throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`Paper 17
`Entered: July 2, 2014
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH
`AMERICA, LLC, VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
`TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., AMERICAN HONDA
`MOTOR CO., INC., NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., and SUBARU
`OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC
`Patent Owner
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`_______________
`
`
`Before JOSIAH C. COCKS, HYUN J. JUNG, and GEORGE R. HOSKINS,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`On December 20, 2013, Ford Motor Company et al. (“Petitioner”)
`
`filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–
`
`5, 12–31, and 34–36 of U.S. Patent No. 6,324,463 (Ex. 1001, “the ’463
`
`patent”). Cruise Control Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a
`
`Preliminary Response (Paper 13, “Prelim. Resp.”) on April 7, 2014. We
`
`have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`
`To institute an inter partes review, we must determine the information
`
`presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable
`
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`
`claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner contends
`
`the challenged claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. See
`
`Pet. 5–6. We determine there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would
`
`prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1–3, 5, 12–19, 21–26, and
`
`28–31. We therefore institute an inter partes review as to those claims.
`
`A.
`
`The ’463 Patent
`
`The ’463 patent discloses cruise control systems for use in a human
`
`operated vehicle. See Ex. 1001, Abst. Figures 1 and 2 of the ’463 patent are
`
`shown below:
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`
`
`Figure 1 illustrates a digital speed display, while Figure 2 illustrates an
`
`analog speedometer. See id. at 3:8–13. In Figure 1, main speed display 3
`
`shows the current speed at which the vehicle is operating. See id. at 3:49–
`
`53. When a cruise control set button (not shown in Figure 1) is pressed, the
`
`vehicle speed is stored in digital memory 12 as a preset speed. See id. at
`
`3:53–60. Second speed display 16 shows that preset speed. See id.
`
`Figure 2’s analog speedometer 40 incorporates several LED
`
`assemblies 45. See id. at 4:19–26. Each LED assembly 45 has an LED and
`
`a detector. See id. at 4:29–30. When a cruise control set button (not shown
`
`in Figure 2) is pressed, all of the detectors are activated, and all of the LEDs
`
`momentarily light up. See id. at 4:48–51. The back of needle 42 reflects the
`
`light of the lit LEDs behind the needle, and that reflected light is detected by
`
`the detector of the LED assembly disposed at the location of needle 42. See
`
`id. at 4:51–57. The LED of that assembly is then activated and remains lit to
`
`indicate the speed at which cruise control was engaged. See id. at 4:57–64.
`
`3
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`B.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Claim 1 of the ’463 patent is illustrative:
`
`A cruise control system for [a] vehicle having a human
`1.
`operator, comprising:
`a speed controller that automatically maintains the
`vehicle speed at a preset speed;
`an enable switch associated with said controller for
`enabling the system;
`a set speed input in communication with said controller
`for manually setting the speed of the vehicle at said preset
`speed, thereby engaging the system;
`a memory which stores information indicative of said
`preset speed; and
`a feedback system for communicating said information in
`said memory to the operator of the vehicle.
`
`C.
`
`Related Matters
`
`Petitioner has identified several related district court proceedings
`
`involving the ’463 patent, all of which were filed by Patent Owner in the
`
`United States District Court for the District of Delaware. See Pet. 4;
`
`Paper 12, at 2–4. The ’463 patent is also the subject of four other requests
`
`for inter partes review (IPR2014-00279, IPR2014-00280, IPR2014-00289,
`
`and IPR2014-00291).
`
`D.
`
`Prior Art Relied Upon
`
`Narita
`(translation, Ex. 1004)1
`
`Nagashima
`(translation, Ex. 1009)
`
`JP S60-174329
`
`Sept. 1985
`
`Ex. 1003
`
`JP H4-102059
`
`Sept. 1992
`
`Ex. 1008
`
`
`1 Our decision cites to the translations of the prior art relied upon, including
`the page numbers of the Narita translation and the paragraph numbers of the
`Nagashima translation
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`Beiswenger
`
`US 5,381,388
`
`Jan. 1995
`
`Ex. 1006
`
`John Pollard & E. Donald Sussman,
`Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
`An Examination of Sudden Acceleration
`
`Admitted Prior Art in the ’463 Patent
`
`Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill
`
`
`
`Jan. 1989
`
`Ex. 1007
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1001,
`1:10–2:12
`
`Ex. 1011
`
`E.
`
`Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`Petitioner contends claims 1–5, 12–31, and 34–36 of the ’463 patent
`
`are unpatentable based on the following grounds. See Pet. 5–6.
`
`Basis
`
`Reference(s)
`
`§ 102(b) Narita
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Narita and Knowledge of Person
`of Ordinary Skill
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`
`1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21,
`25–28, and 34–36
`
`17, 20, 22–24, and 27
`
`§ 103(a) Narita and Beiswenger
`
`17, 20, 22–24, and 27
`
`§ 103(a) Narita and Admitted Prior Art
`
`1–5, 12, 15, and 34
`
`§ 103(a) Narita and the NHTSA Report2
`
`1–5, 12, 15, and 34
`
`§ 102(b) Nagashima
`
`18, 19, 26, and 29–31
`
`§ 103(a) Narita and Nagashima
`
`17, 20, 23, 24, and 27
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Nagashima and Knowledge of
`Person of Ordinary Skill
`
`20
`
`
`
`
`2 “Ground 5” is identified at page 6 of the Petition as obviousness over the
`NHTSA Report alone, but the substantive analysis at pages 37–39 of the
`Petition considers Narita and the NHTSA Report.
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Preliminary Matters
`
`Patent Owner asserts the Petition errs by failing to identify which
`
`subsection(s) of § 102 qualify each reference as prior art. See Prelim.
`
`Resp. 10–11. Given that the earliest possible priority filing date for the
`
`’463 patent is May 12, 1998, and the respective publication dates of the cited
`
`publications all fall more than one year before that date (the closest being
`
`Beiswenger in January 1995), these publications qualify as prior art under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 102(b). In addition, the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
`
`relied upon in the Petition is dated on or before May 12, 1998. See
`
`Ex. 1011, ¶¶ 13, 16, 18. Based on these considerations, we determine the
`
`Petition adequately identifies the grounds on which the challenges are based.
`
`We further note that, in submitting the Narita translation (Ex. 1004),
`
`the Petition does not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b) (2013). That Rule
`
`requires an “affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the translation.” Id. An
`
`“affidavit,” in turn, is defined as an “affidavit or declaration under § 1.68 of
`
`this chapter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2013). The Translator’s Declaration
`
`(Ex. 1005) pertaining to the Narita translation is not an affidavit because it
`
`was not made under oath. The Translator’s Declaration can qualify as a
`
`permitted declaration only if the declarant is warned on the same document
`
`that willful false statements and the like are punishable by fine or
`
`imprisonment, or both, and it also states all statements made of the
`
`declarant’s own knowledge are true, and all statements made on information
`
`and belief are believed to be true. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 (2013). The
`
`Translator’s Declaration does not satisfy those requirements, and therefore is
`
`not a permitted declaration under Rule 1.68.
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`Nonetheless, we may waive or suspend the requirements of
`
`Rule 42.63(b) and also place conditions on the waiver or suspension. See 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.5(b) (2013). Pursuant to that authority, we have decided to grant
`
`inter partes review based on the representation in the Translator’s
`
`Declaration that “to the best of my knowledge and belief, [the Narita
`
`translation] is a true and accurate translation,” subject to the following
`
`condition. Petitioner must, within 30 days of the date this decision is
`
`entered, file a substitute affidavit or declaration directed to the Narita
`
`translation originally filed with the Petition complying with the requirements
`
`of Rule 42.63(b) to the extent that the substitute statement includes a proper
`
`indication that the declarant is subject to the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.68
`
`(2013). For any content of Narita for which English translation has not been
`
`provided, we remind Petitioner of its duty of candor and good faith to the
`
`Office (37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2013)) as well as its routine discovery obligation
`
`to serve relevant information that is inconsistent with a position advanced by
`
`Petitioner in the Petition (37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2013)).
`
`B.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`As a step in our analysis, we determine the meaning of the claims for
`
`purposes of this decision. In an inter partes review, a claim in an unexpired
`
`patent shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`
`specification of the patent in which it appears. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
`
`(2013). Under that construction, claim terms are given their ordinary and
`
`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`
`art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe the terms below in
`
`accordance with that standard.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`1.
`“engaging the system” (claim 1) and
`“engaging the cruise control system” (claim 21)
`
`Petitioner contends we should construe “engaging the system” in
`
`claim 1 to mean “operating the cruise control system to automatically
`
`control the vehicle at the preset speed.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 4,
`
`1:46–48, 5:13–15). Patent Owner contends we should construe “thereby
`
`engaging the system” in claim 1 to mean “as a result, activating the speed
`
`controller of the cruise control system to automatically maintain the vehicle
`
`speed at the preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:54–57).
`
`Patent Owner describes “operating the cruise control system” in Petitioner’s
`
`proposal as “an overly broad generalization of the claimed invention,” and
`
`contends the construction instead should refer specifically to the speed
`
`controller of the cruise control system, apart from the claimed feedback
`
`system and the claimed set speed input. Id. We conclude Petitioner’s
`
`proposal comports with the broadest reasonable construction of “engaging”
`
`in light of the ’463 patent specification.
`
`The term “comprising” in claim 1 leaves open the possibility that
`
`other unclaimed components of the cruise control system, in addition to the
`
`speed controller, may play a part in controlling the vehicle’s speed. In
`
`addition, the term “maintain” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction is
`
`unduly narrow, because it forecloses temporary acceleration of the vehicle
`
`while the cruise control system is engaged. See Ex. 1001, 1:32–36, 4:6–14
`
`(indicating vehicle may be accelerated temporarily while cruise control is
`
`engaged). We therefore adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.
`
`Petitioner proposes the same construction for “engaging the cruise
`
`control system” in claim 21. See Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner instead proposes
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`“putting the cruise control system into an operative state” for claim 21.
`
`Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In particular, Patent Owner notes claim 21 separately
`
`recites “engaging the cruise control system” and “setting the preset speed”,
`
`and contends claim 21 therefore “requires that the cruise control system is
`
`engaged prior to setting the preset speed (which can only be set, and is only
`
`utilized, during use of the cruise control system).” Id. We are not persuaded
`
`by Patent Owner’s argument. In particular, under a broadest reasonable
`
`construction, the “engaging” and “setting” of claim 21 may occur
`
`simultaneously. See Ex. 1001, 3:56–57 (“when the set button is pressed, that
`
`is, when the cruise control is engaged”). Thus, there is no requirement that
`
`the engagement of the cruise control system must occur “prior to” the act of
`
`setting the present speed. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed
`
`construction.
`
`For the foregoing reasons we construe “engaging the system” in claim
`
`1 and “engaging the cruise control system” in claim 21 to mean “operating
`
`the cruise control system to automatically control the vehicle at the preset
`
`speed.”
`
`2.
`
`“enabling” (claims 1 and 2) and “enabled” (claims 2 and 4)
`
`Petitioner contends that we should construe “enabling the system” in
`
`claim 1 and “enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 to mean “a ‘system on’
`
`state for the cruise control system.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:39–46).
`
`Patent Owner instead proposes “putting the speed controller of the cruise
`
`control system into an operative condition . . . in that the speed controller
`
`will automatically maintain the vehicle at a preset speed.” Prelim. Resp. 2–
`
`3. Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposal as “too vague to provide any
`
`benefit when evaluating the validity of the claims.” Id. at 3.
`
`9
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`We conclude Petitioner’s proposal comports with the broadest
`
`reasonable construction of “enabling” and “enabled” in light of the
`
`’463 patent specification. That is, the ’463 patent specification consistently
`
`describes “enabling” as turning on the cruise control system (see Ex. 1001,
`
`1:18–20, 1:64–65, 4:39–44) and “engaging” as setting the cruise control at a
`
`desired speed (see id. at 1:21–25, 1:45–48, 3:56–57). We therefore adopt
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction that “enabling the system” in claim 1 and
`
`“enabling . . . the controller” in claim 2 mean “a ‘system on’ state for the
`
`cruise control system.” This construction also applies to the descriptor
`
`“enabled” in claims 2 and 4. See Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp. 3.
`
`3.
`“indicating to the operator the unset status of the preset speed”
`(claim 15) and “displaying a symbol indicative of an unset state of the preset
`speed” (claim 21)
`
`Petitioner contends that we should construe “unset status” and “unset
`
`state” in these two claim limitations to mean “a state or status in which there
`
`is no preset speed for the cruise control system.” Pet. 11–12. Patent Owner
`
`contends Petitioner’s proposal is improper because “it adds ‘for the cruise
`
`control system.’” Prelim. Resp. 7. We note, however, that claim 15’s parent
`
`claim 13, and claim 21, both recite “a preset speed for which the cruise
`
`control system is set” (emphasis added). That the claims, themselves,
`
`associate setting of the preset speed with the cruise control system
`
`undermines Patent Owner’s contention that there is impropriety in the
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction. We therefore adopt Petitioner’s
`
`proposed construction.
`
`Patent Owner further contends we should construe these two claim
`
`limitations to mean “displaying a visual indication that [the] preset speed has
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`not been set.” Prelim. Resp. 6–8. We are not persuaded as to claim 15,
`
`which broadly recites “indicating” without requiring the indication to be
`
`visual. As to claim 21, “displaying . . . a symbol” self-evidently requires a
`
`visual indication. We therefore decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed
`
`construction as being either too narrow (claim 15) or inconsistent with the
`
`plain language of the claim (claim 21).
`
`4.
`
`“activating the cruise control system” (claims 12 and 15) and
`“deactivated” (claims 12, 13, and 21)
`
`Petitioner contends we should construe “activating” in these claims to
`
`mean “turning on,” and “deactivated” as “turned off.” Pet. 12. Patent
`
`Owner agrees as to all claims except for claim 12. See Prelim. Resp. 9–10.
`
`We agree with the parties in this regard, and therefore construe “activating
`
`the cruise control system” in claim 15 to mean turning on the cruise system,
`
`and “deactivated” in claims 13 and 21 to mean that the cruise control system
`
`is turned off.
`
`Patent Owner contends we should construe “activating” in claim 12 to
`
`mean something different, namely, “causing the cruise control system to
`
`maintain the speed at which the vehicle is traveling at the desired cruising
`
`speed.” Id. at 8. It is true that claim 12, unlike the other claims, recites
`
`“activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed,”
`
`“displaying a symbol indicative of the speed at which the cruise control
`
`system is activated,” and “maintaining the activated cruise control speed
`
`symbol” (emphases added). These limitations seem to equate activation
`
`with setting the cruise control system at a desired cruising speed.
`
`“[C]laim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.”
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[A] claim
`
`11
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`term should be construed consistently with its appearance in other places in
`
`the same claim or in other claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp. v.
`
`Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, construing the
`
`same term to have different meanings in different claims is the exception
`
`rather than the rule. Moreover, claim 12 recites “removing said symbol
`
`when the cruise control system is deactivated” (emphasis added). If we
`
`were to adopt Patent Owner’s construction of claim 12, that limitation would
`
`require the symbol indicative of the cruising speed to be removed when the
`
`cruise control system stops maintaining the cruising speed — for example,
`
`upon temporary acceleration of the vehicle, or temporary deceleration of the
`
`vehicle when the brakes are applied. We conclude one of ordinary skill in
`
`the art, upon reading the ’463 patent specification, would not construe claim
`
`12 in such a manner. See Ex. 1001, 2:5–35 (discussing “potential safety
`
`hazards” of prior cruise control systems which did not display preset cruise
`
`control speed upon temporary acceleration or deceleration), 2:37–45
`
`(discussing solution). We, therefore, construe activating / activated in claim
`
`12 the same as in the other claims of the ’463 patent.
`
`5.
`
`Remaining claim terms
`
`All other terms of the claims are given their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning that is consistent with the specification. For purposes of this
`
`decision, we need not construe expressly those terms.
`
`C.
`
`Anticipation by Narita
`
`Petitioner contends claims 1–5, 12–16, 18, 19, 21, 25–28, and 34–36
`
`of the ’463 patent are anticipated by Narita. See Pet. 13–33. Patent Owner’s
`
`Preliminary Response does not address directly this contention.
`
`12
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`1.
`
`Claim 1
`
`Claim 1 recites a cruise control system for a vehicle, including a speed
`
`controller. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses
`
`a cruise control speed controller. See Pet. 19. For example, Narita describes
`
`a “vehicle speed automatic control device that is used to automatically
`
`control travel speed of a vehicle to a certain set value.” Ex. 1004, 2.
`
`Claim 1 also recites an enable switch and a set speed input. We are
`
`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that the “main switch” of Narita is an
`
`enable switch as required by claim 1. See Pet. 13–14, 19. In particular,
`
`Narita states: “[T]he operation of the vehicle speed automatic control device
`
`begins with turning on the main switch.” Ex. 1004, 3; see also id. at 5
`
`(Figure 5 illustrates system operation “after turning on power”). We also are
`
`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that set switch 2 of Narita corresponds
`
`to the set speed input required by claim 1. See Pet. 15, 19. In particular,
`
`Narita provides “when turning on the set switch 2 . . . when reaching a speed
`
`of 70 km/hr, a constant speed travel is initiated at a speed of 70 km/hr . . . .”
`
`Ex. 1004, 5; see also id. at 3 (describing operation of set switch 2).
`
`Claim 1 further recites a memory which stores the cruise control’s
`
`preset speed. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita has
`
`such a memory. See Pet. 19. In particular, Narita indicates microcontroller
`
`or microcomputer 9 includes “[a] vehicle speed storage part that stores the
`
`vehicle speed when the set switch 2 is operated.” Ex. 1004, 2; see also id. at
`
`3 (when set switch 2 sends a set signal, “microcomputer 9 stores the pulse
`
`count according to the vehicle speed at that time into the vehicle speed
`
`storage part”).
`
`13
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`Claim 1 finally recites a “feedback system” for communicating the
`
`cruise control’s preset speed to the vehicle operator. Narita’s disclosure in
`
`this regard is exemplified by its Figure 4, reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Ex. 1004, 12. Figure 4 is a system block diagram of a vehicle speed
`
`automatic control device, including “driver seat side speedometer 35.” Id. at
`
`5. Speedometer 35 includes actual vehicle speed display unit 36 and stored
`
`vehicle speed display unit 37. See id. The following excerpt from Narita’s
`
`Figure 5 illustrates the respective displays of units 36 and 37:
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`See id. at 5, 13. This excerpt from Figure 5 illustrates display changes in
`
`units 36, 37 when the cruise control is set. See id. at 5–6. In particular, unit
`
`36 shows the actual vehicle speed increasing from 68 km/hr to 70 km/hr.
`
`See id. at 5, Fig. 5. Cruise control is then set, and “the stored vehicle speed
`
`70 km/hr is displayed on the stored vehicle speed display unit 37.” Id. at 5.
`
`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that stored vehicle speed
`
`display unit 37 corresponds to the feedback system recited in claim 1. See
`
`Pet. 15–16, 20.
`
`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it can establish claim 1 is anticipated by Narita.
`
`2.
`
`Claims 2–5
`
`Claim 2, similarly to claim 1 discussed above, recites a cruise control
`
`system for a vehicle including a speed controller, a cruise control enable
`
`switch, a set speed input, a memory, and a feedback system. We are
`
`persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the reasons provided
`
`above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 1. See supra
`
`Part II.C.1.
`
`Claim 2 further specifies the feedback system “substantially
`
`continuously communicates the selected cruising speed” to the vehicle
`
`operator “until either the operator selects a subsequent cruising speed or the
`
`controller is disabled.” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that
`
`Narita discloses this claim requirement. See Pet. 17, 21. Figure 5 of Narita,
`
`reproduced below, is representative:
`
`15
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`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1004, 13. Concerning a subsequent cruising speed, Narita describes
`
`Figure 5 as illustrating:
`
`[A]fter a temporary acceleration [between time t2 and time t3],
`when turning the set switch 2 on and off again . . . upon
`reaching 80 km/hr at time t3, constant speed travel begins at 80
`km/hr while at the same time the stored vehicle speed at this
`time is displayed on the stored vehicle speed display unit
`37 . . . .
`
`Id. at 6 (emphasis added). As to disabling the controller, Narita indicates:
`
`“[W]hen the system is canceled due to movement by the failsafe 10 for some
`
`reason during constant speed travel . . . display on the stored vehicle speed
`
`display unit 37 is canceled . . . .” Id. at 7.
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`Claims 3 and 5 further specify “the feedback system includes a digital
`
`display” which “displays information indicative of the selected cruising
`
`speed of the vehicle.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that these
`
`requirements are met by Narita’s display of the preset cruising speed as a
`
`digital readout in unit 37. See Pet. 21, 22; Ex. 1004, 7, Figs. 5–7.
`
`Claim 4 specifies “the digital display displays a predetermined signal
`
`when the controller is initially enabled to indicate the state of the controller.”
`
`In this regard, Petitioner relies on the following excerpt from Narita’s
`
`Figure 5:
`
`
`See Pet. 15, 21.3 Narita describes that excerpt as illustrating speedometer 35
`
`“after turning on power, and when the memory cancel signal S . . . is in a Hi
`
`state.” Ex. 1004, 5. According to Petitioner, the “dashed line [in the excerpt
`
`of Figure 5] comprises a predetermined signal when the controller is initially
`
`enabled to indicate the state of the controller.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1011
`
`(Crawford Decl.) ¶ 33). We are not persuaded that the dashed line indicates
`
`the enabled state of the controller, because Narita does not suggest that
`
`portion of stored vehicle display unit 37 changes when the controller is
`
`enabled. That is, display unit 37 may very well show a dashed line before
`
`the controller is enabled.
`
`
`3 Petitioner also cites Figures 6 and 7, which are substantially the same as
`Figure 5 in this regard.
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it can establish claims 2, 3, and 5 are anticipated by Narita, but
`
`not claim 4.
`
`3.
`
`Claim 12
`
`Claim 12 recites a method for visually communicating, to a vehicle
`
`operator, a cruising speed at which a cruise control system is set. The first
`
`two steps of the method are “determining the speed at which the vehicle is
`
`traveling” and “activating the cruise control system at a desired cruising
`
`speed.” We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses
`
`these two steps. See Pet. 22. For example, Narita describes turning on
`
`cruise control via a main switch, and then operating a set switch 2 when
`
`reaching a speed of 70 km/hr in order to initiate constant speed travel at a
`
`speed of 70 km/hr. See Ex. 1004, 3, 5–6.
`
`Claim 12 additionally recites “displaying a symbol indicative of the
`
`speed at which the cruise control system is activated.” Narita indicates “the
`
`stored vehicle speed 70 km/hr is displayed on the stored vehicle speed
`
`display unit 37.” Id. at 5. This is illustrated by the following excerpt from
`
`Narita’s Figure 5, to which we have added numerals “1” through “4,”
`
`identifying four states of the system, for specific reference below:
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`
`
`4
`
`Id. at 13. This excerpt illustrates display changes in stored vehicle speed
`
`display unit 37 in response to various cruise control and vehicle operation
`
`states. See id. at 5–6. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`operation of Narita’s display 37 in state 2, wherein display 37 indicates
`
`constant speed travel at a speed of 70 km/hr, corresponds to displaying a
`
`speed-indicative symbol as recited in claim 12. See Pet. 15–16, 22.
`
`Claim 12 further recites “maintaining the activated cruise control
`
`speed symbol upon temporary acceleration or deceleration of the vehicle.”
`
`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses the
`
`“acceleration” portion of this limitation in state 3 above. See Pet. 16–17, 23.
`
`In particular, state 3 illustrates stored vehicle speed display unit 37
`
`continuing to show 70 km/hr when the vehicle is temporarily accelerated to
`
`a speed of 75 km/hr. See Ex. 1004, 6. We are further persuaded the
`
`“deceleration” claim requirement is met by Narita’s disclosure that “the
`
`change in the actual vehicle speed due to the deceleration is displayed on the
`
`actual vehicle speed display unit 36 while the stored vehicle speed continues
`
`to be displayed as is on the stored vehicle speed display unit 37.” Id. at 6
`
`(describing Fig. 6).
`
`Claim 12 finally recites “removing said symbol when the cruise
`
`control system is deactivated or a new cruising speed is selected.” We are
`
`persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Narita discloses this claim
`
`requirement. See Pet. 16–17, 24. As to the deactivating component, Narita
`
`indicates: “When the system is canceled due to movement by the failsafe 10
`
`for some reason during constant speed travel . . . display on the stored
`
`vehicle speed display unit 37 is canceled . . . .” Ex. 1004, 7. As to selecting
`
`a new cruising speed, Narita indicates stored vehicle speed display unit 37
`
`changes from “70” to “80” in state 4 above to reflect changing the cruising
`
`speed from 70 km/hr to 80 km/hr. See id. at 6.
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it can establish claim 12 is anticipated by Narita.
`
`4.
`
`Claims 13–16
`
`Claim 13, similarly to claim 12 discussed above, recites a method for
`
`indicating, to a vehicle operator, a preset speed for which a cruise control
`
`system is set, including setting the preset speed, displaying a symbol
`
`indicative of the preset speed, maintaining the display, and discontinuing the
`
`display when the cruise control system is deactivated or a new preset speed
`
`is selected. We are persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the
`
`reasons provided above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 12.
`
`See supra Part II.C.3.
`
`Claim 14 further specifies “displaying a second symbol upon the
`
`selection of a new preset speed, said second symbol indicative of the new
`
`preset speed.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that Narita discloses this
`
`claim limitation when stored vehicle speed display unit 37 changes from
`
`“70” to “80” to reflect changing the cruising speed from 70 km/hr to 80
`
`km/hr. See Pet. 16, 25; Ex. 1004, 6.
`
`Claim 15 further specifies “before setting the preset speed, activating
`
`the cruise control system.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that Narita
`
`correspondingly discloses “turning on the main switch” in order to activate
`
`the cruise control system before using set switch 2 to set the preset speed.
`
`Ex. 1004, 3; see Pet. 25. Claim 15 also specifies “after activating the cruise
`
`control system, but before setting the preset speed, indicating to the operator
`
`the unset status of the preset speed.” In this regard, Petitioner relies on the
`
`following excerpt from Narita’s Figure 5:
`
`20
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`
`
`See Pet. 15, 26. Narita describes that excerpt as illustrating speedometer 35
`
`“after turning on power, and when the memory cancel signal S . . . is in a Hi
`
`state.” Ex. 1004, 5. We are persuaded by Petitioner that the dashed line in
`
`the excerpt indicates the unset status of the preset speed. See Pet. 15.4
`
`Claim 16 depends from claim 15, and further specifies “wherein
`
`indicating the unset status of the preset speed includes displaying a visual
`
`symbol to the operator.” We are persuaded by Petitioner that the dashed line
`
`of Figure 5 is a visual symbol as claimed here. See id.
`
`We, therefore, determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable
`
`likelihood it can establish claims 13–16 are anticipated by Narita.
`
`5.
`
`Claims 18 and 19
`
`Claim 18, similarly to claim 12 discussed above, recites a method for
`
`indicating, to a vehicle operator, a preset speed for which a cruise control
`
`system is set, including setting the preset speed, displaying a symbol
`
`indicative of the preset speed, and maintaining the display. We are
`
`persuaded Narita discloses these claim limitations for the reasons provided
`
`
`4 In this regard we note a critical distinction between claim 4 (for which we
`do not institute review as anticipated by Narita) and claim 15 (for which we
`do institute such review). Claim 4 requires the digital display to indicate the
`enabled state of the controller, whereas claim 15 requires indicating the
`unset status of the preset speed. Claim 15 does not require indicating the
`activated status of the cruise control system.
`
`21
`
`

`

`IPR 2014-00281
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`
`above in relation to corresponding limitations in claim 12. See supra
`
`Part II.C.3.
`
`Claim 18 also recites braking the vehicle, and “u

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