May 23, 1981: At its annual convention, in New Orieans, PATCO set a Jan 21 deadline for reaching
`agreement on a new contract with FAA. PATCO President Robert Poii said if agreement was not
`reached by that date the union would poll its members for a strike vote. Newspapers quoted Poli as vowing
`that the "the skies will be silent" if FAA's negotiators did not "come to their senses." (See Apr 28, 1981,
`and Jun 18, 1981.)
`
`May 26, 1981: FAA banned any new long—haul airiine flights to or from Washington National
`Airport pending issuance by the Department of Transportation of a new Metropolitan Washington Airports
`Policy. The ban preserved a policy, begun in 1966 and condoned voluntarily, under which nonstop flights
`to and from National were limited to a perimeter with a 650-mile radius, with certain exceptions. FAA
`acted to preserve Nat.ionai's traditional role as a short-haul airport in the face of a decision by three carriers-
`-American, Pan Am, and Braniffwto inaugurate nonstop flights into National from Houston and Dallas,
`each of which would have exceeded 1,000 miles. (See Sep 1, 1966, and Dec 6, £981.)
`
`May 28. 1981: At a meeting on this date. Adrnirustrator Helms directed a change in policy on acquisition
`of space for the planned Automated Flight Service Stations, known as AFSSS (see Apr 2, 1980).
`In
`addition to building and owning the facilities, FAA would also lease space at airports from municipalities,
`airport operators, private parties, or government agencies at the state or Federal level. FAA would seek
`competitive bids to obtain the most favorable rates.
`(See Oct 2, 1981, and Nov I982.)
`
`Inn 12, 1981: FAA announced a planned regionai consolidation, to be effective Jul 1, that would reduce
`the number of regional headquarters from eleven to six (see Apr 2, 1971). The headquarters at New York,
`Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and Honolulu would be phased out, and their functions merged with the
`remaining sites. Boston would take over the functions of New York, and Kansas City would assume those
`of Chicago. Seattle would take over the functions of Denver, Los Angeles, and Honolulu. The regional
`offices at Anchorage, Atlanta, and Fort Worth would remain essentially unchanged. The plan aroused
`political opposition, and FAA agreed to review the decision. (See Sep 4, 1981.]
`
`Jun 17, 1981: PATCO rejected a Reagan Administration contract propose} as inadequate and broke
`off informal talks with representatives of FAA. The informal talks, conducted irregularly since the break in
`formal talks on Apr 28, were heid under the aegis of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. (See
`Jun 18, 1981, and Jun 22, 1981.)
`
`Jun 18, 1981: The U.S. District Court rejected a PATCO motion to vacate the injunction restraining
`the anion from engaging in illegal job actions or strikes (see Jun 21, 1978). PATCO moved to have the
`injunction lifted on the grounds that it had been superceded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
`which gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority original jurisdiction in Federal
`iabor-management
`disputes. (See May 23, 1981, and Jun 17, 1981.)
`
`Jun 22, 1981: Department of Transportation and PATCO representatives reached agreement on a
`tentative new contract after a marathon bargaining session, thus averting a threatened nationwide strike by
`PATCO-affiliated controllers that had been scheduled to begin at 7 a.rn., Monday, Jun 22.
`Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis and PATCO President Robert Poli had gone back to
`the bargaining table Friday evening, Jun 19, at the behest of Representative James J. Howard (D-N.J.),
`chairman of the House Public Works Committee. The resumption of talks may also have been prompted
`by a letter to Poli from 36 U.S. Senators, stating that a strike by PATCO "will do nothing to further your
`goals of increased pay and changes in working conditions." The bargaining sessions, which took place at
`the offices of the Federai Mediation and Conciliation Service and were joined in by Federal mediator
`Kenneth Moffett, lasted more than 25 hours, with the last session running past 3 a.rn., Monday.
`The agreement contained four key provisions, which the Reagan Administration agreed to
`recommend to Congress:
`* A "responsibility" differential that would give controllers 42 hours pay for each normal 40-
`hour week worked.
`
`* An increase in the night differential from 10 to 15 percent of base pay.
`* The exclusion of overtime, night differential, and Sunday and holiday pay from the
`limitations of the Federal pay cap.
