IPR2014-00276
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`NORMAN INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`HUNTER DOUGLAS INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE UNDER
`37 CFR § 42.107 TO PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S.
`PATENT NO. 6,968,884
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`A.
`B.
`
`A.
`B.
`
`A.
`B.
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`
`D.
`
`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Introduction ........................................................................................... 1
`Background ........................................................................................... 2
`Procedural History ................................................................................. 2
`The ‘884 Patent ..................................................................................... 3
`1.
`The Invention and the Industry ................................................... 3
`2.
`Commercial Embodiments of the ‘884 Patent ............................ 5
`3.
`Petitioner’s Cited References ...................................................... 5
`Claim Construction ............................................................................... 6
`Legal Standard ....................................................................................... 6
`Each of the Identified Claim Terms Has a Plain and Ordinary
`Meaning and Should Not Be Construed. ............................................... 6
`1.
`“system for covering an architectural opening” ......................... 7
`2.
`“covering” ................................................................................... 8
`3.
`“power spool” ............................................................................. 9
`4.
`“spring motor” ............................................................................. 9
`5.
`“rotating output” ....................................................................... 10
`6.
`“lift cord” .................................................................................. 11
`7.
`“one-way friction brake” ........................................................... 12
`8.
`“transmission” ........................................................................... 14
`Legal Standards ................................................................................... 16
`Inter Partes Review ............................................................................. 16
`Obviousness ......................................................................................... 17
`Petitioner’s Allegations Fail for Lack of Support ............................... 20
`Petitioner’s Expert Opinion ................................................................. 20
`The Petition Does not Define a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art. . 23
`The Petition Does Not Properly Define Applicable Legal Standards
`For Obviousness. ................................................................................. 24
`The Patent Office Already Considered Substantially the Same
`Prior Art and Arguments. .................................................................... 25
`
`i
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`

`

`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Petition Improperly Relies on Todd, which the
`Examiner Fully Considered During Prosecution of the ‘884
`Patent. ........................................................................................ 26
`The Petition Improperly Relies on Kuhar, which the
`Examiner Fully Considered During Prosecution of the ‘884
`Patent. ........................................................................................ 27
`Petitioner Does Not Provide Any Reason for Modifying and/or
`Combining Its Cited References ......................................................... 27
`1.
`Todd in view of Strahm (Ground 2) ......................................... 29
`2.
`Todd in view of Strahm and further in view of McClintock
`(Ground 3) ................................................................................. 31
`Kuhar in view of Lohr (Ground 4) ............................................ 32
`Kuhar in view of Lohr and further in view of McClintock
`(Ground 5) ................................................................................. 34
`Conclusion ........................................................................................... 35
`
`E.
`
`VI.
`
`
`3.
`4.
`
`ii
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
`
`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Exhibit 2001
`
`Hunter Douglas Advanced Operating
`
`Systems—LiteRise®
`
`‘884 Office Action, June 15, 2004
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`‘884 Amendment, February 25, 2005
`
`‘503 Amendment, September 12, 2001
`
`‘884 Information Disclosure Statement, July
`
`29, 2005
`
`Exhibit 2002
`
`Exhibit 2003
`
`Exhibit 2004
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`Exhibit 2005
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`
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
`
`Patent Owner Hunter Douglas Inc. (“Patent Owner”) hereby respectfully
`
`submits this Preliminary Response to the Petition seeking inter partes review in
`
`this matter. This filing is timely under 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, as
`
`it is being filed within three months of the January 6, 2014 mailing date of the
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`Notice of Filing Date Accorded to the Petition.
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`A trial should not be instituted in this matter as none of the references or
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`combinations of references relied upon by Petitioner gives rise to a reasonable
`
`likelihood of Petitioner prevailing with respect to a challenged claim of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 6,968,884 (the “‘884 Patent”).
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`The Petition for Inter Partes Review Case No. IPR 2014-00276 (the
`
`“Petition”) filed by Norman International, Inc. (“Petitioner”) challenges the
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`validity of claims 5, 6, and 7 of the ‘884 Patent. The United States Patent and
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`Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) should not institute inter partes review of the
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`‘884 Patent because there is no reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to
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`any of these claims of the ‘884 Patent.
