UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEALS BOARD
`
`BROSE NORTH AMERICA, INC.
`and
`BROSE FAHRZEUGTEILE GMBH & CO. KG, HALLSTADT,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`UUSI, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00417
`Patent No. 7,579,802
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEALS BOARD
`
`BROSE NORTH AMERICA, INC.
`and
`BROSE FAHRZEUGTEILE GMBH & CO. KG, HALLSTADT,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`UUSI, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00417
`Patent No. 7,579,802
`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
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`CLAIM 1 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED ......................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`Claim Construction: The “Sensor” Limitation ..................................... 1
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`Invalidity ............................................................................................... 3
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`III. CLAIM 6 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED ......................... 4
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`IV. CLAIMS 7-9 ARE INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED ............... 6
`
`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`Claim Construction - The “Sensor” Limitation .................................... 6
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`Claim Construction - The “Travel Path” Limitation ............................. 8
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`Invalidity ............................................................................................... 9
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`V.
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`CLAIM 14 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED ..................... 12
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`A.
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`B.
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`Claim Construction - Limitations (c) And (c)(i)-(iv) .......................... 12
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`Invalidity ............................................................................................. 13
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`VI. MOTIVATION AND ABILITY TO COMBINE ......................................... 14
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`VII. ENABLEMENT ............................................................................................ 14
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`VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 15
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`
`i
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`UUSI advocates contrived claim constructions designed to circumvent the
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`prior art, even proposing constructions that contradict those used by UUSI in
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`litigation prior to this IPR. UUSI’s claim constructions not only ignore file
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`histories that UUSI’s proffered expert did not review, but also run afoul of the
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`plain meaning of the claim language. UUSI’s constructions should be rejected.
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`The claims in many cases are invalid even under UUSI’s incorrect constructions,
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`but in all cases, the challenged claims are invalid under Brose’s proposed
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`constructions, which UUSI does not dispute.1
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`II. CLAIM 1 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED
`A. Claim Construction: The “Sensor” Limitation
`The “sensor” limitation should be given its plain meaning, which includes
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`any sensor that measures any motor parameter that varies as a result of resistance
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`to motion. Ex. 1063 ¶ 26. This includes a current value (amplitude or magnitude)
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`sensor, or various types of speed sensors (e.g., Hall effect, rotary encoders, motor
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`current commutation pulse (“MCCP”) sensors). Id. ¶¶ 24, 27-29. Before this IPR,
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`1 The claims are invalid under either expert’s understanding of the level of
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`ordinary skill in the art. Indeed UUSI’s proferred expert, Dr. Ehsani, opines
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`that the level of ordinary skill in the art is even higher than what Brose’s expert
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`believes it to be. Ex. 1053 ¶¶ 19-20.
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`UUSI agreed that claim 1 included a Hall effect sensor. Ex. 1033 at 14-16;
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`Ex. 1059 at 1-10, 13-22, 24-33; see also Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 54-56.
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`UUSI’s argument that parts of the specification are “consistent” with its
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`construction (Response (“R.”) 14) does not save its construction; even if correct,
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`such “consistency” is far from express and unambiguous disavowal or definition of
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`a speed sensor. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 43-48. Indeed, the ’802 patent discloses use of various
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`types of sensors and parameters, including speed sensors and specifically MCCP
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`sensors. Id. ¶¶ 43-46. Similarly, the file history does not “require” UUSI’s narrow
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`construction. R. 13. It contains no disavowal of the plain and ordinary meaning of
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`the “sensor” limitation, and UUSI does not argue otherwise. Instead, UUSI argues
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`that charts provided to establish priority were “narrowing distinctions.” R. 13-14.
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`The charts are not a “clear” disavowal.”2 Ex. 1063 ¶ 51. The file history actually
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`shows that the Examiner understood the “sensor” limitation as not limited to a
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`current amplitude sensor, and as including a speed sensor. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. The claims
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`of related U.S. Patent No. 6,064,165 also demonstrate that the claimed “parameter”
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`sensed by the “sensor” can be “speed.” Id. ¶ 41. Claim differentiation does not
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`save UUSI’s construction. R. 15. Brose’s proposed constructions do not result in
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`claims 1 and 7 having the same scope. Ex. 1063 ¶ 40, 73.
