Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 44
`Date: June 29, 2015
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA
`LLC, SUBARU OF AMERICA INC., TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA,
`INC., and VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, HYUN J. JUNG, and GEORGE R. HOSKINS,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`COCKS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Ford Motor Company et al. (“Petitioner”), filed an amended petition
`
`(Paper 6, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19,
`21, 25–31, and 34–36 of U.S. Patent 6,324,463 (“the ’463 patent”). Cruise Control
`Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”), filed a Patent Owner Preliminary Response.
`Paper 7. The panel determined that the information presented in the Petition
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging
`claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 25–31, and 34–36 as unpatentable. Paper 11
`(“Decision”). The panel instituted an inter partes review on the following
`grounds: (1) claims 1–3, 5, 12–14, 18, 19, 25–27, 29–31, and 34–36 under 35
`U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Prometheus1; (2) claims 3, 5, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 28
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Prometheus and Narita2; and
`(3) claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Prometheus and Celsior3.
`
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 21, “PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 29, “Pet. Reply”). An oral
`hearing was conducted on March 25, 2015. A transcript of the oral hearing is
`included in the record. Paper 42 (“Tr.”).
`
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This decision is a final written
`decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to the patentability of
`claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 25–31, and 34–36. For the reasons discussed
`below, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
`claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 25–31, and 34–36 are unpatentable.
`
`1 Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control (AICC), Prometheus dated April 1991
`(Ex. 1003).
`2 JP 8-192663 dated September 1995 (Ex. 1004) (English translation, Ex. 1006).
`3 Toyota Celsior Owner’s Manual dated July 1997 (Ex. 1007) (English translation,
`Ex. 1009).
`
`
`
`2
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
`
`
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner has identified several related district court proceedings involving
`
`the ’463 patent. See Pet. 3–4; Paper 5, at 2–4. The ’463 patent is also the subject
`of four other requests for inter partes review (IPR2014-00279, IPR2014-00280,
`IPR2014-00281, and IPR2014-00289). Final decisions in those proceedings are
`being entered concurrently with this final decision.
`
`B. The ’463 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’463 patent discloses cruise control systems for use in a human operated
`
`vehicle. Ex. 1001, Abst. Figures 1 and 2 of the ’463 patent are shown below:
`
`
`
`
`Figure 1 illustrates a digital speed display, while Figure 2 illustrates an
`
`analog speedometer. Id. at 3:8–13. In Figure 1, main speed display 3 shows the
`current speed at which the vehicle is operating. Id. at 3:49–53. When a cruise
`control set button (not shown in Figure 1) is pressed, the vehicle speed is stored in
`digital memory 12 as a preset speed. Id. at 3:53–60. Second speed display 16
`shows that preset speed. Id. Figure 2’s analog speedometer 40 incorporates
`several LED assemblies 45. Id. at 4:19–26. Each LED assembly 45 has an LED
`and a detector. Id. at 4:29–30. When a cruise control set button (not shown in
`Figure 2) is pressed, all of the detectors are activated, and all of the LEDs
`
`
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
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`momentarily light up. Id. at 4:48–51. The back of needle 42 reflects the light of
`the lit LEDs behind the needle, and that reflected light is detected by the detector
`of the LED assembly disposed at the location of needle 42. Id. at 4:51–57. The
`LED of that assembly is then activated and remains lit to indicate the speed at
`which cruise control was engaged. Id. at 4:57–64.
`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Claims 1, 2, 6, 12, 13, 18, 21, 25, 26, and 34 are independent. Claims 1 and
`
`12 are illustrative and are reproduced below:
`1. A cruise control system for vehicle having a human operator,
`comprising:
`
`a speed controller that automatically maintains the vehicle
`speed at a preset speed;
`
`an enable switch associated with said controller for enabling the
`system;
`
`a set speed input in communication with said controller for
`manually setting the speed of the vehicle at said preset speed, thereby
`engaging the system;
`
`a memory which stores information indicative of said preset
`speed; and
`
`a feedback system for communicating said information in said
`memory to the operator of the vehicle.
`
`12. A method for visually communicating to the human operator of
`a vehicle having a cruise control system a cruising speed at which the
`vehicle is set, comprising:
`
`determining the speed at which the vehicle is travelling;
`
`activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed;
`
`displaying a symbol indicative of the speed at which the cruise
`control system is activated;
`
`maintaining the activated cruise control speed symbol upon
`temporary acceleration or deceleration of the vehicle;
`
`removing said symbol when the cruise control system is
`deactivated or a new cruising speed is selected.
`
`
`
`4
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
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`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its
`
`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`it appears. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2013); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778
`F.3d 1271, 1279–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under that construction, claim terms are
`given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of
`ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re
`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`In instituting trial with respect to the ’463 patent, we determined that all
`terms of the involved claims should be given their ordinary and customary
`meaning in the context of the disclosure of that patent. We made that meaning
`explicit for certain claim terms/phrases. Neither party challenges any aspect of our
`claim constructions. Based on the entire record presented during trial, we discern
`no reason to alter our claim constructions in connection with this Final Written
`Decision. For reference, the claim constructions that we made explicit are
`reproduced in the table below:
`Claim Term or Phrase
`
`“engaging the system” (claim 1) and
`“engaging the cruise control system”
`(claim 21)
`
`
`Claim Construction
`“[W]e construe ‘engaging the system’ in
`claim 1 and ‘engaging the cruise control
`system’ in claim 21 to mean ‘operating
`the cruise control system to
`automatically control the vehicle at the
`preset speed.’ Decision 9.
`“‘[E]nabling the system’ in claim 1 and
`‘enabling . . . the controller’ in claim 2
`mean ‘a “system on” state for the cruise
`control system.’ This construction also
`applies to the descriptor ‘enabled’ in
`claims 2 and 4.” Id. at 10.
`5
`
`
`
`“enabling” (claims 1 and 2) and
`“enabled” (claims 2 and 4)
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
`
`Claim Term or Phrase
`“indicating to the operator the unset
`status of the preset speed” (claim 15)
`and “displaying a symbol indicative of
`an unset state of the preset speed”
`(claim 21)
`
`
`“activating the cruise control system”
`(claims 12 and 15) and “deactivated”
`(claims 12, 13, and 21)
`
`
`
`Claim Construction
`“‘[U]nset status’ and ‘unset state’ in
`these two claim limitations . . . mean ‘a
`state or status in which there is no preset
`speed for the cruise control system.’”
`Id.
`We “construe ‘activating the cruise
`control system’ in claim 15 to mean
`turning on the cruise system, and
`“deactivated” in claims 13 to mean that
`cruise control system is turned off.” Id.
`at 11. “We . . . construe activating /
`activated in claim 12 the same as in the
`other claims of the ’463 patent.” Id. at
`12.
`
`B. Grounds of Unpatentability
`As noted above, there are three grounds of unpatentability involved in this
`
`inter partes review proceeding: (1) claims 1–3, 5, 12–14, 18, 19, 25–27, 29–31,
`and 34–36 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Prometheus; (2) claims 3, 5, 12,
`15, 16, 21, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Prometheus and
`Narita; and (3) claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Prometheus
`and Celsior.
`
`1. Prometheus as Prior Art
`As an initial matter, Patent Owner challenges Prometheus’s status as prior
`
`art. In that regard, Patent Owner disputes that all the content of Prometheus has a
`publication date of April 19, 1991, which was the publication date offered by the
`Petitioner as to that document. PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner also contends that
`Petitioner “has not provided any declaration testimony to indicate the source of
`[Prometheus] (or any of the documents therein) or when, if ever, it was
`
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`disseminated to the public.” Id. at 3. On that basis, Patent Owner requests that the
`Board deny all grounds in this proceeding that involve Prometheus.
`
`Petitioner responds that the only portions of Prometheus on which the
`Petitioner relies are those designated pages 104–1114, and that each of those pages
`is dated April 19, 1991 and includes a Copyright notice of 1991. Pet. Reply 1.
`Petitioner also cites to various Board Decisions finding that the presence of a
`Copyright date or notice was sufficient to provide prima facie evidence of public
`availability of an underlying document. Id. at 1–2. Petitioner concludes that
`Patent Owner has “proffered no evidence contradicting the prima facie publication
`date” of the portions of Prometheus on which Petitioner relies. Id. at 2.
`Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. David McNamara, also testifies that Prometheus was
`published in 1991, and that the “PROMETHEUS Project” was a “large scale
`research and development (R&D) project from 1987 to 1995” involving various
`European automotive manufacturers, and focused on improving vehicle speed
`controls and warnings including aspects designated “Autonomous Intelligent
`Cruise Control” (“AICC”). Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 43, 44.
`
`We are cognizant that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability rely solely on
`pages designated 104–111 in Prometheus. Those pages include a title “OBJET:
`SCENARIO DU MMI-AICC,” and are described as a document that explains “the
`controls of Renault’s AICC vehicle and what type of information receives the
`driver from the AICC system.” Ex. 1003, 104, 105. As noted by Petitioner, each
`of the noted pages bears the markings “Copyright © 1991 Régie National des
`Usines Renault” and “19/4/91.” In that respect, we understand the pages to be
`
`
`4 Citations herein to page numbers in Prometheus refer to the consecutive page
`numbering 1 through 122 added by Petitioner on each page of Exhibit 1003, in the
`extreme lower right hand corner.
`
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`dated April 19, 1991, and include a copyright notice of 1991. In similar
`circumstances, such indicators have been regarded as sufficient to establish a
`threshold showing that a document was a printed publication as of the date of the
`copyright notice. See International Business Machines Corporation v. Intellectual
`Ventures II LLC, IPR2014-00681, Paper 11 (October 30, 2014) at 13–14; see also
`FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, Paper 9 (September 5,
`2014) at 18–19 (“On the record before us, we are persuaded that the Copyright
`notice prima facie establishes a prior art date of 2002”). The inference that a
`copyright notice bearing the symbol “©” provides some evidence of a date of
`publication finds support in the understanding that such markings generally
`indicate the “first year of publication.” See Joseph S. Dubin, The Universal
`Copyright Convention, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 89, 103 (1954).
`Here, in instituting trial in this inter partes review proceeding, the panel was
`
`satisfied that a threshold showing had been made that the pertinent pages of
`Prometheus were printed publications as of the date of the 1991 copyright notice,
`well before any effective filing date of the ’463 patent. Although Patent Owner
`discounts Petitioner’s reliance on Prometheus as a whole because of the lack of
`“any declaration testimony to indicate the source of Exhibit 1003 (or any of the
`documents therein) or when, if ever, it was disseminated to the public” (PO Resp.
`3), Patent Owner offers no rebuttal vis-à-vis the printed copyright notice on the
`relevant pages of Prometheus. It is not the case that a pre-requisite for establishing
`the publication date of a document is the presence of declaration testimony in the
`record.
`
`Moreover, although Patent Owner postulates that dates attributed to
`Prometheus, or portions thereof, are, perhaps, simply “printing dates” divorced
`from actual publication, Patent Owner points to no content of the record supporting
`
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`that theory. In that respect, Patent Owner does not provide any underlying
`explanation as to why a printed copyright notice would tend to only demonstrate a
`printing date.
`Furthermore, regarding Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner “has not
`provided any declaration testimony to indicate the source of [Prometheus] (or any
`of the documents therein) or when, if ever, it was disseminated to the public” (PO
`Resp. 3), Petitioner’s declarant avers “the PROMETHEUS Project . . . was a large
`scale research and development (R&D) project from 1987 to 1996 . . . was
`sponsored and funded by . . . an intergovernmental organization for pan-European
`research and development funding and coordination that involved leading
`European automotive manufacturers which included . . . Renault” and that a “key
`goal was to improve safety and mobility by enhancing speed control as well as
`many other electronic control/warning systems on cars and trucks.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 44.
`The portion of Prometheus relied upon by Petitioner indicates it was copyrighted
`by “Régie National des Usines Renault.” Ex. 1003 at 104. Thus, Petitioner
`provides declaration testimony that the source of Prometheus is the Prometheus
`Project, which included Renault.
`Also, our reviewing court has explained that a reference is “publicly
`accessible” upon a satisfactory showing that: (1) the “document has been
`disseminated”; or (2) “otherwise made available to the extent that persons
`interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable
`diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of
`the claimed invention without need of further research or experimentation.”
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`(quoting In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981)). Petitioner provides
`declaration testimony that an intergovernmental organization funded and
`
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`IPR2014-00291
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`coordinated research and development with the goal of improving safety of cars
`and trucks. Ex. 1010 ¶ 44. Patent Owner does not respond with any evidence that
`the intergovernmental organization did not make its research and development
`available to persons of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Moreover, we see no
`reason why such an intergovernmental organization would impede access to
`research to improve the safety of cars and trucks. We, thus, determine that
`Petitioner satisfactorily shows that Prometheus was “otherwise made available to
`the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art
`exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend
`therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research
`or experimentation.”
`
`In reviewing the evidence before us, we discern the following: (1) the
`pertinent pages of Prometheus are dated and printed with a copyright notice; (2)
`the date of the copyright notice is well before the filing date of the patent
`application that became the ’463 patent; (3) a copyright notice generally is
`regarded as indicating a date of first publication; (4) similar circumstances have
`prompted panels in other inter partes review proceedings to conclude that a
`threshold showing of publication has been established; and (5) Mr. McNamara
`testifies that Prometheus was published in 1991, and he explains that “AICC”
`systems, such as that referenced at pages 104–111 of Prometheus as a part of
`Renault’s system, were part of a collaboration between various European
`automotive manufacturers.
`
`Accordingly, in view of the above, we remain satisfied that Petitioner
`established a threshold showing that the involved content of Prometheus (i.e. pages
`104–111) was published as of the copyright notice date of 1991, well before any
`effective filing date of the ’463 patent. We do not discern that the totality of the
`
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`record before us suggests that the threshold showing of publication of at least
`pages 104–111 of Prometheus has been displaced. We do not determine, based on
`this record, that Prometheus should be discounted as not constituting prior art to
`the ’463 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
`
`2. Anticipation by Prometheus
`Anticipation is established only when a single prior art reference discloses
`all elements of the claimed invention. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir.
`1990). Here, Petitioner contends that Prometheus discloses all the features
`required by 1–3, 5, 12–14, 18, 19, 25–27, 29–31, and 34–36 and, thus, anticipates
`those claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
`
`a. Overview of Prometheus
`The first page of Prometheus designates its disclosed content as being
`
`directed to “Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control (AICC).” Ex. 1003, 1.
`Figure 3 appears on page 110 of Prometheus, and is reproduced below:
`
`Figure 3 above depicts an image of a vehicle’s dashboard that incorporates
`
`an AICC system. See Ex. 1003, 107. As is apparent from Figure 3, the left side of
`
`
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`the Figure presents a speedometer that indicates the speed of the vehicle. The
`Figure also describes that there are “CONSIGN SPEED LEDs” as a part of the
`speedometer. Prometheus explains that “consign speed is the speed selected by the
`driver to maintain the vehicle.” Id. at 105. That “consign speed” is displayed to
`the vehicle’s operator via the consign speed LEDs, which, in Figure 3, are
`expressed as being “green.” See id. at 110; see also id. at Figure 4 (“All LEDS
`under consign speed corresponding LED are ON.”) Prometheus also explains that
`its AICC system includes two modes of “regulation”: “speed” regulation, and
`“distance” regulation. Id. at 105–106. Prometheus further describes the following:
`
`To activate the regulation, the driver has to press on the
`ACTIVATE button, and immediately the system starts the regulation,
`as well in speed if there is not a detected target, as in distance if there
`is at least one. To deactivate the regulation and take control of the
`vehicle, the driver has two possibilities: the DEACTIVATE button or
`the BRAKE PEDAL. In both cases the driver stops the regulation and
`the consign speed is memorized by the system. If the driver wants to
`take up the regulation, he can act in two ways: press on the
`ACTIVATE button so the system starts again the regulation with the
`vehicle speed as consign speed, or press on the RESUME button and
`the system starts again the regulation with the memorized speed as
`consign speed.
`
`Id. Thus, Prometheus discloses that a “consign speed” is memorized by the system
`and may be resumed by the vehicle after certain actions are taken by the vehicle’s
`operator. Further, as discussed above, that memorized consign speed is displayed
`to the vehicle’s operator by virtue of the consign speed LEDs associated with the
`speedometer. See id. at 108; see also id. at Figure 4.
`
`b. Claim 1
`Claim 1 of the ’463 patent is drawn to a cruise control system. The Petition
`
`lays out where Petitioner believes all the features of claim 1 are found in
`
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`Prometheus. Pet. 18–20.5 As set forth in its Patent Owner Response, Patent
`Owner is of the view that Prometheus lacks disclosure of three elements of claim 1.
`To that end, Patent Owner contends that Prometheus does not disclose: (1) a
`“speed controller that automatically maintains the vehicle speed at a preset speed”;
`(2) a “memory which stores information indicative of said preset speed;” and (3) a
`“feedback system for communicating said information in said memory to the
`operator of the vehicle.” PO Resp. 5
`
`i. Speed controller feature
`In accounting for the speed controller of claim 1, the Petition refers to
`
`disclosure at page 105 of Prometheus describing the activation of a system to
`regulate the vehicle speed as the “consign speed,” which is selected by the driver
`as the vehicle’s speed. Pet. 18–19. Patent Owner discounts the noted statement of
`Prometheus, arguing that none of that disclosure “expressly refers to the structural
`requirement of ‘a speed controller.’” PO Resp. 5.
`
`We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument. Although Prometheus may
`not make express referral to a “speed controller,” it is clear from the context of
`Prometheus’s disclosure that the “system” is operable to regulate or control a
`vehicle’s speed, and, thus, the system necessarily includes some component as a
`part of the system to accomplish that regulation or control. Indeed, it is not
`apparent why the system, itself, would not constitute a speed controller. We share
`Petitioner’s view that Prometheus’s disclosure satisfies the requirement of the
`“speed controller” called for in claim 1. See Pet. Reply 4.
`
`
`5 As noted during oral argument, the references in the Petition to page “2” of
`Prometheus are typographical errors, and should instead be read as references to
`page 105 of the document. See Tr. 36.
`
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`ii. Memory feature
`The Petition emphasizes Prometheus’s disclosure that its speed regulation
`
`system describes that the consign speed is “memorized by the system,” and reasons
`that the system, therefore, includes a memory for storing the speed information.
`Pet. 19 (quoting Prometheus at p. 105). Patent Owner generally contends that
`there is some “structural difference” between the claimed “memory” and the
`memorization capability of Prometheus’s system. See PO Resp. 5–6.
`
`We are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s position is correct. That
`Prometheus’s system functions to memorize the consign speed means that the
`system, if not itself a memory, is equipped suitably with a component to perform
`that memorization operation. Patent Owner does not explain why that component
`is not understood readily as a “memory.” Based on the record before us, we are
`satisfied that a skilled artisan would have understood that Prometheus’s system
`includes a memory as required by claim 1.
`
`iii. Feedback system feature
`The Petition cites the following portions of Prometheus’s disclosure as
`
`constituting the required feedback system of claim 1:
`
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`Pet. 20. In that respect, the Petitioner points to the arrangement of LEDs in
`Prometheus that are illuminated and located under the designated consign speed as
`forming a system for providing feedback of that consign speed to a vehicle
`operator. Patent Owner argues that the LEDs depicted in Prometheus’s Figure 3
`are arranged generally at intervals of “10 km/h,” and, apparently, theorizes that
`such intervals are of insufficient precision such that “an operator would have no
`way of knowing the actual consign speed.” PO Resp. 5–7.
`Patent Owner’s argument is misplaced. Even were we to assume, arguendo,
`
`that Prometheus’s LED display does not convey some speed regarded as the
`“actual consign speed,” that is not what is required by claim 1. Rather, the claim
`simply calls for the feedback system to communicate information “indicative of
`said preset speed.” Information may be indicative of the preset speed but not
`constitute the “actual” speed. In attempting to explain its position, Patent Owner
`offers the following scenario: “[f]or example, if the consign speed was 42 km/h,
`Prometheus does not explain whether the 40 km/h or 50 km/h LED will be lit, and,
`
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`in any event, neither is indicative of the consign speed, which is between the two
`values.” PO Resp. 7. Thus, Patent Owner discredits a possible LED lighting
`scheme in Prometheus as inadequate to present “indicative” information of the
`consign speed (i.e. when the consign speed is 42 km/h), yet also recognizes that the
`same scheme would convey that the consign speed is between two particular
`values (i.e. 40 km/h and 50 km/h). In our view, a display arrangement that
`conveys a speed within a range between two distinct and identifiable values is an
`arrangement that provides information “indicative” of that speed. That view is
`supported by the declaration testimony of Petitioner’s expert, David McNamara.
`See Ex. 1010 ¶ 48 (“One of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the
`consign speed using LEDs to indicate discrete speed intervals.”)
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Prometheus fails to incorporate the
`feedback system required by claim 1 of the ’463 patent.
`
`iv. Conclusion – Claim 1
`We have considered the record at hand, including the Petition, its supporting
`
`documentation, and Patent Owner’s Response. We conclude that a preponderance
`of the evidence supports a conclusion that claim 1 of the ’463 patent is anticipated
`by Prometheus.
`
`c. Claims 2 and 3
`Claim 2 is independent and is drawn to a cruise control system. Claim 3
`
`depends from claim 2 and adds the feature of a “digital display” as a part of the
`feedback system. Like claim 1, claim 2 includes features pertaining to a “speed
`controller,” a “memory,” and a “feedback system.” Patent Owner argues that
`Prometheus does not anticipate claim 2 for the same reasons that it offered for
`claim 1. PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner does not present any arguments as to claim 3.
`
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`As discussed above, we are not persuaded that Prometheus fails to disclose
`
`the above-noted features of claim 1. We are also not so persuaded with respect to
`claims 2 or 3.6 We have considered the entirety of the record, and conclude that a
`preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that claims 2 and 3 of the
`’463 patent are anticipated by Prometheus.
`
`d. Claim 5
`Claim 5 depends from claim 3 and adds the feature “wherein the digital
`
`display displays information indicative of the selected cruising speed of the
`vehicle.” The Petition identifies the speedometer assembly, and its LED
`arrangement, depicted in Figure 3 of Prometheus as constituting a digital display.
`Pet. 23.
`
`Patent Owner disputes that Prometheus accounts for the requirements of
`claim 5, arguing the following:
`
`[T]he LEDs do not indicate the selected cruising speed, because
`they are arranged at varying intervals around the speedometer dial.
`Further, the LEDs, by themselves, do not display information
`indicative of the selected cruising speed. As Petitioner’s declarant
`notes, each LED “has only two states, i.e., an on state or an off state.”
`Ex. 1010, ¶ 48. Accordingly, the only “information” an LED can
`display is light, and light, by itself, does not provide “information
`indicative of the selected cruising speed of the vehicle.”
`
`PO Resp. 8–9. Thus, with respect to claim 5, Patent Owner contends that the on
`and off states of the LEDs do not convey the requisite speed information, and
`instead only communicate “light” as information. Patent Owner’s contention,
`however, is not persuasive. Whether the LEDs “by themselves” display the
`
`
`6 The Petition, with recourse to Mr. McNamara’s testimony, articulates the position
`that “’the Renault dashboard display, as disclosed in Prometheus, uses LEDs with
`a speedometer as a digital display. (See [Ex. 1010 at ¶ 48].)’” Pet. 23–24.
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
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`pertinent information in their emission of “light” is not the correct inquiry. Rather,
`the appropriate evaluation is whether the LEDs in the context of their collective
`capacity as a display communicate the pertinent information. In that respect, the
`LEDs are understood as forming an arrangement in which multiple LEDs operate
`in concert to convey information concerning a vehicle’s speed based on various
`illumination patterns. See, e.g., Ex. 1003, 110–111.
`
`We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but in view of the entirety
`of the record, we determine that Prometheus’s disclosure is sufficient to account
`for the requirements of claim 5, and conclude that a preponderance of the evidence
`supports a conclusion that claim 5 is anticipated by Prometheus.
`
`e. Claim 12
`Claim 12 is independent, and is drawn to a “method for visually
`
`communicating to the human operator of a vehicle having a cruise control system a
`cruising speed at which the vehicle is set.” Claim 12 contains five steps, including
`steps of determining the speed a vehicle is traveling, and activating a cruise control
`system at a desired cruising speed. Claim 12 also requires the following steps:
`
`displaying a symbol indicative of the speed at which the cruise
`control system is activated;
`
`maintaining the activated cruise control speed symbol upon
`temporary acceleration or deceleration of the vehicle;
`
`removing said symbol when the cruise control system is
`deactivated or a new cruising speed is selected.
`
`
`Petitioner contends that all of the steps required by claim 12 are found in
`
`Prometheus. Pet. 24–26. Patent Owner disputes that the above-quoted steps
`directed to “displaying” and “maintaining” are satisfied by Prometheus, but does
`not challenge that the “removing” step is present. See PO Resp. 9–10. We focus
`
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`IPR2014-00291
`Patent 6,324,463 B1
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`on whether the “displaying” step, the “maintaining” step, and the unchallenged
`“removing” step, are disclosed in Prometheus.
`
`i. The “displaying” step
`With respect to the “displaying” step of claim 12, Patent Owner argues the
`
`following:
`The Petitioner’s allegation that all of the LEDs under the
`
`consign speed corresponding LED that are ON meet this claim
`limitation (Pet. at 24) is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, as
`explained above,
`the consign corresponding speed LED
`in
`Prometheus is not “indicative of the speed at which the cruise control
`system is activated,” because, given the arrangement of the LEDs as
`shown in Figure 3, an operator would have no way of knowing the
`actual consign speed.
`
`Second, Petitioner alleges that the limitation “activating the
`cruise control system at a desired cruising speed” is met by the
`“ON/OFF switch” of Prometheus. Pet. at 24. When the ON/OFF
`switch is turned on, the “[m]emorized consign speed corresponding
`LED is ON.” Ex. 1003 (state 2). However, the memorized consign
`corresponding LED indicates a previously set consign speed, not “the
`speed at which the cruise control system is activated.”
`PO Resp. 9–10.
`
`As discussed above, we do not agree that Prometheus’s arrangement of
`LEDs fails to provide information “indicative” of the consign speed.
`
`Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the Petition does not explain
`sufficiently how Prometheus discloses the display of the speed at which the cruise
`control system is activated. The Petition