`* A retraining allowance equivalent to 14 weeks of base pay for controllers who became
`rnedicaliy disqualified after five consecutive years of service at the journeyman level or
`above and who were ineligible for retirrnent or disability compensation.
`
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`The first-year cost of the total package, which included a cost-of-living raise of 4.8 percent
`clue Federal civil service employees in October, came to approximately $40 million or, on the average,
`$4.000 per controller per year. PATCO had been seeking a package that would have cost the goverrunent.
`initially, in excess of $700 million peryear. (See Jun 17, 1981, and Jul 2, 1981.)
`
`Jun 23, 1981: Administrator Helms announced FAA‘s decision to adopt the Threat Alert and Collision
`Avoidance System, soon renamed the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The
`TCAS system was an evolutionary improvement of the Beacon Collision Avoidance System (BCAS) that
`the agency had been developing (see Mar 1976). Like BCAS, TCAS would work in conjunction with the
`Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) transponder already in wide use.
`It would also be
`compatible with the next-generation transponder, originally designated the Discrete Address Beacon
`System (DABS) and later known as Mode S (see Dec 27, l978, and Oct 5, 1984).
`Two types of the new collision avoidance system were planned. TCAS I, intended for general
`aviation use, would in its basic form simply alert the pilot to the proximity of another aircraft carrying
`TCAS I or a conventional ATCRBS transponder. More expensive TCAS I versions would have some
`ability to provide certain data on the altitude and/or "o'clock" position of threat aircraft. TCAS It would
`provide more sophisticated advisories,
`including data on range and bearing of transponder-equipped
`aircraft. When the transponder aboard the threat aircraft had altitude-reporting capability, TCAS II‘s
`advisories would also include altitude data In the case of two aircraft equipped with TCAS II, coordinated
`advisories would be provided. TCAS H would suggest vertical escape manuevers. If feasible, the system
`might be enhanced to include both vertical and horizontal escape manuevers, a version later designated
`TCAS III. TCAS was expected to overcome a fundamental limitation of BCAS by its ability to operate
`cfiectively even in the highest air traffic densities. This modified the need for a new ground-based
`collision avoidance system, and led to discontinuance of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and
`Resolution System (ATARS) project, originally known as Intermittent Positive Control (see Mar 4,
`1976).
`
`On Nov 13, 1981, FAA announced a contract with Bendix Corporation to provide two TCAS
`II engineering models to be tested and then enhanced to advise pilots of horizontal escape rnanuevers. (See
`Mar 18, 1987.)
`
`Jul 2, 1981: PATCO's nine-member executive board recommended unanimously that the union's
`members reject the tentative contract agreed to on Jun 22 by PATCO President Robert Poli and
`Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis. Poli also voted to reject the contract, although he had stated that
`he was pleased with the settlement at the time of its negotiation, On Jul 29, PATCO announced that its
`members rejected the tentative contract by a vote of 13,495 to 616. Two days later, on Jul 31, PATCO
`President Robert Poli announced at a press conference in Washington that his union would go on a
`nationwide strike beginning on Monday, Aug 3, unless the government met PATCO's demands.
`(See Jun
`22. 1981, and Aug 3, 1981.)
`
`
`In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Jul 30, 1981:
`Circuit struck down an attempt by the State of California to impose more stringent noise rules at Lindbergh
`Field than those imposed by Lindbergh‘s proprietor. The court's decision included a rationale for the
`"Burbank exception" (see May 14, E973). Noting that the US. Supreme Court had held in Griggs v.
`A]legl_tenv that airport proprietors can be held liable for the noise produced by aircraft using their facilities
`(see Mar 5, 1962), the Court observed that "faimess dictates that they must also have power to insulate
`themselves from that liability." At the same time,
`the Court set forth criteria that determine airport
`proprietorship, including "ownership, operation, promotion, and the ability to acquire necessary approach
`easements."
`If a local or state entity possessed these characteristics, then it also possessed power to
`regulate noise.
`In the case of Lindbergh Field, however, the State of California did not possess these
`characteristics, having entrusted them to the San Diego Unified Port District.
