`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper 17
`Entered: July 2, 2014
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH
`AMERICA, LLC, VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
`TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., AMERICAN HONDA
`MOTOR CO., INC., NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., and SUBARU
`OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`_______________
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, HYUN J. JUNG, and GEORGE R. HOSKINS,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`On December 20, 2013, Ford Motor Company et al. (“Petitioner”)
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`filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–
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`5, 12–31, and 34–36 of U.S. Patent No. 6,324,463 (Ex. 1001, “the ’463
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`patent”). Cruise Control Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a
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`Preliminary Response (Paper 13, “Prelim. Resp.”) on April 7, 2014. We
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`have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
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`To institute an inter partes review, we must determine the information
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`presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable
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`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
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`claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner contends
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`the challenged claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See
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`Pet. 5–6. We determine there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would
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`prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1–3, 5, 12–19, 21–26, and
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`28–31. We therefore institute an inter partes review as to those claims.
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`A.
`
`The ’463 Patent
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`The ’463 patent discloses cruise control systems for use in a human
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`operated vehicle. See Ex. 1001, Abst. Figures 1 and 2 of the ’463 patent are
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`shown below:
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`2
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`Figure 1 illustrates a digital speed display, while Figure 2 illustrates an
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`analog speedometer. See id. at 3:8–13. In Figure 1, main speed display 3
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`shows the current speed at which the vehicle is operating. See id. at 3:49–
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`53. When a cruise control set button (not shown in Figure 1) is pressed, the
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`vehicle speed is stored in digital memory 12 as a preset speed. See id. at
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`3:53–60. Second speed display 16 shows that preset speed. See id.
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`Figure 2’s analog speedometer 40 incorporates several LED
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`assemblies 45. See id. at 4:19–26. Each LED assembly 45 has an LED and
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`a detector. See id. at 4:29–30. When a cruise control set button (not shown
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`in Figure 2) is pressed, all of the detectors are activated, and all of the LEDs
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`momentarily light up. See id. at 4:48–51. The back of needle 42 reflects the
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`light of the lit LEDs behind the needle, and that reflected light is detected by
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`the detector of the LED assembly disposed at the location of needle 42. See
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`id. at 4:51–57. The LED of that assembly is then activated and remains lit to
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`indicate the speed at which cruise control was engaged. See id. at 4:57–64.
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`3
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`B.
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`Illustrative Claim
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`Claim 1 of the ’463 patent is illustrative:
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`A cruise control system for [a] vehicle having a human
`1.
`operator, comprising:
`a speed controller that automatically maintains the
`vehicle speed at a preset speed;
`an enable switch associated with said controller for
`enabling the system;
`a set speed input in communication with said controller
`for manually setting the speed of the vehicle at said preset
`speed, thereby engaging the system;
`a memory which stores information indicative of said
`preset speed; and
`a feedback system for communicating said information in
`said memory to the operator of the vehicle.
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`C.
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`Related Matters
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`Petitioner has identified several related district court proceedings
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`involving the ’463 patent, all of which were filed by Patent Owner in the
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`United States District Court for the District of Delaware. See Pet. 4;
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`Paper 12, at 2–4. The ’463 patent is also the subject of four other requests
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`for inter partes review (IPR2014-00279, IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00289,
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`and IPR2014-00291).
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`D.
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`Prior Art Relied Upon
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`Narita
`(translation, Ex. 1004)1
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`Nagashima
`(translation, Ex. 1009)
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`JP S60-174329
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`Sept. 1985
`
`Ex. 1003
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`JP H4-102059
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`Sept. 1992
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`Ex. 1008
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`
`1 Our decision cites to the translations of the prior art relied upon, including
`the page numbers of the Narita translation and the paragraph numbers of the
`Nagashima translation
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`4
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`
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`Beiswenger
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`US 5,381,388
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`Jan. 1995
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`Ex. 1006
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`John Pollard & E. Donald Sussman,
`Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
`An Examination of Sudden Acceleration
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`Admitted Prior Art in the ’463 Patent
`
`Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill
`
`
`
`Jan. 1989
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`Ex. 1007
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`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1001,
`1:10–2:12
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`Ex. 1011
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`E.
