UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA
`LLC, VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA LLC, TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH
`AMERICA, INC., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., NISSAN NORTH
`AMERICA INC., and SUBARU OF AMERICA INC.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`CRUISE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-00281
`
`Patent 6,324,463
`
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH
`AMERICA LLC, AND VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA LLC’S
`OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER OF
`INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................... 2
`
`III. ARGUMENT................................................................................................ 3
`
`Page
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`CCT’s Request For Denial Under Its Invented “One Voice”
`Rule Was Not Authorized And Is Nevertheless Satisfied .................... 4
`1.
`CCT May Not Seek Denial Of Any Petition Because The
`PTAB Did Not Authorize A Motion To Seek Denial ................ 4
`2. Matthew Moore Of Latham & Watkins Is The Only Lead
`Counsel Designated And Is The Single Voice For Ford’s
`Petition ..................................................................................... 4
`Pre-Institution Joinder Is Not Permissible And Is In Any Case
`Unnecessary ........................................................................................ 7
`1.
`The PTAB Has Already Confirmed That Pre-Institution
`Joinder Is Statutorily Impermissible And CCT Offers No
`Contrary Authority .................................................................... 7
`Joinder Is Unnecessary Given The PTAB’s Inherent
`Authority To Control Discovery And The Discovery
`Rules ......................................................................................... 9
`CCT Has Separately Sued Fifteen Entities, Has Sufficient
`Resources, And Will Not Be Prejudiced by Denial of
`Joinder .................................................................................... 10
`The Related Petitions Should Not Be Joined Because
`They Involve Different Prior Art, Declarants And Claims ...... 11
`Pre-Institution
`Joinder Would
`Violate
`The
`Administrative Procedure Act And Deny Ford Due
`Process .................................................................................... 12
`Pre-Institution Joinder On The Basis Of Common
`Petitioners Makes No Sense Given Post-Institution
`Joinder Rules .......................................................................... 13
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 14
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Cruise Control Technologies LLC’s (“CCT”) motion for
`
`joinder should be rejected. First, as a matter of law, joinder of the five petitions
`
`seeking inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 6,324,463 (the “’463 Patent”) is
`
`statutorily impermissible since joinder is only available after the institution date of
`
`an inter partes review. Moreover, the PTAB has found that joinder is not proper
`
`where petitions seek invalidity based on different primary references, as here,
`
`where each of the five petitions presents unique primary references.
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`Next, while CCT argues that it would be subject to undue discovery burden
`
`absent joinder, the PTAB has already resolved that concern by assigning all five
`
`petitions to the same panel of judges, who can set coordinated schedules, hearings,
`
`and discovery. To the extent discovery may be further coordinated, the discovery
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`rules permit the parties to do so by agreement, or CCT may seek it by motion.
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`In any case, CCT’s assertion that it will be “significantly prejudiced” absent
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`joinder is disingenuous given its conduct and resources. In district court, CCT
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`separately sued fifteen different automotive companies on the ’463 patent.1 CCT is
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`just one of over a dozen related non-practicing entities founded and/or controlled
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`by a former patent litigator who has brought countless patent infringement lawsuits
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`across the country.
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`CCT’s actual goal as expressed in its motion papers is to combine the five
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`petitions into one, thereby eliminating grounds raised in each petition. In this way,
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`
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`1 Seven of these fifteen defendants filed the five IPR petitions for which
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`CCT seeks joinder.
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`
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`1
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`

