throbber

`
`Paper No.
`Filed: March 27, 2014
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`NETFLIX, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`OPENTV, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00267
`Patent 7,409,437
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,409,437
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Preliminary Statement ..................................................................................... 1
`
`The Board Should Deny Netflix’s Petition Because All of the Grounds
`in the Petition are Uninstitutable ..................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`The Throckmorton grounds for claims 1-4 are uninstitutable
`because the petition fails to articulate information necessary to
`show obviousness .................................................................................. 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The petition fails to apply the cited art to the claims, as it
`proposes to construe them ........................................................... 5
`
`The petition fails to articulate where each of the claim
`elements is found in the cited art ................................................ 6
`
`The petition fails to articulate a complete obviousness
`analysis with respect to Throckmorton ....................................... 8
`
`B.
`
`The Palmer grounds for claims 1-4 are uninstitutable because
`the petition fails to articulate how the cited subject matter of
`Palmer is prior art ................................................................................ 13
`
`III. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 17
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Table of Authorities
`
`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Application of Klesper, 397 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1968) ........................................... 14
`
`In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................... 14
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................. 9
`
`Federal Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .......................................................................................................... 9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312 .................................................................................................passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .......................................................................................................... 3
`
`Regulations
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6 ......................................................................................................... 8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22 ..............................................................................................passim
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65 ..................................................................................................... 13
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ............................................................................................passim
`
`Other Authorities
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48620 (Aug. 14, 2012) ......................................................................... 4
`
`IPR2013-00183, Paper 12 (Jul. 31, 2013) ........................................................... 9, 13
`
`IPR2013-00186, Paper 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .............................................................. 15
`
`IPR2013-00510, Paper 9 (Feb. 12, 2014) .................................................................. 8
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`I.
`
`Preliminary Statement
`
`The patented technology at issue relates to Over-the-Top delivery of content
`
`(such as movies, television, and other media) over the Internet, which forms a
`
`foundation for Patent Owner OpenTV’s highly successful digital television
`
`business. That business includes over 200 million digital set-top boxes and
`
`televisions shipped to consumers with OpenTV software, and 80 worldwide
`
`customers that run OpenTV solutions. Indeed, The Kudelski Group, of which
`
`OpenTV is a subsidiary, has been innovating in the content industry for more than
`
`60 years, and its founder, Stefan Kudelski, has received numerous awards for his
`
`innovations in the industry, including recently being honored in memoriam as an
`
`inventor by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences at the 86th Annual
`
`Academy Awards in March, 2014.
`
`OpenTV formally notified Petitioner Netflix, Inc. that it was using
`
`OpenTV’s patented technology in its streaming video service, and on December
`
`19, 2012, after nearly 12 months of Netflix ignoring OpenTV’s repeated requests
`
`for a license, OpenTV reluctantly filed a patent infringement lawsuit against
`
`Netflix in Delaware. See OPENTV Exhibit 2002, Complaint in OpenTV, Inc., v.
`
`Netflix, Inc. Netflix could no longer ignore OpenTV’s patents, but instead of
`
`addressing the matter directly, Netflix continued its delay tactics, waiting until the
`
`very last moment to file a flawed and incomplete petition for inter partes review of
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,409,437, hoping to side-step liability from its continuing use of
`
`OpenTV’s patented technology.
`
`Netflix’s petition fails because, among other things, it fails to support its
`
`proposed grounds of unpatentability with reasoning required by the statute and the
`
`Board’s rules, with multiple fatal flaws in the proposed obviousness grounds for
`
`every claim.
`
`A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if . . . the petition
`
`identifies, in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on
`
`which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the
`
`grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312. To ensure that this
`
`statutory requirement is met, the Board’s rules specify detailed requirements for a
`
`petition, including an identification of how each challenged claim is to be
`
`construed, how each construed claim is unpatentable, and where each element of
`
`the claim is found in the prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b); see also 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.22(a)(2) (requiring a full statement of the reasons for the relief requested,
`
`including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including
`
`material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent). Here, the petition’s
`
`analysis is incomplete for these and other reasons, and such an incomplete analysis
`
`cannot establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing for any claim.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Netflix’s petition requests the cancellation of claims 1-4 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,409,437 based on alternative obviousness grounds, some relying on U.S. Patent
`
`No. 5,818,441 to Throckmorton et al. (“Throckmorton”) and others relying on U.S.