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`Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
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`Petitioner contends claims 1–5, 12–31, and 34–36 of the ’463 patent
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`are unpatentable based on the following grounds. See Pet. 5–6.
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`Basis
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`Reference(s)
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`§ 102(b) Narita
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`§ 103(a)
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`Narita and Knowledge of Person
`of Ordinary Skill
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`Claim(s) Challenged
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`1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21,
`25–28, and 34–36
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`17, 20, 22–24, and 27
`
`§ 103(a) Narita and Beiswenger
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`17, 20, 22–24, and 27
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`§ 103(a) Narita and Admitted Prior Art
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`1–5, 12, 15, and 34
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`§ 103(a) Narita and the NHTSA Report2
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`1–5, 12, 15, and 34
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`§ 102(b) Nagashima
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`18, 19, 26, and 29–31
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`§ 103(a) Narita and Nagashima
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`17, 20, 23, 24, and 27
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`§ 103(a)
`
`Nagashima and Knowledge of
`Person of Ordinary Skill
`
`20
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`
`
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`2 “Ground 5” is identified at page 6 of the Petition as obviousness over the
`NHTSA Report alone, but the substantive analysis at pages 37–39 of the
`Petition considers Narita and the NHTSA Report.
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`5
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A.
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`Preliminary Matters
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`Patent Owner asserts the Petition errs by failing to identify which
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`subsection(s) of § 102 qualify each reference as prior art. See Prelim.
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`Resp. 10–11. Given that the earliest possible priority filing date for the
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`’463 patent is May 12, 1998, and the respective publication dates of the cited
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`publications all fall more than one year before that date (the closest being
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`Beiswenger in January 1995), these publications qualify as prior art under 35
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`U.S.C. § 102(b). In addition, the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
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`relied upon in the Petition is dated on or before May 12, 1998. See
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`Ex. 1011, ¶¶ 13, 16, 18. Based on these considerations, we determine the
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`Petition adequately identifies the grounds on which the challenges are based.
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`We further note that, in submitting the Narita translation (Ex. 1004),
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`the Petition does not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b) (2013). That Rule
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`requires an “affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the translation.” Id. An
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`“affidavit,” in turn, is defined as an “affidavit or declaration under § 1.68 of
`
`this chapter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2013). The Translator’s Declaration
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`(Ex. 1005) pertaining to the Narita translation is not an affidavit because it
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`was not made under oath. The Translator’s Declaration can qualify as a
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`permitted declaration only if the declarant is warned on the same document
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`that willful false statements and the like are punishable by fine or
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`imprisonment, or both, and it also states all statements made of the
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`declarant’s own knowledge are true, and all statements made on information
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`and belief are believed to be true. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2013). The
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`Translator’s Declaration does not satisfy those requirements, and therefore is
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`not a permitted declaration under Rule 1.68.
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`6
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`Nonetheless, we may waive or suspend the requirements of
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`Rule 42.63(b) and also place conditions on the waiver or suspension. See 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.5(b) (2013). Pursuant to that authority, we have decided to grant
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`inter partes review based on the representation in the Translator’s
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`Declaration that “to the best of my knowledge and belief, [the Narita
`
`translation] is a true and accurate translation,” subject to the following
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`condition. Petitioner must, within 30 days of the date this decision is
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`entered, file a substitute affidavit or declaration directed to the Narita
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`translation originally filed with the Petition complying with the requirements
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`of Rule 42.63(b) to the extent that the substitute statement includes a proper
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`indication that the declarant is subject to the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.68
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`(2013). For any content of Narita for which English translation has not been
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`provided, we remind Petitioner of its duty of candor and good faith to the
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`Office (37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2013)) as well as its routine discovery obligation
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`to serve relevant information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by
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`Petitioner in the Petition (37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2013)).
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`B.