`

`
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`CCT attempts to deny petitioners due process by combining separate proceedings
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`(for which substantial fees have been paid) into one, prior to any decision on the
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`merits of their institution.
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`Finally, CCT’s invented “one petitioner, one voice” rule is satisfied because
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`only a single Lead counsel will prosecute each petition. Even if it were not
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`satisfied, there is no basis for the extraordinary remedy CCT seeks – denial of
`
`institution.
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`Petition No. 2014-00281 for inter partes review of the ’463 Patent was
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`requested by seven co-petitioners2. Latham & Watkins, representing three of the
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`petitioners Ford, JLR, and Volvo (collectively, “Ford”), prepared that petition
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`(“Ford’s Petition”).
`
`All seven co-petitioners have the same interests in the Ford Petition and
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`have agreed to speak with a common voice in connection with the Ford Petition.
`
`Only one Lead counsel – Matthew Moore of Latham & Watkins – is designated in
`
`the Ford Petition and he is the common voice for all seven co-petitioners in both
`
`oral and written representation. Michael B. Eisenberg, also of Latham & Watkins,
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`and four additional counsel are listed as Backup counsel to Mr. Moore. Should
`
`
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`2 Ford Motor Company (Ford”), Jaguar Land Rover North America LLC
`
`(“JLR”), Volvo Cars of North America LLC (“Volvo”), Toyota Motor North
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`America, Inc. (“Toyota”), American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), Nissan
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`North America Inc. (“Nissan”), and Subaru of America (“Subaru”).
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`
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`Mr. Moore become unavailable, he and Backup counsel have agreed to coordinate
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`with one another so that only one Backup counsel will act as lead counsel and
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`speak on behalf of all co-petitioners for the Ford Petition.3
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`Similarly, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Subaru have each filed their own
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`separate petitions on the ’463 Patent.4 Although Ford is a co-petitioner and Mr.
`
`Moore is Backup counsel in each of those four other petitions, Ford will not take
`
`positions that are contrary to those presented by Lead counsel. Further, Ford
`
`agreed that the Lead counsel listed in each of those four other petitions will speak
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`on Ford’s behalf for those petitions. Should the need arise for Backup counsel to
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`assume the role of Lead counsel, the co-petitioners for the applicable petition will
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`coordinate to designate a new Lead counsel.
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`3 CCT takes the Board’s authorization order out of context by alleging that
`
`petitioners admitted that they will not speak with one voice in any one petition.
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`IPR 2013-00281, paper 15 (“CCT’s Motion”), p. 10 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2014) (citing
`
`IPR2014-00279, paper 14, p. 3).) But, as is clear in the Order, petitioners actually
`
`stated that only if the petitions are joined would the petitioners likely not be able to
`
`speak with a common voice, as that joint proceeding would involve five lead
`
`counsels, each representing a separate party. Conversely, if not joined, each
`
`separate petition will have a single voice – the listed Lead counsel.
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`4 IPR2014-00280 – “Toyota’s Petition”; IPR2014-00289 – “Honda’s Petition”;
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`IPR2014-00291 – “Nissan’s Petition”; and IPR2014-00279 – “Subaru’s Petition.”
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`
`
`A.
`
`CCT’s Request For Denial Under Its Invented “One Voice”
`Rule Was Not Authorized And Is Nevertheless Satisfied
`
`1.
`
`CCT May Not Seek Denial Of Any Petition
`Because The PTAB Did Not Authorize A Motion
`To Seek Denial
`
`In its April 2, 2014 email to the Board, CCT sought “authorization to file a
`
`motion to join” the five related proceedings. Consistent with that, the Board
`
`authorized only “a motion to join.” IPR 2013-00281, paper 14, p. 2 (PTAB, Apr.
`
`10, 2014). But CCT’s motion goes beyond the authorization granted by the Board
`
`and alternatively seeks denial of the petitions themselves or consolidation. IPR
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`2013-00281, paper 15 (“CCT’s Motion”), pp. 11, 16 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2014). A
`
`motion seeking denial or consolidation was not authorized; therefore, CCT’s
`
`request for any relief other than joinder is precluded and must be denied. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.20(b).
`
`2. Matthew Moore Of Latham & Watkins Is The
`Only Lead Counsel Designated And Is The Single
`Voice For Ford’s Petition
`
`CCT’s concern that there could be conflicting positions from multiple
`
`parties is a red herring. All co-petitioners in the Ford Petition have agreed that
`
`Matthew Moore of Latham & Watkins will be the single voice for the co-
`
`petitioners both in writing and oral representation. Should Mr. Moore not be
`
`available, Backup counsel Michael Eisenberg, also of Latham & Watkins, has the
`
`same authority. In the unlikely event that both Messrs. Moore and Eisenberg are
`
`unavailable, four additional Backup counsel are listed in the Ford Petition and the
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`
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`co-petitioners have agreed that one of them would then have the authority to speak
`
`on behalf of the co-petitioners as the single voice.
`
`CCT cites Agilysys in support of the so-called “One Petition, One Voice
`
`Rule” that it invented. See Agilysys, Inc., et al. v. Ameranth, Inc., CBM2014-
`
`00014, paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2014). However, this proceeding only supports
`
`the notion that there should be only one Lead counsel providing a single voice on
`
`behalf of all petitioners in the same petition. The facts in Agilsys do not apply
`
`here. There, the petitioner designated fifteen different lead counsel for fifteen
`
`different groupings of thirty-five companies, all in one petition. Id. at 2. Further,
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`petitioner’s counsel proposed “that in the event of differences in the positions of
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`different companies, there would be one or more separate sections within the same
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`paper to articulate the differences.” Id. The PTAB stated that this would be
`
`“prejudicial to Patent Owner, who potentially would have to respond to thirty five
`
`different, possibly inconsistent, positions on every issue,” based on the filing of
`
`only a single petition. Id. at 3-4.
`
`In contrast here, only one Lead counsel – Mr. Moore of Latham & Watkins
`
`– has been designated in the Ford Petition.5 More importantly, all co-petitioners
`
`
`
`5 CCT also cites Fandango, LLC, et al. v. Ameranth, Inc., CBM 2014-00013,
`
`paper 22, p. 9 (PTAB Mar. 24, 2014) for support. But there, as in Agilysys, the
`
`petitioner listed multiple lead counsel in one petition. The petitioners also stated
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`that the pages in any submission could be “shared to allow the separate views of
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`Petitioner’s constituent members to be expressed.” In fact, in Fandango, one
`
`
`
`5
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`

`

`
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`agree that Mr. Moore speaks for the entire group with respect to the Ford Petition.
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`Although each petitioner has not executed a power of attorney for Mr. Moore, each
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`has agreed that Mr. Moore will speak on the group’s collective behalf, orally and
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`in writing. The PTAB has recognized that such coordination is sufficient to satisfy
`
`any “one voice” requirement. See, e.g., Denso Corp. and Clarion Co. Ltd.,
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`IPR2013-00026, papers 3-4, 7, 9 (PTAB 2012) (the two members of a petition did
`
`not grant POAs to any common attorney, yet the PTAB allowed the proceeding to
`
`reach an advanced stage because the different counsel coordinated to advance a
`
`common position). Such coordination is no different from when a joint defense
`
`group (“JDG”) elects one attorney to speak on behalf of all separately represented
`
`clients in a District Court litigation, even though that attorney has not executed
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`engagement letters with every single member of the JDG.
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`Finally, CCT’s allegation that “the designated Backup Counsel is not
`
`authorized to conduct business on behalf of the Lead Counsel” is simply false.
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`CCT’s Motion at p. 10. First, the Ford Petition lists Michael B. Eisenberg as
`
`Backup counsel to Mr. Moore. Mr. Eisenberg, like Mr. Moore, is also of Latham
`
`& Watkins, and Mr. Eisenberg is obviously authorized to conduct business on Mr.
`
`Moore’s behalf. Second, four other Backup counsel are listed in addition to Mr.
`
`Eisenberg. Rule 37 C.F.R. §42.10(a) requires backup counsel to be able to
`
`
`
`petitioner wanted to be dismissed and be granted the right to file a separate petition
`
`with differing arguments. Again, the facts in Fandango are completely different
`
`from those here where only one lead counsel – Mr. Moore – has been designated.
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`
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`6
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`

