throbber

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`Paper No. 33
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`VIRNETX, INC. AND SCIENCE APPLICATION INTERNATIONAL
`CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner
`___________________
`
`Case IPR2014-00237
`Patent 8,504,697
`____________________
`
`Before MICHAEL P. TIERNEY, KARL D. EASTHOM, and STEPHEN C. SIU,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
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`
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`

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`IPR2014-00237
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`Table of Contents
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`I. Mr. Fratto’s Testimony is Competent and Unbiased ................................ 1
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`II. Claim Construction ...................................................................................... 3
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`Broadest Reasonable Interpretation ................................................. 3
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`“Secure Communication Link”.......................................................... 4
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`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an [IP] Address” ........... 4
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`The “Determining” Step ..................................................................... 5
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`III. Anticipation by Beser ................................................................................... 6
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`Beser Discloses the Claimed “Intercepting” Features ..................... 6
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`Beser Discloses the Claimed “Determining” Features..................... 9
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`Beser Discloses the Claimed “Secure Communication Link” ....... 12
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`Beser Discloses Encryption of Video or Audio Data (Claim 2) .... 13
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`Beser Discloses a VPN Communication Link (Claim 3) ................ 14
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`IV. Obviousness over Beser in view of RFC 2401 .......................................... 14
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`ii
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`IPR2014-00238
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`The Board correctly found that Beser anticipates and renders obvious claims
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`1-11, 14-25, and 28-30 of the ’697 patent. Paper 15 (“Dec.”) at 33. In its
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`Response (“Resp.”) (Paper 30), Patent Owner tries to divert attention from the
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`largely undisputed evidence of record establishing this, choosing instead to accuse
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`Mr. Fratto of bias and disputing his credentials. It then asks the Board to read new
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`limitations into its claims. When it finally addresses the grounds, Patent Owner
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`advances strained readings of the prior art its own expert largely abandoned at his
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`deposition. The Board’s determination that the challenged claims are unpatentable
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`thus is supported by more than substantial evidence and should be maintained.
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`I. Mr. Fratto’s Testimony is Competent and Unbiased
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`Patent Owner devotes more than 8 pages of its Response to an attack on Mr.
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`Fratto’s supposed lack of expertise and bias. Far more telling is Patent Owner’s
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`conduct – Patent Owner did not ask Mr. Fratto a single substantive question
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`about his declaration testimony at his deposition. Patent Owner’s decision to not
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`test any of Mr. Fratto’s technical opinions shows those opinions are accurate and
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`well-founded. Moreover, Patent Owner did not identify a single inaccuracy in
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`Mr.Fratto’s testimony linked to this supposed “bias” and lack of expertise.
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`Patent Owner’s challenge to Mr. Fratto’s credentials is baseless. Mr. Fratto
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`has over 15 years of experience in studying, evaluating, testing, and describing
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`networking, networking security and related technologies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 9. In the
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`1
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`IPR2014-00237
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`early 1990s he was writing computer programs as part of an IT consulting business
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`that provided remote office automation. Ex. 1081 (Fratto Dep. Tr.) at 13:4-14:7.
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`He can write computer programs in several languages including “C, Pascal, Turbo
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`Pascal, PERL, PHP, JAVA, Javascript, [and] a little bit of Python,” all of which
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`were self-taught. Ex. 1081 at 13:11-14:19. These subject areas are directly
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`relevant to understanding the state of the art as it relates to the ’697 patent, and
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`more than qualify Mr. Fratto as an expert in these proceedings.
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`Patent Owner claims Mr. Fratto is nonetheless unqualified as he “does not
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`have a master’s degree” – it argues that knowledge cannot be gained through work
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`experience to qualify a witness as an expert. Resp. at 1-5. Patent Owner’s expert
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`disagrees – Dr. Monrose testified that someone with substantial work experience in
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`the “things that are really relevant to understanding [] the state of the art” could
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`acquire the same level of expertise as someone with a master’s degree. Ex. 1083
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`(Monrose Dep. Tr.) at 48:8-49:9; see id. at 36:1-17, 37:6-11, 48:8-49:9. Patent
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`Owner’s theory also ignores Fed. R. Evid. 702 (i.e., a witness may qualify “as an
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`expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” (emphasis added)).