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`Claim Construction
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`As a step in our analysis, we determine the meaning of the claims for
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`purposes of this decision. In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired
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`patent shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
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`specification of the patent in which it appears. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
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`(2013). Under that construction, claim terms are given their ordinary and
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`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
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`art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
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`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe the terms below in
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`accordance with that standard.
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`7
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`1.
`“engaging the system” (claim 1) and
`“engaging the cruise control system” (claim 21)
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`Petitioner contends we should construe “engaging the system” in
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`claim 1 to mean “operating the cruise control system to automatically
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`control the vehicle at the preset speed.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 4,
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`1:46–48, 5:13–15). Patent Owner contends we should construe “thereby
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`engaging the system” in claim 1 to mean “as a result, activating the speed
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`controller of the cruise control system to automatically maintain the vehicle
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`speed at the preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:54–57).
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`Patent Owner describes “operating the cruise control system” in Petitioner’s
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`proposal as “an overly broad generalization of the claimed invention,” and
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`contends the construction instead should refer specifically to the speed
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`controller of the cruise control system, apart from the claimed feedback
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`system and the claimed set speed input. Id. We conclude Petitioner’s
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`proposal comports with the broadest reasonable construction of “engaging”
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`in light of the ’463 patent specification.
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`The term “comprising” in claim 1 leaves open the possibility that
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`other unclaimed components of the cruise control system, in addition to the
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`speed controller, may play a part in controlling the vehicle’s speed. In
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`addition, the term “maintain” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction is
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`unduly narrow, because it forecloses temporary acceleration of the vehicle
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`while the cruise control system is engaged. See Ex. 1001, 1:32–36, 4:6–14
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`(indicating vehicle may be accelerated temporarily while cruise control is
`
`engaged). We therefore adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.
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`Petitioner proposes the same construction for “engaging the cruise
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`control system” in claim 21. See Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner instead proposes
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`8
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`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
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`“putting the cruise control system into an operative state” for claim 21.
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`Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In particular, Patent Owner notes claim 21 separately
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`recites “engaging the cruise control system” and “setting the preset speed”,
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`and contends claim 21 therefore “requires that the cruise control system is
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`engaged prior to setting the preset speed (which can only be set, and is only
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`utilized, during use of the cruise control system).” Id. We are not persuaded
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`by Patent Owner’s argument. In particular, under a broadest reasonable
`
`construction, the “engaging” and “setting” of claim 21 may occur
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`simultaneously. See Ex. 1001, 3:56–57 (“when the set button is pressed, that
`
`is, when the cruise control is engaged”). Thus, there is no requirement that
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`the engagement of the cruise control system must occur “prior to” the act of
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`setting the present speed. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed
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`construction.
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`For the foregoing reasons we construe “engaging the system” in claim
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`1 and “engaging the cruise control system” in claim 21 to mean “operating
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`the cruise control system to automatically control the vehicle at the preset
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`speed.”
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`2.
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`“enabling” (claims 1 and 2) and “enabled” (claims 2 and 4)
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`Petitioner contends that we should construe “enabling the system” in
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`claim 1 and “enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 to mean “a ‘system on’
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`state for the cruise control system.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:39–46).
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`Patent Owner instead proposes “putting the speed controller of the cruise
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`control system into an operative condition . . . in that the speed controller
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`will automatically maintain the vehicle at a preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 2–
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`3. Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposal as “too vague to provide any
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`benefit when evaluating the validity of the claims.” Id. at 3.
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`9
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`Patent 6,324,463
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`We conclude Petitioner’s proposal comports with the broadest
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`reasonable construction of “enabling” and “enabled” in light of the
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`’463 patent specification. That is, the ’463 patent specification consistently
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`describes “enabling” as turning on the cruise control system (see Ex. 1001,
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`1:18–20, 1:64–65, 4:39–44) and “engaging” as setting the cruise control at a
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`desired speed (see id. at 1:21–25, 1:45–48, 3:56–57). We therefore adopt
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction that “enabling the system” in claim 1 and
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`“enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 mean “a ‘system on’ state for the
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`cruise control system.” This construction also applies to the descriptor
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`“enabled” in claims 2 and 4. See Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp. 3.
