Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`
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`Paper No.
`Filed: June 16, 2014
`
`Naveen Modi
`Paul Hastings LLP
`875 15th Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 551-1990
`Facsimile: (202) 551-0490
`E-mail: naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`VIRNETX INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Case IPR2014-00481
`Patent 7,188,180
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`to Petition for Inter Partes Review
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,188,180
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`
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`Filed on behalf of: VirnetX Inc.
`By:
`
`Joseph E. Palys
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
` Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P.
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190-5675
`Telephone: (571) 203-2700
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4400
`E-mail: joseph.palys@finnegan.com
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`Page 1 of 46
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`VIRNETX EXHIBIT 2027
`Apple v. VirnetX
`Trial IPR2014-00237
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`Table of Contents
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
`The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review ......................................................................................... 2
`A.
`The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ..................................................................... 2
`B. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ............ 8
`C.
`The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds .............................................................................11
`D. Apple Asserts an Anticipation Ground Based on Three
`Documents, Contrary to Basic Anticipation Law ...............................14
`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be
`Rejected .........................................................................................................16
`A. Overview of the ’180 Patent ................................................................16
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art .......................................................18
`C.
`“Virtual Private Network” (Claims 4-10, 20-26, and 35-40) ..............19
`D.
`“Virtual Private Network Communication Link” (Claims 1-3,
`17-19, and 34) ......................................................................................23
`“Secure Computer Network Address” (Claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12,
`17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 28, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40) ...........................................26
`“Secure Domain Name” (Claims 1, 2, 11, 13, 17, 18, 27, 29, 33,
`34, and 41) ...........................................................................................30
`“Secure Domain Name Service” (Claims 1, 17, and 33) ....................32
`G.
`“Provisioning Information” (Claims 4, 20, and 35) ............................34
`H.
`“Client Computer” (Claims 13, 15, 29, 30 and 31) .............................36
`I.
`If Trial Is Instituted, VirnetX Requests an 18-Month Schedule ...................39
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`I.
`II.
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`IV.
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`E.
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`F.
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`i
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`V.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`Conclusion .....................................................................................................40
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Federal Cases
`Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ.,
`212 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 16
`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC,
`IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) ...................................................... 3
`Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`725 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 14, 16
`Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc.,
`IPR2013-00186, Paper No. 34 (Oct. 23, 2013) .................................................... 3
`CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00549, Paper No. 20 (Apr. 28, 2014) .................................................... 4
`EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC,
`IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 (June 5, 2013) .............................................. 12, 14
`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC,
`IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 (May 22, 2014) .................................................. 3, 8
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 (June 11, 2013) .................................................. 12
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 (Nov. 21, 2013) ................................................... 9
`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n; 545 F.3d 1340, 1351
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 16
`Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012) ...................................... 11, 12, 13
`ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 (Aug. 26, 2013) ........................................... 12, 14
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`IPR2012-00041, Paper No. 16 (Feb. 22, 2013) .................................................... 3
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani,
`IPR2013-00103, Paper No. 6 (May 23, 2013) ...................................................... 3
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper No. 16 (July 13, 2013) .................................................... 3
`Federal Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) ..................................................................................... 1, 3, 7, 8
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(4) ..................................................................................... 1, 3, 7, 8
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 40
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ....................................................................................... 1, 8, 9, 11
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.8 ....................................................................................................... 39
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c) ............................................................................................... 40
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 1
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ........................................................................................ 3, 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) ........................................................................................ 3, 8
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`Other Authorities
`157 Cong. Rec. S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) ................................................... 9
`77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012).......................................................................... 8
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012).......................................................................... 8
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`I.
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`Introduction
`Patent Owner VirnetX Inc. respectfully submits this Preliminary Response
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`in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, responding to the
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`Petition for Inter Partes Review (the “Petition”) filed by Apple Inc. against
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`VirnetX’s U.S. Patent No. 7,188,180 (“the ’180 patent”). VirnetX requests that the
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`Board not institute inter partes review for several reasons.
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`First, the Petition fails to identify where the prior art discloses each claimed
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`feature, violating the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b).
