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`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
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`Joseph E. Palys
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`Telephone: (571) 203-2700
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
`E-mail: joseph.palys@finnegan.com
`
`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`Paper No.
`Filed: June 17, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00484
`Patent 7,987,274
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`I.
`II.
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`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 1
`A.
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 1
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds ............................................................................... 9
`C. Apple’s Arguments About the Priority Date of Claim 18 Are
`Incorrect and Moot ..............................................................................12
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................13
`A. Overview of the ’274 Patent ................................................................13
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................14
`C.
`“Virtual Private Network” (Construe as Part of “Virtual Private
`Network Communication Link”) ........................................................16
`“Virtual Private Network Communication Link” (Claims 1, 2,
`and 11-13) ............................................................................................20
`“Secure Network Address” (Claims 1, 6-8, 10, and 17) .....................22
`“Secure Domain Name” (Construe as Part of “Secure Domain
`(Name) Service”) .................................................................................26
`“Secure Domain (Name) Service” (Claim 1) ......................................28
`“[X], [Y], [Z], or Any Combination Thereof” (Claims 3-5) ...............30
`“Tunneling” (Claim 12) ......................................................................31
`“Tunnel Packeting” (Claim 13) ...........................................................33
`“Client Computer” (Claim 15) ............................................................34
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`B.
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`D.
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`E.
`F.
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`G.
`H.
`I.
`J.
`K.
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`i
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`IV.
`V.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................37
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................37
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`ii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Federal Cases
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ...................................................... 3
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00085, Paper No. 9 (Apr. 24, 2014) ...................................................... 2
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................... 3
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) .................................................... 3
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) .......................................... 9, 10, 11
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .................................................. 3, 8
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................... 9
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) .............................................. 9, 10
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ........................................... 10, 11
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................... 3
`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) ...................................................... 3
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................... 3
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`iii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 12
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ................................................................................................... 12
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 33
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 8
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 8
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 37
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 37
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 37
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................ 2, 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ........................................................................................ 2, 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
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`iv
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`I.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`Introduction
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
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`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
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`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple Inc. against
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`VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274 (“the ’274 patent”). VirnetX requests that the
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`Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
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`First, the Petition fails to identify where the prior art discloses each claimed
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`feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
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`Second, Apple proposes redundant grounds without addressing redundancy
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`at all, let alone identifying how any one ground improves on any other, as required
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`by Board precedent.
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`Finally, Apple proposes a series of incorrect claim constructions. Because
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`its unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Apple
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`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
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`unpatentability of any ’274 patent claim.
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`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`Independent claim 1 recites, among other things, “sending an access request
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`message to the secure computer network address using a virtual private network
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`communication link.” Apple’s Petition fails to explain where a purported “access
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`request message” is disclosed in Kiuchi or Beser. Furthermore, the Petition relies
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`heavily on an accompanying declaration (Ex. 1011) for its Kiuchi arguments, but
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`that declaration fails to even mention Kiuchi or the ’274 patent. Instead, it
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`exclusively discusses prior art not at issue in this proceeding and a different
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`VirnetX patent. (See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 26-43.) When faced with a similar situation, and
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`the same petitioner, the Board has denied institution. See Apple Inc. v.
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`Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00085, Paper No. 9 at 11-12 (Apr. 24,
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`2014) (denying institution where the accompanying declaration addressed prior art
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`not asserted in the petition). Because the Petition lacks the explanation and
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`particularity required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4),
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`42.104(b)(5), it should be denied.
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`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
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`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
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`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
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`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
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`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
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`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
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`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
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`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
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`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
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`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
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`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
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`prior art); Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054,
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`Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103,
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`Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc., IPR2013-
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`00186, Paper 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
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`IPR2012-00041, Paper 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013). As the Board has explained, it
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`will not “search the record and piece together any evidence or arguments that may
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`support Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
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`IPR2013-00549, Paper 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014).
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`Here, Apple’s Petition contends that a “REQUEST” message mentioned in
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`Kiuchi corresponds to “sending an access request message to the secure computer
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`network address using a virtual private network communication link,” as recited in
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`independent claim 1. Specifically, the Petition cites “step 6” of section 2.3 of
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`3
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`Kiuchi. (Pet. at 23 (citing Ex. 1004, p. 66, § 2.3, step 6).)1 This portion of Kiuchi
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`simply states:
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`6) Sending C-HTTP requests to the server-side proxy (Fig. 2g)
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`Once the connection is established, a client-side proxy forwards
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`HTTP/1.0 requests from the user agent in encrypted form using
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`C-HTTP format.
