throbber
Paper No. ______
`Filed August 14, 2014
`
`
`
`
`Filed on behalf of: Sequenom, Inc.
`
`By: Michael J. Wise (mwise@perkinscoie.com)
`
`Patrick D. Morris (pmorris@perkinscoie.com)
`Perkins Coie LLP
`1888 Century Park East, Suite 1700
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-1721
`Telephone: (310) 788-3210
`Facsimile: (310) 788-3399
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SEQUENOM, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR
`UNIVERSITY
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SEQUENOM REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 3
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD .................................................................................... 5
`
`IV. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Lo I Qualifies as Prior Art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) .......................... 6
`
`Sequenom Will Suffer Prejudice if It Cannot Rely on Lo I and
`Other Prior Art References Cited in the Petition ............................... 11
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 13
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
`
`
`
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`
`Cases
`
`Ex Parte Argasinski,
`Appeal 2008-3200, Decision on Appeal, 2009 WL 460669
`(B.P.A.I. Feb. 24, 2009) .......................................................................... 1, 7, 9, 10
`
`Focal Therapeutics, Inc. v. Senorx, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00116, Paper 8, 2014 WL 1651257 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22,
`2014) ........................................................................................................... 2, 7, 10
`
`Ex Parte Gilde,
`Appeal 2011-012641, Decision on Appeal, 2014 WL 1154004
`(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014) ............................................................................ 2, 7, 10
`
`Ex Parte Green,
`Appeal 2010-002449, Decision on Appeal, 2011 WL 5116559
`(B.P.A.I. Oct. 25, 2011) ...............................................................................passim
`
`Lacavera v. Dudas,
`441 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................ 5-6
`
`Ex parte Yamaguchi,
`88 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1606 (B.P.A.I. 2008) ..........................................................passim
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ............................................................................................passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ...................................................................................................... 4, 6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 111(b) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(5)............................................................................................. 8-9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 119(e) ................................................................................................. 4, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 122(b) ............................................................................................. 1, 6, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(iii) ..................................................................................... 8
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
` (continued)
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`Page
`
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(iv) .......................................................................................... 9
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(iv)-(vi) ................................................................................... 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.211(a) ................................................................................................... 9
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) .............................................................................................. 1, 5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-iii-
`
`
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner Sequenom, Inc. ("Sequenom") requests a rehearing under 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(d) regarding the Board's July 16, 2014 Decision Denying Institution
`
`of Inter Partes Review (Paper 11). The Board denied Sequenom's petition
`
`"because Lo I [a provisional patent application] is neither a patent nor an
`
`application for patent published under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)" so the Board concluded
`
`that Lo I "does not qualify under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as prior art to the claims of the
`
`'415 patent." Paper 11 at 4.
`
`The Board abused its discretion by overlooking controlling case law in Ex
`
`parte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1606 (B.P.A.I. 2008). In that case, the Board
`
`held that even though provisional patent applications are not published under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 122(b), they become public when corresponding utility applications are
`
`published, and thus qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) "like a regular
`
`utility application" and "constitute[] prior art for all that [they] teach[]."
`
`Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1611-12. Other panels of this Board have followed
`
`the precedential decision in Yamaguchi and found that a provisional application to
`
`which an application published under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) claims priority qualifies
`
`as § 102(e) prior art. Ex Parte Argasinski, Appeal 2008-3200, Decision on Appeal
`
`at 3 n.2, 2009 WL 460669, at *4 n.2 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 24, 2009) ("We note that the
`
`Ferreira 60/182,282 reference is the provisional application for the Ferreira utility
`
`patent application publication, US 2001/0034661 A1. We consider Ferreira's
`
`60/182,282 provisional application available as prior art in accordance with Ex
`
`parte Yamaguchi[.]"); Ex Parte Green, Appeal 2010-002449, Decision on Appeal
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`at 3 n.2, 2011 WL 5116559, at *5 n.2 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 25, 2011) ("Nevertheless, as in
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`the earlier decision, we rely exclusively on Kuwata's provisional application
`
`('Kuwata '180') in this opinion—a document whose qualification as prior art is
`
`undisputed.").