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`Second, this proceeding is duplicative of other actions before the Office and
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`should be dismissed under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Office currently has an inter
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`partes reexamination proceeding against the ’180 patent, and the ’180 patent
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`survived a previous challenge in reexamination. Microsoft filed a third set of
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`challenges to the ’180 patent in IPR2014-00401 and IPR2014-00405. A fourth set
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`of proceedings against the ’180 patent, as Apple requests here, is unnecessary and
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`burdens both the Office and VirnetX. In addition, the primary prior art references
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`Apple relies on here have already been considered by two different examiners in
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`the reexaminations of the ’180 patent, so the Petition raises issues already
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`considered by the Office. Section 325(d) was designed to avoid the type of serial
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`challenge Apple requests here.
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`Third, Apple proposes redundant grounds without addressing redundancy at
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`all, let alone identifying how any one ground improves on any other, as required by
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`Board precedent.
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`Fourth, Apple proposes anticipation based on RFC 2543 in combination with
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`two other references. RFC 2543 does not incorporate by reference the other
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`references, and Apple does not even attempt to show that it does. Apple’s multi-
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`reference anticipation ground violates basic anticipation principles, so it should be
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`rejected.
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`Finally, Apple proposes a series of incorrect claim constructions. Because
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`its unpatentability challenges are premised on incorrect claim constructions, Apple
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`has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of proving
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`unpatentability of any ’180 patent claim.
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`II. The Petition Fails to Meet the Requirements for Instituting an
`Inter Partes Review
`A. The Petition Fails to Comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4) and
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)
`Independent claims 1, 17, and 33 recite, among other things, “sending an
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`access request message to the secure computer network address using a virtual
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`private network communication link.” Apple’s Petition fails to explain where a
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`purported “access request message” is disclosed in Provino or RFC 2543. Nor
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`does the accompanying declaration provide the missing explanation. Because the
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`Petition lacks the explanation and particularity required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-
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`(4) and 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4)-(5), it should be denied.
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`Petitions must identify “in writing and with particularity, each claim
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`challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
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`evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim[.]” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 312(a)(3) (emphasis added). They must also “specify where each element of the
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`claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon” (37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support
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`the challenge” (37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)) (emphases added).
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`Petitions that lack the requisite particularity and specificity of explanation
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`are denied. See Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper
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`No. 9 at 18-20 (May 22, 2014) (rejecting petition for insufficient explanation);
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`Apple Inc. v. Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC, IPR2014-00079, Paper No. 8 at 17-
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`19 (Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting petition for including “vague” explanation that did
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`“not identify specifically what Petitioner regards as the” relevant feature of the
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`prior art); Wowza Media Sys., LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., IPR2013-00054,
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`Paper No. 16 at 3, 6 (July 13, 2013); Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103,
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`Paper No. 6 at 18-22 (May 23, 2013); Atrium Med. Corp. v. Davol Inc., IPR2013-
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`00186, Paper 34 at 3 (Oct. 23, 2013); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
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`IPR2012-00041, Paper 16 at 14-15 (Feb. 22, 2013). As the Board has explained, it
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`will not “search the record and piece together any evidence or arguments that may
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`support Petitioner’s ultimate conclusion.” CaptionCall, LLC v. Ultratec, Inc.,
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`IPR2013-00549, Paper 20 at 5 (Apr. 28, 2014).
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`Here, Apple’s Petition generally refers
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`to Provino’s discussion of
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`“generating message packets,” but fails to “particularly” explain how Provino
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`discloses “sending an access request message,” as recited in independent claims 1,
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`17, and 33. According to the Petition, Provino’s device 12(m) receives an integer
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`Internet address for server 31(s). (Pet. at 22.) “Thereafter, Provino describes
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`sending an access request message to the server 31(s) for which the integer Internet
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`address is resolved by nameserver 32, and that access request message leverages a
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`communication link in the VPN of that destination server 31(s).” (Id. at 23
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`(emphasis added).) The Petition fails to cite Provino in support of this conclusion,
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`instead citing declarant testimony. (Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 38-39).)