`
`“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
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`unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed
`
`under section 311 . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
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`1
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged . . . .” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314 (a).
`
`All of the obviousness rejections proposed in the Petition lack articulated
`
`reasoning with a rational underpinning to support a legal conclusion of
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`obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In
`
`re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Indeed, the Petition only provides
`
`“mere conclusory statement[s]” (id.) that the claims are obvious, and lacks any
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`cogent reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would modify or
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`combine the cited references in the manner recited by the challenged claims of the
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`‘884 Patent.
`
`Moreover, even if the Petition is granted as to some claims, review should
`
`not extend to claims that independently and plainly distinguish over the cited art.
`
`II. Background
`A.
`Procedural History
`Petitioner makes and sells products that infringe the ‘884 Patent. Patent
`
`Owner and the owner of two patents exclusively licensed to Patent Owner filed a
`
`lawsuit against Petitioner for infringement of the ‘884 Patent, a related patent, U.S.
`
`Patent No. 8,230,896 (the “‘896 Patent”), and two additional patents, U.S. Patent
`
`Nos. 6,283,192 (the “‘192 Patent”) and 6,648,050 (the “‘050 Patent”). See Hunter
`
`Douglas, Inc. et al. v. Nien Made Enterprise Co. Ltd. et al., No. 1:13-cv-01412-
`
`2
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`MSK-MJW (D. Colo. filed May 31, 2013) (the “Lawsuit”). Each of the claims
`
`Petitioner now challenges is asserted against Petitioner in the Lawsuit.
`
`On December 20 and 21, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for inter partes
`
`review of each of the patents asserted against Petitioner in the Lawsuit, Case Nos.
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`IPR2014-00283 (regarding the ‘192 Patent), IPR2014-00286 (regarding the ‘050
`
`Patent), IPR2014-00276 (regarding the ‘884 Patent), and IPR2014-00282
`
`(regarding the ‘896 Patent). The Board has yet to issue a decision on any of these
`
`petitions.
`
`Petitioner is one of fourteen (14) defendants in the litigation currently
`
`pending in the District of Colorado. Many of these entities are related to
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`Petitioner, in that they share the same parent company or are subsidiaries of
`
`Petitioner. Notably, there is at least one defendant in the Lawsuit that has no
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`corporate affiliation with Petitioner, Global Custom Commerce, Inc. d/b/a
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`Blinds.com. Blinds.com is a distributor for Petitioner’s parent company, but all of
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`the defendants are represented by the same counsel in the Lawsuit, and this same
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`counsel also filed the Petition on Petitioner’s behalf.
`
`B.
`
`The ‘884 Patent
`1.
`The invention of the ‘884 Patent relates to a modular transport system for
`
`The Invention and the Industry
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`opening and closing cordless window cover systems.
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`3
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`Not long ago, many in the industry became interested in developing blinds
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`that did not have exposed cords. The impetus for this was the increased
`
`recognition of safety concerns for children by U.S. government agencies and
`
`industry organizations, though other factors (such as aesthetic concerns) also exist.
`
`The ‘884 Patent describes a novel and nonobvious solution to difficulties
`
`prior attempted cordless systems failed to address. As noted in the background
`
`section of the ‘884 Patent, the mechanisms utilized in cordless blind systems left
`
`much to be desired. For example, blinds using “lift cord” and “ladder types” to
`
`achieve a cordless product require minimum and maximum force to raise or lower
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`the blind precisely when the opposite is desired. ‘884 Patent at 1:45–2:5. Cordless
`
`blinds of the prior art required complicated mechanisms to achieve their purpose,
`
`and such blinds had to be customized not only at the design stage, but the
`
`installation stage as well, to ensure that the mechanisms worked together properly.
`
`Id. at 2:59–3:6.
