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`_____________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`_____________________
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`WAVEMARKET, INC. D/B/A LOCATION LABS
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`LOCATIONET SYSTEMS, LTD.
`Patent Owner
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`_____________________
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`_____________________
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`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER'S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
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`
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`Pursuant to the Scheduling Order (Paper No. 19) Petitioner Wavemarket
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`d/b/a Location Labs timely opposes Patent Owner's Motion to Exclude Evidence
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`filed December 30, 2014 ("Motion"). The Patent Owner has moved to exclude the
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`entire Declaration of Petitioner's rebuttal witness, Dr. Craig Rosenberg (Exhibit
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`1020). For at least the reasons explained in detail below, Patent Owner's request to
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`exclude this evidence is entirely without merit.
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`The Board instituted trial of claim 18 of the '970 Patent in its Decision of
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`May 9, 2014 (Paper No. 18, "Decision"). The Board found that Petitioner had
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`adequately shown that the Elliot reference (Exhibit 1003) discloses each and every
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`element of claim 18, including the recited "map database" and "map engine for
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`manipulating said map database." Decision, pp. 16-17. In doing so, the Board did
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`not feel it necessary to construe the well-known terms "database" or "engine."
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`Decision, p. 7. On August 11, 2014 the Patent Owner filed its Response to the
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`petition ("Response"). The only defense offered in the Response is that Elliot fails
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`to disclose a "map database" or "map engine for manipulating said map database."
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`Given the breadth of the claim language on its face, the key to the Patent Owner's
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`strategy is to import limitations into the claims from cherry-picked dictionary
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`definitions introduced through its expert's testimony. On November 10, 2014,
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`Petitioner filed its Reply to the Patent Owner's Response ("Reply"). As part of its
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`Reply, Petitioner introduced the testimony of Dr. Craig Rosenberg ("Roseberg
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`Decl."; Exhibit 1020) as a rebuttal witness. In his role as a rebuttal witness, Dr.
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`Rosenberg's testimony addresses those points raised in the Patent Owner's
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`Response and in the Patent Owner's expert witness declaration. The Rosenberg
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`Decl. is helpful to the finder of fact for at least the reasons that it includes an
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`explanation of how Elliot does in fact disclose the claimed "map database" and
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`"map engine for manipulating said map database," and further includes an
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`explanation of how the Patent Owner's expert overlooks the teachings of Elliot and
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`misinterprets the plain language of the claims.
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`I.
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`GENERAL PRINCIPLES
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`As the movant, the Patent Owner bears the burden of demonstrating that it is
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`entitled to the drastic measure of excluding the entire Rosenberg Decl. 37 C.F.R. §
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`42.20(c).
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`The Board has made it clear that policy considerations favor inclusion and
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`consideration of evidence that is available to the public during these proceedings:
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`There is a strong public policy for making all information filed
`in a non-jury, quasi-judicial administrative proceeding available
`to the public, especially in an inter partes review which
`determines the patentability of claim in an issued patent. It is
`within the Board’s discretion to assign the appropriate weight to
`be accorded to evidence.
`Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., CBM2012-
`00002, Paper No. 66, p. 60.
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`Moreover, these proceedings are heard by a panel of administrative patent
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`judges possessing considerable substantive and procedural expertise who are
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`capable of attributing appropriate weight to all of the evidence of record:
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`We also agree with [patentee] that “the Board, sitting as a non-
`jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to
`determine and assign appropriate weight to the evidence
`presented in this trial, without resorting to formal exclusion that
`might later be held reversible error.” Opp. 1 (citing e.g., S.E.C.
`v. Guenthner, 395 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 n.3 (D. Neb. 2005)).
`Id. at p. 70.
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`Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) governs admissibility of
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`expert testimony in these proceedings. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a). Pursuant to Rule
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`702, a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience
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`training or education may testify in the form of an opinion.
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`Finally, challenges to the credibility of a witness and weight of the evidence
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`raised are not appropriate in a motion to exclude. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,633
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`(Aug. 14, 2012); and 77 Fed. Reg. 48,765, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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`II.
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`DR. ROSENBERG IS QUALIFIED TO OFFER EXPERT
`TESTIMONY IN THIS TRIAL UNDER RULE 702
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`FRE 702 reads:
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
`experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
`opinion or otherwise if:
`technical, or other specialized
`(a)
`the expert’s scientific,
`knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
`or to determine a fact in issue;
`(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
`(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
`methods; and
`(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
`the facts of the case.
`(Emphasis added).
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`The Patent Owner argues that Dr. Roseberg does not qualify as a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art, but does not address the correct legal issue of whether Dr.
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`Rosenberg's testimony should be considered pursuant to FRE 702. See, Liberty
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`Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., CBM2013-00004, Paper No. 53,
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`p. 60 ("Liberty has not shown that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
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`requires the witness to have particular experience with the specific subject matter
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`of the . . . patent or requires the relevant experience of the witness to have been
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`acquired during the January 1996 time-frame."); Id. at p. 59 ("It is only the
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`'hypothetical' person of ordinary skill in the art who possesses ordinary skill . . .
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`[t]he qualifications of [the expert], as summarized in his curriculum vitae . . .
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`Patent 6,771,970
`qualify him to give expert testimony . . .). The Patent Owner's motion fails for this
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`reason alone.
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`The Patent Owner falsely alleges on page 3 of its Motion that Dr. Roseberg
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`"admits" that he does not hold a degree in computer science, electrical engineering
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`or any comparable degree. Aside from this assertion being false, it fails to explain
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`why Dr. Rosenberg's testimony is precluded by FRE 702. Dr. Rosenberg's
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`educational background is more that adequate to provide a foundation for
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`understanding, applying and explaining any technical principle at issue in this trial.
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`Dr. Rosenberg possesses a Ph.D., successfully completed a core engineering
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`curriculum of study, and studied more advanced subjects such as computer
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`programming, CAD/CAM, artificial intelligence and computer networks.
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`Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg, Exhibit 2021. One need only
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`look to Dr. Rosenberg's actual work and experience in the field to prove that his
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`educational background is more than sufficient. See, Exhibit 1020, ¶¶4-9. There
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`is no requirement imposed by the FRE that an expert's qualifications perfectly
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`match the field of the patent at issue. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594
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`F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In addition, FRE 702 states that an expert can
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`be qualified to offer opinion testimony "by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
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`or education." Thus, FRE 702 recognizes that it is the overall qualifications of an
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`individual that should be examined. The Patent Owner arguments concerning Dr.
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`Rosenberg's educational background as being different form the definitions of a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art are misplaced and unavailing.
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`The Patent Owner makes the even more outlandish argument that Dr.
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`Rosenberg lacks adequate work experience to qualify as an expert pursuant to the
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`FRE. Motion, p. 4. Dr. Rosenberg's experience includes: (i) 19 years as a
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`technical consultant in areas including software engineering and design,
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`programming, and user interface design, applied to domains including mobile
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`devices (Rosenberg Decl., ¶5); (ii) a technical consultant for Boeing in areas
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`including systems architecture and mapping software, networking,
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`communications, and mobile computing (Rosenberg Decl., ¶6); (iii) systems
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`engineering and software development for the Department of Homeland Security
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`(Rosenberg Decl., ¶6); systems engineering and software development involving
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`moving maps with intelligent overlays for the U.S. Army Future Combat Systems
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`(Rosenberg Decl., ¶6); over 4 years serving as the founder and CEO of a Seattle
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`technology company (WhereWuz) focusing on location tracking applications for
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`GPS enabled smartphones (Rosenberg Decl., ¶8, and Exhibit 1020, p. 23); and
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`over twenty two publications relating to computer software applications
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`(Rosenberg Decl., ¶8). Dr. Rosenberg's experience is more than adequate to
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`establish his technical expertise. There can be no serious doubt that Dr.
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`Rosenberg's testimony is the result of "the same level of intellectual rigor that
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`Patent 6,771,970
`characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Kuhmo Tire Co. v.
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`Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 152 (1999).
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`The Patent Owner's sole citation to Sundance Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating
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`Ltd.1 on page 4 of its Motion fails to support its position. Sundance involved a
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`review of the District Court's admission of the testimony, before a jury, of a patent
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`law expert (patent attorney) on issues of noninfringement and invalidity. The
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`Federal Circuit found that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the
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`jury to hear the testimony because "[a]llowing a patent law expert without any
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`technical expertise to testify on the issues of infringement and validity amounts to
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`nothing more than advocacy from the witness stand." Id. at 1364-65 (emphasis
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`added). Unlike the facts in Sundance, there is no jury of laypeople to protect, and
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`Dr. Rosenberg indeed possesses a great deal of technical expertise in the field.
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`III. DR. ROSENBERG'S OPINIONS REST UPON THE BEDROCK OF
`THE CLAIM LANGUAGE, SPECIFICATION AND REFERENCE
`DISCLOSURE
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`The Patent Owner alleges, without justification or cited authority, that the
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`opinions of Dr. Roseberg should be excluded because they are conclusory and/or
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`not the result of an application of "the principles and methods to the facts of this
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`1 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Case IPR2014-00199
`Patent 6,771,970
`case." Motion, p. 5. First, the Board has consistently noted that the issue of
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`whether a witness's testimony includes the underlying facts or data goes to the
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`weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See, e.g., Corning Inc. v. DSM IP
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`Assets B.V., IPR2013-00048, Paper No. 94, p. 74 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)).
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`Second, Dr. Rosenberg's rebuttal testimony is well-reasoned and supported by the
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`explicit language of the specification and claim 18 of the '970 Patent, as well as the
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`disclosure of the Elliot reference (Exhibit 1003).
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`The Patent Owner incorrectly alleges that Dr. Rosenberg's declaration
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`should be excluded from evidence because of "his failure to identify definitions for
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`the disputed claim terms." Motion, p. 6. With regard to the Patent Owner's
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`contention that the Elliot reference fails to disclose the "map database" recited in
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`claim 18, Dr. Rosenberg methodically explains how the facts alleged in the
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`Petition demonstrate that Elliot does in fact explicitly disclose the claimed "map
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`database." In doing so, Dr. Rosenberg points to facts alleged in the Petition
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`(Rosenberg Decl., ¶13), then turns to an analysis of Elliot to demonstrate how the
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`"web server with its associated files" described by Elliot expressly satisfies the
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`claimed "map database" (Rosenberg Decl., ¶¶14-17). Given that Dr. Rosenberg
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`determines that Elliot explcitly discloses the claimed "map database," and that
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`there is nothing inconsistent between how the term "database" is used in claim 18
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`of the '970 Patent and the Elliot reference, Dr. Rosenberg concludes that Elliot
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`does in fact disclose a "map database." Rosenberg Decl., ¶18. Under these
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`circumstances, there is no real claim construction issue that need be resolved to
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`determine that Elliot in fact discloses a "map database"; the claim calls for a map
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`database and Elliot discloses a map database, period. The Patent Owner seeks to
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`synthesize a claim construction issue from thin air for the purposes of reading
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`limitations into the claims from extrinsic dictionary definitions.
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`With respect to the recited "map engine for manipulating said map
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`database," Dr. Rosenberg explains that the term "engine" is a common term in the
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`art, looks to how the term is used on the face of the claim (i.e., "for manipulating
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`said map database"), then looks to the specification of the '970 Patent to understand
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`the above-quoted claim limitation. Rosenberg Decl., ¶¶27-28. Dr. Rosenberg
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`explains that the specification of the '970 Patent describes an engine as accessing
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`and/or obtaining a map from a map database, and based on this analysis, one of
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`ordinary skill in the art would interpret an element of component that accesses
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`and/or obtains a map from a database as satisfying the claimed "a map engine for
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`manipulating said map database." Rosenberg Decl., ¶29. Dr. Rosenberg then
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`proceeds to explain how the Patent Owner's interpretation of "engine" seeks to
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`introduce limitations into the claim that find no basis in the claim language itself or
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`on the specification of the '970 Patent (Rosenberg Decl., ¶30), and how the Web
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`Case IPR2014-00199
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`server (34) of Elliot satisfies the claimed "map engine for manipulating said map
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`database" (Rosenberg Decl., ¶¶31-34).
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`Therefore, the claims by the Patent Owner that the opinions expressed by
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`Dr. Rosenberg are conclusory, or do not reliably apply the principles and methods
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`to the facts of the case, are entirely without merit.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`The declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg, Exhibit 1020, proffered by the
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`Petitioner in its Reply is admissible under the FRE. The Patent Owner's Motion to
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`Exclude is entirely devoid of any legitimate basis to exclude this evidence from the
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`public record, and should be denied.
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`Dated: January 13, 2014
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`Respectfully submitted,
`Dentons US LLP
`
`By:
`
`/Scott W. Cummings /
`
`Mark L. Hogge, Reg. No. 31,622
`Email: mark.hogge@dentons.com
`
`Scott W. Cummings, Reg. No. 41, 567
`Email: scott.cummings@dentons.com
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`Attorneys for Petitioner
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e))
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing PETITIONER’S
`OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`was served by electronic mail, in its entirety, on the following Attorneys of record
`in IPR2014-00199.
`
`Thomas Engellenner
`
`Reza Mollaaghababa
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`Pepper Hamilton LLP
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`125 High Street
`
`Andy Chan
`
`Pepper Hamilton LLP
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`333 Twin Dolphin Dr.
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`Suite 400
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`19th Floor, High Street Tower
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`Redwood City, CA 94065
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`Boston, MA 02110
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`chana@pepperlaw.com
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`engellennert@pepperlaw.com
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`mollaaghababar@pepperlaw.com
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`Dated: January 13, 2014
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`By: /Nona Durham/
`Nona Durham
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`