`

`
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`“conduct business on behalf of lead counsel,” and that is exactly what the
`
`petitioners have agreed will happen should the need arise: Mr. Moore and Backup
`
`counsel will coordinate with one another so that Backup counsel can act as lead
`
`counsel seamlessly.
`
`The same reasoning applies to each of the four other proceedings. In each of
`
`the four other petitions, only one Lead counsel was identified. Ford agrees with
`
`the other petitioners that each Lead counsel is the single voice for its respective
`
`petition, and Ford will not seek to advance different positions either orally or in
`
`writing from those presented by the Lead counsel. For these reasons, the
`
`petitioners have complied with the “one voice” rule. Finally, this Board should
`
`deny the extraordinary relief requested by CCT – denial of institution – because
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`there is no rule or precedent to support it, and CCT has cited none.
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`B.
`
`Pre-Institution Joinder Is Not Permissible And Is In Any
`Case Unnecessary
`
`1.
`
`The PTAB Has Already Confirmed That Pre-
`Institution Joinder Is Statutorily Impermissible
`And CCT Offers No Contrary Authority
`
`CCT requests pre-institution joinder between Ford’s Petition and the four
`
`other petitions filed by Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Subaru “[p]ursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).” CCT’s Motion at 1. However, 35 U.S.C
`
`§ 315(c) provides:
`
`(c) Joinder.— If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the
`
`Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter
`
`partes review any person who properly files a petition under section
`
`311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under
`
`
`
`7
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`

`

`
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`section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response,
`
`determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under
`
`section 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (emphasis added).
`
`Further, Rule § 42.122(b) provides in relevant part:
`
`(b) Request for joinder. Joinder may be requested by a patent owner
`
`or petitioner. Any request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under
`
`§ 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter
`
`partes review for which joinder is requested. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b)
`
`(emphasis added).
`
`The plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) states
`
`that a party may request joinder only “[i]f the Director institutes an inter partes
`
`review” and only “after the institution date.” Id. Moreover, the PTAB itself has
`
`already held in this proceeding that joinder is appropriate only “after the institution
`
`date of an inter partes review … [and] … [a]t this stage of the proceeding, the
`
`Board has not yet reached a decision on whether to institute an inter partes
`
`review.” IPR2014-00281, paper 14, p. 4 (PTAB Apr. 10, 2014) (emphasis added).
`
`CCT provides no authority to suggest otherwise.
`
`Because CCT can’t muster any support for its position under § 42.122(b), it
`
`attempts somehow to rely on proceeding IPR2013-00432, in which the PTAB
`
`stayed a reexamination pursuant to § 42.122(a). IPR2013-00432, paper 7 (PTAB
`
`Aug. 6, 2013). This proceeding is inapposite because the rule governing joinder is
`
`§ 42.122(b), not § 42.122(a); and in that proceeding, the PTAB permitted a stay,
`
`not joinder. Further, the Patent and Trademark Office cited § 42.122(b), not
`
`§ 42.122(a), in commenting that “a request for joinder must be made by way of
`
`
`
`8
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`

`

`
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`authorized motion and the final rules provide for such motions.” Rules of Practice
`
`for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent
`
`Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 FR 48612-01 (Aug. 14, 2012) (emphasis
`
`added). No such motion was filed in IPR2013-00432.
`
`2.
`
` Joinder Is Unnecessary Given The PTAB’s Inherent
`Authority To Control Discovery And The Discovery
`Rules
`
`Since the same panel of three judges has already been assigned to all five
`
`petitions of the ’463 Patent, it will be able to efficiently coordinate scheduling and
`
`discovery burdens across all the petitions. 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a). CCT’s supposed
`
`efficiency concerns have already been addressed and dismissed by the PTAB:
`
`“[A]ll five Petitions have been assigned the same panel of three
`
`judges for decision. Thus, Patent Owner’s concern that Board
`
`efficiency is impacted due to the necessity of fifteen administrative
`
`patent judges is not germane.” IPR2014-00281, paper 14, p. 3.
`
`Furthermore, Ford and the other co-petitioners will coordinate with CCT on
`
`discovery matters as expressly contemplated and provided by the rules. For
`
`example, Ford is willing to consider mandatory initial disclosures and discovery
`
`“with agreement” pursuant to the PTAB rules. 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(a)(1); see also 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.51(a)(1)(iii). And if further discovery issues arise, Ford is willing to
`
`coordinate with CCT pursuant to § 42.51(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(2) (“The
`
`parties may agree to additional discovery between themselves.”)
`
`CCT lists a parade of discovery horrors that will ostensibly result absent
`
`joinder. For example, CCT states that “during the Petitioner’s discovery period,
`
`
`
`9
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`

