throbber

`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper No. 48
`Entered: May 20, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`BROSE NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
`and
`BROSE FAHRZEUGTEILE GMBH & CO. KG, HALLSTADT
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UUSI, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patent 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
`____________
`
`Held: April 30, 2015
`____________
`
`
`
`BEFORE: GLENN J. PERRY, HYUN J. JUNG, and JASON J.
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday, April 30,
`2015, commencing at 10:00 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
`Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`

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`CRAIG D. LEAVELL, ESQUIRE
`ELIZABETH A. CUTRI, ESQUIRE
`Kirkland & Ellis, LLP
`300 North LaSalle
`Chicago, Illinois 60654
`
`MONTE L. FALCOFF, ESQUIRE
`Harness, Dickey & Pierce, PLC
`5445 Corporate Drive
`Suite 200
`Troy, Michigan 48098
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`Cases IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
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`APPEARANCES:
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`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
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`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
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` P R O C E E D I N G S
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`JUDGE PERRY: We are convened for oral argument in
`cases IPR2014-00416 and 00417. Petitioner, Brose, versus Patent
`Owner, UUSI. These two IPRs are being argued together because
`they raise common issues and have overlapping prior art. Each side
`has 90 minutes per the trial order. Petitioner has the burden of proof,
`of course, to establish the unpatentability of the challenged claims and
`will argue first. Petitioner may reserve rebuttal time. And before
`your presentation, please identify yourself for the record. And if
`anyone wants a five-minute break between arguments since we are
`going three hours this morning, feel free to raise your hand and say so
`and we'll take a break between arguments.
`So with that, petitioner, when you are ready.
`MR. LEAVELL: Thank you, Your Honor. I have got hard
`copies of the slides.
`JUDGE PERRY: Thanks. Appreciate it.
`MR. LEAVELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Craig
`Leavell on behalf of the petitioners and along with me is Elizabeth
`Cutri. And I've given you the slides. We are going to go through
`them in order, but I will be skipping some of the slides for the most
`part.
`
`JUDGE PERRY: Would you like to reserve any time for
`rebuttal?
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`MR. LEAVELL: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
`Twenty minutes.
`So I would like to begin by talking about the '802 patent
`which is the 417 IPR. And on slide 9 here, this slide summarizes the
`grounds that were instituted that were raised by Brose against the '802
`patent. So the claims across the top row and the various grounds
`along the first column.
`But today's argument can be focused on a subset of those
`grounds and claim combinations. First of all, ground 6 and 7
`petitioner, Brose, relied on Zuckerman only for the principle that it
`was obvious or would have been well known in the art to rewrite or
`rethink Itoh's equation in terms that are mathematically identical.
`Because patent owner doesn't contest that obviousness of that
`principle, ground 6 and 7 are essentially, largely overlap prior
`grounds. So we won't focus on ground 6 or 7 today.
`Also, UUSI, the patent owner, does not separately argue
`dependent claims 8 or 9. So I think we all agree that dependent
`claims 8 or 9 will rise or fall with independent claim 7. So I won't
`discuss claims 8 or 9 today either.
`Now, on slide 7 here, these are the grounds raised against
`claim 1 of the '802 patent. And claim 1 of the '802 patent is
`unpatentable for three reasons. First of all, it's anticipated by the Itoh
`reference. Ground 1 is obvious over Itoh. Ground 2 is anticipated by
`Itoh. And ground 5 is obvious over the combination of Itoh and
`Kinzl.
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`Now UUSI briefly raises some arguments about the
`motivation to combine Itoh and Kinzl with respect to ground 5 and
`very briefly raises some enablement issues, and we'll address those at
`the end of the presentation.
`But in terms of distinctions, differences between the require
`part and claim 1 of the '802, patent owner identifies only one. And
`that difference only exists under patent owner's proposed construction.
`So really the key issue on the patentability of claim 1 of the '802
`patent is a claim construction issue and it's whether or not claim 1 is
`limited to a particular type of sensor. Patent owner argues it's limited
`to a current amplitude sensor. Whereas, petitioners argue that the
`plain and ordinary meaning should apply and any type of sensor
`would fall within the scope of claim 1.
`The disputed phrase is found --
`JUDGE PERRY: Let me interrupt you. We are using the
`Philips standard for construction because we are dealing with an
`expired patent?