`
`The invention of the ‘884 Patent addresses several shortcomings of cordless
`
`blinds under the prior art. One of its primary features is that it discloses a modular
`
`system, where components are housed individually rather than being
`
`interconnected in a single system. This achieves many purposes, including
`
`removing the necessity of a customized installation, allowing the system to be
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`4
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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`modified more easily to accommodate a wide variety of blinds, and minimizing the
`
`cost and effort of replacing parts or generally maintaining the blind. See id.
`
`Commercial Embodiments of the ‘884 Patent
`
`2.
`Hunter Douglas manufactures and sells window covering products that
`
`include the LiteRise® system—a system that incorporates the inventions of the
`
`‘884 Patent. This LiteRise® system is available in at least 20 current Hunter
`
`Douglas product lines. See Exhibit 2001.
`
`Petitioner’s Cited References
`
`3.
`Petitioner identifies the following five (5) references as alleged prior art:
`
`• U.S. Patent No. 6,056,036 (“Todd”) (Petition Exhibit 1002);
`
`• U.S. Patent No. 3,327,765 (“Strahm”) (Petition Exhibit 1003);
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`• U.S. Patent No. 5.531,257 (“Kuhar”) (Petition Exhibit 1004);
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`• U.S. Patent No. 3,216,528 (“Lohr”) (Petition Exhibit 1005); and
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`• U.S. Patent No. 5,641,229 (“McClintock”) (Petition Exhibit 1006).
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`For at least the reasons mentioned below, Petitioner has failed to show that any of
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`the above-listed references invalidate the ‘884 Patent, either alone or in
`
`combination.
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`5
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`III. Claim Construction
`A. Legal Standard
`In applying the broadest reasonable construction, the Board gives the claim
`
`terms their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the
`
`specification. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
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`Mich., IPR 2013-00041, Paper 12 at 6(PTAB May 2, 2013) (applying the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning of “alcohol” where no reason to depart from that definition was
`
`evident in the specification); see also Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
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`669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“There are only two exceptions to this
`
`general rule [that a claim term is given its ordinary meaning]: 1) when a patentee
`
`sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee
`
`disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
`
`prosecution.”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
`
`B.
`
`Each of the Identified Claim Terms Has a Plain and Ordinary
`Meaning and Should Not Be Construed.
`
`Petitioner attempts to construe eight claim terms in the ‘884 Patent. In
`
`reviewing Petitioner’s proposed constructions, however, it is readily apparent that
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`none of the claim terms identified by Petitioner require construction. Each of the
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`eight claim terms has a plain and ordinary meaning that is readily apparent to even
`
`a lay person. Moreover, with respect to certain claim terms Petitioner clearly does
`
`not offer the “broadest reasonable interpretation” as required by 37 C.F.R. §
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`6
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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`42.100(b). Instead, review of each identified term confirms that the Petitioner’s
`
`proposed constructions are not only unnecessary, but in certain instances
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`improperly attempt to import additional limitations into the claims as written.
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`Finally, certain of Petitioner’s proposed constructions are demonstrably
`
`superfluous and thus confusing. For each of these reasons, Petitioner’s proposed
`
`constructions should be disregarded by the Board.
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`“system for covering an architectural opening”
`
`1.
`The Petition identifies “system for covering an architectural opening” as a
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`term that requires construction pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and §
`
`42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition alleges that the broadest reasonable
`
`construction of the term “transport mechanism for covering an architectural
`
`opening” is “a group of functional components that retract and extend a window
`
`blind or shade.” Petition at 10.
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`It is important to note that this claim term comprises the preamble of
`
`independent Claims 5 and 7 of the ‘884 Patent. Where, as here, a preamble simply
`
`states the intended use or purpose of the invention will usually not limit the scope
`
`of the claim. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998). The preambles of Claims 5 and 7 do nothing more than provide context in
`
`which the invention—as fully defined in the body of claim—operates. See Rowe v.
`
`Dior, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]here a patentee defines a
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`7
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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to
`
`state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim
`
`limitation”). The term “system for covering an architectural opening” does not fall
`
`into any of the exceptions to the general rule against construction, and Petitioner
`
`has not made any argument claiming that this preamble requires construction. See
`
`generally Petition at 10-11. Thus, the preamble is irrelevant to the Petition and
`
`should not be construed.