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`3.
`“indicating to the operator the unset status of the preset speed”
`(claim 15) and “displaying a symbol indicative of an unset state of the preset
`speed” (claim 21)
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`Petitioner contends that we should construe “unset status” and “unset
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`state” in these two claim limitations to mean “a state or status in which there
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`is no preset speed for the cruise control system.” Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner
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`contends Petitioner’s proposal is improper because “it adds ‘for the cruise
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`control system.’” Prelim. Resp. 7. We note, however, that claim 15’s parent
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`claim 13, and claim 21, both recite “a preset speed for which the cruise
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`control system is set” (emphasis added). That the claims, themselves,
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`associate setting of the preset speed with the cruise control system
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`undermines Patent Owner’s contention that there is impropriety in the
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction. We therefore adopt Petitioner’s
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`proposed construction.
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`Patent Owner further contends we should construe these two claim
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`limitations to mean “displaying a visual indication that [the] preset speed has
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`10
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`Patent 6,324,463
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`not been set.” Prelim. Resp. 6–8. We are not persuaded as to claim 15,
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`which broadly recites “indicating” without requiring the indication to be
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`visual. As to claim 21, “displaying . . . a symbol” self-evidently requires a
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`visual indication. We therefore decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed
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`construction as being either too narrow (claim 15) or inconsistent with the
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`plain language of the claim (claim 21).
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`4.
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`“activating the cruise control system” (claims 12 and 15) and
`“deactivated” (claims 12, 13, and 21)
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`Petitioner contends we should construe “activating” in these claims to
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`mean “turning on,” and “deactivated” as “turned off.” Pet. 12. Patent
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`Owner agrees as to all claims except for claim 12. See Prelim. Resp. 9–10.
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`We agree with the parties in this regard, and therefore construe “activating
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`the cruise control system” in claim 15 to mean turning on the cruise system,
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`and “deactivated” in claims 13 and 21 to mean that the cruise control system
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`is turned off.
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`Patent Owner contends we should construe “activating” in claim 12 to
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`mean something different, namely, “causing the cruise control system to
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`maintain the speed at which the vehicle is traveling at the desired cruising
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`speed.” Id. at 8. It is true that claim 12, unlike the other claims, recites
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`“activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed,”
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`“displaying a symbol indicative of the speed at which the cruise control
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`system is activated,” and “maintaining the activated cruise control speed
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`symbol” (emphases added). These limitations seem to equate activation
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`with setting the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed.
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`“[C]laim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.”
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[A] claim
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`11
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`term should be construed consistently with its appearance in other places in
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`the same claim or in other claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp. v.
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`Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, construing the
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`same term to have different meanings in different claims is the exception
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`rather than the rule. Moreover, claim 12 recites “removing said symbol
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`when the cruise control system is deactivated” (emphasis added). If we
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`were to adopt Patent Owner’s construction of claim 12, that limitation would
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`require the symbol indicative of the cruising speed to be removed when the
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`cruise control system stops maintaining the cruising speed — for example,
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`upon temporary acceleration of the vehicle, or temporary deceleration of the
`
`vehicle when the brakes are applied. We conclude one of ordinary skill in
`
`the art, upon reading the ’463 patent specification, would not construe claim
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`12 in such a manner. See Ex. 1001, 2:5–35 (discussing “potential safety
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`hazards” of prior cruise control systems which did not display preset cruise
`
`control speed upon temporary acceleration or deceleration), 2:37–45
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`(discussing solution). We, therefore, construe activating / activated in claim
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`12 the same as in the other claims of the ’463 patent.
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`5.
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`Remaining claim terms
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`All other terms of the claims are given their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning that is consistent with the specification. For purposes of this
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`decision, we need not construe expressly those terms.
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`C.
`
`Anticipation by Narita
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`Petitioner contends claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 25–28, and 34–36
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`of the ’463 patent are anticipated by Narita. See Pet. 13–33. Patent Owner’s
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`Preliminary Response does not address directly this contention.
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`12
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`1.
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`Claim 1
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`Claim 1 recites a cruise control system for a vehicle, including a speed
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`controller. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses
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`a cruise control speed controller. See Pet. 19. For example, Narita describes
`
`a “vehicle speed automatic control device that is used to automatically
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`control travel speed of a vehicle to a certain set value.” Ex. 1004, 2.
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`Claim 1 also recites an enable switch and a set speed input. We are
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`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that the “main switch” of Narita is an
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`enable switch as required by claim 1. See Pet. 13–14, 19. In particular,
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`Narita states: “[T]he operation of the vehicle speed automatic control device
`
`begins with turning on the main switch.” Ex. 1004, 3; see also id. at 5
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`(Figure 5 illustrates system operation “after turning on power”). We also are
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`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that set switch 2 of Narita corresponds
`
`to the set speed input required by claim 1. See Pet. 15, 19. In particular,
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`Narita provides “when turning on the set switch 2 . . . when reaching a speed
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`of 70 km/hr, a constant speed travel is initiated at a speed of 70 km/hr . . . .”
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`Ex. 1004, 5; see also id. at 3 (describing operation of set switch 2).
`
`Claim 1 further recites a memory which stores the cruise control’s
`
`preset speed. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita has
`
`such a memory. See Pet. 19. In particular, Narita indicates microcontroller
`
`or microcomputer 9 includes “[a] vehicle speed storage part that stores the
`
`vehicle speed when the set switch 2 is operated.” Ex. 1004, 2; see also id. at
`
`3 (when set switch 2 sends a set signal, “microcomputer 9 stores the pulse
`
`count according to the vehicle speed at that time into the vehicle speed
`
`storage part”).
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`13
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`Claim 1 finally recites a “feedback system” for communicating the
`
`cruise control’s preset speed to the vehicle operator. Narita’s disclosure in
`
`this regard is exemplified by its Figure 4, reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Ex. 1004, 12. Figure 4 is a system block diagram of a vehicle speed
`
`automatic control device, including “driver seat side speedometer 35.” Id. at
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`5. Speedometer 35 includes actual vehicle speed display unit 36 and stored
`
`vehicle speed display unit 37. See id. The following excerpt from Narita’s
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`Figure 5 illustrates the respective displays of units 36 and 37:
`
`
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`14
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`See id. at 5, 13. This excerpt from Figure 5 illustrates display changes in
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`units 36, 37 when the cruise control is set. See id. at 5–6. In particular, unit
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`36 shows the actual vehicle speed increasing from 68 km/hr to 70 km/hr.
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`See id. at 5, Fig. 5. Cruise control is then set, and “the stored vehicle speed
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`70 km/hr is displayed on the stored vehicle speed display unit 37.” Id. at 5.
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`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that stored vehicle speed
`
`display unit 37 corresponds to the feedback system recited in claim 1. See
`
`Pet. 15–16, 20.
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`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it can establish claim 1 is anticipated by Narita.
`
`2.
`
`Claims 2–5
`
`Claim 2, similarly to claim 1 discussed above, recites a cruise control
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`system for a vehicle including a speed controller, a cruise control enable
`
`switch, a set speed input, a memory, and a feedback system. We are
`
`persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the reasons provided
`
`above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 1. See supra
`
`Part II.C.1.
`
`Claim 2 further specifies the feedback system “substantially
`
`continuously communicates the selected cruising speed” to the vehicle
`
`operator “until either the operator selects a subsequent cruising speed or the
`
`controller is disabled.” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that
`
`Narita discloses this claim requirement. See Pet. 17, 21. Figure 5 of Narita,
`
`reproduced below, is representative:
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`15
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`Ex. 1004, 13. Concerning a subsequent cruising speed, Narita describes
`
`Figure 5 as illustrating:
`
`[A]fter a temporary acceleration [between time t2 and time t3],
`when turning the set switch 2 on and off again . . . upon
`reaching 80 km/hr at time t3, constant speed travel begins at 80
`km/hr while at the same time the stored vehicle speed at this
`time is displayed on the stored vehicle speed display unit
`37 . . . .
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`Id. at 6 (emphasis added). As to disabling the controller, Narita indicates:
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`“[W]hen the system is canceled due to movement by the failsafe 10 for some
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`reason during constant speed travel . . . display on the stored vehicle speed
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`display unit 37 is canceled . . . .” Id. at 7.
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`16
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`Claims 3 and 5 further specify “the feedback system includes a digital
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`display” which “displays information indicative of the selected cruising
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`speed of the vehicle.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that these
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`requirements are met by Narita’s display of the preset cruising speed as a
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`digital readout in unit 37. See Pet. 21, 22; Ex. 1004, 7, Figs. 5–7.
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`Claim 4 specifies “the digital display displays a predetermined signal
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`when the controller is initially enabled to indicate the state of the controller.”
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`In this regard, Petitioner relies on the following excerpt from Narita’s
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`Figure 5:
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`
`See Pet. 15, 21.3 Narita describes that excerpt as illustrating speedometer 35
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`“after turning on power, and when the memory cancel signal S . . . is in a Hi
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`state.” Ex. 1004, 5. According to Petitioner, the “dashed line [in the excerpt
`
`of Figure 5] comprises a predetermined signal when the controller is initially
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`enabled to indicate the state of the controller.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1011
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`(Crawford Decl.) ¶ 33). We are not persuaded that the dashed line indicates
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`the enabled state of the controller, because Narita does not suggest that
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`portion of stored vehicle display unit 37 changes when the controller is
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`enabled. That is, display unit 37 may very well show a dashed line before
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`the controller is enabled.
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`3 Petitioner also cites Figures 6 and 7, which are substantially the same as
`Figure 5 in this regard.
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`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
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`likelihood it can establish claims 2, 3, and 5 are anticipated by Narita, but
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`not claim 4.
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`3.
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`Claim 12
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`Claim 12 recites a method for visually communicating, to a vehicle
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`operator, a cruising speed at which a cruise control system is set. The first
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`two steps of the method are “determining the speed at which the vehicle is
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`traveling” and “activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising
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`speed.” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses
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`these two steps. See Pet. 22. For example, Narita describes turning on
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`cruise control via a main switch, and then operating a set switch 2 when
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`reaching a speed of 70 km/hr in order to initiate constant speed travel at a
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`speed of 70 km/hr. See Ex. 1004, 3, 5–6.
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`Claim 12 additionally recites “displaying a symbol indicative of the
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`speed at which the cruise control system is activated.” Narita indicates “the
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`stored vehicle speed 70 km/hr is displayed on the stored vehicle speed
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`display unit 37.” Id. at 5. This is illustrated by the following excerpt from
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`Narita’s Figure 5, to which we have added numerals “1” through “4,”
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`identifying four states of the system, for specific reference below:
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`
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`1
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`2
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`3
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`
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`4
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`Id. at 13. This excerpt illustrates display changes in stored vehicle speed
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`display unit 37 in response to various cruise control and vehicle operation
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`states. See id. at 5–6. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that
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`operation of Narita’s display 37 in state 2, wherein display 37 indicates
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`constant speed travel at a speed of 70 km/hr, corresponds to displaying a
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`speed-indicative symbol as recited in claim 12. See Pet. 15–16, 22.
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`Claim 12 further recites “maintaining the activated cruise control
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`speed symbol upon temporary acceleration or deceleration of the vehicle.”
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`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses the
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`“acceleration” portion of this limitation in state 3 above. See Pet. 16–17, 23.