`MR. LEAVELL: Correct, Your Honor.
`JUDGE PERRY: So the spec is relevant?
`MR. LEAVELL: Yes, the parties agree on that. The
`disputed limitation is found in limitation A of claim 1. And it's a
`sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor coupled to a
`motor-driven element. For example, the window or the sunroof is the
`motor-driven element that varies in response to a resistance to motion.
`For example, if the window or sunroof panel encounters an obstacle,
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`the parameter of the motor will change in response to encountering
`that resistance.
`And on slide 13, we show side-by-side petitioner Brose's
`position on the claim construction of this limitation and UUSI's
`position. Brose's position is that the sensor can be any type of sensor
`that measures any motor parameter that varies as a result of resistance
`to motion. This would include all types of sensors, including the
`current amplitude sensor the patent owner says is required but also
`other types of sensors like a Hall effect sensor, a motor current
`commutation pulse sensor and other types of sensors, particularly
`since there's the detect speed because motor speed is a parameter that
`will vary in response to a resistance to motion.
`And like we'll see on most of the claim construction issues
`and I submit, I think, probably all, essentially what patent owner is
`trying to do is import limitations from the specification into the claim
`without any basis for doing so. The limitations they are seeking to
`import are not supported by disavowals in the specification. They are
`not required by any disclaimers in the prosecution history. As we'll
`see, the specification and prosecution history actually support Brose's
`constructions and show that there was no disclaimer or disavowal of
`scope.
`
`On slide 14, this is a focus in on the disputed language. And
`the real issue here is not the meaning of sensor but really what type of
`parameters of the motor vary in response to a resistance to motion.
`Patent owner's expert opines that it's theoretically possible to design
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`Cases IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
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`some systems where the motor load can be adjusted or the power to
`the motor can be adjusted so that when the window slows down, the
`motor can be compensated with an increased power to try to maintain
`current speed on the motor. And that's not described in the patent. It's
`not required by the patent. In fact, it makes no sense in the patent. If
`you are in the context of an anti-pinch safety system for power
`windows, why would you respond to a trapped arm or a trapped neck
`by ramping up the power to the motor to try to keep it moving faster?
`It just doesn't make sense.
`Speeds does change. And in fact, there are other claims in
`the patent, claims 7 and 15 -- claim 7 is one of the challenged patent
`claims, claim 15 is not -- where the patent requires that speed be the
`parameter of the motor that allows the obstacle detection to work. So
`Brose submits that UUSI's position that speed theoretically doesn't
`have to change is irrelevant. It is a parameter that changes in response
`to resistance to motion and therefore, speed sensors are within the
`scope of claim 1.
`On slide 15, again, claims 7 and 15, these establish that
`motor speed is a parameter that can be used for detecting obstacles.
`On slide 16, this is a related patent that is at issue in the litigation but
`not at issue in the IPRs. The '802 patent claims of priority to the '165
`patent and has a little bit different specification but it's incorporated
`by reference into the '802 patent. And claim 1 of the '165, patent
`which is Exhibit 1010 in the '802 IPR has the exact same language, a
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`sensor for measuring a parameter of a motor coupled to the
`motor-driven element that varies in response to a resistance to motion.
`And then claim 14, which depends directly from that
`claim 1, says the parameter's speed. And so the claim 1 and its
`dependent claim 14 of the '165 further show that speed is a parameter
`in the context of the '802 patent that does vary in response to a
`resistance to motion.
`On slide 17 UUSI's expert conceded during his deposition
`that Brose's construction is the correct construction. He was asked
`about the sensor limitation of claim 1A of the '802 patent and he was
`asked, Are there any characteristics associated with the term in claim
`1, a sensor for measuring the parameter of a motor?
`And he asked to repeat the question. The sensor for
`measuring a parameter recited in claim 1A, are there any
`qualifications on what that sensor or parameter is?
`No. It's a parameter, a sensor for a parameter.
`And this testimony was not elicited by me. It was elicited
`by patent owner's own counsel on redirect in the deposition of its own
`expert. So there's no argument that I tricked him into giving this
`admission.
