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`
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`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`Telephone: (571) 203-2700
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
`E-mail: joseph.palys@finnegan.com
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`
`
`Paper No.
`Filed: June 17, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00483
`Patent 7,987,274
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`I.
`II.
`
`B.
`
`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 2
`A.
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 2
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds ............................................................................... 8
`C. Apple Asserts an Anticipation Ground Based on Three
`Documents, Contrary to Basic Anticipation Law ...............................10
`D. Apple’s Arguments About the Priority Date of Claim 18 Are
`Incorrect and Moot ..............................................................................13
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................14
`A. Overview of the ’274 Patent ................................................................14
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................15
`C.
`“Virtual Private Network” (Construe as Part of “Virtual Private
`Network Communication Link”) ........................................................17
`“Virtual Private Network Communication Link” (Claims 1, 2,
`and 11-13) ............................................................................................21
`“Secure Network Address” (Claims 1, 6-8, 10, and 17) .....................24
`“Secure Domain Name” (Construe as Part of “Secure Domain
`(Name) Service”) .................................................................................28
`“Secure Domain (Name) Service” (Claim 1) ......................................30
`“[X], [Y], [Z], or Any Combination Thereof” (Claims 3-5) ...............32
`“Tunneling” (Claim 12) ......................................................................33
`“Tunnel Packeting” (Claim 13) ...........................................................35
`
`D.
`
`E.
`F.
`
`G.
`H.
`I.
`J.
`
`i
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`

`

`
`
`
`IV.
`V.
`
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`K.
`“Client Computer” (Claim 15) ............................................................36
`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................39
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................39
`
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`ii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ.,
`212 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 12
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ...................................................... 3
`Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`725 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 11, 12
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................... 3
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) .................................................... 3
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) ............................................ 8, 9, 10
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .................................................. 3, 7
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................... 8
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`545 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................ 12
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) .................................................... 9
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ............................................. 9, 10
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................... 3
`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) ...................................................... 3
`
`iii
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`
`
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................... 3
`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................... 13
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ................................................................................................... 13
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 35
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 7
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ......................................................................................... 1, 2, 7
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 39
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ............................................................................................ 1, 2
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................ 2, 7
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ........................................................................................ 2, 7
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`iv
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`
`
`I.
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`
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
`
`Introduction
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
`
`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
`
`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple Inc. against
`
`VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274 (“the ’274 patent”). VirnetX requests that the
`
`Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
`
`First, the Petition fails to identify where the prior art discloses each claimed
`
`feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
`
`Second, Apple proposes redundant grounds without addressing redundancy
`
`at all, let alone identifying how any one ground improves on any other, as required
`
`by Board precedent.
`
`Third, Apple proposes anticipation based on RFC 2543 in combination with
`
`two other references. RFC 2543 does not incorporate by reference the other
`
`references, and Apple does not even attempt to show that it does. Apple’s multi-
`
`reference anticipation ground violates basic anticipation principles, so it should be
`
`rejected.
`
`Finally, Apple proposes a series of incorrect claim constructions. Because
`
`its unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Apple
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`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`
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`unpatentability of any ’274 patent claim.
`
`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`Independent claim 1 recites, among other things, “sending an access request
`
`message from the first network device to the secure network address using a virtual
`
`private network communication link.” Apple’s Petition fails to explain where a
`
`purported “access request message” is disclosed in Provino or RFC 2543. Nor
`
`does the accompanying declaration provide the missing explanation. Because the
`
`Petition lacks the explanation and particularity required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
`
`(4) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4)-(5), it should be denied.
`
`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
`
`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
`
`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
`
`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
`
`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
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`2
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
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`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
`
`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
`
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
`
`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
`
`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
`
`prior art); Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054,
`
`Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103,
`
`Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc., IPR2013-
`
`00186, Paper 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`
`IPR2012-00041, Paper 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013). As the Board has explained, it
`
`will not “search the record and piece together any evidence or arguments that may
`
`support Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
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`IPR2013-00549, Paper 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014).
`
`Here, Apple’s Petition generally refers
`
`to Provino’s discussion of
`
`“generating message packets,” but fails to “particularly” explain how Provino
`
`discloses “sending an access request message,” as recited in independent claim 1.