`On Sep 23, 1981, in Santa Monica Air_-mrt Association v. ggity of Santa Monica, the same
`Court reaffirmed the "Burbank exception" by upholding aircraft-noise abatement ordinances and a night
`curfew on ta.keofi‘s and landings imposed by the City of Santa Monica, which owned and operated t.he local
`airport. In reaching this decision, the Court again emphasized that "municipal airport owners needed some
`means of limiting their liability under Griggs." The Court did strike down, however, a categorical ban on
`all jet aircraft as violating the Commerce and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.
`(See Aug 24,
`1983)
`
`Aug 1, 1981: Michael J. Fencllo became FAA's Deputy Administrator, succeeding Quentin S. Taylor
`(see May 4, l977). A native of Rochester, N.Y., Fenello was a graduate of Buffalo State Teachers College
`
`MPCS|NV0006187
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`
`and held a Master's degree in Administration and Supervision from New York University. He was a junior
`high school teacher before starting a 38-year career with Eastern Air Lines in Jan 1943. Fenello began as a
`capital, rose to captain, and later served as a flight
`instructor and supervisor of flying before being
`promoted in 1963 to Assistant Operations Manager in New York. The following year, he was named
`Director of Administration for Flight Operations, with headquarters in Miami.
`In 1968, Fenello became
`Assistant to the Vice President, Operations Group, and in 1972 was promoted to Vice President, Operations
`Control. From 1976 until his retirement from Eastern in Feb 1981, he served as Vice President for System
`Operations and Safety. Fenello was FAA’s Deputy Administrator for two years and 9 months, resigning
`effective May 1, 1984. (See Dec 23. 1983, and Dec I3, 1934.)
`
`Aug 3, 1981: Nearly 12,300 members of the £5,000-member Professional Air Traffic Controllers
`Organization (PATCO) went on strike, beginning at 7 a.m., EST, grounding approximately 35 percent of
`the nation's 14,200 daily commercial flights. The controllers struck after the failure of eleventh hour
`negotiations, which began 2 p.m. Sunday, Aug 2, and continued, with one break, past 2 am. Monday, Aug
`3. Shortly before 11 am. on Aug 3, at an impromptu news conference, President Reagan issued the
`strikers a finn ultimatum: return to work within 48 hours or face permanent dismissal. The government
`moved swiftly on three fronts -— civil, criminal, and adnrirtistraiive -- to bring the full force of the law to
`bear on the strikers. In a series of legal steps, Federal ofiicials:
`to decertify PATCO as the
`* Asked the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)
`bargaining agent for the 17,200 controllers and controller staff members.
`* Moved to impound the union's $3.5 million strike fund.
`* Filed criminal complaints in Federal courts in eleven cities against twenty—two PATCO
`officials.
`
`* Sought restraining orders against the strikers in thirty-three courts.
`Even before the 7 am. walkout, a U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia signed an
`order directing the controllers to return to work. Late in the evening on Aug 3, another judge of the same
`court found the union in contempt for failing to obey the first order and imposed an accelerating schedule
`of fines totaling $4.7 million if the controllers failed to report to work ($250,000 for Tuesday, August 4;
`$500,000 for Wednesday; $1 million a day for the next four days). That judge also fined PATCO President
`Robert Poli $1,000 a day for each day the strike continued, through Sunday, Aug 9. Approximately 875
`controllers returned to work during the 48 hour grace period granted. After expiration of the grace period,
`about 11,400 controllers were dismissed. Most of those fired appeaied the action, and 440 were eventually
`reinstated as a resuit of their appeals.
`The strike and dismissals drastically curtailed FAA’s controller workforce. According to
`DOT’s FY1982 annual report, the firings reduced the number of controllers at the full performance or
`developmental level from about l6,375 to about 4,200. To keep the airways open, approximately 3,000
`ATC supervisory personnel worked at controlling traffic.
`FAA assigned assistants to support
`the
`controllers, and accelerated the hiring and training of new air traffic personnel. Military controllers arrived
`at FAA facilities soon after the strike began, and about 800 were ultimately assigned to the agency. The
`combined force was sufficiently large to handle traffic without activating the National Air Traffic Control
`Contingency Plan, which called for FAA itself to establish rigid, severely curtailed airline schedules and to
`prescribe routes and altitudes.