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`In particular, state 3 illustrates stored vehicle speed display unit 37
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`continuing to show 70 km/hr when the vehicle is temporarily accelerated to
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`a speed of 75 km/hr. See Ex. 1004, 6. We are further persuaded the
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`“deceleration” claim requirement is met by Narita’s disclosure that “the
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`change in the actual vehicle speed due to the deceleration is displayed on the
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`actual vehicle speed display unit 36 while the stored vehicle speed continues
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`to be displayed as is on the stored vehicle speed display unit 37.” Id. at 6
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`(describing Fig. 6).
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`Claim 12 finally recites “removing said symbol when the cruise
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`control system is deactivated or a new cruising speed is selected.” We are
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`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses this claim
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`requirement. See Pet. 16–17, 24. As to the deactivating component, Narita
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`indicates: “When the system is canceled due to movement by the failsafe 10
`
`for some reason during constant speed travel . . . display on the stored
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`vehicle speed display unit 37 is canceled . . . .” Ex. 1004, 7. As to selecting
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`a new cruising speed, Narita indicates stored vehicle speed display unit 37
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`changes from “70” to “80” in state 4 above to reflect changing the cruising
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`speed from 70 km/hr to 80 km/hr. See id. at 6.
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`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
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`likelihood it can establish claim 12 is anticipated by Narita.
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`4.
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`Claims 13–16
`
`Claim 13, similarly to claim 12 discussed above, recites a method for
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`indicating, to a vehicle operator, a preset speed for which a cruise control
`
`system is set, including setting the preset speed, displaying a symbol
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`indicative of the preset speed, maintaining the display, and discontinuing the
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`display when the cruise control system is deactivated or a new preset speed
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`is selected. We are persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the
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`reasons provided above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 12.
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`See supra Part II.C.3.
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`Claim 14 further specifies “displaying a second symbol upon the
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`selection of a new preset speed, said second symbol indicative of the new
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`preset speed.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that Narita discloses this
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`claim limitation when stored vehicle speed display unit 37 changes from
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`“70” to “80” to reflect changing the cruising speed from 70 km/hr to 80
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`km/hr. See Pet. 16, 25; Ex. 1004, 6.
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`Claim 15 further specifies “before setting the preset speed, activating
`
`the cruise control system.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that Narita
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`correspondingly discloses “turning on the main switch” in order to activate
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`the cruise control system before using set switch 2 to set the preset speed.
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`Ex. 1004, 3; see Pet. 25. Claim 15 also specifies “after activating the cruise
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`control system, but before setting the preset speed, indicating to the operator
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`the unset status of the preset speed.” In this regard, Petitioner relies on the
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`following excerpt from Narita’s Figure 5:
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`See Pet. 15, 26. Narita describes that excerpt as illustrating speedometer 35
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`“after turning on power, and when the memory cancel signal S . . . is in a Hi
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`state.” Ex. 1004, 5. We are persuaded by Petitioner that the dashed line in
`
`the excerpt indicates the unset status of the preset speed. See Pet. 15.4
`
`Claim 16 depends from claim 15, and further specifies “wherein
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`indicating the unset status of the preset speed includes displaying a visual
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`symbol to the operator.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that the dashed line
`
`of Figure 5 is a visual symbol as claimed here. See id.
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`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
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`likelihood it can establish claims 13–16 are anticipated by Narita.
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`5.
`
`Claims 18 and 19
`
`Claim 18, similarly to claim 12 discussed above, recites a method for
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`indicating, to a vehicle operator, a preset speed for which a cruise control
`
`system is set, including setting the preset speed, displaying a symbol
`
`indicative of the preset speed, and maintaining the display. We are
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`persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the reasons provided
`
`
`4 In this regard we note a critical distinction between claim 4 (for which we
`do not institute review as anticipated by Narita) and claim 15 (for which we
`do institute such review). Claim 4 requires the digital display to indicate the
`enabled state of the controller, whereas claim 15 requires indicating the
`unset status of the preset speed. Claim 15 does not require indicating the
`activated status of the cruise control system.
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`above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 12. See supra
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`Part II.C.3.
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`Claim 18 also recites braking the vehicle, and “u