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`According to the Petition, the example Kiuchi provides with reference to Figs. (a),
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`(b), and (c) involves the end-user’s request for “the resource ‘sample.html’ from
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`the
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`server-side
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`proxy
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`corresponding
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`to
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`the
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`hostname
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`‘server.in.current.connection,’” which the “client-side proxy will forward” using
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`the C-HTTP connection. (Id. at 23-24.)
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`Next, the Petition contends that each “REQUEST” message “include[s] the
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`IP address of the server-side proxy, which the client-side proxy received from the
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`C-HTTP name server.” (Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1004, p. 70-71, Appendix 1, § 1; Ex.
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`1011 ¶ 40).) The Petition further cites Appendix 3 of Kiuchi, which the Petition
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`1 The Board recently entered a new ground of rejection in the pending
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`reexamination control no. 95/001,792 of related U.S. Patent No. 7,188,180, which
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`relies in part on mapping Kiuchi’s request in “step (6)” to the recited “access
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`request message.”
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`contends illustrates an “example of the structure of these REQUEST messages.”
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`(Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 41).) In addition, the Petition generally cites the
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`Abstract of Kiuchi, for the general proposition that “Kiuchi further describes that
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`the client-side proxy and server-side proxy exchange encrypted requests and
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`responses via the Internet.” (Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1004, p. 64, abstract).)
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`Despite its general citation to a “REQUEST” message and an exchange of
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`requests, the Petition fails to “particularly” explain why this message constitutes an
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`“access request message” as recited in the challenged claims. The Petition offers
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`no construction for “sending an access request message,” and it is unclear from the
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`Petition why Apple believes that Kiuchi’s “REQUEST” satisfies the claim
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`language. The cited portions of the accompanying declaration also omit the
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`missing explanation, for the declaration fails to cite Kiuchi at all or even address
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`the ’274 patent. (See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 26-43.)
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`The Petition’s claim chart contains the same defects. The claim chart cites
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`portions of Kiuchi discussing “a client-side proxy forward[ing] HTTP/1.0 requests
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`from the user agent in encrypted form using C-HTTP format.” (Pet. at 27 (citing
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`Ex. 1004, p. 66, § 6).) The claim chart also refers to the structure of a C-HTTP
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`request as including the IP address of the server-side proxy. (Id. at 27-28 (citing
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`Ex. 1004, p. 71, Appendix 1, § 1).) But beyond indicating that a request message
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`is sent from the client-side proxy to the server-side proxy, the Petition fails to
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`explain why the request message is an “access request message,” as recited in
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`independent claim 1.
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`The Petition’s discussion of Beser is also deficient, but in different ways
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`than its discussion of Kiuchi. For Beser, the Petition quotes and mentions different
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`portions of the reference, and then—without any explanation—concludes that they
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`disclose entire combinations of claimed features. (See id. at 39-45.) Because the
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`Petition fails to specifically associate features of Beser with specific elements of
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`the claims, the substance of Apple’s purported anticipation theory is unknown and
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`a trial based on Beser would have an unknowable scope.
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`As an example, the Petition contends that Beser discloses “sending an access
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`request message from the first network device to the secure network address,” but
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`the Petition fails to state what in the reference allegedly discloses these features.
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`Instead, the Petition refers generally to a “first network device” and a “terminating
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`device,” and how an “originating device” can send data to the “terminating
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`device.” (Id. at 44-45.) Nowhere does the Petition identify how the referenced
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`process of transmitting data discloses “sending an access request message to the
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`secure computer network address.”
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` The discussion of Beser is entirely
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`disconnected from the Petition’s ultimate conclusion that Beser “thus shows a
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`method comprising” the entire combination of claimed features. (Id. at 45.)
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`The Petition’s citations to the accompanying declaration are also unhelpful.
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`(See id. at 44-45 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 232-35, 243-47, 279, 284-85, 289-307, 351-
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`55).) Paragraphs 232-35, 243-47, 279, 284-85, and 289-307 of the declaration do
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`not attempt to map any feature of Beser to any feature of the challenged claims.
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`The other portions of the declaration appear to take conflicting positions on the
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`relevance of Beser to the claim elements, without actually taking specific positions.