`
`The Board has reached the same conclusion in recent decisions even without
`
`citing Yamaguchi. See, e.g., Ex Parte Gilde, Appeal 2011-012641, Decision on
`
`Appeal at 5-6, 2014 WL 1154004, at *3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014) ("Although the
`
`Vermeulen provisional application was not published, it became disseminated and
`
`available for public inspection upon the publication of the Vermeulen pre-grant
`
`document. We hold the Vermeulen provisional application to be a valid prior-art
`
`reference against the presently rejected claims."); Focal Therapeutics, Inc. v.
`
`Senorx, Inc., IPR2014-00116, Paper 8 at 3-4, 15, 19, 2014 WL 1651257, at *2,
`
`*10, *13 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 2014) (relying on provisional applications that
`
`correspond to published utility applications as prior art in an inter partes review).
`
`Under the precedent of this Board, the Lo I provisional application that Sequenom
`
`relies on in its Petition is prior art, and the Board erred in finding otherwise.
`
`The Board's decision on this issue matters because the Lo I provisional
`
`application has a filing date earlier than any prior invention date alleged by Patent
`
`Owner in a previous proceeding, IPR2013-00390 (the "'390 IPR"). If Patent
`
`Owner can make good on its prior invention claim in the '390 IPR, Sequenom's
`
`ability to rely on the Lo I provisional application and its earlier filing date in this
`
`proceeding would be critical to proving unpatentability.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`For these reasons, Sequenom asks the Board to reconsider its decision and
`
`institute an inter partes review based on the Petition.
`II. BACKGROUND
`In this proceeding, Sequenom requests inter partes review of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 8,195,415 (the "'415 patent") (Ex. 1001) based on the Lo I provisional
`
`application (U.S. Provisional Patent Application 60/951,438; Ex. 1003) in
`
`combination with other prior art references.
`
`Before filing the Petition, Sequenom requested, and the Board instituted, the
`
`'390 IPR relating to the '415 patent. There, Sequenom originally sought inter
`
`partes review for obviousness based on Lo I, as well as for anticipation and
`
`obviousness based on the Lo II published patent application (U.S. Patent
`
`Application Publication No. 2009/0029377; Ex. 1002). The Board denied
`
`Sequenom's request relating to Lo I, but instituted a review based on Lo II. In
`
`particular, the Board determined that Sequenom's arguments based on Lo I were
`
`"redundant" of its arguments based on Lo II. Ex. 1017 at 21.
`
`Sequenom requested that the Board reconsider its ruling in the '390 IPR,
`noting that Lo I is not redundant of Lo II at least because Lo I's filing date is a full
`year earlier. Ex. 1018 at 7. That difference matters because while the Board was
`
`still considering whether to institute a review in the '390 IPR, as part of
`
`Interference No. 105,922 involving the '415 patent, Patent Owner filed a notice that
`
`it intended to prove a conception date of December 18, 2007, which is earlier than
`
`the filing date of Lo II but later than the filing date of Lo I. Ex. 1014 at 2.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`Sequenom's request for rehearing also pointed out that the unpatentability
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`arguments relating to Lo I and Lo II are different, including because Sequenom
`
`relies on different references in combination with Lo I. Ex. 1018 at 10.
`
`Ultimately, the Board denied Sequenom's request for rehearing in the '390
`
`IPR, stating that "Lo II expressly claims the benefit of Lo I under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 119(e), and, indeed, incorporates by reference the entire contents of Lo I" and
`
`"[t]hus, Lo II has the same effective patent-defeating date as Lo I for disclosure
`
`that the two references have in common." Ex. 1019 at 4. The Board also stated
`
`that "Sequenom's conjecture as to what evidence of prior invention [Patent Owner]
`
`might file" was "too speculative a basis on which to distinguish its challenges." Id.
`
`Not long after the Board denied Sequenom's request for rehearing, Patent Owner
`
`submitted alleged prior invention evidence as part of its opposition, including
`
`notebooks, emails, papers, and witness declarations. Ex. 1020 at 29-60 (citing
`
`Exhibits 2109-2113, 2118-2135, 2138, and 2139 in the '390 IPR). The earliest of
`
`that alleged evidence is dated December 18, 2007, which is nearly five months
`
`after the filing date of Lo I.