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`2 UUSI acknowledges this elsewhere in its Response. R. 34.
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`2
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`
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`Dr. Ehsani tries to justify UUSI’s construction by theorizing that speed is not
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`always a parameter that changes with resistance to motion. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 54-55. But
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`his explanation is devoid from the apparatus of claim 1, in which motor speed will
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`decrease in response to resistance to motion. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 30-35. Moreover, it is
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`illogical for claim 1 to include a current amplitude sensor, but not a MCCP sensor,
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`which utilizes the same structure as a current amplitude sensor. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 36-38.
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`Invalidity
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`B.
`Grounds 1 and 2 - Obviousness Over and Anticipation by Itoh. UUSI’s
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`arguments regarding Grounds 1 and 2 are premised entirely on its improper claim
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`construction. UUSI does not dispute that, under Brose’s construction, Itoh
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`anticipates and renders obvious claim 1. Id. ¶¶ 139-42. 147-51.
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`Ground 5 - Obviousness Over Itoh in View of Kinzl. UUSI argues that
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`(1) Kinzl does not teach or suggest a current amplitude sensor, and (2) Itoh and
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`Kinzl cannot be combined. Under Brose’s construction of the “sensor” limitation,
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`Itoh discloses all elements of claim 1 and renders it obvious; Kinzl also discloses
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`the claimed “sensor.” UUSI’s argument that Itoh and Kinzl cannot be combined
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`hinges on UUSI’s incorrect construction of the sensor limitation. Under the proper
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`construction, claim 1 is obvious over Itoh in view of Kinzl. Id. ¶¶ 157-60.
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`3
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`III. CLAIM 6 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED
`Ground 1 - Obviousness Over Itoh. UUSI argues that (1) “Itoh does not
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`teach a 40 ms time window within which past measurements for an obstacle detect
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`threshold are measured” (R. 21); and (2) the 40 ms time frame would not have
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`been an obvious design choice to a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”).
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`R. 22-28. Regarding UUSI’s first argument, Itoh provides guidance for selecting a
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`time range over which immediate past measurements are taken, some of which
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`would
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`involve
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`taking measurements within 40 ms. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 167-70.
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`Dr. Ehsani’s reliance on the example of n=33 (Ex. 2001 ¶ 63) is not instructive.
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`The 1.2 ms pulse period is an example, and it is within the scope of Itoh for more
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`than 33 Tp samples to elapse in 40 ms, and for the time over which the
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`measurements are taken to be under 40 ms. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 171-72.
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`Contrary to UUSI’s second argument, 40 ms would have been an obvious
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`design choice to a POSA, and 40 ms is not “uniquely successful.” Here, UUSI
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`posits that “there is no suggestion in Itoh that the total length of time over which
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`measurements are collected should be constrained.” R. 26. But this ignores Itoh’s
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`discussion of selecting number of measurements. Ex. 1001 ¶ 107. Itoh implicitly
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`teaches that the time period for sampled data is a parameter to be selected.
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`Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 173, 177-78. It would have been obvious to a POSA as of 1992 to use
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`any of various values for the time period for immediate past measurements,
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`4
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`
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`depending on the requirements and parameters of the system, utilizing routine
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`experimentation and manipulation of known variables, e.g., window and motor
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`characteristics. Id. ¶¶ 175-76, 180, 196-98. Further, a POSA “would have
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`understood the need to optimize the number and time span of immediate past
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`measurements based on system requirements and parameters.” Id. ¶ 176; Ex. 1050
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`198:18-300:4. “[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior
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`art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine
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`experimentation.” In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955); see also Ex. 1063
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`¶ 179; Rexnord Indus., LLC v. Kappos, 705 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`Additional evidence shows that 40 ms was an an obvious design choice:
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`• Dr. Ehsani believes the 40 ms period was “uniquely successful” simply because
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`it was claimed, but admits it is merely “exemplary.” Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 193-95.