`The day the strike began, FAA adopted Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 44,
`establishing provisions for inrplernenting an interim air traffic control operations plan (see Feb 18,
`1982). That plan allowed FAA, among others things, to limit the number of aircraft in the national airspace
`system. Hence, on Aug 5, the agency implemented a plan dubbed "Flow Control 50," whereby air carriers
`were required to cancel approximately 50 percent of their scheduled peak-hour flights at 22 major airports.
`FAA maintained an en route horizontal spacing between aircraft under instrument flight rules of up to 30
`miles. Aircraft were kept on the ground, as necessary, to maintain this spacing. FAA gave priority to
`medical emergency flights, Presidential flights, flights transporting critical FAA employees, and flights
`dictated by military necessity. General aviation flights operated under the severest restrictions. Aircraft
`with a gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or less were prohibited from flying under instrument flight
`rules; moreover, aircraft flying under visual flight nrles were prohibited from entering terminal controi
`areas. Other general aviation aircraft were served, as conditons permitted, on a first-corne~first—served
`basis. (See Jul 2, 1981, and Sep 4, 1981.)
`
`Aug 6, 1981: The Civil Aeronautics Board approved acquisition of Continental Airlines by Texas
`Intenrationai, a subsidiary of Frank Lorenzo's holding company, Texas Air‘.
`The transaction was
`consumated in Oct 1981. A year later, Lorenzo merged Texas intemationa1's operations into those of
`the much larger Continental. (See Sep 24, 1983)
`
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`Aug 13, 1981: President Reagan signed the Fiscal Year 1981 Airport Development Authorization Act
`(Title XI of PL. 97-35) which briefly renewed the Airport Development Aid Program. The iaw
`authorized S450 miliion in grants from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund for airport development,
`planning, and noise compatibility projects during fiscal 1981.
`It also specified that at least $25 million be
`used for noise compatibility grants, and forbade future authorization in excess of $600 million for fiscal
`1982.
`
`FAA had only until the end of Sep 30, 1981, to allocate the $450 million, plus another $9
`million resulting from adjustments to prior year's grants. The agency approved 622 new grants and 181
`amendments to previous grants, for a total of $450.4 million. FAA was unable to allocate the whole
`amount because one airport sponsor did not use all the money specifically set aside for it in the legislation.
`(See Sep 3, 1982).
`
`Sep 4, 1981: FAA announced a revised regional consolidation plan under which the number of regions
`would be reduced from eieven to nine. The original plan would have resulted in only six regions (see Jun
`12, 1931), but FAA stated that this had been modified due to the more pressing need to rebuild the air
`Lrnffic control system in the wake of the PATCO controllers strike (see Aug 3, 1981). The consolidation
`was detailed in a notice issued on Sep 29. Under the new pian, FAA combined the existing Pacific«Asia
`and Western Regions into a new Western-Pacific Region with headquarters in Los Angeles, and closed the
`Honolulu regional office. The agency also combined the existing Rocky Mountain and Northwest Regions
`into a new Northwest Mountain Region with lteadquarters in Seattle, and closed the Denver regional office.
`It also reassigned the states of North and South Dakota from the Rocky Mountain to the Great Lakes
`Region. Operations under the new concept began on Oct 1, and all physical relocation was scheduled for
`completion by the end of Aug 1982.
`
`Sep 4, 1981: FAA announced it would hire approximately 1,500 temporary employees, inciutiing
`furloughed airline pilots, to assist in replacing air traffic controllers fired for striking. The temporary
`employees would not control traffic, but would perform duties related to flight strip disu-ibution and other
`controller support functions.
`(See Aug 3, 1981, and Oct 2, 1981.)
`
`Sep 11, 1981: Federal Aviation Regulation Part 108, a new nrle on airline security, went into effect. The
`regulation levied airline security requirements according to the perceived threat facing different types of
`operations and sizes of aircraft, and established security safeguards appropriate to the various types of
`comrnercial passenger operations. Also on this date, FAA approved a new concept allowing airport
`operators to position law enforcement officers farther from passenger screening checkpoints provided
`certain conditions were fulfilled (see Mar 29, 1979).
`
`Sep 26, 1981: The twin—engine Boeing 767 made its first flight. On Jul 30, 1982, FAA certificated the
`aircraft. the first entirely new U.S. commercial transport design in more than a decade. The 767 began its
`first revenue service on Sep 8 of that year with United Air Lines. On Jul 14, 1978, United Airlines had
`placed the largest order to date for a single commercial airplane, when it made a $1.2 billion order for the
`airliner.