`
`Patent No. 5,905,865 to Palmer et al. (“Palmer” or “the Palmer patent”). All of
`
`these grounds are uninstitutable, however, because the petition fails to articulate
`
`information required by the statute and the Board’s rules. For the Throckmorton
`
`grounds, the petition fails to apply the cited art to the claims, as the petition
`
`proposes to construe them, fails to specify where each element of the claims is
`
`found in the cited art, and fails to provide a complete obviousness analysis. For the
`
`Palmer grounds, the petition fails to articulate how the portions of Palmer it relies
`
`upon are even prior art.
`
`Because Netflix’s petition is deficient in multiple ways, the Board should
`
`deny it as uninstitutable for failing to establish a reasonable likelihood of
`
`prevailing on any claim.
`
`II. The Board Should Deny Netflix’s Petition Because All of the Grounds in
`the Petition are Uninstitutable
`
`For a petition to be institutable, it must establish that there is “a reasonable
`
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`
`challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). To do so, the statute requires that
`
`“the petition identif[y], in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that
`
`supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312.
`
`To implement the statute, the Board’s rules require that each petition include
`
`“[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed
`
`explanation on the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the
`
`governing law, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). Compliance with
`
`this rule is essential because “[v]ague arguments and generic citations to the record
`
`are fundamentally unfair to an opponent and do not provide sufficient notice to an
`
`opponent and creates inefficiencies for the Board.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48620 (Aug. 14,
`
`2012).
`
`Because Netflix’s petition fails to satisfy these requirements, inter partes
`
`review should not be instituted.
`
`A. The Throckmorton grounds for claims 1-4 are uninstitutable
`because the petition fails to articulate information necessary to
`show obviousness
`
`The petition alleges that claims 1-4 are obvious over Throckmorton, alone or
`
`in combination with other references. Pet. 7. These grounds are deficient for
`
`several reasons: (i) the grounds fail to apply the cited art to the claims, as the
`
`petition proposes to construe them; (ii) the grounds fail to specify where each
`
`element of the claims is found in the cited art; and (iii) the grounds fail to provide a
`
`complete obviousness analysis.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`1. The petition fails to apply the cited art to the claims, as it
`proposes to construe them
`
`Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 312, which requires that “the petition identif[y],
`
`in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
`
`challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the
`
`challenge to each claim,” Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires that the petition must set forth
`
`“[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds identified.”
`
`(Emphasis added). The petition does not articulate how any of the claims, as it
`
`proposes to construe them, are obvious over Throckmorton, alone or in
`
`combination with other references, so it lacks the particularity required by the
`
`statute and the rules.
`
`The petition proposes construing the claim limitation “a processor which
`
`automatically directs the web browser to establish a communications link with the
`
`online information source” to mean “a processor which directs the web browser to
`
`establish a communications link with the online information source, where the act
`
`of directing occurs without human intervention.” Pet. 7. This limitation is recited
`
`by every claim. In particular, it is part of claim elements discussed on pages 18-19
`
`(element 1.4), 24 (element 2.4), 27-28 (element 3.4), and 32 (element 4.4) of the
`
`petition. Even if the petition’s proposed construction were proper (which OpenTV
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`does not concede1), the petition fails to articulate how Throckmorton, alone or in
`
`combination with other references, maps to the claims as construed. Indeed, the
`
`petition fails to even make an allegation regarding any relationship between “the
`
`act of directing occurs without human intervention” and the disclosures of the cited
`
`references. To the contrary, the petition merely cites various lines of Throckmorton
`
`with reference to the original claim language, not the proposed construction. Pet.
`
`18-19, 24, 27-28, 32. The declaration filed with the petition repeats this error.
`
`NTFX-1003 at 23-25. Thus, no explanation is provided of how any of the
`
`construed claims are obvious over Throckmorton, alone or in combination with
`
`other references, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) and 35 U.S.C. § 312.
`
`Therefore, the Throckmorton grounds proposed for claims 1-4 are all
`
`uninstitutable.
`
`2. The petition fails to articulate where each of the claim elements
`is found in the cited art
`
`Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 312, which requires that “the petition identif[y],
`
`in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
`
`challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the
`
`challenge to each claim,” Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires that the “petition must specify
`
`
`1 OpenTV is not currently proposing any claim constructions but reserves the right
`
`to do so if inter partes review is instituted.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed
`
`publications.” The petition does not articulate where each of the claim elements is
`
`found in the cited art, so it lacks the particularity required by the statute and the
`
`rules.