`
`“covering”
`
`2.
`The Petition identifies “covering” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “covering” is “a group
`
`of slats, a pleated fabric shade, or a roller shade.” Petition at 11. This proposed
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`construction improperly limits a “covering” to the three identified forms, which is
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`not supported by the specification. As conceded in the Petition, the ‘884 Patent
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`specifically states that “[t]he present invention relates to a modular transport
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`system for opening and closing Venetian blinds, pleated shades, and other blinds
`
`and shades. While the embodiments shown herein are of horizontal blinds, the
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`transport system may also be used on vertical blinds.” ‘896 Patent at 1:14-18.
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`Thus, by limiting the construction of “covering” to the three embodiments
`
`identified, Petitioner’s proposed construction improperly imports limitations from
`
`8
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`the specification and unquestionably does not offer the “broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation.” Therefore, this construction should be rejected by the Board.
`
`“power spool”
`
`3.
`The Petition identifies “power spool” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “power spool” is “a
`
`component to hold and wind a spring.” Petition at 11. Petitioner’s proposed
`
`construction does nothing to clarify what constitutes a “power spool” in the context
`
`of the ‘896 Patent. Indeed, the Petitioner admits that the basis for this construction
`
`is “from the claim limitations.” Id. For example, independent claim 5 of the ‘884
`
`Patent provides for a “coil spring [that] wraps onto and off of [a] power spool.”
`
`See ‘884 Patent, Claim 5. Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary in
`
`light of the clear description provided in the claims themselves. Thus, the Board
`
`should reject Petitioner’s proposed construction of “power spool.”
`
`“spring motor”
`
`4.
`The Petition identifies “spring motor” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “spring motor” is “a
`
`mechanism that uses a spring to output mechanical power to another component or
`
`components.” Petition at 11. In doing so, Petitioner blatantly attempts to import
`
`9
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`

`

`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`limitations from the specification into the claim without any analysis or
`
`justification, including an “output [of] mechanical power” requirement which is
`
`not provided in the claims.
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary in light of the clear
`
`definition provided in the claims themselves. Thus, the Board should reject
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction of “spring motor.”
`
`“rotating output”
`
`5.
`The Petition identifies “rotating output” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “rotating output” is “a
`
`component to rotate upon actuation by another component.” Petition at 12. Again,
`
`Petitioner provides no explanation as to why this is the proper construction, or
`
`even why one of ordinary skill in the art would require construction of this term at
`
`all. Instead, Petitioner merely makes a couple of passing references to
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`disconnected sections of the specification as alleged support for the proposed
`
`construction. In light of this complete lack of analysis or explanation, the Board
`
`should refuse to improperly import limitations into the term “rotating output” as
`
`requested by Petitioner.
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`Further, independent claims 5 and 7 of the ‘884 Patent provide for a “a
`
`rotating output operatively connected to [] the spring motor; and lift cord
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`10
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`operatively connected to the rotating output and to the covering; said rotating
`
`output being rotatable in clockwise and counterclockwise directions to move the
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`covering between its extended and retracted positions.” Petitioner’s proposed
`
`construction is therefore unnecessary in light of the clear description provided in
`
`the claims themselves. Thus, the Board should reject Petitioner’s proposed
`
`construction of “rotating output.”
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`“lift cord”
`
`6.
`The Petition identifies “lift cord” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “lift cord” is “a
`
`flexible line or cord capable of being wound or unwound, to cause lifting or
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`lowering of the covering of a window blind or shade.” Petition at 12.
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`Petitioner’s construction should be rejected by the Board to the extent that it
`
`requires “lifting or lowering of the covering of a window blind or shade.” As
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`previously discussed with respect to the construction of “window covering,” the
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`invention of the ‘884 Patent can apply to vertical or horizontal blinds or shades.
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`Thus, by requiring “lifting or lowering,” Petitioner improperly limits the scope of
`
`the invention without any basis whatsoever for doing so. Thus, Petitioner’s
`
`proposed construction of “lift cord” should be rejected.
`
`11
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`The broadest reasonable interpretation (which is also the definition
`
`supported by the intrinsic evidence) is a “cord for use in extending and/or
`
`retracting the cover.” Such definition is readily apparent reading the claims in
`
`which the term “lift cord” is mentioned. For example, Claim 5 of the ‘884 Patent
`
`reads in relevant part: “a lift cord operatively connected to the rotating output and
`
`to the covering; said rotating output being rotatable in clockwise and
`
`counterclockwise directions to move the covering between its extended and
`
`retracted positions.” The specification of the ‘884 Patent similarly confirms Patent
`
`Owner’s understanding of the meaning of the term “lift cord,” as it repeatedly
`
`describes lift cords as used for “extending and/or retracting the cover.” See e.g.,
`
`‘884 Patent at 1:23-25 (“The raising and lowering [of the cover] is done by a lift
`
`cord attached to the bottom rail (or bottom slat).”). Thus, the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation of “lift cord” is “cord for use in extending and/or retracting a cover.”
`
`“one-way friction brake”
`
`7.
`The Petition identifies “one-way friction brake” as a term that requires
`
`construction pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically,
`
`the Petition alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “one-way
`
`friction brake” is “a mechanism that applies a frictional braking force against a
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`rotational motion of a rotating component in one rotational direction and
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`insubstantial frictional braking force in the other rotational direction.” Petition at
`
`12
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`13. Neither the specification of the ‘884 Patent, nor the physical reality of braking
`
`systems, provide any support for Petitioner’s proposed construction.
`
`In particular, Petitioner’s proposed construction does nothing to clarify the
`
`meaning of “one-way friction brake” to one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`
`context of the ‘884 Patent. Specifically, independent claims 5 and 7 of the ‘884
`
`Patent provide for a “one-way friction brake providing a braking force that stops
`
`the rotation of the rotating output in one of the directions while permitting the
`
`rotating output to rotate freely in the other of said directions” and “one-way
`
`friction brake providing braking force opposing the rotation of the rotating output
`
`in one of the directions while permitting the rotating output to rotate freely in the
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`other of said directions,” respectively. In light of this clear description, Petitioner’s
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`attempt to provide additional functional explanation is entirely unnecessary in light
`
`of the clear definition provided in the claims themselves. As such, the Board
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`should reject Petitioner’s proposed construction of “one-way friction brake” and
`
`afford this term its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`The broadest reasonable interpretation of “one-way friction brake” is “a
`
`mechanism that applies a frictional braking force primarily in a single direction.”
`
`In particular, the specification of the ‘884 Patent describes a “one-way brake” that
`
`“provides greater braking force when the blind is in the raised position and less
`
`braking force when the blind is in the lowered position.” See ‘884 Patent at col.
`
`13
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`

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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`58, lines 52-58. One of ordinary skill in the art would therefore understand that a
`
`“one-way friction brake” as described in the ‘884 Patent provides frictional braking
`
`force in primarily a single direction, and by implication “less” force in the other
`
`direction. Nowhere, however, does the ‘884 Patent require that the force in the
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`non-primary direction be “insubstantial” as Petitioner requests. Therefore, to the
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`extent a construction is required of this term, the proper construction is “a
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`mechanism that applies a frictional braking force primarily in a single direction.”
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`“transmission”
`
`8.
`The Petition identifies “transmission” as a term that requires construction
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and § 42.104(b)(3). Specifically, the Petition
`
`alleges that the broadest reasonable construction of the term “transmission” is “a
`
`mechanism coupled to the spring motor and the rotating output to transmit motion
`
`between the rotation of the spring motor and the rotation of the rotating output.”
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`Petition at 14. Again, Petitioner blatantly attempts to import limitations from the
`
`specification into the claim without any analysis or justification beyond the
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`conclusory reference to alleged “[e]xamples in the specification.” Petition at 14.
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`In particular, Petitioner improperly attempts to import limitations from the
`
`specification regarding “to transmit motion between the rotation of the spring
`
`motor and the rotation of the rotating output,” which is not provided in the claims.