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`For example, the declaration offers contradictory views on the claim feature
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`of “receiving at the first network device a response message from the secure
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`domain name service,” mapping the identical feature to two different devices in
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`Beser. The declarant first states, “Therefore, the first network device receives a
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`message containing a network address associated with the secure name of the
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`terminating device.” (Ex. 1029 at ¶ 347, emphasis added.) In the next paragraph,
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`however, an otherwise identical sentence replaces Beser’s “first network device”
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`with its “originating device”: “Therefore, the originating device receives a
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`message containing a network address associated with the secure name of the
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`terminating device.” (Id. at ¶ 348, emphasis added).
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`And rather than identify where the purported “access request message” is
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`found in Beser, the declarant generally states that Beser’s “trusted-third-party
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`network device can require ‘encryption or authentication’ of any communications
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`exchanged with it,” and then concludes that, “[t]herefore, the first network device
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`sends an access request message to the address associated with the terminating
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`device using a virtual private communication link.” (Id. at ¶ 351 (emphasis
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`added).) The declarant fails to explain this conclusion.
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`At least because the Petition fails to explain where or how Kiuchi or Beser
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`discloses “sending an access request message from the first network device to the
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`secure network address using a virtual private network communication link,” as
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`recited in independent claim 1, the Petition does not demonstrate how Kiuchi or
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`Beser anticipates each and every limitation of the challenged claims. The Petition
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`lacks the “particularity” required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4), and fails to
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`“specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed
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`publications relied upon” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that
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`support
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`the challenge,” as required by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4) and
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`42.104(b)(5)). See, e.g., Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347,
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`Paper No. 9 at 19 (May 22, 2014) (finding that petitioners’ “brief summary, and
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`quotations, citations and reproduced figures from” the prior art failed to “(1)
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`specify sufficiently where each element of independent claim 1 is found in [the
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`prior art], and (2) constitute a detailed explanation of the significance of the
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`quotations, citations, and figures from [the prior art].”). Apple’s Petition should be
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`denied based on these same substantive defects.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`B.
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`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds
`The Petition does not include a section addressing redundancy, and Apple
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`does not attempt to explain why the horizontally and vertically redundant grounds
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`it proposes should be instituted. Giving no justification based on the Board’s
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`jurisprudence regarding redundancy, Apple’s redundant grounds should be
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`rejected.
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`The Board does not consider redundant grounds of rejection because it must
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`issue a final written decision within one year of institution (or 18 months for good
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`cause). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003,
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`Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012). Redundant grounds place a significant burden on the
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`Board and the patent owner, and cause unnecessary delay that jeopardizes meeting
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`the statutory deadline for final written decisions. Id.
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`Because “[t]he Board seeks to streamline and converge issues at all phases
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`of the proceeding . . . at [the] time of institution the Board analyzes the petition on
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`a claim-by-claim, ground-by-ground basis, to eliminate redundant grounds.” Idle
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`Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 3 (June 11,
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`2013). The redundancy inquiry does not focus on “whether the applied prior art
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`disclosures have differences, for it is rarely the case that the disclosures of different
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`prior art references, will be literally identical.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web
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`Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3 (June 5, 2013). Instead, the Board
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`considers “whether the petitioner articulated a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” Id. at 3-4. The petitioner carries the
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`burden of articulating that “meaningful distinction.” ScentAir Techs., Inc. v.
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`Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
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`In Liberty Mutual, the Board identified two types of redundant rejections:
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`(1) “horizontally” redundant rejections and (2) “vertically” redundant rejections.
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`Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 at 3. The Board explained that
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`horizontally redundant rejections apply “a plurality of prior art references . . . not
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`in combination to complement each other but as distinct and separate alternatives.”
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`Id. Vertical redundancy “exists when there is assertion of an additional prior art
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`reference to support another ground of unpatentability when a base ground already
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`has been asserted against the same claim without the additional reference and the
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`Petitioner has not explained what are the relative strength and weakness of each
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`ground.” Id. at 12.
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`Here, Apple’s Petition is horizontally redundant in view of its petition in
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`IPR2014-00483 (“the ’483 Petition”). In this Petition, Apple alleges that Kiuchi
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`anticipates claims 1-4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17. Yet in the ’483 Petition, Apple
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`alleges that Provino anticipates an overlapping group of claims, namely claims 1,
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`7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 17. Further, the present Petition contends that Kiuchi in
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`10
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`view of two other references renders obvious claims 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17.