`
`Meanwhile, before the Board instituted the '390 IPR, Lo—a party for whom
`
`Sequenom is the real party-in-interest in the '390 IPR and this proceeding—
`
`requested permission to file a motion in Interference No. 105, 922 that the '415
`
`patent's claims are unpatentable under §§ 102 and 103 based on Lo II, Lo I, and
`
`other prior art references. Ex. 1021 at 1-2. The Board denied that request after it
`
`had instituted the '390 IPR. Ex. 1022 at 2. In its decision, the Board explained that
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`Lo would have the opportunity to pursue the relief it was seeking during the inter
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`partes review involving Sequenom. Id. Lo asked the Board to reconsider its
`
`ruling in light of the limited scope of the '390 IPR, but the Board declined. Ex.
`
`1023, Ex. 1024.
`
`In addition to its request for rehearing in the '390 IPR and Lo's efforts to
`
`seek permission to file a motion in Interference No. 105,922, Sequenom also filed
`
`its Petition in this proceeding, asking the Board to institute an inter partes review
`
`based on Lo I in combination with other prior art. See Paper 5. But for the third
`
`time, the Board denied Sequenom's request relating to Lo I, ruling that Lo I did not
`
`qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) because it is an unpublished
`
`provisional patent application. Paper 11 at 3-4. In doing so, however, the Board
`
`erred in interpreting the law and thus abused its discretion.
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`When rehearing a decision on a petition to institute an inter partes review,
`
`the Board "will review the decision for an abuse of discretion." 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision
`
`should be modified, and "[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the
`
`party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
`
`matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply." 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.71(d).
`
`"An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous
`
`interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors."
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A. Lo I Qualifies as Prior Art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
`The Board overlooked its own controlling case law in finding that Lo I, as a
`
`provisional patent application, is not prior art under § 102(e). Sequenom initially
`
`raised this issue in its Petition, explaining that "Lo I is a provisional U.S. patent
`
`application that is prior art to the '415 patent under §§ 102(e)/103(a) as of its filing
`
`date for all it discloses." Paper 5 at 2. As support for that statement, Sequenom
`
`cited the Board's precedential opinion in Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1606
`
`(B.P.A.I. 2008). In Yamaguchi, the Board held that under § 102(e) a provisional
`
`application that becomes public when a corresponding utility application is
`
`published under § 122(b) "is considered prior art for all that it teaches." Id. at
`
`1612. The Board went on to explain and reiterate its holding:
`In sum, the statutory scheme of Title 35 indicates that
`Congress intended for "applications for patent" under
`§ 102(e) to apply to both regular utility applications and
`provisional applications, particularly when considering
`§ 111(b) and 102(e) together. As a published "application
`for patent" under this statutory framework, a provisional
`application—like a regular utility application—constitutes
`prior art for all that it teaches and, as such, promotes the
`progress of the useful arts.
`
`Id. (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`The Board has repeatedly followed Yamaguchi to find that provisional
`
`applications are prior art. See, e.g., Argasinski, Decision on Appeal at 3 n.2, 2009
`
`WL 460669, at *4 n.2 ("We note that the Ferreira 60/182,282 reference is the
`
`provisional application for the Ferreira utility patent application publication, US
`
`2001/0034661 A1. We consider Ferreira's 60/182,282 provisional application
`
`available as prior art in accordance with Ex parte Yamaguchi[.]"); Green, Decision
`
`on Appeal at 3 n.2, 2011 WL 5116559, at *5 n.2 ("Nevertheless, as in the earlier
`
`decision, we rely exclusively on Kuwata's provisional application (‘Kuwata '180')
`
`in this opinion—a document whose qualification as prior art is undisputed."). The
`
`Board has reached the same result even without citing Yamaguchi. See, e.g., Gilde,
`
`Decision on Appeal at 5-6, 2014 WL 1154004, at *3 ("Although the Vermeulen
`
`provisional application was not published, it became disseminated and available
`
`for public inspection upon the publication of the Vermeulen pre-grant document.
`
`We hold the Vermeulen provisional application to be a valid prior-art reference
`
`against the presently rejected claims."); Focal Therapeutics, Paper 8 at 3-4, 15, 19,
`
`2014 WL 1651257, at *2, *10, *13 (relying on provisional applications that
`
`correspond to published utility applications as prior art in an inter partes review).
`
`Yamaguchi applies to Lo I as a provisional application that corresponds to a
`
`published utility application (Lo II). Accordingly, Lo I is prior art under § 102(e).
`
`The Board erred in denying Sequenom's Petition because it failed to
`
`recognize the precedential findings in Yamaguchi about provisional applications as
`
`prior art and interpreted that opinion too narrowly. In its decision, the Board
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`described Yamaguchi as holding that "a patent that claimed the benefit of an earlier
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`filed provisional application qualified as prior art, as of the filing date of the
`
`provisional application, for all commonly disclosed subject matter." Paper 11 at 4.