`

`
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`Patent Owner will have to coordinate with five separate counsel for depositions of
`
`its declarant(s).” CCT’s Motion at 12. This is simply another red herring. First,
`
`the PTAB APJs may address and resolve such issues in the respective scheduling
`
`orders. Second, petitioners expect to coordinate with one another and work out
`
`discovery issues with CCT by agreement. Third, to the extent CCT is dissatisfied
`
`with petitioners’ proposed compromises on discovery and scheduling, CCT may
`
`move for relief under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(a)(2) or § 42.51(b)(2).
`
`In short, the PTAB has already anticipated CCT’s discovery concerns by
`
`assigning the same panel of judges to all five related proceedings and, failing that,
`
`the rules themselves assume that attorneys for the parties will conduct discovery
`
`sensibly and coordinate with one another with decorum. If the parties cannot
`
`resolve their discovery disputes, the rules provide relief through motion practice.
`
`There is simply no need to join the cases (pre-institution or otherwise) merely to
`
`coordinate discovery.
`
`3.
`
`CCT Has Separately Sued Fifteen Entities, Has Sufficient
`Resources, And Will Not Be Prejudiced by Denial of
`Joinder
`
`CCT argues that absent joinder, it would be “significantly prejudice[d].”
`
`CCT’s Motion at 12. But even assuming there were some incremental burden
`
`resulting from five petitions that could not be resolved by a scheduling order,
`
`cooperation, or motion practice, this would not be overly burdensome or
`
`prejudicial to CCT. CCT has separately sued fifteen different automotive
`
`companies on the ’463 Patent. CCT is one of more than a dozen non-practicing
`
`
`
`10
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`

`

`
`
`entities formed by a former patent litigator, Daniel Mitry, who has brought patent
`
`infringement suits across the U.S., including in Delaware, Texas, New Jersey,
`
`Colorado, and Florida. See CCT v. Ford Motor Company, No. 12-cv-01756-GMS,
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`D.I. 16 at 6-7 (D.Del. May 29, 2013) (factual background section on CCT in
`
`Ford’s successful transfer motion). Having the resources to separately sue entities
`
`nationwide, and having sued fifteen different companies on the ’463 patent, CCT
`
`cannot plausibly argue that it did not expect each entity to separately mount its
`
`own spirited defense. The, five petitions filed by the petitioners, each seeking to
`
`invalidate the ’463 patent on different bases, cannot be considered unexpected,
`
`overly burdensome, or prejudicial.
`
`4.
`
`The Related Petitions Should Not Be Joined Because
`They Involve Different Prior Art, Declarants And Claims
`
`In determining whether to join petitions, the PTAB furthers asks if the
`
`petitions proposed for joinder involve the same: (1) prior art; (2) declarants; and
`
`(3) patents or claims. See, e.g., IPR2103-00250, paper 24 at 2-3 (PTAB Sept. 3,
`
`2013). Each of these factors weighs against joinder.
`
`First, where petitions seek invalidity based on different primary references,
`
`the PTAB has denied joinder. See, e.g. CBM2012-00002, paper 16, p. 2 (PTAB
`
`Feb. 22, 2013) (denying joinder “given the focus and clarity afforded by [multiple]
`
`smaller proceedings with different prior art issues.”); CBM2012-00004, paper 15,
`
`p. 2 (PTAB Feb. 22, 2013) (same). Here, each of the petitions rely on unique
`
`primary references. For example, the Ford petition relies on two primary
`
`references, Japanese Patent Pub. No. S60-174329 by Narita et al. (“Narita”) and
`
`
`
`11
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`