`
`Sep 30, 1981: During fiscal year 1981, which ended on this date, FAA added two major new capabilities
`to the en route air traffic control system: minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW), already a feature
`of the ARTS III terminal system (see Oct 28, 1977); and arrival metering, a function that provided the
`controller with computer advisories to help in managing the flow of traffic into congested terminal areas.
`
`Oct 2, 1981: FAA announced the award of two contracts to E-Systems for computer systems for 61
`automated flight service stations (AFSS). The agency planned that the existing network of over 300
`stations would eventually be consolidated into the 61 automated facilities. The equipment to be produced
`by E-Systems would provide flight service specialists with rapid retrieval of data needed to brief pilots,
`presenting the information on television-like displays. Production was to be in two stages. Model 1, with
`capability of displaying weather and aeronautical alphanumeric data, would be implemented at 41 sites.
`Later, all 61 sites would get Model 2, which would add a second display for weather radar, charts, and
`other graphics. Model 2 would also include the capability for demonstrating direct access by pilots to the
`computer data base from remote computer terminals. The computers for both models were to be installed
`at air route traffic control centers and connected by leased telephone lines to the flight service stations.
`(See May 28, 1981, and Nov 1982.)
`
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`Oct 2, 1981: FAA announced a $10 million contract with the University of Oklahoma to help train new
`air traffic controllers to replace those fired for participating in the illegal strike. The University would
`provide FAA-certificated instructors as supplemental staffing for the FAA Academy. The agreement
`proved to be the first in a series of controller training contracts with the University.
`(See Sep 4, 1981, and
`Oct22,198lJ
`
`Oct 6, 1981: Blanche W. Noyes died. One of the nation's early female pilots, she was probabiy the first
`woman pilot to have a career in the U.S. government. Noyes was known for her work in the air marking
`program during 35 years with FAA and its predecessors. She participated in many aviation events and
`races, winning the 1936 Bendix Air Race, was a founder of the Ninety—Niiies, Inc, an organization
`established to encourage women in aviation. Her many awards included the Department of Commerce's
`gold medal for exceptional service in 1956, and induction into the Aviation Halt of Fame in 1970.
`
`Oct 19, 1981: FAA placed a Genera} Aviation Reservation (GAR) plan in effect, because the number of
`private aircraft flying in the syteni increased substantially after the controllers’ strike. General aviation
`pilots who wished to fly under air traffic control were required to make reservations under a quota based on
`the percentage of flights that aircraft in their category had "flown prior to the PATCO strike of Aug 3, 1981
`(see that date). The restriction became necessary as non-airline pilots, some of whom had refrained from
`using the air traffic control system at the strike's beginning, began to increase operations. After two weeks
`under the GAR plan, FAA announced that the number of private aircraft flying in the system had been
`reduced to approximately the pre-strike level, and that the plan had helped to cut delays for both airline and
`private flights.
`(See Dec 31, 1983.)
`
`The Federal Labor Relations Authority dcccrtified the Professional Air Traffic
`Oct 22, 1981:
`Controllers Association, depriving the union of the right to represent its members. Following a temporary
`stay by a Federal Appeals Court, the deceztification became effective on Oct 27. (See Oct 2, 1981, and Dec
`3i. 1981.)
`
`Nov l, 1981: Effective this date, Administrator Helms designated four aircraft certification directorntcs.
`The directorates assumed the certification responsibilities previously assigned to the lead and certtficating
`regions tinder the lead region concept (see Jan 1, 1980}. They also received additional respornibilities to
`strengthen and streamline the certification process. The directorates were managed by the directors of the
`following regions: Central (for aircraft under 12,500 lbs.); Northwest Mountain (for transport aircraft);
`Southwest (for rotorcraft); and New England (for engines and propellers). The authority of the directorates
`extended beyond regional boundaries. For example, aircraft certification offices in the Central, Southern,
`and Great Lakes regions reported directly to the Small Airplane Certification Directorate at the Central
`Region headquarters. FAA formaliy established the directorates by an order dated Feb 1, 1982, and on Mar
`9 issued a news release stating that the directorate system had become operational.
`
`Nov 2, 1981: Effective this date, FAA reestaiiiished 12 inches as the required height for registration
`marks (N-numbers) on fixed-wing aircraft. This size requirement had originally been established by a rule
`published on Jan 6, 1961.
`In 1977, however, the size of the N—nurnbe-rs was reduced to 3 inches for small
`airplanes with speeds not greater than 180 knots. The agency permitted this reduction in response to the
`Experimental Aircraft Association's concern to improve the aesthetic appearance of small aircraft. FAA
`reestablished the 12 inch height after complaints from citizens, law enforcement agencies, and the Defense
`Department demonstrated that timely and positive visual identification was compromised by the smalier
`iuarkings.
`To avoid undue cost, however, FAA allowed owners of existing and certain newly-
`manufactured aircraft to dispiay the smaller N—numbers until the aircraft was repainted or its marks were
`restored, repainted, or changed. The new requirement for 12 inch numbers did not affect existing rules on
`special marking procedures for certain aircraft that were amateur-built, unusualiy configured, over 30 years
`old, or operated for exliibition.
`
`Nov 9-12, 1981: Ben L. Abruzo, Larry Newman, Ron Clark, and Rocky Aoki made the first balloon
`crossing of the Pacific, a trip from Nagashirna, Japan, to near Covelo, Calif, in Double Eagel V.
`
`Nov 20, 1981: Effective this date, FAA permitted biind airiine passengers to use certain approved
`methods of storing their canes at their seats. The agency had declined to permit this in an earlier rule
`(see May 16, 1977), deciding instead that the long utility canes should be handed over to flight attendants
`to be secured during takeoff and landing. This policy amused considerable opposition, particularly from
`the National Federation of the Blind (NFB). The NFB petitioned FAA on the issue, and filed suit when the
`
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`
`petition was denied. Meanwhile, more than 100 blind persons and their supporters picketed FAA°s national
`headquarters on Jul 5, 1978, to protest the cane policy. In Jan 1979, a U.S. court granted FAA’s request for
`time to reconsider the issue. After testing by the agency’s Civil Aeromeclical Institute {CAMI)_. FAA in
`Nov 1980 proposed a rule permitting accesibte storage of the canes. The agency announced the final nile
`on Jul 24, 1981.
`
`Nov 30, 1981: FAA "decornbined" the last domestic combined stationftower (CS/T). Located at Valdez,
`Alaska, the CS/1" had been the final survivor of a program begun by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
`under which air traffic control
`towers were consolidated with airway communication stations,
`the
`forerunners of flight service stations (see Aug 8, 1950). The number of CS/T's had been declining since
`1958.
`
`In the making since
`Dec 6, 1981: A new Metropolitan Washington Airports Policy became effective.
`1978 (see Mar 23, 1978), the new policy differed only in a few respects with the policy proposed by the
`Carter Administration in 1980. The overall objectives of both the Caner and Reagan policies were to
`reduce the noise impact of operations at Washington National, maintain National's longstanding status as a
`short-haul airport, and promote better utilization of Dulles. The policy placed no restrictions on Dulles,
`while putting the following limitations on National:
`* A [6 million cap on the number of passengers enplaning and deplaning per year (compared
`to 17 million under the Carter plan).
`* A ntaxinuun of 60 landing slots per hour distributed as follows: Part 121 air carriers, 37;
`Part 135 corruuuter air carriers and air taxis, 11;. general aviation, 12.
`(Compared to the
`Carter plan, this gave Part 121 operators one more slot and Part 135 operators one less.)
`* Extension of the nonstop service perimeter rule from a radius of 650 to 1,000 miles (see
`Oct 30, 1986).
`Whereas the Caner plan would have lifted the ban on 2- and 3-engine widebody jets at
`National, the Reagan plan retained the ban. Moreover, the new adrninistration eliminated the Caner plan's
`restrictions on night-time arrivals and departures; instead, it limited operations at National between 10:00
`p.rn. and 7:00 a.rn. to aircraft that generated no more noise than 73 dBA on takeoti‘ and 85 dBA on
`approach. The noise limitations, which become effective on Mar 1, 1982, initially had the efifect of
`excluding jet operations at the airport during the specified hours. (See Aug 31, 1983.)