`
`As noted above, however, the holding of Yamaguchi is broader—the Board found
`
`that a provisional application made public when a corresponding utility application
`
`is published qualifies on its own as prior art for all that it teaches. 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d
`
`at 1612.
`
`Yamaguchi also dispenses with the Board's argument (Paper 11 at 3) that
`
`provisional applications are not prior art under § 102(e) because they are not
`
`published. As explained in Yamaguchi, both a provisional application and its
`
`corresponding utility application become public when the corresponding utility
`
`application is published under § 122(b):
`[W]hile provisional applications are not themselves
`published under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(iii), the
`corresponding regular utility application that claims priority
`to a provisional application under § 119(e) is generally
`published (with certain exceptions) after 18 months. Upon
`such publication, not only is the regular utility application
`laid open to the public, but its corresponding provisional
`application is likewise made available to the public. See 37
`C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(iv)-(vi).
`
`While the filing of a provisional application itself does not
`trigger the publication of that application, the conversion
`from a provisional to an application under § 111(b)(5) does
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`
`
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`cause the application to be available to the public after 18
`months in most instances. Also, since § 111(b)(5) allows for
`conversion of a provisional application to a nonprovisional
`application, provisional applications can become U.S.
`Patents. Moreover, the filing of the provisional
`application's corresponding regular utility application will,
`in most instances, cause both applications to be available
`to the public 18 months after the provisional application
`filing date. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.211(a); see also 37 C.F.R.
`§ 1.14(a)(1)(iv).
`
`88 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1611 (emphasis added).
`
`The Board reasoned that the extra step required before a provisional patent
`
`application is published—the filing and publication of a corresponding utility
`
`application—does not justify treating provisional applications any differently from
`
`regular utility applications for purposes of § 102(e). Id. When a provisional
`
`application is published, it qualifies as a published "application for patent" under
`
`§ 102(e). Id. at 1612.
`
`The panels in Argasinski and Green followed the law as set forth in
`
`Yamaguchi and found that provisional applications corresponding to published
`
`utility applications are prior art under § 102(e).
` In Argasinski, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/182,282
`
`corresponded to U.S. Patent Application Publication No.
`
`2001/0034661 (published on October 25, 2001). Decision on Appeal
`
`at 3 & n.2, 2009 WL 460669, at *1, *4 n.2.
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`
`
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
` In Green, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/278,180
`
`corresponded to U.S. Patent Application Publication No.
`
`2003/0072031 (published on April 17, 2003). Decision on Appeal at
`
`2, 3 n.2, 2011 WL 5116559, at *1, *5 n.2.
`
`Even without citing Yamaguchi, other panels of the Board have relied on
`
`provisional applications as prior art when they have corresponded to published
`
`utility applications.
` In Gilde, the panel relied on U.S. Provisional Patent Application No.
`
`60/570,962 as prior art where it was the basis for U.S. Patent
`
`Application Publication No. 2007/0192862 (published on August 16,
`
`2007). Decision on Appeal at 3, 5-6, 2014 WL 1154004, at *1, *3.
` In Focal Therapeutics, the panel relied on U.S. Provisional Patent
`
`Application Nos. 60/949,963 and 60/875,776 as prior art where they
`
`corresponded to U.S. Patent Application Publication Nos.
`
`2009/0024225 (published on January 22, 2009) and 2008/0177179
`
`(published on July 24, 2008), respectively. Paper 8 at 3-4, 15, 19,
`
`2014 WL 1651257, at *2, *10, *13.
`
`The result for Lo I should be the same as for the provisional applications at
`
`issue in Argasinski, Green, Gilde, and Focal Therapeutics. In this proceeding, as
`
`in each of those cases, a provisional application (Lo I) is § 102(e) prior art because
`
`it was made public when a corresponding utility application (Lo II) was published.
`
`The Lo II application, which is based on Lo I, was published on January 29, 2009.
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`Ex. 1002. At that point, Lo I became available to the public and therefore qualifies
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`as prior art under § 102(e). Indeed, Lo I is currently available to the public through
`
`the Patent Office's Public Patent Application Information Retrieval website.
