`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`Apple Inc.
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`Virnetx, Inc. and Science Applications International Corporation,
`Patent Owners
`
`Patent No. 6,502,135
`Issued: Dec. 31, 2002
`Filed: Feb. 15, 2000
`Inventors: Edmund C. Munger, et al
`Title: AGILE NETWORK PROTOCOL FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
`WITH ASSURED SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
`____________________
`
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2013-00348 and IPR2013-00349
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`DECLARATION OF JAMES CHESTER UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 1.132
`
`
`
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
`
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`1
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 1
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 2
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`
`INTRODUCTION
`A. Engagement
`1.
`I have been retained by counsel for Apple Inc. to provide testimony in
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`the above-captioned proceeding regarding certain facts of which I am aware, and to
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`offer my opinions regarding certain issues.
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`2.
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`In particular, I have been asked to provide my recollections on the
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`distribution and availability of certain documents relating to a number of Aventail
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`products, and the product manuals and written materials distributed with those
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`products. I also was asked to provide my opinions regarding certain statements
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`about how these products worked that were made in district court and Patent Office
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`proceedings.
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`B.
`3.
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`Background and Qualifications
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`I am a citizen of the United States, and reside in Florida.
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`4. My c.v. is submitted herewith as Exhibit 1062.
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`5.
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`6.
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`I am being compensated for my time at a rate of $375.00 per hour.
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`I am presently CEO of a software development and consulting firm
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`called Assured Products Group, which specializes in software development,
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`consulting, and regulatory compliance.
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`3
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 3
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`7.
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`From March 1992 to August 2002, I was employed by the
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`International Business Machines Corp. (IBM). During the period 1996 to 2002, I
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`was responsible for global strategic initiatives overseeing design and
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`implementation of secure networking services, architecture, and cost reductions for
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`IBM worldwide and IBM clients. In that role, I evaluated network security
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`products and services from many vendors, and for designing and implementing
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`these products and services that IBM designed and implemented for its clients.
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`8.
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`Between 1996 and 2000, I recall receiving a number of VPN
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`networking products from Aventail, Inc. I recall using these Aventail VPN
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`products to develop virtual private networking solutions for several hundred IBM
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`clients during this period as well as for remote access for IBM employees
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`worldwide. CSC, DuPont, and a number of companies had deployed the solution
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`based on Aventail marketing efforts and seminars given by Aventail and IBM
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`during this period as well. Competitors quickly adopted the virtual secure
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`network and communication architecture we employed with Aventail.
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`9.
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`IBM was advancing the use of both hosted and distributed systems
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`through secure networks to routinely communicate company private information
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`internally as well as externally for mobile computing employees and employees
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`assigned behind firewalls on customer premises. I estimate that VPN solutions we
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`4
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 4
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`deployed for clients based on Aventail products were used by more than 65,000
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`users in IBM alone during the period 1996 to 2000 around the world.
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`10.
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`In my role as Vice President of Strategy and Strategic Initiatives, I
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`oversaw and operationally deployed networking security solutions that leveraged
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`the improvements that we saw in the 1990s in the core elements of networking
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`security; namely, communications, routing, security, verification, and paths. These
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`solutions were publically available and showcased to support commercial
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`endeavors and as such were extensively covered in the trade press.
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`C.
`Public Availability of the Aventail VPN Products
`11. Aventail distributed several VPN products during the period 1996 and
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`2000. Each of these products included a server component and a client component.
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`12. One Aventail VPN solution included client software called
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`AutoSOCKS which could be paired with two versions of VPN server software.
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`One version of the Aventail server software was focused on remote employees and
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`was called MobileVPN. The other package focused on non-employees and was
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`called PartnerVPN. Both server products functioned identically in how they
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`worked with the AutoSOCKS client to automatically establish VPNs between
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`remote users and private network resources.
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`13. Aventail distributed several versions of AutoSOCKS and
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`MobileVPN/PartnerVPN products between 1996 and 2000. Each new version of
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`5
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 5
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`each component had a higher version number. Numerous evaluation disks,
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`technical write-ups, and associated marketing materials were available to any and
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`everyone who asked for them to help promote awareness and customer adoption.
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`Aventail followed this policy and actively promoted the product through
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`evaluation copies between 1996 and 2000. Countless copies were provided to IBM
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`and other system integrators to share with customers, partners, and supporting
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`vendors across the United States and overseas.
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`14. The Aventail products were distributed with installation discs and
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`printed manuals for each of the software packages. For example, I received the
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`Administrator’s Guide for version 2.1 of the Aventail AutoSOCKS client software
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`this document on approximately December 1997.
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`15. At the time I received the Administrator’s Guide for version 2.1 of the
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`Aventail AutoSOCKS client software, I was under no obligation to keep this
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`document secret or to not distribute it to others. In fact, we distributed the
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`AutoSOCKS Administrator’s Guide with the other printed materials that came
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`with the Aventail AutoSOCKS/VPN Server to IBM clients to whom we deployed
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`VPN solutions, as well as IBM employees. By the spring of 1998 we were giving
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`seminars and interviews on the solution and benefits.
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`16. A second VPN solution Aventail distributed between 1996 and 2000
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`was called the Aventail Extranet Center (AEC). This product included client
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`6
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 6
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`software called Aventail Connect and server software called Aventail Extranet
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`Server.
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`17.
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`I recall that Aventail announced its AEC v3.0 product in the fall of
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`1998, and began distributing this product no later than mid-January of 1999.
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`Because IBM was the largest user of Aventail VPN products, we would be one of
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`the first companies to receive new versions of the Aventail products; both
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`evaluation and production products. I was personally involved in Aventail’s
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`strategic planning and direction from March 1998.
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`18. The AEC v3.0 product included version 3.01/2.51 of the Aventail
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`Connect software, and version 3.0 of the Aventail Extranet Server.
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`19. Exhibit 1007 is a copy of the Administrator’s Guide for Aventail
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`Connect v3.01/2.51. I recall receiving Exhibit 1007 with the AEC v3.0 product no
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`later than July 1998.
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`20. At the time I received Exhibit 1007, I was under no obligation to keep
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`this document secret or to not distribute it to others. Like earlier Aventail
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`products, we distributed copies of the Aventail Connect Administrator’s Guide
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`along the other printed materials that came with the Aventail Connect/VPN Server
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`to IBM clients to whom we deployed VPN solutions, and to IBM employees using
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`the Aventail Connect v3.01/v2.51 client.
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`7
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 7
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`21. The AEC product was a very versatile and stable VPN solution. It
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`received very good reviews from the technical press. We deployed VPN solutions
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`based on this product to more than 20,000 IBM employees domestically by March
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`1998 and more than 65,000 IBM employees worldwide by July 1998. By October
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`1998 this approach was an active commercial offering and program staffed with
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`dozens of program staff directing hundreds of technical implementation resources.
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`It became a key element of all strategic decisions and showcasing activities for
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`internal and external consumption. I shared and showcased this key initiative on a
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`quarterly basis beginning November 1998.
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`22. Aventail distributed an updated version of the AEC product in the
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`summer of 1999. This updated version was designated AEC v3.1, and included
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`Aventail Connect v3.1/2.6 and Aventail Extranet Server v3.1.
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`23.
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`I recall receiving the AEC v3.1 product no later than the end of June
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`of 1999. The product I received included the installation discs for the Aventail
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`Connect v3.1/2.6 client software and v3.1 of the Aventail Extranet Server software.
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`It also included printed manuals for these products, including the Aventail Connect
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`v3.1/2.6 Administrator’s Guide.
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`24. At the time I received the Aventail Connect v3.1/2.6 Administrator’s
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`Guide, I was under no obligation to keep this document secret or to not distribute it
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`to others. Again, as was the case with earlier Aventail products, we distributed
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`8
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 8
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`copies of the AutoSOCKS Administrator’s Guide along the other printed materials
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`that came with the Aventail AutoSOCKS/VPN Server to IBM clients to whom we
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`deployed VPN solutions, and to IBM employees that were using the Aventail
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`Connect v3.1/2.6 client. By the summer of 1999, this product was routinely
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`packaged with IBM offerings in all business sectors worldwide. Competitors were
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`deploying this product as well in the same timeframe. Numerous articles and go-
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`to-market strategies showcased the technology and benefit for all size businesses
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`and institutions. We developed, pursued, and closed numerous deals worldwide
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`with the Aventail solution. Joint go-to-market and prepared symposium
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`presentations were given by me and my staff on a routine basis, attended by
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`thousands, with print and evaluation materials distributed as previously discussed.
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`Numerous large, medium, and small system integrators across America saw the
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`competitive advantage of this solution and were actively competing for
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`commercial and federal business in the 1997-1998 timeframe.
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`D. Relevant Background on TCP/IP Communications
`25. Two of the claims of the ’135 patent refer to IP hopping schemes or
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`regimes. I have been asked to provide some background on IP hopping schemes.
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`26. The TCP/IP protocol was designed to employ flexible routing of
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`traffic. IP packets are datagrams that contains source and destination IP addresses.
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`These IP packets or datagrams traverse a network by being routed between devices
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`9
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 9
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`(also called nodes). Under the design of the TCP/IP protocol, there is no
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`requirement for an IP packet to take a pre-defined path from source to destination
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`unless the IP packet is being routed over a statically configured network. IP
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`packets thus can take multiple different paths to reach the same destination.
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`27. Routes that an IP packet will take from source to destination are
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`determined by each node/host as it processes the IP datagram. The destination IP
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`of the datagram is compared to a locally maintained routing table, and the IP
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`packet is forwarded as deemed appropriate.
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`28. TCP/IP hosts use a routing table to maintain knowledge about other IP
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`networks and IP hosts. Networks and hosts are identified by using an IP address
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`and a subnet mask. In addition, routing tables are important because they provide
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`needed information to each local host regarding how to communicate with remote
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`networks and hosts. Because it is impractical for each computer on an IP network
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`to maintain a routing table having entries for every other computer or network that
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`communicates with it, a default gateway (IP router) is used instead.
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`29. When a computer prepares to send an IP datagram, it inserts its own
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`source IP address and the destination IP address of the recipient into the IP header.
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`The computer then examines the destination IP address, compares it to a locally
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`maintained IP routing table, and takes appropriate action based on what it finds.
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`The computer does one of three things:
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`10
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 10
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`1.
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`2.
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`It passes the datagram up to a protocol layer above IP on
`the local host.
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`It forwards the datagram through one of its attached
`network interfaces.
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`3.
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`It discards the datagram.
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`30. When the computer searches the routing table to identify a route for
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`an IP packet, it will look for the closest match to the destination address. The most
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`specific to the least specific route is searched for in the following order:
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`A route that matches the destination IP address (host
`route).
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`A route that matches the network ID of the destination IP
`address (network route).
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`The default route.
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`31.
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`If a matching route is not found, the datagram is discarded.
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`32. Routing algorithms can be static or dynamic. A static route implies
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`that every route is known and manually entered. Dynamic routing uses tables that
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`are updated via different protocols. The two most commonly used protocols in the
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`1997-2000 time frame were the RIP protocol (see, Malkin, G., “RIP Version 2,”
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`RFC 2453 (November 1998) (available at
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`http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/rfc/rfc2453.txt)) and the OPSF protocol (see
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`Moy, J., “OSPF version 2,” RFC 2328 (April 1998) (available at
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`http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2328).
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`11
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 11
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`33. Communications between networks relies upon traffic being routed
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`from the source to the destination. In TCP/IP communications, the source will
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`encapsulate a TCP message within an IP datagram; the header of the datagram will
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`contain the source and destination addresses. The source will then encapsulate the
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`IP datagram into a layer 2 frame for transmission across the internetwork hop/link.
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`IF the source does not know the route to the destination address, it will send the
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`packet to its network gateway. From the gateway until the destination, each node
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`will remove the IP datagram from its layer 2 encapsulation. The destination
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`address contained within the IP datagram header is then compared to the current
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`node’s routing table and the best route is determined. The node will then re-
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`encapsulate the IP datagram into a layer 2 frame and pass the datagram along the
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`next hop/link of the network that best matches the destination address.
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`34. Dynamic routing based on RIP or OPSF standards are inherently
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`flexible. So, if one link the network goes down or becomes unavailable, the route
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`can be changed. Routing tables are simply updated to provide the new routes, and
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`the packets get sent along a different path to the destination. When IP packets are
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`sent over the public Internet, and are not routed manually, they inherently will
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`follow pseudorandom paths – the path is not defined until it’s actually taken by the
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`IP packet, and each IP packet will likely travel on different paths even when the
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`source and destinations are the same.
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`12
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 12
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`35. Any TCP/IP communication will inherently meet the requirement in
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`the ’135 patent claims that IP packets must be sent from a client computer to a
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`secure destination by an “IP hopping” scheme or regime. As I explained above, IP
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`hopping is integral to the design of TCP/IP communications, and occurs whenever
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`an IP packet is sent from a source to a destination via a TCP/IP communication.
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`E. Observations of the Declaration of Dr. Jason Nieh in a Prior
`Reexamination
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`36.
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`I reviewed a declaration submitted by Dr. Jason Nieh in
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`Reexamination Control No. 95/001,269 involving U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`(Exhibit 1051). I believe several of Dr. Nieh’s statements in his declaration do not
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`accurately describe how the Aventail products work or what is described in the
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`Administrator’s Guide for Aventail Connect.
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`37. Dr. Nieh’s general conclusion is that the Aventail VPN products did
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`not establish VPNs as they are defined in the claims of the ’135 patent. This is
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`incorrect. Based on my personal experience using these products, they were
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`routinely used by remote users to establish VPNs, and that those VPNs met the
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`requirements of the claims of the ’135 patent worldwide.
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`38.
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`Initially, I understand that a court has interpreted certain phrases in the
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`claims of the ’135 patent, including “virtual private network” or “VPN.” The
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`meaning of VPN was simply “a network of computers which privately
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`13
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 13
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`communicate with each other by encrypting traffic on insecure communication
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`paths between the computers.” This is precisely what Exhibit 1007 shows client
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`computers running Aventail Connect doing.
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`39.
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`Initially, Dr. Nieh states that he believes the Aventail Connect client
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`software was simply a SOCKS v5 client. See Ex. 1051, paragraphs 11 to 14.
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`Aventail Connect v3.1, like the earlier Aventail Connect v3.01/2.51 and the
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`Aventail AutoSOCKS clients, did much more than handle SOCKS transactions.
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`40. The Aventail Connect and Extranet Server, like the earlier Aventail
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`VPN solutions, used well-established network security techniques. For example,
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`the Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) has been in existence since June
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`1984, while session IDs and session synchronization have been in existence since
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`the 1960s.
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`41. Client computers running each of the Aventail clients (i.e., Aventail
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`Connect and Aventail AutoSOCKS) could automatically establish VPNs that
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`allowed a remote user to gain access to secure resources on a private network.
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`These products all worked by transparently intercepting and evaluating DNS and
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`TCP/IP connection requests made on the client computer.
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`42. The Aventail clients could be configured in one of two ways. First,
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`they could be configured to determine if a connection request specified a
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`destination that required a VPN (e.g., a secure website on a private network). If so,
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`14
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 14
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`the client would automatically re-route that connection to a VPN server, manage
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`authentication of the user with the VPN server, and encrypt/decrypt the outgoing
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`and incoming network traffic.
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`43. Second, the Aventail clients could be configured to route all DNS
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`requests containing hostnames that could not be resolved on the local computer to
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`a VPN server. In this configuration, the client computer would establish a
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`connection to the VPN server, authenticate itself with the server, and if that was
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`successful, it would then send the hostname from the original DNS request to the
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`VPN server. The VPN server (i.e., Aventail Extranet Center or Aventail
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`MobileVPN/PartnerVPN) would then resolve the hostname (if necessary) and then
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`determine if a VPN was needed between the requesting client and the destination.
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`If no VPN was required, the VPN server would return the resolved IP address back
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`to the client.
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`44.
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`In either configuration, if a connection request was not seeking access
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`to a secure destination requiring a VPN, it would just be handed off to the normal
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`TCP/IP handling procedures of the client computer for handling. So, for example,
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`if the VPN server had done the hostname resolution and returned a resolved IP
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`address, WinSock and the TCP/IP stack on the client computer would then just
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`establish a connection to the specified IP address without the Aventail client being
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`involved any further.
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 15
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`45. For the Aventail Connect v3.01/2.5 client, this functionality is
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`described on Page 14 of Exhibit 1007:
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`When the Aventail Connect LSP receives a connection request,
`it determines whether or not the connection needs to be
`redirected (to an Aventail ExtraNet Server) and/or encrypted (in
`SSL). When redirection and encryption are not necessary,
`Aventail Connect simply passes the connection request, and any
`subsequent transmitted data, to the TCP/IP stack.
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`46. Exhibit 1007 describes a VPN design made up of client computers
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`running Aventail Connect v3.01/2.5 connecting to a private network through an
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`Aventail VPN server. See Exhibit 1007 at pages 76 to 78. I note that Dr. Nieh did
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`not discuss this section of Exhibit 1007 in his declaration.
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`47. Page 76-77 of Exhibit 1007 explains this VPN implementation as
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`follows:
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`The mobile user workstations connected to the public Internet
`are the client workstations, onto which, Aventail Connect will
`be deployed. Due to the routing restrictions described above,
`these clients will have no network access beyond the Aventail
`ExtraNet Server unless they are running Aventail Connect.
`Depending on the security policy and the Aventail ExtraNet
`Server configuration, Aventail Connect will automatically
`proxy their allowed application traffic into the private network.
`In this situation, Aventail Connect will forward traffic destined
`for the private internal network to the Aventail ExtraNet Server.
`Then, based on the security policy, the Aventail ExtraNet
`Server will proxy mobile user traffic into the private network
`but only to those resources allowed. The client workstations we
`focus on in this section are Microsoft Windows based PCs.
`(emphasis added)
`
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 16
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`48. Exhibit 1007 on page 77 also explains that client computers running
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`Aventail Connect will automatically handle authentication of the remote user, as
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`well as encryption of the traffic between the remote user’s computer and the
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`private network:
`
`User authentication and encryption on the Aventail ExtraNet
`Server require all users to use Aventail Connect to authenticate
`and encrypt their sessions before any connection to the internal
`private network(s). For this example, the Aventail ExtraNet
`Server encrypts all sessions with SSL.
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`49. Dr. Nieh provides three general reasons why he believes that Aventail
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`Connect and Aventail Extranet Server did not create VPNs within the meaning of
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`the ’135 patent claims.
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`50. First, in paragraph 20, Dr. Nieh states:
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`Aventail has not been shown to demonstrate that computers
`connected via the Aventail system are able to communicate
`with each other as though they were on the same network.
`Aventail discloses establishing a point-to-point SOCKS
`connection between a client computer and a SOCKS server.
`According to Aventail, the SOCKS server then relays data
`received to the intended target. Aventail does not disclose a
`VPN, where data can be addressed to one or more different
`computers across the network, regardless of the location of the
`computer.
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`I found nothing in the claims of the ’135 patent that require that a
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`51.
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`computer connected to a private network to communicate directly with other
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`remote computers that are also connected to the network. Instead, all that is
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`17
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 17
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`required for there to be a VPN is “a network of computers which privately
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`communicate with each other by encrypting traffic on insecure communication
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`paths between the computers..”
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`52. Regardless, Exhibit 1007 shows that client computers running
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`Aventail Connect v3.01/2.5 did have the ability to communicate with other
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`computers on the network, including other remote users.
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`53. For example, the figure on page 76 of Exhibit 1007 shows a remote
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`user using a client computer running Aventail Connect to gain access to and to
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`interact with different computers on a private network. Network traffic from the
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`remote computers is sent into the private network, and handled by the rules and
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`policies governing all network traffic on that private network. As explained on
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`page 76-77 of Exhibit 1007:
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`Depending on the security policy and the Aventail ExtraNet
`Server configuration, Aventail Connect will automatically
`proxy their [the client computer’s] allowed application traffic
`into the private network. In this situation, Aventail Connect will
`forward traffic destined for the private internal network to the
`Aventail ExtraNet Server. Then, based on the security policy,
`the Aventail ExtraNet Server will proxy mobile user traffic into
`the private network but only to those resources allowed.
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`54. This explanation makes it clear that a remote user running Aventail
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`Connect could interact with any resources on the private network that the user was
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`authorized to access. It also shows that a mobile user connected through Aventail
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`18
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 18
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`Connect will be equivalent to a local user on the private network – both the remote
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`and local users will be able to send and receive traffic to and from destinations on
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`the private network. So, if network policies allowed a user to route network traffic
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`to other users on the private network (including remote users), a remote user
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`connected to that network through the Aventail VPN solution will be able to
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`communicate to those other users.
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`55. Exhibit 1007 also describes the ability of client computers running
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`Aventail Connect to dynamically navigate resources made available on a private
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`network via the “Secure Extranet Explorer” capability of Aventail Connect. As
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`Exhibit 1007 explains on page 94:
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`Secure Extranet Explorer (SEE) allows you to view your
`Extranet Neighborhood, which is accessed through the Extranet
`Neighborhood
`icon on your desktop. The Extranet
`Neighborhood user
`interface resembles
`that of Network
`Neighborhood. However, while Network Neighborhood
`displays all computers on your local network, Extranet
`Neighborhood allows you to browse, copy, move, and delete
`files from remote computers via the Aventail Connect extranet
`connection. With Extranet Neighborhood, all interaction with
`the remote server can be secured. Network administrators
`determine which local and remote computers are available to
`users.
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`56. So, if a private network had the appropriate policies in place, a remote
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`user would be able to view and access resources on any of the computers on the
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`network, including those on other remote computers/servers.
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
`
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`19
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 19
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`57. The second reason Dr. Nieh offers to support his belief that the
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`Aventail VPN products did not establish VPNs was that “Aventail Connect’s
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`fundamental operation is incompatible with users attempting to transmit data that is
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`sensitive to network information.” See Ex. 1051 at paragraphs 23-25.
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`58. Dr. Nieh incorrectly suggests that applications making DNS requests
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`will try to make connections using the “false network information” that Aventail
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`Connect uses to flag connection requests requiring a VPN. Specifically, Dr. Nieh
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`says that:
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`24. Because Aventail discloses that Aventail Connect operates
`between these layers, Aventail Connect can intercept DNS
`requests requested by the user. Aventail discloses that Aventail
`Connect intercepts certain DNS requests, and returns a false
`DNS response to the user if the requested hostname matches a
`hostname on a user-defined
`list. Accordingly, Aventail
`discloses that the user will receive false network information
`from Aventail Connect for these hostnames.
`
`25. If the client computer hopes to transfer to the target data
`that is sensitive to network information, this falsification of
`network information would prevent the correct transfer of data.
`A client and target connected according to Aventail would be
`unable to transfer data as they otherwise would have been had
`they been on the same network. Thus, Aventail has not been
`shown to disclose a VPN.
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`59. Dr. Nieh has apparently misunderstood how client computers running
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`Aventail Connect actually function.
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`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
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`20
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`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 20
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`60. As explained on pages 14 to 16 of Exhibit 1007, Aventail Connect
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`would monitor DNS requests made by applications on the client computer. If the
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`DNS request contained a hostname instead of a literal IP address, and that
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`hostname specified a secure destination that required a VPN, then Aventail
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`Connect would insert a false hostname into the DNS request. See, e.g., Exhibit
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`1007 at page 15-16 (“If the destination hostname matches a redirection rule
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`domain name (i.e., the host is part of a domain we are proxying traffic to) then
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`Aventail Connect creates a false DNS entry (HOSTENT) that it can recognize
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`during the connection request.”) Similarly, if the Aventail Connect client
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`computer was configured to proxy all non-local DNS requests to a separate
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`computer for resolution, Aventail Connect would return a false DNS entry that it
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`could recognize later to the requesting application.
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`61.
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`In a second step, Aventail Connect would evaluate the connection
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`request to see if it had to be redirected to the VPN proxy server. If a connection
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`request contained the “false” information inserted in step 1 or because the real IP
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`address was on a redirection list1, the Aventail Connect client would establish a
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`connection to the VPN proxy server (i.e., Aventail Extranet Server). The VPN
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`Server and the Aventail Connect Client would then perform authentication, and if
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`1 As explained in step 2(a) on page 12 of Exhibit 1007, if the DNS request did not include a
`host name, but was a real IP address (e.g., 1.2.3.4), then no DNS resolution step is needed.
`Declaration Of James Chester
`Regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135
`
`
`Petitioner Apple – Ex. 1006
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`21
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`Petitioner RPX Corporation - Ex. 1006, p. 21
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`that was successful, the VPN would be established between the client computer
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`and the destination computer specified in the original connection request. See
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`Exhibit 1007, pages 16 (steps 2 and 3). False hostnames thus were used by
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`Aventail Connect to flag DNS requests requiring redirection to a VPN server
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`during the TCP connection process, and would not cause client computers to
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`attempt to connect to “false” destinations.
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`62. As Exhibit 1007 explains on pages 15-16, this entire process is
`