`

`
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`Japanese Published App. No. H4-102059 to Nagashima et al. (“Nagashima”).
`
`None of the other petitions use Narita or Nagashima as primary references.
`
`Because each of the petitions utilize different primary references and raise different
`
`grounds for unpatentability, joinder should be denied on this basis alone.
`
`Second, the respective petitions rely on different expert declarants who
`
`opine on the different primary prior art references. The Ford Petition relies on
`
`Daniel A. Crawford. The Toyota Petition relies on Paul Green. The Subaru,
`
`Honda, and Nissan Petitions rely on David A. McNamara.
`
`Third, although the petitions each challenge the same patent, they do not
`
`challenge the same claim sets. The PTAB has previously held that the addition of
`
`even a single claim in a petition proposed for joinder would “raise substantive
`
`issues that are not before the Board” in the other petition, and denied joinder on
`
`that basis. IPR2013-00319, paper 18, p.5 (PTAB July 22, 2013).
`
`5.
`
`The
`Violate
`Joinder Would
`Pre-Institution
`Administrative Procedure Act And Deny Ford Due
`Process
`
`CCT’s request for pre-institution joinder is a transparent attempt to avoid
`
`agency consideration of the full suite of arguments proffered in the five separate
`
`petitions that set forth substantially different grounds, and for which substantial
`
`filing fees have been paid for each petition. On page 13 of CCT’s motion, it
`
`argues that joinder now will enable the PTAB to eliminate inter-petition
`
`redundancies. However, such pre-institution elimination of unique grounds from
`
`the five petitions would violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The
`
`
`
`12
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`

`

`
`
`PTAB must, as a matter of law, address the unique grounds of each petition on the
`
`merits, and it is best positioned to do that by maintaining separate petitions. The
`
`reasoned or “responsible” decision-making requirement that courts have imposed
`
`on agencies since the 1940s cannot be satisfied if entire arguments get eliminated
`
`before the PTAB even has an opportunity to consider their merits. Sec. & Exch.
`
`Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Joinder at this stage should be
`
`denied because it would likely preclude the agency from discharging its duty to
`
`“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
`
`including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”
`
`Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
`
`29, 43 (1983) (citations omitted).
`
`6.
`
`Pre-Institution Joinder On The Basis Of Common
`Petitioners Makes No Sense Given Post-Institution
`Joinder Rules
`
`Pre-institution joinder should not be allowed merely because common
`
`petitioners are listed across multiple petitions. Under the rules, the petitioners
`
`could have simply joined post-institution. For example, Ford could have filed the
`
`Ford Petition on its own without the four other companies. Assuming the Ford
`
`Petition were instituted, those other companies would have been able to join the
`
`Ford Petition post-institution by motion pursuant to §42.122(b). The purpose of
`
`each co-petitioner signing onto the same petition was a matter of prudence and
`
`efficiency – to anticipate the possibility that a party could settle early and
`
`potentially cause the petition to terminate.
`
`
`
`13
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`

`

`
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For at least the reasons discussed herein, CCT has not met its burden to
`
`establish that the proceedings should be joined. Accordingly, Ford respectfully
`
`requests that the Board deny CCT’s Motion for Joinder, including any alternative
`
`requests to deny or consolidate the petitions.
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Matthew J. Moore
`
`Matthew J. Moore
`Reg. No. 42012
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`555 Eleventh St., N.W.
`Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004
`202.637.2278
`202.637.2201 (Fax)
`
`Michael B. Eisenberg
`Reg. No. 50643
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`212.906.1655
`212.751.4868 (Fax)
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`14
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`Dated: May 8, 2014
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that a copy of the attached Opposition to CCT’s
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`Motion for Joinder was sent via e-mail on May 8, 2014, to the following:
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`John R. Kasha, Reg. No. 53,100
`Kasha Law LLC
`14532 Dufief Mill Rd.
`North Potomac, MD 20878
`(703) 867-1886
`john.kasha@kashalaw.com
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`Counsel of Record for U.S. Patent No.
`6,324,463
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`/s/ Chi Cheung____________
`By:
`Chi Cheung
`Latham & Watkins LLP
`885 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022-4834
`212.906.1361
`212.751.4868 (Fax)
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`15
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