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`• The ’802 patent does not discuss the 40 ms limitation. See generally Ex. 1005;
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`Ex. 1063 ¶ 181-82. It does indicate that the number of stored values to use, and
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`thus the time frame of such values, are based on design choices. Ex. 1063 ¶ 186.
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`• In
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`the one embodiment described
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`in detail
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`in
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`the specification,
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`the
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`measurements span 90 ms, with more than 50% outside 40 ms. Id. ¶¶ 183-85.
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`• The Examiner correctly found that “[i]t would have been obvious to one having
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to provide
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`measurements at forty millisecond interval,” since “where the general
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`5
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`conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, discovering the optimum or
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`workable ranges involves only routine skill in the art.” Id. ¶ 189.
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`• That the 40 ms limitation did not appear until nearly fifteen years into
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`prosecution and that the 40 ms limitation is not claimed in any of the related
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`patents (aside from the ’612 patent), undermine UUSI’s position. Id. ¶¶ 187-92.
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`In short, the named inventors, the Examiner, and Dr. Ehsani all apparently believe
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`the 40 ms limitation is an obvious design choice.
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`Ground 5 - Obviousness Over Itoh in View of Kinzl. UUSI argues that
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`(1) Kinzl does not teach or suggest the 40 ms limitation, and thus does not “fill[]
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`the void of Itoh with regard to dependent Claim 6”; and (2) Itoh and Kinzl cannot
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`be combined. R. 28-29. Ground 5 does not rely on Kinzl for disclosure of the
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`40 ms limitation, which is the only limitation at issue. Corr. Pet. 49-52. The
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`40 ms limitation is obvious in view of Itoh, as discussed above. Ex. 1063 ¶ 204.
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`UUSI’s argument that Itoh and Kinzl cannot be combined is wrong, the reasons for
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`which are addressed in Part VI.
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`IV. CLAIMS 7-9 ARE INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED3
`A. Claim Construction - The “Sensor” Limitation
`The “sensor” limitation of claim 7 should be given its plain and ordinary
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`meaning, which includes any sensor that (directly or indirectly) monitors
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`3 UUSI concedes that claims 8-9 rise or fall with claim 7. R. 47-48.
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`6
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`movement of the object. Ex. 1063 ¶ 65. (Claim 7 also requires that the “sensor”
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`permit the controller to “determine motor speed of movement from an output
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`signal from the movement sensor.” Id.) Such a construction would include a
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`MCCP sensor—a hardware-based sensor that uses the same structure as a current
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`magnitude sensor, which UUSI argues is the “sensor” required by claim 1 (R. 10-
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`11), despite it sometimes being referred to as “sensorless.” Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 66-68.
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`UUSI’s construction (requiring the “sensor” to be a separate discrete,
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`physical hardware-based sensor) contradicts the plain meaning. Nothing in claim 7
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`requires the sensor be “specialized” or “separate and discrete.” Id. ¶ 68.4 Also,
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`dependent claim 13 states that “the sensor is a current sensor.” Institution Decision
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`(“ID”) 8; Ex. 1063 ¶ 69. Further, claim 14 also claims “a sensor for sensing
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`movement of a window or panel,” and UUSI does not contend that claim 14
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`excludes a current pulse counter. Ex. 1063 ¶ 70. Claims in related patents and
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`applications, which include the same “movement sensor” limitation, also show that
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`the “movement sensor” includes a MCCP sensor. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
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`The specification contains no clear disavowal or express definition of
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`claim 7’s “sensor” (Id. ¶75), and UUSI does not argue otherwise. R. 31-32. As for
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`4 UUSI’s construction is illogical, because a MCCP sensor outputs a pulse train
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`indicative of the motor rotation, just like a Hall sensor, and which is perceived by
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`a controller no differently than a Hall sensor. Id. ¶ 67.
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`7
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`
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`the file history, UUSI relies on charts provided for priority purposes (R. 32-34),
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`which are not a clear disavowal of claim scope. Ex. 1063 ¶ 78. The file history
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`actually indicates that the Examiner found no material distinction between the
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`“sensor” of claim 7 (then claim 12) and the “sensor” of claim 1. Id. ¶¶ 79-80.