`Then finally, in the litigation in the infringement contentions
`that were served on us, patent owner itself took the position with
`respect to claim 1 of the '802 patent that that claim covered our device
`because we had a sensor for measuring a parameter coupled to the
`motor-driven element that varies in response to resistance to motion, a
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`Cases IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
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`Hall sensor. And then in our system the change in motor speed was
`detected by Hall effect sensors. So prior to this IPR, patent owner
`said that claim 1 covers speed sensors. And now they are saying, no,
`it must be a current amplitude sensor.
`JUDGE PERRY: Counsel, do Hall effect sensors directly
`measure speed?
`MR. LEAVELL: Just like a motor current commutation
`pulse, they will time the duration between pulses or rotations of the
`motor. So they work by detecting the magnetic change of the motor
`rotates and they will measure time implements --
`JUDGE PERRY: So it's an indirect measure of motor
`rotational speed?
`MR. LEAVELL: I would argue it's probably -- well, it's
`close to a direct. It's almost a direct measurement. It's right on the
`motor itself, just like a motor current commutation pulse. But it's not
`directly measuring the speed of the window movement, which is an
`issue in a later claim.
`I think during the preliminary finding, I don't think this issue
`came up, but I think our position was that it can't directly sense or
`indirectly sense. And that was an issue with a later claim because the
`claim talks about monitoring movement of the window or panel. And
`the issue in our petition was whether indirectly monitoring that would
`suffice, and our position was that it would suffice, and that's the
`position the Board adopted.
`JUDGE PERRY: Thank you.
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`MR. LEAVELL: So on slide 22, this is from patent owner's
`response brief. And this shows that the only distinction that patent
`owner raised with respect to grounds 1, 2 and 3, I think this might
`be -- the heading is wrong. I apologize. Grounds 1, 2 and 5 are that
`Itoh does not have a current amplitude sensor. So the only difference
`they raise is under their unduly narrow construction. So if the claim is
`construed to cover speed sensors, there's no distinction between Itoh
`or the combination of Itoh and Kinzl in claim 1 of the '802 patent.
`So unless there's any questions on claim 1, I'll turn next to
`claim 6 of the '802 patent. And with respect to claim 6, there are two
`grounds that were initiated. The first ground 1, that claim 6 is obvious
`over Itoh and the second was ground 5, that claim 6 is obvious over
`the combination of Itoh and Kinzl.
`Now, the same issue and the same grounds were raised with
`respect to claim 5 of the '612 patent. It's a very similar claim. It's not
`identical, but both parties have briefed the issues identically on both
`claims. So the argument here with respect to claim 6 of the '802
`patent will apply equally to claim 5 of the '612 patent, but I won't
`reargue that later when we get to the '612 patent.
`Now, the main issue with respect to claim 6 is the
`40-millisecond claim limitation taught by or rendered obvious by Itoh
`or would it have been an obvious design choice in light of Itoh. And
`Brose contends that, yes, it would. And the Board, in its preliminary
`decision, agreed. And the Patent Office agreed during prosecution
`that this was just a mere design choice.
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`First by disclosing the value of N, Itoh leaves it as a design
`choice, but he teaches to those of skill in the art that you can choose N
`to be any value, including values that are sufficiently low so that the
`number of values that are used, the N number of values would be
`within the 40 milliseconds. So our position is that Itoh does actually
`teach one of skill in the art that they can use values that are less than
`40 milliseconds.
`But even if Itoh's leaving it unstated expressly, even if the
`fact that Itoh doesn't expressly state to use N sufficiently low so that
`all measurements would be within 40 milliseconds, one of skill in the
`art would understand very easily that you could do that.
`And moreover, regardless of what Itoh teaches, Itoh could
`be completely silent on this, and our position would be that it was an
`obvious design choice exercising routine engineering skill so that
`claim 6 is invalid or unpatentable over Itoh or the combination of Itoh
`and Kinzl. Although, we don't rely on Kinzl for the 40 milliseconds
`because that's really the only issue. There's only one issue for grounds
`1 and 5.
`Now, on slide 25 here, UUSI's expert concedes it is possible
`within the scope of Itoh for all the measurements to be taken within
`the prior 40 milliseconds. He does concede that that's possible. So
`Itoh doesn't exclude that possibility.
`Let me back up for a second on slide 24. And this is the
`actual language of the claim 6. And patent owner's position is that
`this 40-millisecond value is some uniquely successful number and
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`their expert goes on at length about why this is a uniquely successful
`interval and as if there's some magic to choosing 40 milliseconds as
`the interval.
`But the claim doesn't say take measurements up to
`40 milliseconds ago. It says the immediate past measurements were
`taken within 40 milliseconds. So this claim would cover if
`measurements are taken within 35, 30, 25, 20 and so forth. There is
`no magic or there is no unique success associated with
`40 milliseconds. And they don't claim, they don't say in their claim
`take the measurements at 40 milliseconds and before. It just says all
`the measurements are within --
`JUDGE PERRY: Is there anything in the specification that
`suggests that there is a particular advantage to that number?
`MR. LEAVELL: No, there's not. The '802 patent doesn't
`mention that number at all anywhere in the specification. The
`40 milliseconds comes from the original 1992 specification which is
`incorporated by reference. And it doesn't associate, doesn't explain
`why they chose that or any benefit to choosing that. But they simply
`point out they have got a FIFO 20 values deep and they are clocking it
`every 2 milliseconds, and that's how they get to the 40 milliseconds.
`So whether it was they just happened to choose FIFO 20 values deep
`or whether it was intentional, they don't say and they certainly don't
`explain any benefit to that number.
`JUDGE JUNG: Can the patent owner's argument for
`40 milliseconds also apply to 39 seconds, 35 seconds, 20 seconds?
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`MR. LEAVELL: They don't address that. They don't say
`anything about those other values. They just key in on the
`40 milliseconds. I don't think there's any uniqueness or value to any
`particular value. I think it depends on the system. It depends on a lot
`of the factors. In fact, the specification of the '802 patent says you can
`choose anywhere -- let me back up.
`The '802 patent doesn't say use 40 milliseconds. The
`preferred embodiment that's actually in the '802 four corners not
`incorporated by reference says use your design skills, and based on
`your system and the feedback and the interference, choose a value of
`measurements. And it says you can choose anywhere from one value
`up to over a hundred values, and it teaches to use your skill in the art
`to choose a number of measurements.
`But the preferred embodiment, let me jump ahead to slide
`number 27. So this is the preferred embodiment in the '802 patent. It
`says to use 90 values. It says use six sets of 15 values as the preferred
`embodiment. And the specification also says that the typical full
`travel span or it does say the full travel span for this embodiment is
`3,000 pulses. And so for 90 pulses to fit within 40 milliseconds over a
`window that goes 3,000 pulses, that window or sunroof -- it's actually
`a sunroof in the preferred embodiment -- would have to go from fully
`opened to fully closed in 1.33 seconds. It would be a superfast, unsafe
`at any speed type system.
`A typical window, and our expert addresses that, would take
`three seconds to go from fully opened to fully closed. If in three
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`seconds you could travel 3,000 pulses, that's one pulse per
`millisecond. So 90 pulses would take 90 milliseconds. So the
`preferred embodiment that they actually teach in the '802 patent itself
`measures values from a period two-and-a-half times as long as
`40 milliseconds which also undermines their argument that this is a
`magical, unique, inventive number that they invented and should be
`entitled to a patent.
`And the patent itself, the '802 patent does say that you
`choose the number of units, and this is on slide 28, based on all of
`these routine engineering design choices.
`They say to determine how many pulses you should use
`should be determined based on the system requirements and
`conditions, the motor parameters, the filtering needs, the noise level of
`the signal, the pulses per revolution, in other words, how many poles
`do you have on the motor, how fast the motor is spinning, the gear
`ratio between the motor and the window. All of these things are
`system design constraints that one of skill in the art would use to
`determine how many measurements to use and thereby determining
`what time period those measurements would be in. This is
`engineering 101 stuff. It's a routine design choice and the patent says
`so.
`
`Now, Itoh -- and I'm jumping back to slide 26 now. Itoh,
`again, says just use end values. He doesn't say how many to use
`because he doesn't try to pretend that he knows the right number for
`any system. In figure 9, he says to use -- these are the values. TP, the
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`bottom number in Figure 9, is the present time value. So Figure 9
`shows at least five prior values. In the equation of Itoh he uses four
`values, four past values with the ellipses indicating that you could use
`some more values.
`And as we explain in the petition, Itoh discloses at a high
`speed those pulses are going to be coming in at .4 milliseconds each.