`
`Every claim recites “a processor which automatically directs the web
`
`browser to establish a communications link with the online information source.” In
`
`particular, the limitation is part of claim elements discussed on pages 18-19
`
`(element 1.4), 24 (element 2.4), 27-28 (element 3.4), and 32 (element 4.4) of the
`
`petition. The petition never identifies where the “automatically” limitation is found
`
`in the cited art, as required by Rule 42.104(b)(4) to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 312.
`
`Instead, the petition simply states:
`
`Throckmorton teaches (i) a microprocessor that is
`connected to the two-way communication channel, (ii)
`the two-way communication channel is used to connect
`to an online service, (iii) the connection to the service is
`automatically performed by the system (which is
`controlled by the microprocessor), and (iv) the
`referenced online information is retrieved for display in
`the web browser, thereby disclosing “a processor which
`automatically directs the web browser to establish a
`communications link with the online information source
`identified by the address . . . .”
`
`Pet. 18-19 (citing NTFX-1003 at 23-25) (emphasis added).
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Instead of explaining where the “automatically” limitation is found in the
`
`cited art, the petition cites only the declaration filed with it. Id. But arguments
`
`presented in an expert declaration cannot cure the deficiencies of the petition. The
`
`Board has previously “decline[d] to consider information presented in a supporting
`
`declaration, but not discussed in a petition, because, among other reasons, doing so
`
`would encourage the use of declarations to circumvent the page limits that apply to
`
`petitions. Along those lines, [the Board’s] rules prohibit arguments made in a
`
`supporting document from being incorporated by reference into a petition. See
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).” IPR2013-00510, Paper 9 (Feb. 12, 2014), at 8-9. Indeed,
`
`35 U.S.C. § 312 requires that “the petition identif[y], in writing and with
`
`particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each
`
`claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each
`
`claim.” (Emphasis added). Netflix’s petition fails to identify where at least the
`
`“automatically” limitation of every claim is found in Throckmorton or any other
`
`reference, so the Throckmorton grounds proposed for claims 1-4 are all
`
`uninstitutable.
`
`3. The petition fails to articulate a complete obviousness analysis
`with respect to Throckmorton
`
`Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 312, which requires that “the petition identif[y],
`
`in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
`
`challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`challenge to each claim,” Rule 42.22(a)(2) requires that the petition set forth “[a]
`
`full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed
`
`explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the
`
`governing law, rules, and precedent.” Although all of the Throckmorton grounds
`
`rely upon obviousness arguments under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the petition does not
`
`provide a complete obviousness analysis, so it lacks the particularity required by
`
`the statute and the rules.
`
`To provide a complete obviousness analysis, a petition must include
`
`“explanation of how the teachings of the references would be arranged or
`
`combined or why a person of ordinary skill would have made the combination”
`
`and “some reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have thought to
`
`combine particular available elements of knowledge, as evidenced by the prior art,
`
`to reach the claimed invention.” IPR2013-00183, Paper 12, at 9 (Jul. 31, 2013)
`
`(citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). When, as here, a
`
`petition’s analysis of obviousness is “incomplete,” it is “insufficient to demonstrate
`
`a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on [the] obviousness challenge.” Id. at 10.
`
`Netflix’s petition does not explain its proposed combination of disparate
`
`portions of Throckmorton, so it lacks a complete analysis. The petition states that
`
`its application of Throckmorton relies upon the teachings contained in two
`
`embodiments of Throckmorton: “a one-way communication system and a two-way
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`communication system.” Pet. 12. It, however, fails to articulate how these different
`
`systems would be combined or even which system teaches which claim element.
`
`Instead, the petition merely cites sections of Throckmorton in the abstract, without
`
`explaining whether each section addresses the one-way communication system or
`
`the two-way communication system. See, e.g., Pet. 15. For example, with respect
`
`to element 1.1, Netflix’s petition cites Throckmorton at 7:63-65 and 9:1-12. Pet.
`
`15. The first citation refers to a section addressing the one-way communication
`
`system of Throckmorton, while the second refers to a section addressing the two-
`
`way communication system of Throckmorton. See NTFX-1004 at 8:16-24
`
`(introducing the two-way communication system for the first time). The petition,
`
`however, fails to articulate how the teachings of the different sections (which
`
`address different systems) would be combined. See Pet. 15.
`
`Worse, after contrasting the one-way communication system’s handling of
`
`web pages with the two-way communication system’s handling of URLs2, Pet. 11,
`
`Netflix’s petition cites the one-way communication system of Throckmorton at
`
`7:63-65 for the proposition that “Throckmorton teaches that the associated data
`
`(e.g., the URL) could be encoded into the television signal,” Pet. 15. Such internal
`
`contradiction demonstrates why the petition’s failure to articulate how the different
`
`2 Throckmorton only discuses a URL in the context of the two-way communication
`
`system, not the one-way communication system. NTFX-1004 at 9:1-7.