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`And in the ’483 Petition, Apple contends that Provino in view of two other
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`references renders obvious claims 2-5 and 18. Apple’s Kiuchi-based grounds of
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`rejection are horizontally redundant in view of its Provino-based grounds of
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`rejection. The Petition’s Kiuchi-based grounds of rejection are also horizontally
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`redundant in view of its Beser-based grounds of rejection. In addition, Apple’s
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`Petition is horizontally redundant in view of Microsoft’s two petitions challenging
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`common claims of the ’274 patentIPR2014-00403 and IPR2014-00404.
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`The Petition also proposes vertically redundant grounds. For claims 1-4, 7,
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`8, 10, 12, 15, and 17, the Petition asserts both an anticipation ground based on
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`Kiuchi and obviousness grounds based on the same reference in combination with
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`other references. And for claims 1-5, 7-8, 10, 12-13, 15, and 17-18, the Petition
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`asserts both an anticipation ground based on Beser and an obviousness ground
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`based on the same reference in combination with other references.
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`Apple does not attempt to “articulate[] a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs.,
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`LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3-4 (June 5, 2013) (emphases added).
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`Consequently, the Board should deny Apple’s redundant grounds. ScentAir
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`Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
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`Case No. IPR2014-00484
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`C. Apple’s Arguments About the Priority Date of Claim 18 Are
`Incorrect and Moot
`Apple contends that claim 18 of the ’274 patent “should not be afforded a
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`priority date any earlier than the filing of the ’274 patent, which is August 16,
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`2007.” (Pet. at 4.) Apple is incorrect. When claim 18 was added during
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`prosecution of the ’274 patent application, the Examiner did not find any problems
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`regarding written description support. Instead, the Examiner noted that “claims 2-
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`18 [were] newly added for examination,” and proceeded to reject the claims on
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`other grounds. (Ex. 1028 at 250.) The Examiner was correct in not finding a lack
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`of written description support. The ’274 patent specification provides adequate
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`written description support for claim 18. (See, e.g., Ex. 1027 at 21:20-22, 34:36-
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`42, 45:8-49:13, 52:15-18; Figs. 12A, 33, 34, 35.)
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`In any event, Apple’s argument about priority dates is entirely academic.
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`Apple contends that Kiuchi, RFC 2401, and RFC 2543 are each prior art for all
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`challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and Lindblad, Bhatti, and Beser are
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`prior art for all challenged claims claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). (Pet. at 4-5.)
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`Apple does not present any references that, according to its proposed grounds,
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`require claim 18 to have a priority date of August 16, 2007. Thus, while VirnetX
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`does not agree with Apple’s characterizations of the prior art status of the asserted
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`references, Apple’s arguments regarding the priority date of claim 18 have no
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`bearing on the Petition and should be disregarded.
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`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be Rejected
`Apple proposes several defective claim constructions that do not represent
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`the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) of the claims. Because it is based
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`on incorrect claim constructions, the Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing for any claim of the ’274 patent.
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`A. Overview of the ’274 Patent
`The ’274 patent discloses several embodiments relating to accessing secure
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`network addresses using virtual private network communication links. In one
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`embodiment, as shown in FIG. 33 reproduced below, a client computer 3301 may
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`send a query message to a specialized, secure DNS server 3313 requesting a secure
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`network address for a second network device. (Ex. 1027 at 46:44-47, 60-62.) The
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`client computer 3301 may receive a response message from the secure DNS server
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`3313 containing the secure network address, and then send an access request
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`message to the secure computer network address. (Id. at 47:15-37.) The access
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`request message is sent over a virtual private network communication link, i.e., a
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`communication link over a virtual private network. (Id. at 47:37-51.)
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`(Ex. 1027, FIG. 33.)
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`The claims of the ’274 patent are directed to some of these embodiments.
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`Claim 1 is the only independent claim, and claims 2-18 depend directly or
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`indirectly from claim 1.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`B.
`A person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a
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`master’s degree in computer science or computer engineering and approximately
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`two years of experience in computer networking and computer security. In
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`litigation related to VirnetX’s patents, this level of skill was adopted by a host of
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`companies, including Apple itself in addition to Cisco Systems, Inc.; NEC
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`Corporation; NEC Corporation of America; Aastra USA, Inc.; Aastra Technologies
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`Ltd.; Mitel Networks Corp.; Mitel Networks, Inc.; Siemens Enterprise
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`Communications GmbH & Co. KG; Siemens Enterprise Communications, Inc.;
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`and Avaya Inc. (Ex. 2012 at 4, Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v.