`So at that speed, as long as N is less than 100, all of those pulses are
`going to be taken within 40 milliseconds.
`Itoh also discloses at low speed the pulse period is about
`0.8 milliseconds. So even at that lower speed, as long as N is less
`than 50, all the values are going to be taken within 40 milliseconds.
`Now, the specification elsewhere says that in actual
`experiments, Itoh saw a pulse period of 1.2 seconds per pulse. And if
`that's the speed of the motor, then as long as N is under 33, then all the
`measurements will be taken within 40 milliseconds.
`Now, those numbers are just math and in reality when the
`window hits an obstacle, it is going to slow down. So when I say N
`would be less than 100, maybe it needs to be 95 because those last
`pulses are going to be slower. Or if I say it's 50, maybe it's really 45.
`But the point is there are a lot of different values of N that would
`easily fall within 40 milliseconds and Itoh teaches one of skill in the
`art to choose that number.
`JUDGE JUNG: Mr. Leavell, if we go back to your expert's
`example of a window that shuts in three seconds, how many pulses of
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`Itoh would be counted in 40 milliseconds? I don't know if that's
`possible to figure out from the description of Itoh.
`MR. LEAVELL: So if each pulse is at 3,000 -- I think Itoh
`teaches that its system has 2,000 pulses. And so in order for 2,000
`pulses to come in three seconds -- I should have had that ready. I
`apologize. So it's probably 1.67 milliseconds per pulse. And so you
`could then do the math to figure out how many pulses and it would
`have to be under 40 milliseconds.
`But Itoh's disclosure of 200 pulses in a typical window is
`just an example, of course. Any system is going to have different
`pulses and it's going to depend how many poles are on the motor
`whether you would have 2,000 or 4,000 pulses. But the point is it's
`just a routine design choice.
`JUDGE JUNG: Based on what Itoh discloses, would we get
`to the 40 milliseconds window?
`MR. LEAVELL: To one of skill in the art, yes.
`JUDGE JUNG: If we applied it to the expert's example?
`MR. LEAVELL: Yes, because one of skill in the art reads
`in as including anything from one to infinity. So, yeah.
`JUDGE JUNG: But an expert wouldn't pick infinity. An
`expert would actually pick some subset that fits the criteria that the
`window is supposed to operate in.
`MR. LEAVELL: Correct.
`JUDGE JUNG: So we are not talking about infinity.
`
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`Cases IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
`
`
`MR. LEAVELL: Right. So 100 pulses, 200 pulses, 50
`pulses. And it depends on how fast of a reaction time you need, how
`much noise is in your signal and so forth. So one of skill in the art
`reading Itoh would understand that he's disclosing all of those values
`from N to something, from one to something reasonable, including the
`lower numbers which would clearly be 40 milliseconds.
`But the Board didn't institute on anticipation by Itoh. I still
`think Itoh discloses it to one of skill in the art, but that's not our
`burden here under obvious. It's just whether it would be obvious to
`one of skill in the art. And I think the issue of whether Itoh expressly
`or inherently or impliedly teaches that, I think it does. But you don't
`have to agree with me in order to find claim 6 unpatentable over Itoh.
`On slide 29, even -- well, first of all, Brose's expert,
`Dr. MacCarley, explained why 40 milliseconds would be a routine
`design choice and he did that in his declaration. That's at
`Exhibit 1063 in paragraphs 175 and 176.
`But Dr. Ehsani, patent owner's expert, also agrees that the art
`of engineering should be exercised to arrive at an appropriate time
`period. I asked him about the 40 milliseconds and he said, In practice,
`the art of engineering should be exercised to find the right value for
`the right motor for the right circumstance, both -- on the basis of both
`imperial and theoretical and intuitive understanding. So he
`recognized this is a design choice that engineers have to use.
`And interestingly, his definition of a person of ordinary skill
`in the art, Dr. Ehsani, patent owner's own expert, is even higher than
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`Cases IPR2014-00416 and IPR2014-00417
`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
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`ours. In his deposition he testified that one of skill in the art would
`have to have a year of experience in this particular field and
`understand anti-pinch systems and algorithms.
`Our definition of level of skill in the art was somebody with
`a couple of years of experience designing automotive systems. Not
`necessarily window control systems. So we are happy to adopt his
`definition of level of skill in the art which is even higher, which
`makes it even more obvious that 40 milliseconds is a design choice.
`JUDGE JUNG: Is it possible that Dr. Ehsani is saying that
`an engineer would consider 40 milliseconds but there's other reasons
`why 40 milliseconds might be preferred over, say, 60 or
`20 milliseconds or some other number?
`MR. LEAVELL: He doesn't go into that. He doesn't render
`that opinion. It's not in their papers and it's certainly not in the patent,
`the specification.
`And this is an additional admission by patent owner's expert.
`He does say there may be other less or equally successful numbers
`than 40 milliseconds. So he admits that 40 milliseconds is not
`uniquely successful for every system.
`JUDGE JUNG: But he does say it may be less successful?
`MR. LEAVELL: It could be lesser or equally. I submit it
`could be even more successful. I don't know why 39 milliseconds
`would be any different than 40 in these systems, and he never explains
`that either. Again, the claim doesn't say 40 milliseconds. It says
`within 40. So it could be 2 milliseconds or 10 or 15.
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`Patents 8,217,612 and 7,579,802
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`JUDGE JUNG: He might be saying that pick 40 instead of
`41, 43 or 44.
`MR. LEAVELL: That's what the claim says. The
`specification never says why. But the claim also says you can use 39,
`38, 20 or 2.
`And then finally on claim 6, the examiner, he also agreed
`that 40 milliseconds was an obvious design choice. And this is from
`the prosecution history. Here are two examples. The first is from an
`office action in Exhibit 1017 and the second is from an office action at
`Exhibit 1020.
`JUDGE JUNG: What was the applicant's response to the
`examiner's finding?
`MR. LEAVELL: The applicant never argued these
`dependent claims at all. He either swore behind the reference by
`pointing to the earlier specifications or they occasionally amended the
`base claim. But there was never any comment or any response to this.
`They never took issue with this conclusion from the examiner.
`Then finally on claim 6, this is the case that we cited and I
`believe this is the case the examiner applied as well, the In re Aller
`case. It says, Where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in
`the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable
`ranges by routine experimentation.
`So even if Itoh doesn't expressly or inherently or impliedly
`disclose the limitation of 40 milliseconds, it is the prior art that
`discloses the general conditions of the claim. And it's not inventive
`
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`particularly in a mechanical or electromechanical case like this. This
`isn't an unpredictable art like chemical or biotech. The design choice
`of this interval is a routine design choice.
`Unless there's any questions on claim 6, I'll move ahead to
`claim 7 of the '802 patent. And here there's really two main issues.
`And again, both are claim construction issues. Under Brose's
`constructions, UUSI, patent owner, doesn't identify any distinction at
`all between Itoh or Kinzl or the combination of Itoh and Kinzl. And
`the patentability of claim 7, under our construction is undisputed other
`than perhaps the enablement issue or for ground 5, the motivation to
`combine issue.
`The disputed limitation on claim 7 is, again, the sensor
`limitation. Positions, again, petitioner, Brose, alleges or contends it's
`the plain and ordinary meaning, that any type of sensor that monitors
`movement either directly or indirectly of the object would suffice for
`claim 7.
`Patent owner, instead, says it has to be a special sensor. It
`has to be separate. It has to be discrete. It has to be physical
`hardware-based. It can't simply measure existing motor current or
`voltage. And in other words, the sensor is a separate sensor such as a
`positioning coder or Hall effect sensor. Not simply a current pulse
`counter as used in sensorless control.
`And the Board, in its preliminary construction, agreed with
`Brose that the sensor is any type of sensor, either directly or
`indirectly. And the Board wasn't presented with the exact issue that
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`we have here today as to whether it has to be a Hall effect sensor or it
`could be something else. But the Board did agree it could be indirect
`or direct sensing. I don't think patent owner disputes that it could be
`indirect sensing.
`Now, the plain meaning on slide 37 here, we've got the plain
`meaning of the sensor for monitoring movement is any type of sensor
`that's going to indirectly or directly monitor movement. Now, claim
`7, in other limitations, specifies that speed is the parameter that's
`being used for the obstacle detection. So I think everybody agrees
`that this has to be a speed sensor of some type. Even though
`limitation A, the disputed phrase, doesn't require that, we concede that
`the sensor does have

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