`
`Dec 9, 1981: President Reagan rescinded a three—year prohibition of any Federal employment of
`controllers dismissed for participation in the PATCO strike (see Aug 3, 1981); however, the fired
`controllers were still barred from employment with FAA.
`
`Dec 29, 1981: President Reagan suspended the U.S. landing rights of the Soviet airline Aeroflot as
`part of sanctions enacted in response to repression in Poland. The action came soon after a temporary one-
`week suspension of Aeroflofs US. operations imposed during November because of violations of the
`prescribed routes.
`(See .lun 19, 1973, and Apr 29, 1986)
`
`The Federal Labor Relations Authority certified the Professional Airway Systems
`Dec 31:, 1981
`Specialists (PASS) as the exclusive representative of FAA's electronics technicians.
`In a July election,
`PASS had defeated the Federal Aviation Science and Technological Association, known as FASTA (see
`Oct 5, 1976); however, PASS's certification was delayed by objections filed by FASTA. FAA and PASS
`concluded a national labor agreement during fiscal 1984. (See May 1, 1991.)
`
`Dec 3 1, 198i: Robert E. Poli resigned as president of PATCO. (See Oct 22, 1981, and Jul 2, 1982.)
`
`Dec 31, 1981: The end of this day mariced the completion of the second consecutive calendar year with
`no fatal airplane crashes by scheduled air carriers operating under Federal Aviation Regulations
`Part 121--an unprecedented two-year record. Despite the absence of fatal crashes, however, Part 121
`operations involved four varied mishaps in and around aircraft that each claimed one life in 1981. (See Dec
`31, 1980, and Dec 31, 1993.)
`
`Jan 13, 1982: A Boeing 737 operated by Air Florida crashed near Washington National Airport
`shortly after taking off during snowfall. The aircraft hit a bridge, killing 4 persons in vehicles, and plunged
`
`*1982
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`MPCSWV0006191
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`
`into the icy Potomac River. Of the 79 persons aboard the jet, only four passengers and one flight attendant
`survived. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the crash was
`the crew's failure to use the engine anti-icing system during ground operation and takeoff, their decision to
`take off with snowfice on the airfoil surfaces, and the captain's failure to abort takeoff when his attention
`was called to anoloinoos engine instrument readings. Contributing to the accident were: prolonged delay
`between deicing by ground crew and takeoff, during which the aircraft was exposed to continual snowfall;
`the known piteliup cliaracteristics of the 737 when the leading edge was contaminated by even small
`amounts of snow or ice; and the crew’s limited experience in jet transport winter operations. As a result of
`the accident, FAA and the aviation industry took a number of actions to increase awareness of cold weather
`hazards and the proper response to them.
`(See Dec 12, 1985.)
`
`Jan 23, 1982: In a night landing too far down an icy runway at Boston's Logan airport, a World Airways
`DC-10 slid over the edge of a seawail and into shallow harbor water. The nose section separated from
`the fuselage, and two passengers seated at the separation point were later found to be missing and presumed
`drowned.
`In its original report on the accident the National Transportation Safety Board listed pilot error
`as a contributory factor, but found the probable cause to be the pilot's lack of information on the slippery
`runway conditions. The Board blamed this lack on the airport management and on FAA, citing inadequate
`regulation and air traffic controllers‘ failure to relay runway condition reports. After protests from FAA
`and the airport authority, the Board issued a revised finding that placed somewhat more emphasis on pilot
`error.
`
`Jan 28, 1982: FAA released a National Airspace System Plan (NAS Plan or NASP), a comprehensive 20-
`year blueprint for modernizing the nation's air traffic control and air navigation system The 450-page
`document had been printed the previous month and bore the date Dec 1981.
`It spelled out specific
`improvements to be made to facilities and equipment to meet the projected demands of air transportation.
`Key elements of the plan included:
`* Computers: FAA would first replace the IBM 9020 computers at the air route traffic
`control centers with more powerful computers that could use the existing programs or "software packages."
`The agency would then proceed with development of new software as welt as new consoles and displays
`known as "sector suites." (See Aug 30, 1982.)
`* Facility consolidation: air route traffic control centers and terminal radar control rooms
`would be consolidated from approximately 200 into about 60 by the year 2,000 (see Mar 22, 1983). Flight
`service statio