`
`Moreover, Petitioner also improperly inserts a specific orientation into the
`
`14
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`IPR2014-00276
`U.S. Patent No. 6,968,884
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`proposed broadest reasonable interpretation of “transmission” in requiring that the
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`transmission be “coupled to the spring motor and the rotating output.” All relevant
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`orientation details, however, are expressly described already in the text of Claim 6,
`
`which reads:
`
`A system for covering an architectural opening as recited in claim 5,
`and further comprising a transmission operatively connected to the
`spring motor and to the rotating output.
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`Petitioner’s proposed construction is therefore improperly restrictive and
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`entirely unnecessary in light of the clear description provided in the claims
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`themselves. Indeed, inserting Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of
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`“transmission” would render Claim 6 needlessly repetitive and confusing:
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`A system for covering an architectural opening as recited in claim 5,
`and further comprising a mechanism coupled to the spring motor and
`the rotating output to transmit motion between the rotation of the
`spring motor and the rotation of the rotating output operatively
`connected to the spring motor and to the rotating output.
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`Thus, the Board should reject Petitioner’s proposed construction of “transmission.”
`
`The broadest reasonable interpretation of “transmission” is “a device that
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`operates to either offset or supplement the operating characteristics of another
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`device.” In particular, the specification of the ‘884 Patent specifically states that
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`the “transmission” is designed to supplement the operating characteristics of the
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`spring drive unit. See e.g., ‘884 Patent at 5:6-24 (“In some embodiments of the
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`present invention, the coiled spring motor power unit provides sufficient force, in
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`combination with the system inertia, to balance the weight of the blind so that,
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`when a user touches the blind and urges it up or down, the blind easily moves in
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`the direction it is urged and will then stop when the user stops urging it and will
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`remain in that position. [T]he force required to balance the blind varies as the
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`blind is moved up and down . . . . For that reason, it is usually desirable to use a
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`transmission, so that the proper amount of force is provided at all positions of the
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`blind.”). Thus, reading “transmission” in light of the specification, a transmission
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`is designed to either offset or supplement the operating characteristics of another
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`device.
`
`IV. Legal Standards
`A.
`Inter Partes Review
`To institute an inter partes review, there must be “a reasonable likelihood
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`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
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`in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner therefore carries the burden to
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`“demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims
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`challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
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`The Petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief
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`requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence
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`including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.22(a)(2); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (requiring IPR petitions to meet the
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`requirements of §§ 42.6, 42.8, and 42.24).
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`In addition, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5), “the petition must set
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`forth: . . . (5) The exhibit number of the supporting evidence relied upon to support
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`the challenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including
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`identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge. The Board
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`may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where party has failed to state its
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`relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the
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`challenge” (emphasis added).
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`As discussed in greater detail below, the Petition fails to establish that there
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`is a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim is invalid and has therefore
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`failed to meet its burden to show sufficient grounds to institute inter partes review.
`
`B. Obviousness
`The Petition fails to present any obviousness arguments sufficient create a
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`“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of
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`the claims challenged.” Patentability requires that the claimed invention would not
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`have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
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`invention. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1565–68
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`(Fed. Cir. 1987). The relevant factual inquiries include: (1) the level of ordinary
`
`skill in the pertinent art; (2) the scope and content of the prior art; (3) the
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`differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) objective
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`secondary considerations of non-obviousness, if any. See, e.g., SIBIA
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`Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re
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`Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, In re
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`Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking
`
`Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art. See
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`Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.
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`1986).
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`Additionally, “a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious
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`merely by demonstrating that each element was, independently, known in the prior
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`art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Rather, to establish
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`prima facie obviousness, the cited references must be shown to disclose or suggest
`
`each claimed element and it must be shown that it would have been obvious to
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`combine the teachings in the references together to arrive at the claimed invention.
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`See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There must be an apparent
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`reason to combine the cited references to create the specific invention.
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`In addition, a showing that the reason to combine stems from the nature of
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`the problem to be solved must be “clear and particular, and it must be supported by
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`actual evidence.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2002). The combined art must narrow the scope of the inventor’s task to the
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`point where it would have been obvious to try the particular invention claimed. If
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`the particular invention lies hidden in