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`Patent Owner’s claim of “bias” rests on a handful of tweets by Mr. Fratto
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`reflecting his belief that several of Patent Owner’s patents are invalid. Resp. at 5-
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`8. This is hardly an indicia of bias –institution of this trial and other proceedings
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`before the Office substantiates the merits of that belief. The tweets at issue do not
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`IPR2014-00237
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`even mention VirnetX. At worst, those tweets are consistent with Mr. Fratto’s
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`declarations and little more than candid reflections of the fact that the patents at
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`issue in this and related proceedings are invalid. It is also irrelevant that Mr. Fratto
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`has never found a patent valid – under this metric, Dr. Monrose is also fatally
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`biased because he has never found a patent invalid. See Ex. 1083 at 8:7-9. Both
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`critiques are meaningless – each has only served as an expert in proceedings
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`involving Patent Owner. Id.; Ex. 1081 at 46:18-22. Patent Owner’s manufactured
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`“bias” theory is simply an effort to distract the Panel from the merits and can be
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`ignored – once again, Patent Owner identifies no error in Mr. Fratto’s testimony
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`linked to this supposed bias. Resp. at 6-8.
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`II. Claim Construction
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`A. Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
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`Patent Owner argues the broadest reasonable interpretation should “not
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`apply” because its ability to amend the claims is “restricted.” Resp. at 9-10. But
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`Patent Owner made no attempt to amend its claims in this proceeding, and its
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`hypothetical concerns over amending the claims is unmerited – the Board has
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`provided ample guidance on motions to amend. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Corp. v.
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`American Vehicular Sciences, LLC, IPR2013-00419, Paper 32 at 2-5. Patent
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`Owner’s real problem is its disclosure, which does not describe an invention
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`having the intricate set of requirements it seeks to now read into its claims. Patent
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`Owner also has not moved to waive Rule 42.100(b), much less identified a
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`legitimate justification for doing so – there is no basis for not following that rule.
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`B.
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`“Secure Communication Link”
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`Patent Owner contends a secure communication link requires encryption.
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`But Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Monrose admits that techniques such as “[a]ddress
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`hopping may hide who is talking to whom,” and “provides some amount of
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`security.” Ex. 1083 at 113:16-114:12, 74:12-14; see Prelim. Resp., Paper 12, at 21
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`(in some circumstances, “hiding the address information is important while hiding
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`the video data and/or audio data itself is not”). Dr. Monrose also acknowledges the
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`’697 patent has “opposing views” on what secure communications means. Ex.
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`1083 at 66:11-17. Moreover, reading “secure” to require encryption renders
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`dependent claim 2 entirely superfluous, contrary to the doctrine of claim
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`differentiation. Pet. at 34; Ex. 1083 at 110:8-21; Sunrace Roots Enterprise Co. v.
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`SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Finally, the Board
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`properly rejected Patent Owner’s request to read limitations into its claims due to
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`an opaque “disclaimer” in pending Office proceedings. Dec. at 8; Resp. at 15-18.
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`C.
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`“Intercept[ing] . . . A Request to Look up an [IP] Address”
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`The Board correctly found “intercepting” means “receiving a request
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`pertaining to a first entity at another entity,” (Dec. at 13), which is consistent with
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`its ordinary meaning and the ’697 disclosure (e.g., showing a request specifying
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`IPR2014-00237
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`one computer being received by a different “proxy” computer), (Ex. 1001 at 40:31-
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`33). Despite admitting that redefining “intercepting” would have no impact in
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`proceeding, Patent Owner asks the Board to read into this term the additional step
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`of “performing an evaluation on [the request] related to establishing a secure
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`communication link.” Resp. at 26; see Dec. at 12. Patent Owner’s illogical
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`construction must be rejected – it would create hopeless confusion in the claims,
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`given that the proposed “evaluation” is actually part of the next step of the claims
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`(i.e., the “determining” step). See Ex. 1083 at 140:5-9 (one example of an
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`“evaluation” is “to determine whether the access to a secure site has been
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`requested”); id. at 135:7-19 (“determin[ing] whether access to a secure site has
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`been requested” part of “determining” step), 68:6-20, 70:1-19; see Resp. at 29.
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`D. The “Determining” Step
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`Patent Owner argues the “determining” step should be read as not covering a
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`determination based on an indication of the relative permission level or security
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`privileges of the requestor. It contends the ’697 patent distinguishes between
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`“focusing on the second network device” (“determin[ing] whether access to a
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`secure site has been requested,” Ex. 1001 at 40:32-33), and “focusing on the first
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`network device” (“determin[ing] whether the user has sufficient security privileges
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`to access the site,” (id. at 40:36-37). Resp. at 29. The language of the claims
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`makes no such distinction. And Patent Owner ignores that the ’697 patent itself
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`explains that security privileges correspond to “different levels of security []
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`provided for different categories of hosts” (Ex. 1001 at 41:20-21) and states “some
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`sites may be designated as having a certain security level, and the security level of
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`the user requesting access must match that security level.” Id. at 41:22-24. Thus,
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`the ’697 patent shows its “determining” step covering determining the relative
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`permission levels or security privileges of the requestor.
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`III. Anticipation by Beser
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`The Board correctly found claims 1-11, 14-25, and 28-30 of the ’697 patent
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`anticipated by Beser. In response, Patent Owner argues that Beser does not show
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`(i) the claimed “intercepting” features, (ii) the claimed “determining” features, or
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`(iii) the claimed “secure communication link.” Each argument relies on limitations
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`not found in the claims, and conflicts with evidence in the record.
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`A. Beser Discloses the Claimed “Intercepting” Features
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`Patent Owner does not challenge the Board’s finding that Beser shows the
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`first network device intercepts the request, determines if it contains a distinctive
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`sequence of bits, and if so, routes the request to the trusted-third-party network
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`device instead of processing it normally. Dec. at 20-21; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 297-98 (Ex.
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`1009 at 8:33-43); see Ex. 1009 at 8:21-50. Instead, Patent Owner contends that
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`Beser does not disclose the “request to lookup an [IP] address,” arguing (1) the
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`trusted-third-party network device does more than just look up an IP address,
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`(Resp. at 36-37), and (2) even if it looks up an IP address, it looks up the wrong IP
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`address, (Resp. at 37-39). It also argues that (3) the trusted-third-party network
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`device cannot “intercept[]” a request. Resp. at 38-39. Each argument lacks merit.
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`First, Beser’s “tunneling” request is a “request to look up an [IP] address.”
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`The originating device sends out a request containing a unique identifier (e.g., a
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`domain name) of a terminating device, and it obtains an IP address that it uses to
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`communicate with the terminating device. See Pet. at 19; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 296, 305-
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`06; Ex. 1009 at Fig. 5, 8:1-9, 9:64-10:41. The trusted-third-party network device
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`uses the unique identifier to look up an IP address of the terminating device – “a
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`public IP address for a second network device 16 is associated with the unique
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`identifier for the terminating telephony device.” Ex. 1009 at 11:26-28, 11:48-52,
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`Fig. 5 (step 116); Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 304-06; Ex. 1083 at 166:11-167:12, 173:6-13,
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`174:3-16, 177:20-178:1 (“Beser [teaches that] there is a resolution . . . that could
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`happen on the trusted third party to get a public address of device 16.”), 189:2-5.
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`After looking up the IP address, the trusted-third-party network device negotiates
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`with the first and second network devices to obtain a private IP address for the
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`terminating device, which it returns to the originating device. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 309-
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`10; Ex. 1009 at 11:9-24, 33-37, 45-62; 12:5-19; 21:48-55. The distinction Patent
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`Owner and its expert attempt to draw – why the request to look up an IP address is
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`sent – does not change the actions being performed in Beser. Ex. 1083 at 197:10-
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`19. The trusted-third-party network device looks up an IP in response to the
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`tunneling connection; that the device also performs additional actions to establish a
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`tunnel is irrelevant. Id. at 172:1-11, 195:17-197: 19; see In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d
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`1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Simply put, Beser shows a “tunneling” request that is
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`used to “look[] up an [IP] address.”
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`Second, Patent Owner asserts the “trusted-third-party network device 30
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`does not perform any translation into an IP address of the domain name of the
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`terminating device 26.” Resp. at 37-38. Patent Owner is simply wrong. Beser
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`shows that the originating device must communicate through the first and second
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`network devices in order to reach the terminating device. See Ex. 1009 at Fig. 1,
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`22:4-8; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 260-63, 283. Beser repeatedly shows that the IP address of
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`second network device 16 is the address associated with the domain name of
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`terminating device 26. Ex. 1009 at 11:48-58; see id. at 22:2-22, 11: 26-32, 15:50-
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`54; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 263, 267, 315. As Dr. Monrose agrees, the claimed “[IP]
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`address” covers a public IP address associated with the claimed second device.
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`Ex. 1083 at 169:22-172:13, 227:22-228:12. The trusted-third-party network device
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`also negotiates a private IP address for the terminating device, which is returned to
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`the originating device. E.g., Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 309-10; Ex. 1009 at 11:9-24; Ex. 1083
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`at 191:15-192:16, 232:12-234:9. Thus, the trusted-third-party network device
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`looks up two IP addresses (the public IP address of device 16 and the private IP
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`8
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`address of device 26), which are both necessary to enable communications
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`between the originating and terminating end devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1009 at 22:12-
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`22. Beser thus discloses that the trusted-third-party network device “look[s] up an
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`[IP] address of the second network device.”
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`Third, the Board also correctly found in the alternative that trusted-third-
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`party network device 30 “intercept[s] a request” as required by the claims. Dec. at
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`21. Patent Owner contends that Beser’s system does not intercept requests but
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`instead is one that “has requests intercepted from it.” Resp. at 38. But Patent
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`Owner overlooks that the trusted-third-party network device checks for the
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`indicator bits on incoming requests (the same bits checked by the first network
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`device), and if present, will give the request special processing. Ex. 1009 at 8:59-
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`9:1. If the bits are not present, the request will be processed normally. Ex. 1003 at
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`¶¶ 302-06, 357. Thus, Beser discloses the claimed “intercepting” step.
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`B.
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`Beser Discloses the Claimed “Determining” Features
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`The Board correctly found Beser discloses the “determining” step. Initially,
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`Patent Owner contends the Board’ “exceeded its statutory authority” by adopting a
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`rationale different than that set forth in the petition as to Beser teaches the
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`“determining” step. Resp. at 39-41. The Board plainly acted within its authority,
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`and each of two rationales employed by the Board to find that Beser shows the
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`claimed “determining” step was actually set forth in the Petition. See Dec. 21-23.
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`First, the Board correctly found the trusted-third-party network device is a
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`modified DNS (Dec. at 22), that it determines whether the terminating device is
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`available by checking to see if it has “a stored public address” for the device (id.),
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`and that it initiates an IP tunnel and returns a private IP address “only if the
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`terminating device has a public address” listed in its tunneling application database
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`(id. at 23). The Board explained that “without a currently valid domain name, the
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`DNS [i.e., the trusted-third-party network device] will not return a public or private
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`address.” Dec. at 23. This same explanation was provided in the Petition: the
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`trusted-third-party network device is able negotiate a tunnel with registered
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`terminating devices “because the trusted-third-party network device stores domain
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`names and associated IP addresses, and may also contain a database of users or end
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`devices.” Pet. at 20; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 262-64; Ex. 1009 at 4:9-11, 4:44-5:2, 11:45-
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`58; see Ex. 1083 at 159:13-160:8, 183:16-184:15. If the domain name “sent to the
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`trusted-third-party network device specifies a destination that is unavailable or
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`unknown to the trusted-third-party network device . . ., the request will not be
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`routed further.” Pet. at 20; id. at 20-21 (if the domain name “does not map to a
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`device requiring negotiation of an IP tunnel” a private IP address is not returned).
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`Patent Owner challenges these findings, focusing on the Board’s statement
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`that the determining step “includes determining that the device has a private
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`Internet address assigned to it,” (see Dec. at 23), and arguing that Beser’s system
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`10
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`does not “determine[] [whether] device 25 [sic] or device 26 has a private internet
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`address assigned to it.” Resp. at 43-48. But Patent Owner’s myopic argument
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`ignores that the Board clearly explained that the trusted-third-party network device
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`returns a private IP address “only if the terminating device has a public address”
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`listed in its tunneling application database. Dec. at 23.
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`Patent Owner also argues that Beser does not disclose a “determination”
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`because it “does not necessarily” return a public IP address if the tunneling request
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`specifies a non-secure domain name, and it instead could, e.g., “return[] an error
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`message” or “discard[] the request.” Resp. at 41-43. Initially, Patent Owner
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`ignores that a standard DNS lookup returns an associated IP address of a domain
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`name. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 77-81, 109-12, 287-89. But more importantly, Patent
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`Owner’s argument actually supports the Board’s finding – the counterexamples
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`show that no tunnel is created if the domain name is not listed in the trusted-third-
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`party network device’s table. Dec. 21-23; Ex. 1003 at ¶ 367. Thus, the
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`determination affects whether the secure communication link is established.
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`Second, the Board correctly found Beser discloses the “determining” step
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`because Beser show determining whether “the originating device, device 24, has
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`authorization to communicate [using the secure tunneling service].” Dec. at 23.
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`As Mr. Fratto explained “the request containing the unique identifier ‘may require
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`encryption or authentication to ensure [it] cannot be read on the public network.’”
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`Ex. 1003 at ¶ 303 (quoting Ex. 1009 at 11:22-25); accord Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 316-18;
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`see Dec. at 21, 24; Pet. at 20-22. Thus, if the originating device is not authorized
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`to initiate a tunnel with the terminating device, it will not be able to initiate a
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`tunnel. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 303 (“clients [must be] authenticated before [the trusted-
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`third-party network device] will process a request”), 316-18. In response, Patent
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`Owner argues that the only data transmitted to the trusted-third-party network
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`device are the unique identifier and the distinctive bit sequence, and it believes
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`those data do not show “authorization.” Resp. at 48-49. Patent Owner’s argument
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`is irrelevant because it overlooks that the originating device also sends
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`authentication information, and as Patent Owner admits, the trusted-third-party
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`network device will only initiate a tunnel if the originating device has been
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`authenticated. Resp. at 49 (citing Ex. 1009 at 11:22-25).
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`C. Beser Discloses the Claimed “Secure Communication Link”
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`Patent Owner argues that Beser does not show a “secure communication
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`link” because “Beser never discloses that the packets being sent using the allocated
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`private network addresses use ‘authentication,’ ‘encryption,’ or ‘address
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`hopping.’” Resp. at 49, 50-52. Here, Patent Owner simply reads “including, but
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`not limited to” out of the Board’s construction. See Dec. at 10; § II.B; Ex. 1083 at
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`68:6-20, 70:1-19. In reality, Beser shows “obfuscation methods” that “restrict
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`access to data, addresses, or other information on the path” which are “secure
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`12
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`communication links.” See Dec. at 10. For example, Beser’s tunnel restricts
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`access to the identities of the communicating devices: “the identities of the
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`originating 24 and terminating 26 telephony devices are inside the payload fields
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`85 of the IP 58 packets and may be hidden from hackers on the public network
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`12.” Ex. 1009 at 12:6-19 (emphasis added); Ex. 1003 at ¶ 312. Protecting the
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`identities of communicating devices restricts access to “data, addresses, or other
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`information on the path.” Ex. 1083 at 113:16-114:12; compare Resp. at 49 (Beser
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`discloses using encryption “to ensure that the unique identifier cannot be read”)
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`with Prelim. Resp., Paper 12, at 21 (in some circumstances, “hiding the address
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`information is important while hiding the [] data itself is not.”).
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`D. Beser Discloses Encryption of Video or Audio Data (Claim 2)
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`Patent Owner advances two reasons why it believes Beser does not disclose
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`that “at least one of the video data and the audio data is encrypted”: (i) that Beser
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`does not incorporate IPSec by reference, and (i) it “teach[es] away” from using
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`encryption. Resp. at 52-54. Both arguments miss the mark. First, Beser explicitly
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`discloses that IPSec is one conventional way to “encrypt the information inside the
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`IP packets before transmission.” Ex. 1009 at 1:54-56. A person of skill would
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`read this as indicating the contents of IPSec are being incorporated by reference.
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`Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 320-22; Ex. 2025 at ¶ 16. Second, Beser’s indication that IPSec
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`may have limitations in certain streaming video applications “does not vitiate the
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`fact that [using IPSec] is disclosed.” See Celeritas Technologies Ltd. v. Rockwell
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`International Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); In re
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`Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (patents are prior art “for all they
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`contain”). Beser actually states that “the sender may encrypt the information
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`inside the IP packets before transmission, e.g. with IP Security (‘IPSec’),” (Ex.
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`1009 at 1:54-56), and that its invention aims to avoid “preventing certain types of
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`encryption from being used,” (id. at 2:22-24; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 318-25). A person of
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`skill thus would have read Beser as indicating video or audio data optionally can
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`be encrypted when sent through a tunnel. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 319; Ex. 1083 at 213:19-
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`214:1 (admitting use of IPSec was “conventional”), 218:1-220:2 (configure IPsec).
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`E.
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`Beser Discloses a VPN Communication Link (Claim 3)
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`Patent Owner argues Beser does not explicitly call its secure tunnels a
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`“VPN.” This is irrelevant – what matters is whether Beser’s tunnel meets the
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`Board’s definition of a “[VPN] communication link.” Dec. at 11. It does –
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`Beser’s secure tunnel traverses a portion of a public network. Ex. 1009 at 4:19-24.
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`Moreover, Beser says a VPN is “a tunneling connection between edge routers on
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`[a] public network,” and describes a tunneling connection between “edge router[s]”
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`over a “public network.” Id.; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 255, 260, 328.
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`IV. Obviousness over Beser in view of RFC 2401
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`The Board correctly found that Beser in view of RFC 2401 renders obvious
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`14
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`IPR2014-00237
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`claims 1-11, 14-25, 28-30. Dec. at 29. In response, Patent Owner argues Beser
`
`“teaches one of ordinary skill in the art away from” using RFC 2401’s IPSec to
`
`encrypt the contents of the tunnel. Resp. at 56-58. Beser does not “teach away”
`
`from using IPSec – it does not say it cannot be used. There is no requirement that
`
`“prior art must teach that a particular combination is preferred, or ‘optimal,’ for the
`
`combination to be obvious.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004); In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, while Beser
`
`identifies situations where encryption “may” (i.e., “streaming” multimedia or high
`
`volume applications) cause challenges, the ’697 claims are not limited to such
`
`applications, and would cover transfer of video file via other means. See Dec. at
`
`31; Ex. 1009 at 1:58-65. Several passages of Beser also contradict Patent Owner’s
`
`assertion, and indicate encryption should be used. Ex. 1009 at 2:22-24; Ex. 1003
`
`at ¶ 321. And the implementation challenges that Beser identifies in using
`
`encryption can easily be navigated as both experts agreed. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 318-25;
`
`Ex. 1083 at 206:20-208:6 (admitting a more powerful computer or lower recording
`
`fidelity would resolve any problems), 211:16-212:2. The Board should maintain
`
`its finding that Beser anticipates or, in view of RFC 2401, renders obvious claims
`
`1-11, 14-25, and 28-30, as that finding is supported by substantial evidence.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2014-00238
`
`
`
`Dated: November 21, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/ Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Registration No. 43,401
`Sidley Austin LLP
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`jkushan@sidley.com
`(202) 736-8914
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Certificate of Service
`
`I hereby certify that on this 21st day of November, 2014, a copy of this
`
`Petitioner’s Reply has been served in its entirety by email on the following counsel
`
`of record for Patent Owner:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1996
`E-mail: josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`
`Dated:
`
`November 21, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
`
`
`
`
`
`

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