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`systems would be combined or even which system teaches which claim element
`
`cannot be overlooked.
`
`The petition also fails to articulate any reasons why the different systems of
`
`Throckmorton would be combined to achieve the subject matter of claims 1-4.
`
`Instead, all of the purported “reasons to combine” are either unsupported attorney
`
`argument or citations to a declaration that just parrots the language of the petition.
`
`a)
`Netflix’s petition asserts, without citing any supporting evidence, that (i)
`
`Unsupported attorney arguments to combine
`
`“the combination amounts to simply combining elements contained in the same
`
`reference in precisely the manner described in the reference,” (ii) “[c]ombining the
`
`retrieving-internet-information-using-a-URL as described in the two-way
`
`embodiment, with the known method of displaying a web page simultaneously
`
`with a video program as described by the one-way embodiment, yields the
`
`predictable result of displaying a web page retrieved with a URL simultaneously
`
`with a video program,” and (iii) “[t]his implementation of the teachings of
`
`Throckmorton would be desirable because it would allow the user to have direct
`
`access to relevant online information during the program reception without the
`
`need for changing screens.” Pet. 12-13. These unsupported reasons to combine
`
`should be given no weight.
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`b)
`The rest of the purported “reasons to combine” are supported by only
`
`“Reasons to combine” parroted by declaration
`
`citations to a declaration filed with the petition. In particular, Netflix’s petition
`
`asserts that (i) “[t]his result is predictable because Throckmorton specifically
`
`teaches such a result,” and (ii) “Throckmorton specifically provides a motivation to
`
`make this combination, because it was desirable to make an experience for viewers
`
`that integrated data with television program reception.” Pet. 13. The declaration
`
`merely parrots the petition without further explanation or even citation to
`
`underlying evidence:
`
`Pet. 13
`This result is predictable because
`
`NTFX-1003 at 16
`This result is predictable because
`
`Throckmorton specifically teaches such
`
`Throckmorton specifically teaches such
`
`a result. (NTFX-1003 at 16.)
`
`a result.
`
`Throckmorton specifically provides a
`
`Throckmorton specifically provides a
`
`motivation to make this combination,
`
`motivation to make this combination,
`
`because it was desirable to make an
`
`because it was desirable to make an
`
`experience for viewers that integrated
`
`experience for viewers that integrated
`
`data with television program reception.
`
`data with television program reception.
`
`(NTFX-1003 at 16.)
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Rule 42.65 explains that expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying
`
`facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight. Here,
`
`where the declaration simply parrots attorney argument, it should be entitled to no
`
`weight.
`
`Nowhere does Throckmorton specifically teach any result of combining its
`
`different one-way and two-way communication systems, as alleged by the petition
`
`and declaration. Nor does Throckmorton specifically provide a reason to make the
`
`combination. Indeed, both systems of Throckmorton appear to individually fulfill
`
`the purposes espoused by Throckmorton, so Throckmorton provides no reason to
`
`combine them. At best, Throckmorton demonstrates that the systems are in the
`
`same field of endeavor, which the Board has found to be insufficient to provide a
`
`reason to combine. See, IPR2013-00183, Paper 12, at 9-10.
`
`Because the obviousness presentation is incomplete, it is “insufficient to
`
`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on [the] obviousness challenge.”
`
`Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Throckmorton grounds proposed for claims 1-4 are all
`
`uninstitutable for this additional reason.
`
`B.
`
`The Palmer grounds for claims 1-4 are uninstitutable because the
`petition fails to articulate how the cited subject matter of Palmer
`is prior art
`
`The petition proposes two grounds based on U.S. Patent No. 5,905,865 to
`
`Palmer et al. Pet. 7-8. The petition does not argue that the Palmer patent is prior art
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`to the ’437 patent on its own. Instead, the petition argues that “[t]he Palmer patent
`
`is prior art to the extent that its subject matter is contained in [an] earlier filed
`
`provisional patent application.” Pet. 33. However, the petition does not explain
`
`how the cited subject matter of the Palmer patent is contained in the provisional
`
`patent application even though that is the only way it can be prior art.3 See In re
`
`Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Section 102(e) codified the
`
`‘history of treating the disclosure of a U.S. patent as prior art as of the filing date
`
`of the earliest U.S. application to which the patent is entitled, provided the
`
`disclosure was contained in substance in the said earliest application.’”) (quoting
`
`Application of Klesper, 397 F.2d 882, 885 (C.C.P.A. 1968)) (Underlining added).