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`B. Claim Construction - The “Travel Path” Limitation
`UUSI argues that claim 7 requires “monitor[ing] movement of an object
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`along an entire travel path and perform[ing] obstacle detection-based motor control
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`along the entire travel path.” R. 40 (emphasis added). But claim 7 simply claims
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`that the movement sensor monitors movement of an object as it is moved along a
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`travel path, and requires neither movement monitoring nor detection based on the
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`obstacle detect threshold, along the entire travel path. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 86-88.
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`The specification and prosecution history contain no special definition of the
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`“travel path” limitation, nor a clear disavowal of plain meaning, and UUSI does
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`not argue otherwise. R. 37-40; Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 94-95, 97-98. Instead, UUSI’s only
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`argument—lacking any citation to the intrinsic record—is that “[p]erforming these
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`control actions along the entire path of travel of the window are critical.” R. 38-
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`39. In its description of the startup phase, however, the specification indicates that
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`obstacle detection along the entire travel path is not critical. Ex. 1063 ¶ 96. And
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`the file history demonstrates the same, based on a rejection over art without this
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`feature, and UUSI’s reliance on priority application passages without this feature.
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`8
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`Id. ¶¶ 97-98. Reliance on claim differentiation (R. 37) would be error, as the
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`intrinsic record dictates that plain meaning must prevail. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 89-91;
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`Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`Invalidity
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`C.
`Ground 1 - Obviousness Over Itoh. UUSI argues that Itoh (1) “excludes
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`using a discrete sensor,” and “provides a motivation for why one of skill in the art
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`would not want to combine a specialized sensor with the system of Itoh”; and
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`(2) “cannot monitor movement along an entire travel path because the current
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`pulses generated at the beginning of motor movement are unreliable (compared to
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`a Hall effect sensor).” R. 40-41. Under Brose’s construction, claim 7 is obvious
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`over Itoh, which UUSI does not dispute. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 205, 211-213, 225-27;
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`Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 110-42.
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`Under UUSI’s construction, which is incorrect, claim 7 is still obvious over
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`Itoh. First, it would have been obvious to a POSA as of 1992 that Itoh’s sensor
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`could be replaced with a different sensor, e.g., a Hall effect sensor, which would
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`serve the same purpose and be used by the controller in the same manner. Ex. 1063
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`¶¶ 215-23. Second, it would have been obvious to a POSA as of 1992 that Itoh
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`could be modified to monitor movement and perform obstacle detection along an
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`entire travel path. Itoh’s alleged lack of obstacle detection in the 0.2 seconds after
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`startup—which, according to UUSI, is due to Itoh’s use of commutation pulses
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`9
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`
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`(R. 40-41; Ex. 2001 ¶ 90)—would not exist were Itoh’s sensor substituted with a
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`Hall effect sensor, as discussed above. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 229-33, 236-38.
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`Ground 2 - Anticipation by Itoh. If the Board maintains the construction of
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`the “signal…for stopping the motor” limitation of claim 7 that it adopted in its PR,
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`claim 7 is anticipated by Itoh, under Brose’s proposed constructions for the other
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`limitations, and subject to the potential “de-activing” issue, which UUSI does not
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`raise. Ex. 1007 3:44-68, Abstract; Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 242-46.
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`Ground 3 - Anticipation by Kinzl. In its Preliminary Response, UUSI argued
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`that Kinzl does not disclose a “stored program that i) determines motor speed of
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`movement from an output signal from the movement sensor.” But Kinzl discusses
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`speed in terms of its inverse, time, and also directly refers to using speed. Ex. 1063
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`¶¶ 248-50; ID 15. In its Response, UUSI argues that Kinzl “does not perform
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`detection based on the obstacle detect threshold along the entire travel path of a
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`window.” R. 43-44. This argument is premised on UUSI’s incorrect claim
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`construction. Under the correct construction, Kinzl anticipates claim 7, which
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`UUSI does not dispute. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 252, 254-55; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 197-98.
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`Ground 4 - Obviousness Over Kinzl. UUSI’s only argument, premised on its
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`incorrect claim construction, is that Kinzl does not perform detection based on the
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`obstacle detect threshold along the entire travel path of the window. R. 43. Under
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`the correct construction, Kinzl renders claim 7 obvious, which UUSI does not
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`10
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`dispute. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 261-63, 266. Moreover, Claim 7 is obvious over Kinzl under
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`UUSI’s incorrect construction. Kinzl discloses a Hall effect sensor that monitors
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`movement along the entire travel path of the window. Id. ¶ 261. Kinzl’s use of a
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`blocking counter in window zones 1 and 3 could be modified to make use of
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`detection based on the obstacle detect threshold used in zone 2. Id. ¶ 264.
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`Ground 5 - Obviousness Over Itoh in View of Kinzl. UUSI argues that Itoh
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`cannot monitor movement along an entire travel path because the current pulses
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`generated at the beginning of motor movement are unreliable; (2) Kinzl and Itoh
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`cannot be combined; and (3) even if combined, “the claimed entire travel path
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`monitoring limitation is still not taught or suggested by either of the cited
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`references. To the contrary, they teach that such is undesirable.” R. 45. UUSI’s
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`first argument is premised entirely on its incorrect claim construction. Under
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`Brose’s construction, claim 7 is obvious over Itoh and over Kinzl. Ex. 1063
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`¶¶ 271-72. Under UUSI’s proposed construction, claim 7 is obvious over Itoh
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`alone, as discussed above. Id. ¶¶ 273-74. Kinzl provides additional motivation to
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`modify Itoh because it uses a Hall effect sensor to monitor movement along the
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`entire travel path. Ex. 1007 2:1-15, 53-57; Ex. 1063 ¶ 275. For this reason, UUSI’s
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`third argument also is wrong. And UUSI provides no support for its statement that
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`Itoh and Kinzl teach that entire travel path monitoring “is undesirable.” R. 45;
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`Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 280-81. UUSI’s second argument is incorrect, as addressed in Part VI.
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`11
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`Ground 6 - Obviousness Over Itoh in View of Zuckerman, and Ground 7 -
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`Obviousness Over Itoh in View of Kinzl and Zuckerman. Brose relies on
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`Zuckerman only to show that it was obvious to reconfigure or “re-write” Itoh’s
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`equation, which UUSI does not dispute. As a result, while Brose maintains its
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`positions under both Grounds 6 and 7, Grounds 6 and 7 are effectively now
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`duplicative of Grounds 1 and 5, respectively. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 287-88 (Ground 6), 297
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`and 300-301 (Ground 7). UUSI’s other arguments regarding Zuckerman are
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`irrelevant, as they are not directed to the issue of reconfiguring Itoh’s equation.
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`V. CLAIM 14 IS INVALID AND SHOULD BE CANCELLED
`A. Claim Construction - Limitations (c) And (c)(i)-(iv)
`UUSI contends that limitations (c) and (c)(i)-(iv) are written in means-plus-
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`function format, that the structure corresponding to “decision making logic” is “a
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`general-purpose processor, memory and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC)” and
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`that the functions are limited to particular algorithms disclosed in the specification.
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`R. 48-55. This construction contradicts UUSI’s position in litigation against Brose
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`North America. Ex. 1033 at 36-39; Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 128-30. UUSI also did not apply
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`such a construction during prosecution. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 124-27. And for good reason.
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`The presumption that a claim term without the word “means” is not a means-
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`plus-function term “is a strong one that is not readily overcome.” Lighting World,
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`Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ex. 1063
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`12
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`
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`¶¶ 112-13. UUSI’s only “evidence” for its construction is Dr. Ehsani’s opinion that
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`“decision making logic” “is not and was not a known structure to those of skill in
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`the art prior to the priority date of the ’802 Patent.” R. 49. UUSI ignores the
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`intrinsic evidence. Claim 14 provides detailed algorithmic functionality that can be
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`implemented in the structural form of circuits and/or program code. Ex. 1063
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`¶¶ 118, 121. And the file history shows that the Examiner (like UUSI) did not
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`understand claim 14 as requiring means-plus-function analysis. Id.¶¶ 125-27.
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`Further, “decision making logic” was in common parlance for a POSA, and did
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`connote understood structure, as of 1992. Id. ¶¶ 106-108, 110-11, 114-17.
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`Invalidity
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`B.
`UUSI’s arguments regarding Grounds 1-7 all are premised on its incorrect
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`claim construction. R. 55-59. Under the correct claim construction (and as
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`explained in the Petition), UUSI does not dispute that claim 14 is invalid under
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`each Ground. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 308-309 (Ground 1), 315-18 (Ground 2), 325-26
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`(Ground 3), 332-33 (Ground 4), 340-41 (Ground 5), 350-51 (Ground 6), 359-60
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`(Ground 7). Further, certain of UUSI’s arguments regarding Kinzl and Zuckerman
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`are irrelevant, because they relate to elements for which Brose did not rely on
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`Kinzl or Zuckerman. Id. ¶¶ 342 (Ground 5), 352 (Ground 6), 361-62 (Ground 7).
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`13
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`VI. MOTIVATION AND ABILITY TO COMBINE
`UUSI argues that Itoh and Kinzl cannot be combined because “using the
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`Hall effect sensor of Kinzl would defeat one of the express objectives of Itoh,
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`which is to avoid ‘mounting of a special sensor.’” R. 19, 29, 45, 58. This is
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`incorrect. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 371-79. Moreover, this is an issue only under UUSI’s
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`incorrect claim constructions. Nonetheless, it is not an “express objective” of Itoh
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`to “avoid” a “special sensor.” Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 365-66. Itoh merely teaches that in some
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`situations, a “special sensor” is not preferred. Ex. 1007 12:32–38, 13:58–61;
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`Ex. 1063 ¶ 367; Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2005) (“A statement that a particular combination is not a preferred
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`embodiment does not
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`teach away absent clear discouragement of
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`that
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`combination.”). Availability and interchangeability of sensors was well known,
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`with Hall sensors known as older and more familiar; the Examiner agreed.
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`Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 368-70. UUSI’s arguments about combinability of that Zuckerman are
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`irrelevant. Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 380-85. Zuckerman is relied upon only for the
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`obviousness of reconfiguring Itoh’s algorithm, an issue UUSI does not dispute.
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`VII. ENABLEMENT
`UUSI does not argue that Itoh or Kinzl (alone or in combination) is not
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`enabling as to any particular claim. Instead, UUSI argues that, in real-world,
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`production-vehicle scenarios, their algorithms would lead to an inordinate amount
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`14
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`of false positives or negatives. R. 59-60. This is a red herring. It suffices that Itoh
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`and Kinzl provide sufficient disclosure to allow a POSA to make and use the
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`inventions recited in each of the challenged claims. In re Antor Media Corp., 689
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`F.3d 1282, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Enablement of prior art requires that the
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`reference teach a skilled artisan to make or carry out what it discloses in relation to
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`the claimed invention. Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is
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`prior art for all that it teaches.”); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d
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`1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A] non-enabling reference may qualify as prior art
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`for the purpose of determining obviousness under § 103.”). Itoh enables claims 1,
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`6-9 and 14, either alone or in combination with Kinzl and/or Zuckerman. Ex. 1063
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`¶¶ 386-94. Kinzl enables claims 7, 9 and 14. Id. ¶¶ 395-98.
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`VIII. CONCLUSION
`UUSI’s proposed constructions should be rejected, and all challenged claims
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`should be found unpatentable and cancelled.
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`Date: February 5, 2015
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`Respectfully submitted,
`/s/ Craig D. Leavell
`
`Craig Leavell (Reg. No. 48505)
`Alyse Wu (Reg. No. 68926)
`Luke L. Dauchot, P.C. (pro hac vice)
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`15
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies
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`that a copy of
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`the
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`foregoing
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`PETITIONERS’ REPLY was served on February 5, 2015 via electronic mail
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`upon the following:
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`Monte L. Falcoff
`Michael R. Nye
`HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
`5445 Corporate Drive, Suite 200
`Troy, Michigan 48098
`plloyd@hdp.com
`mnye@hdp.com
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`Attorneys for Patent Owner UUSI, LLC
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Craig Leavell
`Craig Leavell (Reg. No. 48505)
`Alyse Wu (Reg. No. 68926)
`Luke Dauchot (pro hac vice)
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`Attorneys For Petitioners
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`16
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