes
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`may also be completely transparent to the data link layer processes as well, Thus, no operations
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`BS'i"99 154734?-l 077580 0065
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`_ 5 -
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 14
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 14
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 (VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`at or above the Network layer, or at or below the data link layer, are affected by the insertion of
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`the TARP stack. This provides additional security to all processes at or above the network layer,
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`since the difficulty of unauthorized penetration of the network layer (by, for example, a hacker)
`
`is increased substantially. Even newly developed servers running at the session layer leave all
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`processes below the session layer vulnerable to attack. Note that in this architecture, Security is
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`distributed. That is, notebook computers used by executives on the road, for example, can
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`communicate over the Intemet without any compromise in security.
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`[9020]
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`EP address changes made by TARP terminals and routers can be done at
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`regular
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`intervals, at random intervals, or upon detection of “attacks.” The variation of IP
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`addresses hinders traffic analysis that might reveal which computers are communicating, and
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`also provides a degree of immunity from attack The level of immunity from attack is roughly
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`proportional to the rate at which the IP address of the host is changing.
`
`[0021]
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`As mentioned, IP addresses may be changed in response to attacks. An attack
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`may be revealed, for example, by a regular series of messages indicating that a router is being
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`probed in some way. Upon detection of an attack, the TARP layer process may respond to this
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`event by changing its IP address. In addition, it may create a subprocess that maintains the
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`original IP address and continues interacting with the attacker in some manner.
`
`[0022]
`
`Decoy packets may be generated by each TARP terminal on some basis
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`determined by an algorithm, For example, the algorithm may be a random one which calls for the
`
`generation of a packet on a random basis when the terminal is idle, Alternatively, the algorithm
`
`may be responsive to time of day or detection of low traffic to generate more decoy packets
`
`during low traffic times. Note that packets are preferably generated in groups, rather than one by
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`one, the groups being sized to simulate real messages, In addition, so that decoy packets may be
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`inserted in normal TARP message streams, the background loop may have a latch that makes it
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`more likely to insert decoy packets when a message stream is being received. Alternatively, if a
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`large number of decoy packets is received along with regular TARP packets, the algorithm may
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`increase the rate of dropping of decoy packets rather than forwarding them. The result of
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`dropping and generating decoy packets in this way is to make the apparent incoming message
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`size different from the apparent outgoing message size to help foil traffic analysis.
`
`BS F99 l5473«l7~l 077580 0066
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. — Exhibit 1028, p. 15
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`Petitioner Apple Inc. - Exhibit 1028, p. 15
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`

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`Attorney Docket No. 077580-0066 [VRNK-ICPZDVCNZ)
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`{0023}
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`In various other embodiments of the invention, a scalable version of the
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`system may be constructed in which a piurality of IP addresses are preassigned to each pair of
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`communicating nodes in the network. Each pair of nodes agrees upon an algorithm for
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`“hopping” between IP addresses (both sending and receiving), such that an eavesdropper sees
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`apparently continuously random IP address pairs (source and destination) for packets transmitted
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`between the pair. Overlapping or “reusable” IP addresses may be allocated to different users on
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`the same subnet, since each node merely verifies that a particular packet
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`includes a valid
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`sour