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`Likewise, the cited portions of the declaration refer to “access requests” and
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`“access request messages” in the abstract, but never identify what in Provino
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`corresponds to the claimed “access request message.” (Ex. 1011 ¶ 39.) Even the
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`portions of Provino cited in the referenced portions of the declaration merely
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`describe the device 12(m) “generating message packets for transmission to the
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`server 31(s).” (Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at 15:21-30).) The Petition also quotes this
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`portion of Provino, describing “generating message packets,” but fails to explain
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`how this corresponds to an “access request message” as recited in the challenged
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`claims. (Pet. at 23-24.)
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`The Petition also states that information is transferred from “server 31(s) to
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`device 12(m).” (Id. at 24.) But the cited portion of Provino merely discusses who
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`(e.g., “a company, governmental agency, organization or the like”) maintains the
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`virtual private network 15 and who can access the network. (Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at
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`9:6-13).) Again, this statement in the Petition, and the cited portion of Provino,
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`fail to address or particularly point out what constitutes an “access request
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`message” as recited in the challenged claims. The Petition also generally asserts
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`that “the device 12(m) may send access requests to server 31(s) using the secure
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`tunnel established with the firewall 30 in the first phase of the communication
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`process,” but again cites the same portion of Provino discussed above that
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`describes “generating message packets” and fails to identify what in Provino
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`corresponds to the recited “access request message.” (Id. at 24-25 (citing Ex. 1003
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`at 15:21-30).)
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`The Petition’s claim chart contains the same defects. The claim chart cites
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`portions of Provino discussing “generating and transferring message packets to one
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`or more servers 31(s)” (id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1003 at 12:1-16)) and the device 12(m)
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`“us[ing] that integer Internet address in generating message packets for
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`transmission to the server 31(s) which is associated with the human-readable
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`Internet address” (id. at 29 (citing Ex. 1003 at 15:21-30)). But these cited passages
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`of Provino merely discuss exchanging “message packets,” and the Petition fails to
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`explain how these portions of Provino disclose an “access request message” as
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`recited in the challenged claims. The Petition’s claim chart incorporates the same
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`deficient analysis of claim 1 for independent claims 17 and 33. (Id. at 33-35.)
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`The Petition’s purported application of RFC 2543 to the claims is also
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`deficient, but in different ways than its discussion of Provino. For RFC 2543, the
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`Petition quotes and mentions different portions of the reference, and then—without
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`any explanation—concludes that they disclose entire combinations of claimed
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`features. (See Pet. at 40-47.) Because the Petition fails to specifically associate
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`features of RFC 2543 with specific elements of the claims, the substance of
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`Apple’s purported anticipation theory is unknown and a trial based on RFC 2543
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`would have an unknowable scope.
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`As an example, the Petition contends that RFC 2543 discloses “sending an
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`access request message to the secure computer network address,” but the Petition
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`fails to state what in the reference allegedly discloses these features. Instead, the
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`Petition refers generally to communications between a “callee” and a “caller”
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`before and during a call. (Pet. at 46-47.) Nowhere does the Petition identify how
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`any of those communications discloses “sending an access request message to the
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`secure computer network address.” The discussion of RFC 2543 is entirely
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`disconnected from the Petition’s ultimate conclusion that RFC 2543 “thus shows a
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`method comprising” the entire combination of claimed features. (Id. at 47.)
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`The cited portions of the accompanying declaration are equally unhelpful.
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`(See id. at 46-47 (citing Ex. 1029 at ¶¶ 476-80, 524-31, 545-55).) For example, the
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`declarant concludes that RFC 2543’s “INVITE” message corresponds to the
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`“access request message” recited in the challenged claims. (Ex. 1029 at ¶ 588.)
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`But this contradicts the declarant’s earlier position that the “INVITE” message
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`corresponds to “sending a query message to a secure domain name service,” as
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`recited in the claims. (See id. at ¶¶ 573-78 (referring to “INVITE” message.)
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`Thus, the declaration fails to remedy the lack of explanation in the Petition because
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`it both cites large portions of RFC 2543 without explanation, and where it does
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`attempt to identify a relevant feature corresponding to the “access request
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`message” recited in the challenged claims, it offers contradictory information.
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`At least because the Petition (and even the accompanying declaration) fails
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`to explain where or how Provino or RFC 2543 discloses “sending an access
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`request message to the secure computer network address using a virtual private
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`network communication link,” as recited in each challenged independent claim, the
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`Petition does not demonstrate how Provino or RFC 2543 anticipates or renders
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`obvious each and every limitation of the challenged claims. The Petition lacks the
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`“particularity” required by 35 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(3)-(4), and fails to “specify where
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`each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications
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`relied upon” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the
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`challenge,” as required by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104(b)(4) and 42.104(b)(5)). See, e.g.,
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`Google Inc. et al. v. Everymd.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper No. 9 at 19 (May
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`22, 2014) (finding that petitioners’ “brief summary, and quotations, citations and
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`reproduced figures from” the prior art failed to “(1) specify sufficiently where each
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`element of independent claim 1 is found in [the prior art], and (2) constitute a
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`detailed explanation of the significance of the quotations, citations, and figures
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`from [the prior art].”). Apple’s Petition should be denied based on these same
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`substantive defects.
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`B. Apple’s Petition Should Be Denied Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`The Office may deny institution of an IPR if the same or similar prior art has
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`already been presented in another Office proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (“In
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`determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under . . . chapter 31
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`[addressing IPR, among other things], the Director may take into account whether,
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`and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior
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`art or arguments previously were presented to the Office” (emphases added)); see
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`also 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48765 (Aug. 14, 2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 48680, 48685,
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`48702 (Aug. 14, 2012). The purpose of this provision is to avoid “serial
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`challenges” and the resulting burden on the patent owner and Office in managing
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`multiple proceedings involving the same patent. (Ex. 2011 (157 Cong. Rec.
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`S1041-42 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).)
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`Given the inefficiencies and inequities that arise when a patent is serially
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`challenged, the Board has denied institution of IPR when a petition raises grounds
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`similar to those raised in previous Office proceedings. For example, in Intelligent
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`Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., IPR2013-00324, Paper No. 19 (Nov.
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`21, 2013), the Board declined to institute the IPR. The petition asserted six prior
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`art references. Id. at 3. Three were cited by the same petitioner in an earlier IPR
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`petition, and three were newly cited. Id. Even though three of the six prior art
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`references were newly cited, the two petitions “presented the same, or substantially
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`the same, prior art and arguments to the Office,” so institution was inappropriate
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 6-7.
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`Apple’s two parallel petitions for inter partes review of the ’180 patent (this
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`Petition and the one in Case No. IPR2014-00482) are the fourth wave of
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`challenges at the Office against the ’180 patent, and they present exactly the type
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`of serial validity challenge that Congress sought to forestall through 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 325(d). Microsoft Corporation first initiated inter partes reexamination Control
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`No. 95/001,270, challenging claims of the ’180 patent. The Office confirmed all
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`challenged claims without amendment. (Ex. 1001.) The ’180 patent is currently
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`the subject of pending inter partes reexamination Control No. 95/001,792 filed by
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`Cisco. Microsoft has also filed two requests for inter partes review against the
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`’180 patent (Case Nos. IPR2014-00401 and IPR2014-00405). Given these three
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`prior sets of challenges to the ’180 patent—several of which remain pending
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`before the Office—Apple’s Petition seeking a fourth set of reviews should be
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`denied.
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`In addition, as in Intelligent Bio-Systems, here Apple relies on prior art
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`already presented to the Office. In this Petition, Apple relies on Provino, which is
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`a reference that was considered by the Examiner during the first reexamination of
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`the ’180 patent. (Ex. 1023 at 729.) The Examiner stated that he considered
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`Provino (id. at 970), but he apparently concluded that Provino was not worthy of a
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`rejection. A different examiner in the second reexamination of the ’180 patent also
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`considered Provino. (Ex. 1024 at 164.) This second examiner also had the benefit
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`of reviewing several claim charts applying Provino to other patents in the same
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`family as the ’180 patent. (Id. at 189, 196, 199-201, 204, 206.) Nonetheless, the
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`second examiner likewise did not reject the claims based on Provino.
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`Similarly, the Office also considered RFC 2543 and claim charts applying it
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`to other patents in the same family as the ’180 patent during reexamination. (Ex.
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`1023 at 978-79 (in 95/001,270); Ex. 1024 at 169, 171-73, 183, 197, and 210 (in
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`95/001,792).) Apple’s current Petition requests that the Office consider Provino
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`and RFC 2543 yet again in relation to the ’180 patent, but the Board should reject
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`this request under Section 325(d).
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`Congress did not intend for the Office to become a venue for endless validity
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`challenges and bullying of patent owners. Instead, by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 325(d),
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`Congress appreciated the need for efficient use of Office resources and the
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`diminishing value of serial challenges to the same patent. With two inter partes
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`reexaminations and four inter partes review petitions filed against the ’180 patent,
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`this is exactly the type of situation contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Especially
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`in view of the duplicative prior art at issue, 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and sound Office
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`policy justify denying the Petition.
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`C. The Board Should Not Institute Based on the Petition’s
`Redundant Grounds
`The Petition does not include a section addressing redundancy, and Apple
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`does not attempt to explain why the horizontally and vertically redundant grounds
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`it proposes should be instituted. Giving no justification based on the Board’s
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`jurisprudence regarding redundancy, Apple’s redundant grounds should be
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`rejected.
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`The Board does not consider redundant grounds of rejection because it must
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`issue a final written decision within one year of institution (or 18 months for good
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`cause). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003,
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`Paper No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2012). Redundant grounds place a significant burden on the
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`Board and the patent owner, and cause unnecessary delay that jeopardizes meeting
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`the statutory deadline for final written decisions. Id.
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`Because “[t]he Board seeks to streamline and converge issues at all phases
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`of the proceeding . . . at [the] time of institution the Board analyzes the petition on
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`a claim-by-claim, ground-by-ground basis, to eliminate redundant grounds.” Idle
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`Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Paper No. 26 at 3 (June 11,
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`2013). The redundancy inquiry does not focus on “whether the applied prior art
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`disclosures have differences, for it is rarely the case that the disclosures of different
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`prior art references, will be literally identical.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web
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`Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3 (June 5, 2013). Instead, the Board
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`considers “whether the petitioner articulated a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” Id. at 3-4. The petitioner carries the
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`burden of articulating that “meaningful distinction.” ScentAir Techs., Inc. v.
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`Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
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`In Liberty Mutual, the Board identified two types of redundant rejections:
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`(1) “horizontally” redundant rejections and (2) “vertically” redundant rejections.
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`Liberty Mutual, CBM2012-00003, Paper No. 7 at 3. The Board explained that
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`horizontally redundant rejections apply “a plurality of prior art references . . . not
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`in combination to complement each other but as distinct and separate alternatives.”
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`Id. Vertical redundancy “exists when there is assertion of an additional prior art
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`reference to support another ground of unpatentability when a base ground already
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`has been asserted against the same claim without the additional reference and the
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`Petitioner has not explained what are the relative strength and weakness of each
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`ground.” Id. at 12.
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`Here, Apple’s Petition is horizontally redundant in view of its petition in
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`IPR2014-00482 (“the ’482 Petition”). In this Petition, Apple alleges that Provino
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`anticipates claims 1, 10, 12-15, 17, 26, 28-31, and 33. Yet in the ’482 Petition,
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`Apple alleges that Kiuchi anticipates an overlapping group of claims, namely
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`claims 1, 4, 10, 12-15, 17, 20, 26, 28-31, 33, and 35. Further, the present Petition
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`contends that Provino in view of two other references renders obvious claims 4, 6,
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`20, 22, 35, and 37. And in the ’482 Petition, Apple contends that the same claims,
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`and others, are obvious based on Kiuchi in view of other references. Apple’s
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`Provino-based grounds of rejection are horizontally redundant in view of its
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`Kiuchi-based grounds of rejection. Apple’s Provino-based grounds of rejection are
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`also horizontally redundant in view of the Petition’s RFC 2543-based grounds of
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`rejection, which cover an overlapping set of claims. In addition, Apple’s Petition
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`is horizontally redundant in view of Microsoft’s two petitions challenging common
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`claims of the ’180 patentIPR2014-00401 and IPR2014-00405.