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`Mitel Networks Corp. et al., Case No. 6:11-CV-18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); Ex.
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`1018 at 5, Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
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`et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. April 25, 2012).)
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`In a different set of inter partes review petitions, Microsoft largely agreed
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`with VirnetX’s proposed level of skill, contending through its expert that “one of
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`ordinary skill . . . would have a Master’s degree in computer science or computer
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`engineering, or in a related field such as electrical engineering, as well as about
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`two years of experience in computer networking and in some aspect of security
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`with respect to computer networks.” (Ex. 1011 at 3, ¶7.)
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`Here, Apple relies on Microsoft’s same declaration setting forth this level of
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`skill. (See, e.g., Pet. at 9-11, 13-25, repeatedly relying on Ex. 1011, which is the
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`declaration of Roch Guerin from Microsoft’s IPR2014-00401). Despite this
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`reliance, Apple now proposes a lower level of skill, presumably to ensure that its
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`own expert meets its proposed skill level. (Pet. at 5.) Apple’s newfound definition
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`should be rejected, however, as nearly a dozen companies, including Apple itself,
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`have agreed that the appropriate level of skill is the one proposed by VirnetX.
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`C.
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`“Virtual Private Network” (Construe as Part of “Virtual Private
`Network Communication Link”)
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`VirnetX’s Pro u osed Construction
`Not a separate claim term, construe as
`part of “virtual private network
`communication link”; alternatively, a
`network of computers which privately
`and directly communicate with each
`other by encrypting traffic over insecure
`communication paths between the
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`computers
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`A g . le’s Pro . osed Construction
`A network of computers that privately
`communicate with each other by
`encrypting traffic on insecure
`communication paths between the
`computers
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`The term “virtual private network” does not require construction here
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`because the term is not separately recited in the ’274 patent claims-
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`(See Ex- 1027
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`at 51:53—52:57.)
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`Instead, it forms part of “virtual private network communication
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`link,” which is construed separately elsewhere. (See infra Section IH.D.)
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`Should the Board deem construction necessary, VirnetX and Apple largely
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`agree on the construction of “virtual private network” (or “VPN”). The main point
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`of dispute is whether the computers in the network must be able to directly
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`communicate. Apple relies on a district court’s interpretation of the term in a 2007
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`litigation between VirnetX and Microsoft (Pet. at 9), but it does not mention that
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`the district court later revised its construction to require the ability to directly
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`communicate.
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`(Ex. 1018 at 6-8.) The district court reviewed the reexamination
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`record of related US. Patent No. 6,502,135 (“the ’135 patent”), where VirnetX
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`distinguished a reference referred to as Aventail on the ground that it did not
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`disclose a VPN because, among other things, “computers connected according to
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`Aventail do not communicate directly with each other.” (See Ex. 2013 at 7, Office
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`Action Response filed April 15, 2010, in control no. 95/001,269.) The district
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`court relied on this statement to construe “virtual private network” to require the
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`ability to directly communicate.2 (See Ex. 1018 at 6-8.)
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`VirnetX also made a virtually identical statement during reexamination of
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`parent U.S. Patent 7,188,180 (“the ’180 patent), which recites a “virtual private
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`network” in its claims. VirnetX said that “Aventail has not been shown to disclose
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`a VPN, as recited in claim 1, 17, and 33, because computers connected according
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`to Aventail do not communicate directly with each other.” (Ex. 1023 at 923.)
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`Given the identical term for construction and nearly verbatim reexamination
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`statements regarding the ’135 and ’180 patents, the district court’s reasoning
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`should apply with equal force here. The ability to directly communicate should be
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`part of the construction.
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`The portions of the construction on which VirnetX and Apple agree are
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`supported by the patent specification. For example, the specification discloses
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`2 VirnetX did not disclaim claim scope regarding “virtual private network”
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`in the sense that only certain types of VPNs fall within the scope of the claims.
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`VirnetX merely explained that Aventail did not create a VPN in the ordinary sense
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`of the term. The court treated VirnetX’s explanation of an ordinary VPN as a
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`disclaimer by adopting it as part of its claim construction.
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`techniques for implementing a VPN using encryption. (See, e.g., Ex. 1027 at 3:13-
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`4:13 (describing “the Tunneled Agile Routing Protocol (TARP) [that] uses a
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`unique two-layer encryption format”).) The specification also discloses that its
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`later-discussed embodiments can us