`
`Based on the legal precedent in Yamaguchi and other Board decisions, the
`
`Board abused its discretion in denying Sequenom's Petition and should reconsider
`
`that decision.
`B.
`Sequenom Will Suffer Prejudice if It Cannot Rely on Lo I and
`Other Prior Art References Cited in the Petition
`In light of Patent Owner's assertions about prior invention in the '390 IPR,
`
`the prior art cited in Sequenom's Petition is important because it may ultimately
`
`determine the patentability of the '415 patent's claims. While Patent Owner's
`
`evidence relating to prior invention may have been a matter of speculation when
`
`Sequenom filed its request for rehearing in the '390 IPR, Patent Owner has since
`
`submitted its evidence of prior invention, the earliest of which is dated December
`
`18, 2007. Ex. 1020 at 29-60 (citing Exhibits 2109-2113, 2118-2135, 2138, 2139 in
`
`the '390 IPR). In that context, Lo I and two additional combination references
`
`cited in the Petition are crucial because they have effective dates that Patent Owner
`
`cannot overcome based on its alleged prior invention evidence.
`
`To begin with, Lo I's earlier filing date would undermine the patentability of
`
`the '415 patent's claims even if the Patent Owner's alleged prior invention evidence
`
`in the '390 IPR were to hold up. Lo I has a filing date of July 23, 2007—a year
`
`earlier than the July 23, 2008 filing date for Lo II. That difference matters because
`
`Patent Owner has alleged prior invention as of December 18, 2007 in the '390 IPR.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`
`
`Lo I's filing date is almost five months earlier. In effect, Patent Owner has already
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`conceded that it cannot antedate the filing date of Lo I.
`
`Furthermore, in its Petition Sequenom relies on two additional combination
`
`references that have earlier effective dates than prior art cited in the '390 IPR. The
`
`Board instituted the '390 IPR on six grounds of unpatentability based on Lo II,
`
`alone and in combination with other prior art. Ex. 1017 at 21-22. In its Petition
`
`here, Sequenom includes 12 grounds of unpatentability based on Lo I in
`
`combination with other prior art. Paper 5 at 5-6. The Petition describes
`
`combinations with two additional prior art references—Green and Tarasov—that
`
`were not included in the '390 IPR. Like Lo I, Green and Tarasov have effective
`
`dates before December 18, 2007 (Paper 5 at 29, 40)—the earliest prior invention
`
`date alleged by Patent Owner in the '390 IPR—and thus could have an impact on
`
`the patentability of the '415 patent's claims.
`
`Because the earlier effective dates of Lo I, Green, and Tarasov could tip the
`
`scales in Sequenom's favor on unpatentability, Sequenom would suffer prejudice if
`
`the Board does not consider that prior art. As an initial matter, the '415 patent is
`
`currently being asserted against Sequenom in Verinata Health, Inc. v. Sequenom,
`
`Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00865-SI, pending in U.S. District Court in the Northern District
`
`of California. Estoppel may apply to prior art raised in the '390 IPR and this
`
`proceeding, barring Sequenom from raising that art in the district court case. And
`
`this is likely to be Sequenom's only chance to get the prior art before the Board.
`
`The Board has already precluded arguments based on Lo I from being made in
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`
`
`Interference No. 105,922 under the assumption that Sequenom would be able to
`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`raise those arguments during inter partes review proceedings. For Sequenom, it is
`
`now or never.
`V. CONCLUSION
`Based on the foregoing, the Board should reconsider its July 16, 2014
`
`Decision and institute inter partes review of '415 patent claims 1-17 on
`
`unpatentability grounds 1-12 for obviousness based on Lo I in combination with
`
`other prior art.
`
`
`Dated: August 14, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Michael J. Wise/
`Michael J. Wise, Reg. No. 34,047
`Patrick D. Morris, Reg. No. 53,351
`
`
`
`For Petitioner Sequenom, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00337
`Patent 8,195,415
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SEQUENOM
`
`REQUEST FOR REHEARING UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) was served
`
`electronically via email on the Patent Owner through its attorneys of record on this
`14th day of August, 2014 as follows:
`
`R. Danny Huntington, Esq. (dhuntington@rfem.com)
`Sharon E. Crane, Ph.D., Esq. (scrane@rfem.com)
`Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, PC
`607 14th Street, NW, Suite 800
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Patrick D. Morris/
`Patrick D. Morris
`Registration No. 53,351

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket