`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper No. 14
`Entered: September 23, 2014
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
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`SEQUENOM, INC.
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
`THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
`_______________
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`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and SCOTT E. KAMHOLZ,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
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`PRATS, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`DECISION
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`of Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Sequenom, Inc. (“Petitioner”) has filed a Request for Rehearing (Paper 12,
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`“Req. Reh’g”) of our Decision (Paper 11, “Dec.”) denying review of the claims of
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`U.S. Patent No. 8,195,415 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’415 patent”), as to all grounds
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`advanced in the corrected Petition (Paper 5, “Pet.”). For the reasons that follow,
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`we deny Petitioner’s request to rehear the decision not to institute inter partes
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`review of the ’415 patent.
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`II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`When rehearing a decision on a petition to institute an inter partes review,
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`the Board “will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision
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`should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the
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`party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
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`matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.71(d).
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`“An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous
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`interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial
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`evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.”
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`Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006), citing Star Fruits S.N.C.
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`v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`Petitioner presented twelve grounds of unpatentability, all of which relied on
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`the Lo I1 reference. Pet. 5–6. Petitioner contended that Lo I, a provisional
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`1 Lo et al., U.S. Provisional Patent Application 60/951,438 (filed July 23, 2007)
`(Ex. 1003).
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` 2
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`U.S. patent application, constitutes prior art under § 102(e) as of its filing date for
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`all it discloses, under Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d 1606 (BPAI 2008)
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`(precedential). Pet. 2.
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`We declined to institute trial because Lo I is neither a patent nor an
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`application for patent published under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), and, therefore, is not
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`one of the two types of documents that may be relied upon under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 102(e) to show that claims are unpatentable. Dec. 3. We also explained that we
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`were not persuaded that Ex parte Yamaguchi stands for the proposition that a
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`ground of unpatentability under § 102(e) may be predicated on a provisional
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`application, without reference to a corresponding patent or application for patent
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`published under § 122(b). Id. at 4. Specifically, we noted that, like the decision in
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`In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2010), Ex parte Yamaguchi
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`held that, “under § 102(e)(2), a patent that claimed the benefit of an earlier filed
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`provisional application qualified as prior art, as of the filing date of the provisional
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`application, for all commonly disclosed subject matter.” Dec. 4.
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`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends that our statement of the
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`holding in Yamaguchi overlooks language in that decision stating that a provisional
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`application constitutes prior art under § 102(e) “for all that it teaches.” Req.
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`Reh’g 6 (citing Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d at 1612). Petitioner, thus, argues that our
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`Decision overlooked the full breadth of the holding in Yamaguchi. Id. at 7–8.
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`Moreover, Petitioner contends, contrary to our conclusion that a provisional
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`application is not an application for patent published under § 122(b) as required by
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`§ 102(e)(1), Yamaguchi explains that provisional applications, in general, become
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`publicly available when the corresponding utility application is published. Id. at
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`8–9 (citing Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d at 1611–12).
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`We are not persuaded that our Decision misapprehended or overlooked the
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`breadth of the holding in Yamaguchi. In particular, we are not persuaded that
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`Yamaguchi held that, because provisional applications generally become publicly
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`available, the proponent of the patent-defeating provisional application is
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`discharged from the requirement of showing, in a ground based on § 102(e), that
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`the critical disclosures relied upon in the provisional application are also present in
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`a corresponding patent, or application published under § 122(b). To the contrary,
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`the Yamaguchi decision noted expressly that the examiner had made the fact-
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`finding that the relevant disclosures of the patent and its corresponding provisional
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`application were the same. Yamaguchi, 88 USPQ2d at 1613. Then, in determining
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`whether the appellant had shown error in that finding, the decision used a table to
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`compare directly the disclosures of the patent upon which unpatentability was
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`asserted, and the corresponding disclosures in the related provisional application.
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`Id.
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`Thus, rather than analyzing the provisional application in isolation, the
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`Yamaguchi decision ensured that the patent-defeating disclosures were present in
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`both the patent which formed the basis of unpatentability under § 102(e), as well as
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`the corresponding provisional application. The decision in Yamaguchi recognized,
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`therefore, that in a ground of unpatentability under § 102(e), the patent-defeating
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`disclosures in a provisional application must also be found in a document
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`applicable as prior art under § 102(e), that is, either a patent or application for
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`patent published under § 122(b). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
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`Yamaguchi held that a ground of unpatentability under § 102(e) may be predicated
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`on a provisional application, without reference to a corresponding patent or
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`application for patent published under § 122(b).
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`Petitioner also directs us to the decisions in Ex parte Argasinski, 2009 WL
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`460669 (BPAI 2009), Ex parte Green, 2011 WL 5116559 (BPAI 2011), Ex Parte
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`Gilde, 2014 WL 1154004 (PTAB 2014), and Focal Therapeutics, Inc. v. Senorx,
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`Inc., IPR2014-00116 (Paper 8), 2014 WL 1651257 (PTAB 2014). Req. Reh’g 1–
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`2, 7, 9–10. Those decisions are not precedential, however. We, therefore, are not
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`bound by them, and decline to consider them.
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`In sum, for the reasons discussed, we are not persuaded that our Decision not
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`to institute trial misapprehended or overlooked the holding in Ex parte Yamaguchi.
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`We are also not persuaded that Petitioner has been precluded, in a prejudicial
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`fashion, from presenting to the Board its case regarding Lo I and the other
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`references cited in its corrected Petition. See Req. Reh’g 11–13. Petitioner did, in
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`fact, present its grounds of unpatentability based on Lo I. See Pet., generally.
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`Although Petitioner disagrees with our assessment of the merits of the grounds
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`advanced in the corrected Petition, that disagreement does not demonstrate that
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`Petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to present the grounds of
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`unpatentability it desired, or that we misapprehended or overlooked the grounds of
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`unpatentability that were advanced, to an extent that would be considered an abuse
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`of discretion.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`Having considered Petitioner’s request for rehearing, we are not persuaded,
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`for the reasons discussed, that Petitioner has shown that our Decision
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`misapprehended or overlooked any point of law or fact advanced in the corrected
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`Petition, such that the Decision can be considered an abuse of discretion.
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`V. ORDER
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`For the reasons given, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for
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`rehearing is denied.
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`Case IPR2013-00337
`Patent 8,195,415 B2
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`For PETITIONER:
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`Michael J. Wise
`Patrick D. Morris, Ph.D.
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`mwise@perkinscoie.com
`pmorris@perkinscoie.com
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`For PATENT OWNER:
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`R. Danny Huntington
`Sharon E. Crane, Ph.D.
`ROTHWELL, FIGG, ERNST & MANBECK, P.C.
`dhuntington@rfem.com
`scrane@rfem.com
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