`
`Consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 312, which requires that “the petition identif[y],
`
`in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
`
`challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the
`
`challenge to each claim,” Rule 42.22(a)(2) requires that the petition set forth “a
`
`detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence.” The petition does not
`
`articulate how the cited subject matter of the Palmer patent is prior art, so it lacks
`
`the particularity required by the statute and the rules.
`
`
`3 No other application leading to the Palmer patent was filed before March 8, 1996,
`
`the effective filing date of the ’437 patent. NTFX-1007 at 1; NTFX-1001 at 1.
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Instead of explaining how the cited subject matter of the Palmer patent
`
`relates to the earlier filed provisional patent application (“the Palmer provisional”),
`
`the petition simply states, in a conclusory manner, that “[f]or each element of the
`
`Palmer patent identified below, there is a corresponding teaching in the provisional
`
`applications.” Pet. 33-34. While the petition does list a string of citations to
`
`multiple pages of the Palmer provisional for some claim elements, see, e.g., Pet. 39
`
`(“NTFX-1007 [the Palmer patent], 8:13-19; see NTFX-1008 [the Palmer
`
`provisional], pp. 1, 3.”), these string citations are insufficient to establish grounds
`
`with the particularity required by 35 U.S.C. § 312. Indeed, the Board previously
`
`denied a request for rehearing premised on string citations in a petition because the
`
`petition did “not point out with particularity [a portion of a prior art reference] or
`
`how it satisfies certain claim limitations.” IPR2013-00186, Paper 34 (Oct. 23,
`
`2013), at 3. Citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5), the Board noted that the petitioner
`
`must identify in its petition “specific portions of the evidence that support the
`
`challenge” and that “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence
`
`where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the
`
`evidence that support the challenge.” Id. The Board should do so here, and rule that
`
`the petition has not established that the Palmer patent is prior art as of the filing
`
`date of the Palmer provisional.
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`Even if the Board were inclined to consider the string citations and
`
`undertake its own analysis of the relationship between the Palmer patent and the
`
`Palmer provisional, the citations would be found lacking. For example, one string
`
`citation alleges that the Palmer patent’s recitation of “extracted by receiver 30 and
`
`provided to the computer” is contained somewhere in pages 1 and 3 of the Palmer
`
`provisional. See, e.g., Pet. 39:
`
`Palmer discloses “an address extractor which extracts the
`address from the programming signal” because it teaches
`that the URL embedded in the television broadcast can
`“be extracted by receiver 30 and provided to the
`computer.” NTFX-1007 [the Palmer patent], 8:13-19; see
`NTFX-1008 [the Palmer provisional], pp. 1, 3.
`
`But neither page 1 nor page 3 of the Palmer provisional even contains the word
`
`“extracted.” Netflix’s petition contains more than a dozen similar string citations
`
`spread across its arguments with respect to every claim. Pet. 35-56. Accordingly,
`
`the petition fails to prove that the Palmer patent is prior art as of the filing date of
`
`the Palmer provisional. Lacking a complete explanation of the significance of the
`
`Palmer patent (e.g., how any portion of it constitutes prior art) with respect to even
`
`one claim, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 312, the
`
`petition is left wanting and the Palmer grounds proposed for claims 1-4 are all
`
`uninstitutable.
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`III. Conclusion
`For the reasons set forth above, the petition is deficient and institution
`
`should be denied.
`
`The undersigned attorneys welcome a telephone call should the Office have
`
`any requests or questions. If there are any fees due in connection with the filing of
`
`this paper, please charge the required fees to our deposit account no. 06-0916.
`
`
`
`Dated: March 27, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`By:
`Erika H. Arner
`Registration No. 57,540
`
`Joshua L. Goldberg
`Registration No. 59, 369
`
`Counsel for OpenTV, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2014-00267
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Patent
`
`Owner’s Preliminary Response to Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,409,437 and Exhibit 2002 were served on March 27, 2014 via FedEx and
`
`email directed to counsel of record for the Petitioner at the following:
`
`Andrew S. Ehmke
`andy.ehmke.ipr@haynesboone.com
`Scott Jarratt
`scott.jarratt.ipr@haynesboone.com
`HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
`2323 Victory Ave., Suite 700
`Dallas, Texas 75219
`
`/s/ Ashley F. Cheung
`Ashley F. Cheung
`Case Manager
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
`Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket