UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., ET. AL
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case: IPR2014-00289
`
`Patent 6,324,463
`_______________
`
`OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER OF
`INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDINGS: IPR2014-00279,
`IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00281, IPR2014-00289, AND IPR2014-00291
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________
`
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., ET. AL
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case: IPR2014-00289
`
`Patent 6,324,463
`_______________
`
`OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER OF
`INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDINGS: IPR2014-00279,
`IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00281, IPR2014-00289, AND IPR2014-00291
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 2
`
`PATENT OWNER’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ................. 5
`
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................. 5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Patent Owner Has Not Met Its Burden To Demonstrate The
`Proceedings Should Be Joined .................................................................... 5
`
`Joinder Of The Proceedings Will Not Result In Increased
`Efficiency ............................................................................................................. 6
`
`Petitioner Would Be Prejudiced If The IPR Proceedings
`Are Joined ......................................................................................................... 11
`
`D.
`
`Patent Owner’s Motion For Joinder Is Premature ........................... 11
`
`IV. PATENT OWNER DID NOT HAVE AUTHORIZATION TO SEEK
`
`DENIAL OF THE PETITIONS ........................................................................... 13
`
`V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), Toyota Motor North America,
`
`Inc. (“Toyota”), Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”), Ford Motor Company
`
`(“Ford”), Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC (“JLRNA”), Subaru of America
`
`Inc. (“Subaru”) and Volvo Cars of North America LLC (“Volvo”) (collectively
`
`“Petitioner”) respectfully request that the Board deny Cruise Control Technologies
`
`LLC’s (“Patent Owner’s”) Motion for Joinder of Inter Partes Review Proceedings
`
`IPR2014-00279, IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00281, IPR2014-00289, and IPR2014-
`
`00291 (“Motion”).
`
`As the moving party, Patent Owner has the burden to establish that
`
`IPR2014-00289 should be joined with the other four IPR proceedings. See 37
`
`C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c) and 42.122(b). Patent Owner has not carried its burden and its
`
`motion for joinder should be denied.
`
`First, Patent Owner cannot demonstrate that it is entitled to joinder of the
`
`proceedings, as it failed to address any of the factors considered by the Board when
`
`deciding whether to grant a motion for joinder.
`
`Second, Patent Owner disregards significant differences in the five IPR
`
`proceedings. Each of the differences alone would add complexity and inefficiency
`
`to a joined proceeding; together, the differences would make conducting a joined
`
`proceeding unfeasible.
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`Third, Petitioner would be severely prejudiced by joinder of the five IPR
`
`proceedings, as replying to Patent Owner’s argument on a large number of issues
`
`in a single, limited briefing would handicap Petitioner’s ability to meet its burden
`
`to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims.
`
`Fourth, as the Board has not yet reached its decision on institution, Patent
`
`Owner’s motion for joinder is premature.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`On December 20, 2013, Petitioner, led by Subaru, filed a petition in
`
`IPR2014-00279 (“the Subaru petition”). Subaru of America, Inc., et al. v. Cruise
`
`Control Technologies LLC, IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 1. Matthew D. Satchwell
`
`is the only lead counsel identified in the Subaru petition. Id. at 3. The Subaru
`
`petition requests inter partes review of claims 1-5, 12-16, 18-21, 23, 25-31, and
`
`34-36 of U.S. Patent No. 6,324,463 (“the ‘463 patent”) based on two references:
`
`Mizuno and Miura. Id. at 6. The Subaru petition is supported the expert opinions
`
`of Mr. David A. McNamara. IPR2014-00279, Exhibit 1007.
`
`On December 20, 2013, Petitioner, led by Toyota, filed a petition in
`
`IPR2014-00280 (“the Toyota petition”). Toyota Motor North America, Inc., et al.
`
`v. Cruise Control Technologies LLC, IPR2014-00280, Paper No. 1. William H.