`
`According to the Petition, Provino’s device 12(m) receives an integer Internet
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`address for server 31(s). (Pet. at 26.) “Thereafter, Provino describes sending an
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`access request message to the server 31(s) for which the integer Internet address is
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`3
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`resolved by nameserver 32, and that access request message leverages a
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`communication link in the VPN of that destination server 31(s).” (Id. (emphasis
`
`added).) The Petition fails to cite Provino in support of this conclusion, instead
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`citing declarant testimony. (Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 39-40).) But the declaration
`
`Apple cites does not even pertain to the ’274 patent.
`
`To the extent the declaration refers to “access requests” and “access request
`
`messages,” it does so in the abstract and never identifies what in Provino
`
`corresponds to the claimed “access request message.” (Ex. 1011 ¶ 39.) The
`
`portions of Provino cited in the referenced portions of the declaration merely
`
`describe the device 12(m) “generating message packets for transmission to the
`
`server 31(s)” and indicate general capabilities of unspecified servers. (Id. (citing
`
`Ex. 1003 at 15:21-30; 6:19-50).) The Petition also quotes the portion of Provino
`
`describing “generating message packets,” but fails to explain how this corresponds
`
`to an “access request message” as recited in independent claim 1. (Pet. at 26.)
`
`The Petition also states that information is transferred from server 31(s) to
`
`device 12(m). (Id. at 26-27.) But the cited portions of Provino merely discuss
`
`what information may be stored on an unspecified server, or who (e.g., “a
`
`company, governmental agency, organization or the like”) maintains the virtual
`
`private network 15 and who can access the network. (Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at 6:19-
`
`50; 9:6-13).) Again, these statements in the Petition, and the cited portions of
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`4
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`Provino, fail to address or particularly point out what constitutes an “access request
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`message” as recited in independent claim 1. The Petition also generally asserts
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`that “the device 12(m) may send access requests to server 31(s) using the secure
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`tunnel established with the firewall 30 in the first phase of the communication
`
`process,” but again cites the same portion of Provino discussed above that
`
`describes “generating message packets” and fails to identify what in Provino
`
`corresponds to the recited “access request message.” (Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1003 at
`
`15:21-30).)
`
`The Petition’s claim chart contains the same defects. The claim chart cites
`
`portions of Provino discussing “generating and transferring message packets to one
`
`or more servers 31(s)” (id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1003 at 12:1-16)) and the device 12(m)
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`“us[ing] that integer Internet address in generating message packets for
`
`transmission to the server 31(s) which is associated with the human-readable
`
`Internet address” (id. (citing Ex. 1003 at 15:21-30)). But these cited passages of
`
`Provino merely discuss exchanging “message packets,” and the Petition fails to
`
`explain how these portions of Provino disclose an “access request message” as
`
`recited in independent claim 1.
`
`The Petition’s purported application of RFC 2543 to the claims is also
`
`deficient, but in different ways than its discussion of Provino. For RFC 2543, the
`
`Petition quotes and mentions different portions of the reference, and then—without
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`5
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`any explanation—concludes that they disclose entire combinations of claimed
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`features. (See Pet. at 40-45.) Because the Petition fails to specifically associate
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`features of RFC 2543 with specific elements of the claims, the substance of
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`Apple’s purported anticipation theory is unknown and a trial based on RFC 2543
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`would have an unknowable scope.
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`As an example, the Petition contends that RFC 2543 discloses “sending an
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`access request message from the first network device to the secure network
`
`address,” but the Petition fails to state what in the reference allegedly discloses
`
`these features. Instead, the Petition refers generally to communications between a
`
`“callee” and a “caller” before and during a call. (Pet. at 44-45.) Nowhere does the
`
`Petition identify how any of those communications discloses “sending an access
`
`request message to the secure computer network address.” The discussion of RFC
`
`2543 is entirely disconnected from the Petition’s ultimate conclusion that RFC
`
`2543 “thus shows a method comprising” the entire combination of claimed
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`features. (Id. at 45.)
`
`The Petition’s numerous citations to the accompanying declaration are also
`
`unhelpful. (See id. at 44-45 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 407-11, 455-57, 460-62, 476-86,
`
`and 516-23).) While the declarant purports to be supporting Apple’s anticipation
`
`theory based on RFC 2543, in many instances he strays from RFC 2543 itself and
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`6
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`relies on other documents. (See Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 408, 409, 411, 455, 476, 480
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`(discussing RFC 2327 and/or RFC 1889).)
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`At least because the Petition (and even the accompanying declaration) fails
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`to explain where or how Provino or RFC 2543 discloses “sending an access
`
`request message from the first network device to the secure network address using
`
`a virtual private network communication link,” as recited in independent claim 1
`
`and the remaining claims of the ’274 patent—all of which directly or indirectly
`
`depend from claim 1—the Petition does not demonstrate how Provino or RFC
`
`2543 anticipates or renders obvious each and every limitation of the challenged
`
`claims. The Petition lacks the “particularity” required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
`
`(4), and fails to “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art
`
`patents or printed publications relied upon” and identify “specific portions of the
`
`evidence that support the challenge,” as required by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4) and
`
`42.104(b)(5)). See, e.g., Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347,
`
`Paper No. 9 at 19 (May 22, 2014) (finding that petitioners’ “brief summary, and
`
`quotations, citations and reproduced figures from” the prior art failed to “(1)
`
`specify sufficiently where each element of independent claim 1 is found in [the
`
`prior art], and (2) constitute a detailed explanation of the significance of the
`
`quotations, citations, and figures from [the prior art].”). Apple’s Petition should be
`
`denied based on these same substantive defects.
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`7
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`B.
`
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds
`The Petition does not include a section addressing redundancy, and Apple
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`does not attempt to explain why the horizontally and vertically redundant grounds
`
`it proposes should be instituted. Giving no justification based on the Board’s
`
`jurisprudence regarding redundancy, Apple’s redundant grounds should be
`
`rejected.
`
`The Board does not consider redundant grounds of rejection because it must
`
`issue a final written decision within one year of institution (or 18 months for good
`
`cause). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003,
`
`Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012). Redundant grounds place a significant burden on the
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`Board and the patent owner, and cause unnecessary delay that jeopardizes meeting
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`the statutory deadline for final written decisions. Id.
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`Because “[t]he Board seeks to streamline and converge issues at all phases
`
`of the proceeding . . . at [the] time of institution the Board analyzes the petition on
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`a claim-by-claim, ground-by-ground basis, to eliminate redundant grounds.” Idle
`
`Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 3 (June 11,
`
`2013). The redundancy inquiry does not focus on “whether the applied prior art
`
`disclosures have differences, for it is rarely the case that the disclosures of different
`
`prior art references, will be literally identical.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web
`
`Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3 (June 5, 2013). Instead, the Board
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`considers “whether the petitioner articulated a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” Id. at 3-4. The petitioner carries the
`
`burden of articulating that “meaningful distinction.” ScentAir Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
`
`In Liberty Mutual, the Board identified two types of redundant rejections:
`
`(1) “horizontally” redundant rejections and (2) “vertically” redundant rejections.
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`Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 at 3. The Board explained that
`
`horizontally redundant rejections apply “a plurality of prior art references . . . not
`
`in combination to complement each other but as distinct and separate alternatives.”
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`Id. Vertical redundancy “exists when there is assertion of an additional prior art
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`reference to support another ground of unpatentability when a base ground already
`
`has been asserted against the same claim without the additional reference and the
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`Petitioner has not explained what are the relative strength and weakness of each
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`ground.” Id. at 12.
`
`Here, Apple’s Petition is horizontally redundant in view of its petition in
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`IPR2014-00484 (“the ’484 Petition”). In this Petition, Apple alleges that Provino
`
`anticipates claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 17. Yet in the ’484 Petition, Apple
`
`alleges that Kiuchi anticipates an overlapping group of claims, namely claims 1-4,
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`7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17. Further, the present Petition contends that Provino in view
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`9
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`of two other references renders obvious claims 2-5 and 18. And in the ’484
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`Petition, Apple contends that Kiuchi in view of two other references renders
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`obvious claims 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17. Apple’s Provino-based grounds of
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`rejection are horizontally redundant in view of its Kiuchi-based grounds of
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`rejection. In addition, Apple’s Petition is horizontally redundant in view of
`
`Microsoft’s
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`two petitions
`
`challenging
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`common
`
`claims of
`
`the
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`’274
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`patentIPR2014-00403 and IPR2014-00404.
`
`The Petition also proposes vertically redundant grounds. For claims 1-5, 7-
`
`8, 10, 12-13, 15, and 17-18, the Petition asserts both an anticipation ground based
`
`on RFC 2543 and obviousness grounds based on the same reference in
`
`combination with three other references.
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`Apple does not attempt to “articulate[] a meaningful distinction in terms of
`
`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
`
`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs.,
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`LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3-4 (June 5, 2013) (emphases added).
`
`Consequently, the Board should deny Apple’s redundant grounds. ScentAir
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
`
`C. Apple Asserts an Anticipation Ground Based on Three
`Documents, Contrary to Basic Anticipation Law
`Apple proposes an anticipation ground based on RFC 2543 “considered
`
`alone or in conjunction with” two other documentsRFC 1889 and RFC 2327.
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`10
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`(Pet. at 13-14.) This ground should be rejected because, “[f]or a prior art reference
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`to anticipate a claim, the reference must disclose each claim limitation in a single
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`document.” Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2013). Moreover, Apple’s unexplained theory of incorporation by reference fails.
`
`RFC 2543, RFC 1889, and RFC 2327 are three separate documents. While
`
`Apple asserts an anticipation ground based on RFC 2543, it acknowledges that it
`
`may be relying on RFC 1889 and RFC 2327 in its theory of anticipation. (Pet. at
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`40-41.) Indeed, Apple’s declarant cites features of RFC 1889 and RFC 2327
`
`intermittently in his discussion of RFC 2543. (See, e.g., Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 404, 405,
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`407-09, 411, 416-18, 455, 476, 480.) By relying on three separate documents to
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`purportedly show anticipation, Apple violates a basic tenet of anticipation law.
`
`Apple’s suggestion that RFC 2543 incorporates RFC 1889 and RFC 2327 by
`
`reference is also incorrect. While Apple’s Petition nowhere attempts to explain the
`
`purported basis for its incorporation-by-reference theory, RFC 2543 itself confirms
`
`that Apple’s theory is incorrect. RFC 2543’s Introduction section notes that “SIP
`
`is designed as part of the overall IETF multimedia data and control architecture
`
`currently incorporating protocols such as” those described in RFC 1889 and RFC
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`2327. (Ex. 1033 at 8.) The very next sentence, however, makes clear that RFC
`
`2543 does not even depend on those protocols. (See id., “However, the
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`functionality and operation of SIP does not depend on any of these protocols.”
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`(emphasis added).)
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`Moreover, there is no incorporation-by-reference language anywhere in RFC
`
`2543. In view of both Apple’s absence of explanation, and the contrary statements
`
`in RFC 2543 itself, Apple’s incorporation-by-reference theory falls short of the
`
`requirement that “the host document must identify with detailed particularity what
`
`specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in
`
`the various documents.” Apple, 725 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Advanced Display Sys.,
`
`Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also
`
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2008) (“The record evidence suggests that the GSM standard is not a single
`
`reference. The different specifications that comprise the GSM standard were
`
`authored by different subsets of authors at different times. Indeed, the GSM
`
`standard includes hundreds of individual specifications drafted by approximately
`
`ten different subgroups, each with its own title and separate page numbering. Each
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`specification, though part of the greater GSM standard, stands as a separate
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`document in its own right.”). Accordingly, Apple’s proposed anticipation ground
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`based on RFC 2543 should be denied.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`D. Apple’s Arguments About the Priority Date of Claim 18 Are
`Incorrect and Moot
`Apple contends that claim 18 of the ’274 patent “should not be afforded a
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`priority date any earlier than the filing of the ’274 patent, which is August 16,
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`2007.” (Pet. at 4.) Apple is incorrect. When claim 18 was added during
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`prosecution of the ’274 patent application, the Examiner did not find any problems
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`regarding written description support. Instead, the Examiner noted that “claims 2-
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`18 [were] newly added for examination,” and proceeded to reject the claims on
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`other grounds. (Ex. 1028 at 250.) The Examiner was correct in not finding a lack
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`of written description support. The ’274 patent specification provides adequate
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`written description support for claim 18. (See, e.g., Ex. 1027 at 21:20-22, 34:36-
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`42, 45:8-49:13, 52:15-18; Figs. 12A, 33, 34, 35.)
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`In any event, Apple’s argument about priority dates is entirely academic.
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`Apple contends that Provino is prior art for all challenged claims under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 102(e), and that Kosiur, Xu, RFC 2543, RFC 1889, RFC 2327, and RFC 2401 are
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`each prior art for all challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). (Pet. at 4-5.)
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`Apple does not present any references that, according to its proposed grounds,
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`require claim 18 to have a priority date of August 16, 2007. Thus, while VirnetX
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`does not agree with Apple’s characterizations of the prior art status of the asserted
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`references, Apple’s arguments regarding the priority date of claim 18 have no
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`bearing on the Petition and should be disregarded.
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`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be Rejected
`Apple proposes several defective claim constructions that do not represent
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) of the claims. Because it is based
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`on incorrect claim constructions, the Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing for any claim of the ’274 patent.
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`A. Overview of the ’274 Patent
`The ’274 patent discloses several embodiments relating to accessing secure
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`network addresses using virtual private network communication links. In one
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`embodiment, as shown in FIG. 33 reproduced below, a client computer 3301 may
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`send a query message to a specialized, secure DNS server 3313 requesting a secure
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`network address for a second network device. (Ex. 1027 at 46:44-47, 60-62.) The
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`client computer 3301 may receive a response message from the secure DNS server
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`3313 containing the secure network address, and then send an access request
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`message to the secure computer network address. (Id. at 47:15-37.) The access
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`request message is sent over a virtual private network communication link, i.e., a
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`communication link over a virtual private network. (Id. at 47:37-51.)
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`(Ex. 1027, FIG. 33.)
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`The claims of the ’274 patent are directed to some of these embodiments.
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`Claim 1 is the only independent claim, and claims 2-18 depend directly or
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`indirectly from claim 1.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`B.
`A person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have had a
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`master’s degree in computer science or computer engineering and approximately
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`two years of experience in computer networking and computer security. In
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`litigation related to VirnetX’s patents, this level of skill was adopted by a host of
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`companies, including Apple itself in addition to Cisco Systems, Inc.; NEC
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`Corporation; NEC Corporation of America; Aastra USA, Inc.; Aastra Technologies
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`Ltd.; Mitel Networks Corp.; Mitel Networks, Inc.; Siemens Enterprise
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`Communications GmbH & Co. KG; Siemens Enterprise Communications, Inc.;
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`and Avaya Inc. (Ex. 2012 at 4, Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v.
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`Mitel Networks Corp. et al., Case No. 6:11-CV-18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); Ex.
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`1018 at 5, Memorandum Opinion and Order in VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
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`et al., Case No. 6:10-CV-417 (E.D. Tex. April 25, 2012).)
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`In a different set of inter partes review petitions, Microsoft largely agreed
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`with VirnetX’s proposed level of skill, contending through its expert that “one of
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`ordinary skill . . . would have a Master’s degree in computer science or computer
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`engineering, or in a related field such as electrical engineering, as well as about
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`two years of experience in computer networking and in some aspect of security
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`with respect to computer networks.” (Ex. 1011 at 3, ¶7.)
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`Here, Apple relies on Microsoft’s same declaration setting forth this level of
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`skill. (See, e.g., Pet. at 9-11, 13-25, repeatedly relying on Ex. 1011, which is the
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`declaration of Roch Guerin from Microsoft’s IPR2014-00401). Despite this
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`reliance, Apple now proposes a lower level of skill, presumably to ensure that its
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`own expert meets its proposed skill level. (Pet. at 5.) Apple’s newfound definition
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`should be rejected, however, as nearly a dozen companies, including Apple itself,
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`have agreed that the appropriate level of skill is the one proposed by VirnetX.
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`C.
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`“Virtual Private Network” (Construe as Part of “Virtual Private
`Network Communication Link”)
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`Case No. IPR2014-00483
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`VirnetX’s Pro u osed Construction
`Not a separate claim term, construe as
`part of “virtual private network
`communication link”; alternatively, a
`network of computers which privately
`and directly communicate with each
`other by encrypting traffic over insecure
`communication paths between the
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`computers
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`A g . le’s Pro . osed Construction
`A network of computers that privately
`communicate with each other by
`encrypting traffic on insecure
`communication paths between the
`computers
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`The term “virtual private network” does not require construction here
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`because the term is not separately recited in the ’274 patent claims-
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`(See Ex- 1027
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`at 51:53—52:57.)
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`Instead, it forms part of “virtual private network communication
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`link,” which is construed separately elsewhere. (See infra Section IH.D.)
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`Should the Board deem construction necessary, VirnetX and Apple largely
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`agree on the construction of “virtual private network” (or “VPN”). The main point
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`of dispute is whether the computers in the network must be able to directly
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`communicate. Apple relies on a district court’s interpretation of the term in a 2007
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`litigation between VirnetX and Microsoft (Pet. at 9), but it does not mention that
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`the district court later revised its construction to require the ability to directly
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`communicate.
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`(Ex. 1018 at 6-8.) The district court reviewed the reexamination
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`record of related US. Patent No. 6,502,135 (“the ’135 patent”), where VirnetX
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`distinguished a reference referred to as Aventail on the ground that it did not
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`disclose a VPN because, among other things, “computers connected according to
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`Aventail do not communic