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`The Petition also proposes vertically redundant grounds. For claims 1, 4, 6,
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`10, 12-15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 28-31, 33, 35, and 37, the Petition asserts both an
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`anticipation ground based on RFC 2543 and an obviousness ground based on the
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`same reference in combination with three other references.
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`Apple does not attempt to “articulate[] a meaningful distinction in terms of
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`relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
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`disclosures to one or more claim limitations.” EMC Corp. v. Personal Web Techs.,
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`LLC, IPR2013-00087, Paper No. 25 at 3-4 (June 5, 2013) (emphases added).
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`Consequently, the Board should deny Apple’s redundant grounds. ScentAir
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`Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper No. 18 at 3 (Aug. 26, 2013).
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`D. Apple Asserts an Anticipation Ground Based on Three
`Documents, Contrary to Basic Anticipation Law
`Apple proposes an anticipation ground based on RFC 2543 “considered
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`alone or in conjunction with” two other documentsRFC 1889 and RFC 2327.
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`(Pet. at 13-14.) This ground should be rejected because, “[f]or a prior art reference
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`to anticipate a claim, the reference must disclose each claim limitation in a single
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`document.” Apple Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013). Moreover, Apple’s unexplained theory of incorporation by reference fails.
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`RFC 2543, RFC 1889, and RFC 2327 are three separate documents. While
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`Apple asserts an anticipation ground based on RFC 2543, it acknowledges that it
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`may be relying on RFC 1889 and RFC 2327 in its theory of anticipation. (Pet. at
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`40-41.) Indeed, Apple’s declarant cites features of RFC 1889 and RFC 2327
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`intermittently in his discussion of RFC 2543. (See, e.g., Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 473, 474,
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`476-78, 480, 485-87, 524, 545, 549, 599, 650, 701.) By relying on three separate
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`documents to purportedly show anticipation, Apple violates a basic tenet of
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`anticipation law.
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`Apple’s suggestion that RFC 2543 incorporates RFC 1889 and RFC 2327 by
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`reference is also incorrect. While Apple’s Petition nowhere attempts to explain the
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`purported basis for its incorporation-by-reference theory, RFC 2543 itself confirms
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`that Apple’s theory is incorrect. RFC 2543’s Introduction section notes that “SIP
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`is designed as part of the overall IETF multimedia data and control architecture
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`currently incorporating protocols such as” those described in RFC 1889 and RFC
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`2327. (Ex. 1033 at 8.) The very next sentence, however, makes clear that RFC
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`2543 does not even depend on those protocols. (See id., “However, the
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`functionality and operation of SIP does not depend on any of these protocols.”
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`(emphasis added).)
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`Moreover, there is no incorporation-by-reference language anywhere in RFC
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`2543. In view of both Apple’s absence of explanation, and the contrary statements
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`in RFC 2543 itself, Apple’s incorporation-by-reference theory falls short of the
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`requirement that “the host document must identify with detailed particularity what
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`specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in
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`the various documents.” Apple, 725 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Advanced Display Sys.,
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`Case No. IPR2014-00481
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`Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); )); see also
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`Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n; 545 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008) (“The record evidence suggests that the GSM standard is not a single
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`reference. The different specifications that comprise the GSM standard were
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`authored by different subsets of authors at different times. Indeed, the GSM
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`standard includes hundreds of individual specifications drafted by approximately
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`ten different subgroups, each with its own title and separate page numbering. Each
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`specification, though part of the greater GSM standard, stands as a separate
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`document in its own right.”). Accordingly, Apple’s proposed anticipation ground
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`based on RFC 2543 should be denied.
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`III. The Petition’s Claim Constructions Are Flawed and Should Be Rejected
`Apple proposes several defective claim constructions that do not represent
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`the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) of the claims. Because it is based
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`on incorrect claim constructions, the Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable
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`likelihood of prevailing for any claim of the ’180 patent.
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`A. Overview of the ’180 Patent
`The ’180 patent discloses several embodiments relating to ac