`
`Mandir is the only lead counsel identified in the Toyota petition. Id. at 2-3. The
`
`Toyota petition requests inter partes review of claims 1-5, 12-16, 18, 19, 21, 25-
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`28, and 34-36 of the ‘463 patent based on four references: the Diamante Owner’s
`
`Manual, the Preview Distance Control Manual, Watanabe and Celsior. Id. at 6.
`
`The Toyota petition is supported by the expert opinions of Dr. Paul Green.
`
`IPR2014-00280, Exhibit 1011.
`
`On December 20, 2013, Petitioner, led by Ford, filed a petition in IPR2014-
`
`00281 (“the Ford petition”). Ford Motor Co., et al. v. Cruise Control
`
`Technologies LLC, IPR2014-00281, Paper No. 1. Matthew J. Moore is the only
`
`lead counsel identified in the Ford petition. Id. at 2-3. The Ford petition requests
`
`review of claims 1-5, 12-31, and 34-36 of the ‘463 patent based on four references:
`
`Narita, Beiswenger, the NHTSA Report and Nagashima. Id. at 5-6. The Ford
`
`petition is supported by the expert opinions of Mr. Daniel A. Crawford. IPR2014-
`
`00281, Exhibit 1011.
`
`On December 23, 2013, Petitioner, led by Honda, filed IPR2014-00289 (“the
`
`Honda petition”). American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al. v. Cruise Control
`
`Technologies LLC, IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3. John M. Caracappa is the only
`
`lead counsel identified in the Honda petition. Id. at 3-4. The Honda petition
`
`requests review of claims 1-5, 12-15, 18-20, 25-28, and 34-36 of the ‘463 patent
`
`based on four references: Yagihashi, Yoshimitsu, the 300zx Manual, and
`
`Nagashima. Id. at 15-60. The Honda petition is supported by the expert opinions
`
`of Mr. David A. McNamara. IPR2014-00289, Exhibit 1012.
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`On December 23, 2013, Petitioner, led by Nissan, filed IPR2014-00291
`
`(“the Nissan petition”). Nissan North America, Inc., et al. v. Cruise Control
`
`Technologies LLC, IPR2014-00291, Paper No. 1. Vaibhav P. Kadaba is the only
`
`lead counsel identified in the Nissan petition. Id. at 3-4. The Nissan petition
`
`requests review of claims 1-5, 12-16, 18-19, 21, 25-31, and 34-36 of the ‘463
`
`patent based on three references: Prometheus, Narita, and Celsior. Id. at 7. The
`
`Nissan petition is supported by the expert opinions of Mr. David A. McNamara.
`
`IPR2014-00291, Exhibit 1010.
`
`On April 4, 2014, Patent Owner requested “a conference with the Board to
`
`obtain permission to file a motion to join the following IPRs.” Ex. 1013, April 4,
`
`2014 Email from J. Kasha to trials@uspto.gov. On April 9, 2014, the Parties
`
`participated in a call with the Board to address Patent Owner’s request. IPR2014-
`
`00289, Paper No. 10, at 2. During the call, the Board “authorized Patent Owner to
`
`file its requested motion to join the five related proceedings.” Id. at 4. No other
`
`motions were authorized during the call.
`
`On April 24, 2014, Patent Owner filed a motion requesting, inter alia,
`
`joinder of the five IPR proceedings, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.122(b). IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 11.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`II.
`
`PATENT OWNER’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`For the purposes of this Opposition, Petitioner does not dispute any of Patent
`
`Owner’s Statements of Material Fact.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`Patent Owner Has Not Met Its Burden To Demonstrate The
`Proceedings Should Be Joined
`
`A motion for joinder should, at least, address (1) the reasons why joinder is
`
`appropriate; (2) any differences in the grounds of unpatentability presented in each
`
`petition; (3) what impact joinder would have on the schedule; and (4) how briefing
`
`and discovery would be simplified in a joined proceeding. See Texas Instruments
`
`Inc. v. Unifi Scientific Batteries, LLC, IPR2013-00213, Paper No. 19, at 3; NetApp,
`
`Inc. v. PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC, IPR2013-00319, Paper No. 18, at 6.
`
`Patent Owner has not addressed any of these factors in its motion for joinder, and
`
`accordingly, the motion should be denied.
`
`Patent Owner’s only effort to even touch upon the factors was to argue that
`
`joinder is appropriate because it would be prejudiced by having “participate in,
`
`[sic] five parallel proceedings.” Motion, at 11-12. However, Patent Owner’s
`
`argument is belied by the fact that it is Patent Owner’s own actions that led to the
`
`filing of the five IPR proceedings. Patent Owner filed lawsuits against each of the
`
`petitioners, alleging infringement of the ‘463 patent. IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 1.
`
`Challenges to the validity of the ‘463 patent are a predictable consequence of
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`patent infringement lawsuits. As result, Patent Owner cannot credibly argue that it
`
`is unfairly prejudiced by having to defend five IPRs proceedings.
`
`B.
`
`Joinder Of The Proceedings Will Not Result In Increased
`Efficiency
`
`Patent Owner argues that the IPR proceedings should be joined because each
`
`petition shares some similarities with each of the other petitions and the similarities
`
`can be addressed more efficiently in a single proceeding. Motion, at 11. Patent
`
`Owner’s argument fails, however, as Patent Owner overlooks significant
`
`differences between each of the five IPR proceedings that weigh heavily against
`
`joinder.
`
`For instance, Patent Owner contends that the IPR proceedings should be
`
`joined because the proceedings involve the same Petitioner and same counsel.
`
`Motion, at 11. However, Patent Owner ignores that each petition has a different
`
`lead counsel and a different lead petitioner. Honda, and its counsel, are lead on the
`
`Honda petition. IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3, at 3-4. Subaru, and its counsel, are
`
`lead on the Subaru petition. IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 1, at 3. Toyota, and its
`
`counsel, are lead on the Toyota petition, and so on. IPR2014-00280, Paper No. 1,
`
`at 2-3. The fact that a petitioner is acting as lead on a given petition is more than
`
`an administrative act; it has a procedural effect. In the event, the lead petitioner
`
`settles with Patent Owner, the remaining petitioners on each petition have the
`
`ability to maintain the petition. While all of the petitioners are joined on each
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`petition for this procedural reason, each lead petitioner will litigate its own
`
`proceeding.
`
`Patent Owner also contends that joinder is proper because eighteen claims of
`
`the ‘463 patent were challenged in each petition. Motion, at 11. But Patent Owner
`
`disregards that ten of the challenged claims are not challenged in all five of the
`
`petitions,1 and that no two petitions challenge the same subset of claims. IPR2014-
`
`00279, Paper No. 1; IPR2014-00280, Paper No. 1; IPR2014-00281, Paper No. 1;
`
`IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3; and IPR2014-00291, Paper No. 1. As one example,
`
`independent claim 21 is not challenged in all five petitions, and the patentability
`
`analysis of claim 21 is unique. Id. Claim 21 includes the limitation, “after the
`
`cruise control system is deactivated, displaying a symbol indicative of an unset
`
`state of the preset speed.” IPR2014-00289, Ex. 1001, Claim 21. This limitation is
`
`not found in any other claims, and the parties dispute the proper construction of
`
`two separate phrases within the limitation – “cruise control system is deactivated”
`
`and “displaying a symbol indicative of an unset state of the preset speed.” See,
`
`e.g., IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 1, at 8-9; IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 15, at 7-10.
`
`As a result, proceedings in which claim 21 is challenged include a different claim
`
`
`1 Claims 16, 17, 20-24, and 29-31are not challenged in all five petitions.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`construction analysis and a different unpatentability analysis than proceedings in
`
`which claim 21 is not being challenged.2
`
`As another example, claims 29-31 are not challenged in all five petitions.
`
`IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 1; IPR2014-00280, Paper No. 1; IPR2014-00281,
`
`Paper No. 1; IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3; and IPR2014-00291, Paper No. 1.
`
`Claim 29, and its dependant claims 30 and 31, require “the first visual display
`
`apparatus comprises an analog speedometer including a speed indicator operably
`
`disposed adjacent an indicator dial,” and are the only challenged claims that
`
`include an analog speedometer.
`
` IPR2014-00289, Ex. 1001, Claim 29.
`
`Consequently, proceedings in which claims 29-31 are challenged necessarily
`
`include a discussion of prior art describing analog speedometers, which is a
`
`different unpatentability analysis that is not otherwise present in proceedings that
`
`are not challenging claims 29-31.
`
`The difference in the unpatentability analyses between petitions is
`
`compounded by the fact that there is significant variation in the references relied
`
`on in each of the five petitions. IPR2014-00279, Paper No. 1, at 6; IPR2014-
`
`00280, Paper No. 1, at 6; IPR2014-00281, Paper No. 1, at 5-6; IPR2014-00289,
`
`Paper No. 3, at 15-60; and IPR2014-00291, Paper No. 1, at 7. For instance, there
`
`2 Claims 22-24 depend from independent claim 21. Like claim 21, none of claims
`
`22-24 are challenged in all five petitions.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`is no overlap in the primary references relied upon in the five petitions. Id. Of the
`
`fifteen total references relied upon, thirteen of the references are cited in only one
`
`petition. Id. The remaining two references are each relied on in only two
`
`petitions. The first of those two references, Nagashima, is cited in the Ford and
`
`Honda petitions. IPR2014-00281, Paper No. 1, at 6; IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3,
`
`at 39-43. But in each of those petitions, Nagashima is used to challenge a different
`
`subset of claims. Id. The second reference, Narita, is cited in the Ford and Nissan
`
`petitions. IPR2014-00281, Paper No. 1, at 6; IPR2014-00291, Paper No. 1, at 7.
`
`Similar to Nagashima, Narita is also used to challenge a different subset of claims
`
`in each of the petitions. Id.
`
`The unpatentability analyses are further distinguished by Petitioner’s
`
`reliance on three different expert declarants across the five IPR proceedings. The
`
`Subaru, Honda, and Nissan petitions rely on the opinions of David A. McNamara.
`
`IPR2014-00289, Exhibit 1012; IPR2014-00279, Exhibit 1007; IPR2014-00291,
`
`Exhibit 1010. The Toyota petition relies on the opinions of Dr. Paul Green.
`
`IPR2014-00280, Exhibit 1011. The Ford petition relies on the opinions of Daniel
`
`A. Crawford. IPR2014-00281, Exhibit 1011.
`
`The result of all of the differences in the five IPR proceedings is that, even
`
`when the same claim is challenged in all five petitions, the issues would not be
`
`simplified by joinder because that claim is challenged under different grounds
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`using different prior art, which is explained by different experts and different
`
`parties. See, e.g., Table 1, below.
`
`Table 1: Summary of Challenges to Claim 5 of the ‘463 Patent
`
`Subaru
`1. Mizuno
`
`Claim 5
`Prior Art
`Relied
`Upon
`
`Toyota
`1. Diamante
`Owner’s
`Manual
`
`Statutory
`Basis
`Expert
`
`102
`
`102
`
`Ford
`1. Narita;
`2. Narita in
`view of
`Admitted Prior
`Art;
`3. Narita in
`view of
`NHTSA
`Report
`102 and 103
`
`Honda
`1. Yagihashi in
`view of APA or
`Yoshimitsu
`
`Nissan
`1. Prometheus;
`2. Prometheus
`in view of
`Narita
`
`
`103
`
`102 and 103
`
`McNamara
`
`Green
`
`Crawford
`
`McNamara
`
`McNamara
`
`Because each petition raises its own set of issues, any hypothetical
`
`efficiencies gained by joining the proceedings are heavily outweighed by the
`
`complexity that would be added by having unique subsets of claims challenged
`
`under different statutory grounds based on various prior art references that are
`
`explained by multiple experts.3 See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
`
`Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-00002, Paper No. 16 at 2 (“The
`
`Board prefers to proceed without making any joinder or consolidation at this time,
`
`3 The fact that the various prior art references are used to challenge different
`
`subsets of claims under different statutory provisions strongly suggests a lack of
`
`redundancy in the grounds of unpatentability raised in the five petitions.
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`given the focus and clarity afforded by two smaller proceedings with different
`
`prior art issues.”). As such, joinder of the five IPR proceedings does not “secure
`
`the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.1(b). Instead, joinder of the five IPR proceedings would merely serve to amass
`
`a large number of issues into a single, constrained proceeding.
`
`C.
`
`Petitioner Would Be Prejudiced If The IPR Proceedings Are
`Joined
`
`If the proceedings are joined as Patent Owner has proposed, Patent Owner
`
`would present its response in a single brief and Petitioner would present its reply in
`
`a single brief. Motion, at 11-12. While on the surface this appears to have an
`
`even-handed effect on the parties, in actuality the reduced ability to address the
`
`grounds for unpatentability more severely handicaps Petitioner. Petitioner has the
`
`burden to prove that the challenged claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of
`
`the evidence. 35 U.S.C. 316(e) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.2(c). Accordingly, if Petitioner
`
`and Patent Owner are unable to sufficiently address the grounds for unpatentability
`
`in a single briefing, it is Petitioner who pays the price. In theory, Petitioner could
`
`lose its challenge by presenting limited arguments, all while Patent Owner remains
`
`silent.
`
`D.
`
`Patent Owner’s Motion For Joinder Is Premature
`
`Patent Owner has requested joinder of the proceedings under 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.122(b). Motion, at 14. In relevant part, § 42.122(b) states, “Any request for
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`joinder must be filed, as a motion under §42.22, no later than one month after the
`
`institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.” 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (emphasis added). Patent Owner urges that this provision
`
`should be interpreted to allow a motion for joinder to “be filed any time after a
`
`petition is filed up until one month after institution.” Motion, at 14. Patent
`
`Owner’s interpretation is incorrect.
`
`Section 42.122(b) implements 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which requires the
`
`institution of an inter partes review before joinder is permitted:
`
`(c) JOINDER.--If the Director institutes an inter partes
`review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as
`a party to that inter partes review any person who
`properly files a petition under section 311 that the
`Director, after receiving a preliminary response under
`section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a
`response, determines warrants the institution of an inter
`partes review under section 314.
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(c) (emphasis added). Because § 42.122(b) stems from 35 U.S.C. §
`
`315(c), institution of an inter partes review is also required before joinder can
`
`occur under § 42.122(b). See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank v. Leon Stambler, IPR2014-
`
`00244, Paper No. 4, at 5.
`
`
`
`In addition to the express statutory language, practicality supports that an
`
`inter partes review proceeding be instituted before permitting joinder. Joinder is
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`proper when it complies with the Board’s mandate “to secure the just, speedy, and
`
`inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Because the
`
`Board has not reached an institution decision in any of the five IPR proceedings, it
`
`is unclear which grounds the parties will ultimately move forward on in each
`
`proceeding. As such, Patent Owner’s statements regarding any supposed
`
`efficiencies gained through pre-institution joinder are purely speculative.
`
`IV. PATENT OWNER DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORIZATION TO SEEK
`DENIAL OF THE PETITIONS
`
`A motion will not be entered without Board authorization. 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.20(b). In this case, “the panel authorized Patent Owner to file its requested
`
`motion to join the five related proceedings.” Paper No. 10, at 3-4 (emphasis
`
`added). As such, Patent Owner had authority to file a motion for joinder, but
`
`nothing more. While captioned as a motion for joinder, Patent Owner did not limit
`
`its motion to the issue of joinder. Motion, Cover Sheet. Rather, Patent Owner
`
`spent the bulk of its motion—over 10 of its 16 pages—arguing that Petitioner has
`
`not complied with the so-called “One Petitioner, One Voice rule” 4 and asking the
`
`
`4 The “One Petitioner, One Voice rule” cited by Patent Owner presumably refers to
`
`the Board’s decision in Agilysys, Inc., et al. v. Ameranth, Inc., CBM2014-00014,
`
`Paper No. 11. Contrary to the present case, in which the parties have designated a
`
`single lead counsel and have agreed to speak with a single voice on each petition,
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`Board to deny each of the five petitions pursuant to§ 42.10(a) and to require
`
`Petitioner to re-designate its counsel. Motion, at 1-11. As Patent Owner did not
`
`have permission to brief or make a motion regarding the “One Petitioner, One
`
`Voice rule,” Petitioner asks that Patent Owner’s requests be denied.
`
`To the extent the Board elects to consider Patent Owner’s request, Petitioner
`
`maintains that it has not violated the supposed “One Petitioner, One Voice rule.”
`
`In each of the five proceedings, Petitioner has designated a single lead counsel,
`
`who has been selected to speak on behalf of all of the petitioners. See IPR2014-
`
`00279, Paper No. 1, at 3-4; IPR2014-00280, Paper No. 1, at 2-3; IPR2014-00281,
`
`Paper No. 1, at 2-3; IPR2014-00289, Paper No. 3, at 3-4; and IPR2014-00291,
`
`Paper No. 1, at 4-5. Honda agrees with the other petitioners that each lead counsel
`
`is the “single voice” for its respective petition, and Honda will not seek to advance
`
`different positions, either orally or in writing, from those presented by the lead
`
`counsel. As such, Petitioner has and will continue to speak with “one voice” in
`
`each individual IPR proceeding. Nonetheless, Petitioner notes that nothing in the
`
`rules or Board precedent supports the extraordinary remedy Patent Owner is
`
`seeking—denial of institution—for alleged non-compliance with the “One
`
`
`the thirty-five parties in Agilysys had designated fifteen separate lead counsel and
`
`had each requested the ability to present their own positions. Id. at 2.
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`Petitioner, One Voice rule.” See, e.g., Agilysys, Inc., et al., v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`
`IPR2014-00289
`
`CBM2014-00014, Paper No. 11.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`
`For at least the reasons discussed herein, Patent Owner has not met its
`
`burden to establish that the proceedings should be joined. Accordingly, Petitioner
`
`requests that the Board deny Patent Owner’s Motion for Joinder.
`
`
`
`Dated: May 8, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /John M Caracappa Reg No 43532/
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`John M. Caracappa
`Paul D. Lall
`Tremayne M. Norris
`Stephanie L. Schonewald
`STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
`1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20036-1795
`Telephone: 202-429-3000
`Facsimile: 202-429-3902
`
`Counsel for American Honda Motor Co. Inc.
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that a copy of the attached OPPOSITION TO
`
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER, was served via electronic mail on
`
`May 8, 2014, to the following:
`
`John R. Kasha
`KASHA LAW LLC
`john.kasha@kashalaw.com
`
`
` Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`Date: May 8, 2014 By:
`
`
`/Stephanie L Schonewald/
`
`John M. Caracappa
`Paul D. Lall
`Tremayne M. Norris
`Stephanie L. Schonewald
`STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
`1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20036-1795
`Telephone: 202-429-3000
`Facsimile: 202-429-3902
`
`Counsel for American Honda Motor Co.
`Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.
After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.
Accept $ Charge
Still Working On It
This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.
Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.
A few More Minutes ... Still Working
It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.
Thank you for your continued patience.
This document could not be displayed.
We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.
Your account does not support viewing this document.
Set your membership
status to view this document.
With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll
get a whole lot more, including:
- Up-to-date information for this case.
- Email alerts whenever there is an update.
- Full text search for other cases.
- Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.
One Moment Please
The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.
Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.
Your document is on its way!
If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.
Sealed Document
We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.
If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.
Access Government Site
