throbber
Paper No. 28
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`TWITTER, INC., AND YELP INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`EVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENCE LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________________
`
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-00086
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-008121
`
`____________________
`
`
`
`Petitioners’ Reply
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Per the Board’s Order (Paper 16 at 4), Petitioner Apple identifies this as a
`
`consolidated filing.
`
`
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`
`
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I. Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Plurality of Containers” .................................... 1
`
`A. Gibbs Shows Each Map Display Contains a Collection of Instantiated
`
`Transport, Map, and Report Objects ............................................................... 3
`
`B. Gibbs’ Collection of Instantiated Objects is a “Container” ........................... 6
`
`C. Gibbs Discloses a “Plurality of Containers” .................................................. 7
`
`II. Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Plurality of Registers” ...................................... 8
`
`A. “First Register for Storing a Unique Container Identifier” ........................... 8
`
`B. “Acquire Register” For Adding “a Register from Other Containers or
`
`Add[ing] a Container from Other Containers” ..............................................11
`
`C.
`
`“Active Space Register” ..............................................................................12
`
`D. “Passive Space Register” .............................................................................13
`
`E.
`
`“Neutral Space Register” .............................................................................14
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`
`The Board correctly found the “specific types of objects, programs, routines,
`
`and architecture disclosed in Gibbs meet the limitations of” claims 2-12, 14, and 16
`
`of the ’536 patent. Paper 8 (“Dec.”) at 21, 26. In its Response, Patent Owner
`
`seeks to cloud the record by incorrectly portraying Petitioners’ arguments, the
`
`testimony of Petitioners’ expert Henry Houh, Ph.D., the scope of the ’536 claims,2
`
`and the Gibbs reference (Ex. 1006). The Board should dismiss Patent Owner’s
`
`arguments, and maintain its finding that Gibbs anticipates the challenged claims.
`
`I.
`
`Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Plurality of Containers”
`
`The Board correctly found Gibbs discloses the “plurality of containers” of
`
`claims 2 and 16. Dec. at 21 (“Gibbs’ overall train management system receives,
`
`transmits, and manipulates information, as per the limiting preamble of claim 2.”).
`
`This rested on substantial evidence presented in the Petition; namely, that Gibbs
`
`shows the claimed “container” via its description of a collection of transport, map,
`
`and report objects that are instantiated and used to display maps and reports to
`
`users. See Pet. at 18-19 (the map and report objects have “instructions and routines
`
`[that] are used to gather information from the various transport objects . . . to
`
`generate and modify maps and reports”), 15 (the “transport objects interact with
`
`the map and report objects to display information relating to the physical
`
`2 Patent Owner explicitly advances new claim constructions for two of the
`
`“registers” in the ’536 claims. Those are addressed in the analysis of Gibbs below.
`
`1
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`equipment and facilities that the transport objects represent.”); Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 122
`
`(same), 109 (the “system [] uses objects to display and transmit information to the
`
`user, such as through maps and reports.”) (emphases added); see id. at ¶¶ 86-98.
`
`Rather than dispute this in its Response, Patent Owner attacks a straw-man:
`
`Dr. Houh’s use of the label “TMR subsystem” during his deposition as a shorthand
`
`for the architecture and objects in Gibbs that anticipate the claims. See Paper 20
`
`(“Resp.”) at 30-35. While Dr. Houh agreed to use this label as a courtesy to Patent
`
`Owner’s counsel, he repeatedly and consistently explained the “instances of items
`
`from the transport object library, the map object library and report object library”
`
`in Gibbs correspond to the “container” of the claims. E.g., Ex. 1008 at 98:21-
`
`103:1, 95:15-96:1, 63:8-68:22. Dr. Houh’s deposition testimony reinforces that the
`
`displayed maps and reports of Gibbs, created through interactions between the
`
`transport, map, and report objects, anticipate the claims. E.g., Pet. at 12-13, 15, 18.
`
`Patent Owner also contends the individual objects in Gibbs cannot be a
`
`“container.” Resp. at 24-30, 37. Patent Owner raised this same argument in its
`
`Preliminary Response (Paper 6 at 31-32); it remains unpersuasive. See Dec. at 21
`
`(“Gibbs’ disclosure of objects describes the claimed ‘container.’” (emphasis
`
`added)). Patent Owner also advances three theories why it believes Gibbs does not
`
`disclose a “container” that includes the transport, map, and reports objects: (1) that
`
`Gibbs does not describe a “TMR subsystem,” (Resp. at 30-38), (2) even if the
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`“TMR subsystem” did exist, it is not a “container,” (id. at 38-40), and, finally, (3)
`
`even if Gibbs does disclose a container, it does not disclose a “plurality of
`
`containers,” (id. at 55-56). All three theories must be rejected.
`
`A. Gibbs Shows Each Map Display Contains a Collection of
`Instantiated Transport, Map, and Report Objects
`
`Patent Owner argues that because Gibbs itself does not use the term “TMR
`
`subsystem” and does not otherwise coin a term for the collection of instantiated
`
`objects in its system, the disclosure of these objects by Gibbs can only be
`
`“inherent.” Resp. at 10-11, 35-40. This disclosure is not “inherent.” It is explicit.
`
`Patent Owner simply ignores the explanations in the Petition and Dr. Houh’s
`
`original declaration that detail how Gibbs describes this element – it shows
`
`instantiated transport, map, and report objects interacting to create maps and
`
`reports for display to a user. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 89-90, 94, 96-97; Pet. at 15, 18-19, 23;
`
`Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 5-16.
`
`As Dr. Houh explained, Figure 8a of Gibbs depicts the display of maps and
`
`reports generated by its system, which, in turn, contain the transport objects that
`
`are within the selected geographic boundaries and meet the other selected criteria.
`
`Ex. 1003 at ¶ 94; see id. at ¶¶ 89-100, 108-09; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 8a, 20:2-5
`
`(generated display shows map objects), 20:5-16 (transport objects), 20:17-21 &
`
`20:30-40 (report objects); Pet. at 15 (the map object “determine[s] which transport
`
`objects are within the selected map area”), 18. In Figure 9b, Gibbs shows how the
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`map and report objects maintain collections of transport objects within the selected
`
`boundaries and can iterate through each object in the collection to monitor its
`
`status. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 102-04; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 9b, 22:23-55; Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 42-46.
`
`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Green, admitted as much at his deposition. Ex. 2009 at
`
`223:8-225:7, 228:16-229:11, 232:12-17, 234:6-236:9. Thus, Gibbs explicitly
`
`shows instances of the transport, map, and report objects being collected into a
`
`“logically defined data enclosure” used to depict the maps and reports to a user.
`
`Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 32-46; see Ex. 1006 at Figs. 9a-9c, 21:49-65, 22:2-12.
`
`Patent Owner next argues Gibbs’ collection of objects cannot be considered
`
`part of a single enclosure (i.e., a container) because several passages in Gibbs
`
`describe each type of object as a “discrete entity.” Resp. at 25-28, 38 (citing Ex.
`
`1006 at 7:24-27, 8:48-52). But Patent Owner ignores the full meaning of the cited
`
`passages, which explain the objects are “treated by the processing unit 48 as
`
`discrete entities within an object-oriented programming structure as
`
`conventionally known in the art.” Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 78, 89 (emphasis added) (citing
`
`Ex. 1006 at 7:24-27). Gibbs’ disclosure that its system treats these “discrete
`
`entities” as part of a “structure” would be understood by one of skill as meaning
`
`they would be instantiated as part of a logical data structure in an operating system.
`
`Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 11, 33-37. This is how Gibbs’ “object oriented” architecture works
`
`– it combines those objects (i.e., transport, map, and report) into a structure which
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`is used to provide “varying levels of real-time perspective on an operating railroad
`
`system,” such as “a ‘system-wide’ view needed by executives” and an
`
`“individualized and detailed report needed by . . . a train master or a dispatcher.”
`
`Ex. 1003 at ¶ 69 (quoting Ex. 1006 at 3:65-4:10); Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 33-37. This
`
`compound “object” created by combining the transport, map, and report objects in
`
`varying manners to give users access to real-time data about the train system is
`
`plainly a “container.” Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 33-37, 42-48; see Ex. 1001 at 3:28-34.
`
`Patent Owner also misunderstands the law – anticipation exists “when a
`
`claimed limitation is . . . implicit in the relevant reference.” Standard Havens
`
`Products, Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
`
`(emphasis added). Moreover, what an anticipatory reference teaches must be
`
`analyzed from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill. Smith & Nephew v.
`
`Convatec Tech., IPR2013-00102, Paper 87 at 14-15 (May 19, 2014). Thus, “it is
`
`proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the
`
`inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
`
`therefrom.” Denso Corp. v. Beacon Navigation, IPR2013-00026, Paper 34 at 19-
`
`20 (Mar. 14, 2014) (emphasis added). Dr. Houh explained what a person of skill
`
`would infer from Gibbs, essentially without dispute. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 69-106; see,
`
`e.g., Ex. 2006 at ¶¶ 80-84 (Dr. Green agreeing Gibbs includes a plurality of TWS
`
`stations), 98-100 (attributes of transport objects), 107-12 (map and report objects
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`request, receive, and retain data from transport objects), 116 (maps and reports are
`
`nested), 119 (train consist report shows an idealized picture of train cars on a map).
`
`B. Gibbs’ Collection of Instantiated Objects is a “Container”
`
`Patent Owner asserts Gibbs’ collection of objects cannot be the claimed
`
`“container” because the objects are not “nestable containers that include the logical
`
`description of another container.” Resp. at 38-40. This argument is inconsistent
`
`with the Board’s construction and the ’536 patent itself. Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 18-31.
`
`Throughout the specification, “containers” are described as being able to
`
`encapsulate another container or “sets of containers.” Ex. 1003 at ¶ 54 (citing Ex.
`
`1001 at 8:64-9:2); see Ex. 1001 at 12:13-27, Fig. 3A, 3B; Ex. 2009 at 43:4-17,
`
`36:2-38:10. Likewise, the ’536 specification states “Any container may include (n)
`
`other containers, to infinity.” Ex. 1001 at 12:45-46. Although one way of
`
`encapsulating another container is by “includ[ing] the logical description of [the]
`
`container,” nothing in the claim language limits encapsulation of other containers
`
`to this embodiment, as the Board found. Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 26-31; Dec. at 7-9, 21.
`
`Patent Owner’s restricted definition is also inconsistent with Dr. Green’s
`
`understanding of the claimed “container.” Dr. Green explained that one way to
`
`“logically define” an enclosure was “through a software mechanism.” Ex. 2006 at
`
`¶ 35; Ex. 2009 at 27:21-28:4, 56:18-22; see id. at 57:20-58:11 (e.g., a web browser
`
`rendering an HTML page), 50:4-16. Gibbs plainly shows a software mechanism –
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`software running on each TWS workstation creates instances of transport, map,
`
`and report objects and processes them to generate depictions of those objects for a
`
`user. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 71-72, 78, 88, 89; see id. at ¶¶ 90-104, 108-09; Ex. 1006 at
`
`Figs. 2-3, 8a, 9b, 5:52-6:43, 22:23-55. Gibbs explains the objects are created in an
`
`object-oriented programming structure, and are instantiated and used by executing
`
`software. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 78, 88-89; Ex. 1006 at 8:44-53, 9:27-31.
`
`Gibbs also shows “containers” even under Patent Owner’s new theory that
`
`“containers” must include “the logical description” of other containers. As
`
`explained in § II.B, during generation of a map for display to a user, each map and
`
`report acquires the unique ID of each transport object within its boundaries, and,
`
`as Dr. Green admitted, each unique ID is a “logical description” of the transport
`
`object. See Ex. 2009 at 191:15-193:1, 28:5-29:22, 33:20-34:4, 37:11-15, 47:16-
`
`49:16 (a URL is a logical reference), 57:20-58:11; Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 42-48, 62.
`
`C. Gibbs Discloses a “Plurality of Containers”
`
`The Board found that “Gibbs’ overall train management system receives,
`
`transmits, and manipulates information, as per the limiting preamble of claim 2.”
`
`Dec. at 21 (emphasis added). Patent Owner responds that Gibbs does not disclose
`
`“a plurality of containers” because a TWS station generates one set of maps and
`
`reports at a time. Resp. at 56. But Patent Owner ignores, for example, that Gibbs
`
`expressly describes an “overall train management system,” which discloses a
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`network of concurrently operating TWS workstations, each having software
`
`allowing a user to generate various maps and reports. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 69-72 (citing,
`
`e.g., Ex. 1006 at Fig. 2); Ex. 1009 at ¶ 48; see Ex. 1006 at 12:49-50 (generating “a
`
`variety of maps in response to [user-selected] criteria”); Ex. 2009 at 181:4-182:2
`
`(Fig. 2 shows multiple TWS stations). Gibbs discloses a plurality of containers
`
`even under Patent Owner’s rationale, and thus, the Board correctly found that
`
`Gibbs discloses a “plurality of containers” as specified in the preamble.
`
`II. Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Plurality of Registers”
`
`Patent Owner challenges that Gibbs discloses a “plurality of registers” by
`
`again focusing on each individual object in isolation, arguing that none has all the
`
`“registers” in the claims. Resp. at 26. These arguments again ignore the claims
`
`and mischaracterize Gibbs. Patent Owner also asserts that Gibbs does not disclose
`
`that the instances of the transport, map, and report objects used to display
`
`information to a user include “a first register for storing a unique container
`
`identification value,” an “acquire register,” and the active/passive/neutral space
`
`registers.3 Resp. at 41-56. These arguments must be rejected.
`
`A.
`
`“First Register for Storing a Unique Container Identifier”
`
`The Board did not construe the term “a first register for storing a unique
`
`3 Patent Owner “denies” the Board’s constructions of “container,” “gateway,” and
`
`“register” but provides no basis to dispute those findings. Resp. at 4, 15 n.3.
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`container identification value” in its institution decision. For the first time in its
`
`Response, Patent Owner now proposes a construction for this term – “a first
`
`register for storing a value that uniquely identifies the given container.” Resp. at
`
`16-19 (emphasis added), 41-42. Patent Owner’s attempt to incorporate unrecited
`
`limitations into the claims should be rejected.
`
`The claim language is clear – it recites a register for storing “a unique
`
`container identification value” without reference to any particular container. This
`
`limitation is satisfied by a value that uniquely identifies any container. While a
`
`“unique container identification value” can identify the container that includes the
`
`register, no language in the claim requires this – the claims use the indefinite
`
`article “a”, not a term or phrase with an antecedent basis such as “the” or “said.”
`
`This language stands in stark contrast to the language used to describe every other
`
`“register” in claims 2 and 16 – each explicitly specifies “the container” (e.g.: “a
`
`second register . . . governing interactions of the container . . .”; “an active space
`
`register for identifying space in which the container will act . . .”; and an “acquire
`
`register for controlling whether the container . . . .” (emphasis added)).
`
`Patent Owner next argues the unique container identifier must refer to “the
`
`given container” because the specification discloses an example of an “identity
`
`register.” Resp. at 16-17. But even Dr. Green acknowledged the “identity
`
`register” was just one example of a “first” register. Ex. 2009 at 113:1-22, 107:2-
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`110:22; see id. at 66:11-22. And the specification shows other examples, such as
`
`registers that store identifiers of the contents of the container as opposed the
`
`container itself. Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 61-62; e.g., Ex. 1001 at 15:32-34 (describing “a
`
`content key register [] identifying the container contents . . .”). Patent Owner next
`
`asserts the first register must specify “the given container” because the original
`
`claims specified “exchanging identification information.” Resp. at 17. The
`
`original claims are irrelevant – even Dr. Green admitted they do not correspond to
`
`the issued claims. Ex. 2009 at 131:1-10, 132:20-135:11. In addition, opaque
`
`prosecution disclaimers cannot change the plain meaning of clear claim language
`
`under the broadest reasonable construction standard used in these proceedings.
`
`The Board correctly found that Gibbs shows each transport object’s unique
`
`identifier is “a unique container identification value” because it uniquely identifies
`
`the transport object. This is supported by undisputed evidence. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 81-
`
`85; Ex. 2009 at 192:3-4 (“My understanding is that Gibbs discloses that transport
`
`objects have unique IDs.”). Each transport object also is a “container” because
`
`each is a logically defined data enclosure that encapsulates digital content. Ex.
`
`1009 at ¶¶ 40-41; Ex. 2009 at 161:16-162:9, 164:8-18. When generating a map,
`
`the unique IDs of the transport objects within the selected boundaries are loaded
`
`into the map and report objects. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 86, 90, 97, 102, 113, 118, 159-61.
`
`Thus, the collection of instantiated transport, map, and report objects displayed to a
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`user comprise “a first register for storing a unique container identifier.”
`
`B.
`
`“Acquire Register” For Adding “a Register from Other
`Containers or Add[ing] a Container from Other Containers”
`
`The Board correctly found Gibbs discloses an “acquire register.” Dec. at 26
`
`(“the formation of a map . . . is an act of controlling the object itself and adding to
`
`itself a value or code associated with another object, i.e., a register.” (emphasis
`
`added)). Patent Owner disagrees because it believes the instantiated transport,
`
`map, and report objects displayed to a user is not a “container.” Resp. at 55-56.
`
`Gibbs shows that to generate an output display (e.g., Figures 8a & 8b), the
`
`software builds the selected maps and reports (i.e., a “container”) out of individual
`
`transport, map, and report objects. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 159-61; see § I.A-B, above.
`
`Thus, the output displayed to a user is a composite object, built from individual
`
`objects. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 90, 97; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 9a-9c, 8:53-63, 9:31-40, 21:55-65,
`
`22:2-12. Each of the transport, map, and report objects is a type of “container”;
`
`each is a logically defined data enclosure that encapsulates digital content. Ex.
`
`1009 at ¶¶ 40-41; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 77-79, 159-60; Ex. 2009 at 161:16-162:9, 164:8-
`
`18. The collection of instantiated transport, map, and report objects is also a
`
`container as it encapsulates other containers. Ex. 1001 at 8:64-9:2 (“The
`
`information container 100 is a logically defined data enclosure which encapsulates
`
`. . . any system component or process, or other containers or sets of containers.”).
`
`Gibbs also shows that to build the maps and reports displayed to a user, each
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`map and report object will determine which transport objects meet the selected
`
`criteria (e.g., are within the selected geographic boundaries), and each will collect
`
`and store data (e.g., unique IDs, locational attributes, etc.) from the relevant
`
`transport objects. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 159-61, ¶ 90 (citing Ex. 1006 at 8:53-63), ¶¶ 91-
`
`92, 101-06; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 9a-9c, 9:31-40, 21:55-65, 22:2-12; see Pet. at 23, 18-
`
`19; Dec. at 19 (“Gibbs discloses that map objects obtain and retain data items from
`
`the transport objects.”). Thus, the map object “obtains and retains” data (i.e.,
`
`registers) from each transport object (i.e., by adding a register from another
`
`container). Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 90, 97, 159-61; Ex. 2009 at 228:16-229:11 (Dr. Green
`
`agreeing the map object adds data from transport objects). The map object also
`
`acquires each transport object’s unique ID, which is a “logical description” of the
`
`object, and encapsulates the objects themselves (i.e., another container). See Ex.
`
`2009 at 191:15-193:1; see id. at 47:16-22, 49:3-16 (a URL is a logical reference),
`
`57:20-58:11, 28:5-29:22. Thus, building the maps and reports for display to a user
`
`shows an “acquire register.”
`
`C.
`
`“Active Space Register”
`
`The Board found the warning criteria and the map boundaries in Gibbs each
`
`was an active space register. Dec. at 19-20. In response, Patent Owner argues that
`
`Gibbs does not show use of warning criteria to monitor space data (e.g., a train’s
`
`location). Resp. at 43-48. But Gibbs unequivocally states warning criteria can be
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`used to monitor “any selected map or report data item” (Ex. 1003 at ¶ 106; Ex.
`
`1006 at 12:36-41, 22:13-55), that map objects depicts train objects, and that the
`
`map obtains and retains the location of each train. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 90-92, 102-06.
`
`Each train’s location is a “data item” on a map that can be monitored, and if the
`
`train deviates from its expected course, the map object will act on the system and
`
`display by generating an alert displayed or signaled to a user. Id. at ¶¶ 125-28; Ex.
`
`1009 at ¶¶ 49-54; Ex. 2009 at 190:10-191:9, 84:20-85:9, 87:5-9.
`
`Patent Owner also asserts the map object does not “continuously monitor”
`
`transport objects within the boundaries. Resp. at 47-48. But Gibbs shows that,
`
`when generating a map, a user will enter the map boundaries, and the map object
`
`then will act on each transport object within the boundaries to collect data from
`
`those objects. Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 32-34; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 90, 128; Ex. 2009 at 202:1-16,
`
`218:22-222:3, 223:8-228:8. The Gibbs maps also show “real time data,” and Dr.
`
`Green agreed a person of ordinary skill logically would configure Gibbs to provide
`
`updates. Ex. 2009 at 239:19-241:4; Ex. 1003 at ¶ 101 (quoting Ex. 1006 at 4:18-
`
`24). The Board thus correctly found Gibbs discloses an active space register.
`
`D.
`
`“Passive Space Register”
`
`The Board correctly found the zoom increment in Gibbs to be a passive
`
`space register. Dec. at 19-20, 22-23. Patent Owner disagrees, asserting a user can
`
`zoom “irrespective of where the map object is or where the portion of the
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`transportation network it represents is.” Resp. at 48-49. Patent Owner’s theory is
`
`irrelevant. First, Dr. Green agreed a relative location is data about space. Ex. 2009
`
`at 82:12-83:22, 88:2-13, 208:2-11. The zoom increment defines the map’s zoom
`
`boundaries relative to the original boundaries, and thus, is data about space. Id.;
`
`Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 133-37. It also defines space in which the objects will be acted
`
`upon – when a user changes the zoom increment, the CMO will instruct the map
`
`and report objects to regenerate, causing each to collect data from the transport
`
`objects within the new boundaries and changing which objects are added to a map
`
`and displayed. Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 133-34; Ex. 2009 at 208:9-212:19, 215:22-216:15,
`
`238:11-239:3. Thus, the zoom increment plainly specifies the space in which the
`
`objects will be acted upon, which is a “passive space register” of the claims.
`
`E.
`
`“Neutral Space Register”
`
`The Board correctly found the reports in Gibbs to be a neutral space register.
`
`Decision at 20, 23. Patent Owner disagrees, asserting: (a) the reports do not show
`
`interactions among transport objects and (b) even if they did, the location of the
`
`transport objects does not identify space where the interaction may occur. Resp. at
`
`50-54. Patent Owner again improperly focuses on the transport objects in isolation
`
`– it ignores that Gibbs shows interactions among transport, map, and report
`
`objects to generate a report. Gibbs also shows that to generate a train consist
`
`report, a user first selects a particular train on a map. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 98 (citing Ex.
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`1006 at 16:53-17:4). The data about the train is passed to the report object, which
`
`requests and receives data from the relevant train and car objects. Id. The report
`
`object then uses the data from the train and cars to depict those objects on the map.
`
`Id. Gibbs shows this same process for the terminal delay report, where selecting
`
`the report will cause the map object to replace the terminal marker with a pie chart.
`
`Ex. 2009 at 78:7-80:2, 172:3-15, 237:12-238:3, 241:22-245:13; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 99-
`
`106. The location of each transport object thus specifies a point where various
`
`objects may interact, making the terminal delay report a “neutral space register.”
`
`Patent Owner also challenges the Board’s analysis, arguing the Board
`
`“substitute[ed] the phrase ‘may act’ for the phrase . . . ‘may interact’” in its
`
`analysis of Gibbs. Resp. at 20-21. But Gibbs shows interactions between objects
`
`(e.g., the report object requests data from the train and car objects, and then those
`
`objects send data back to the report object). See e.g., Ex. 1003 at ¶ 97 (citing Ex.
`
`1006 at 9:31-40); Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 63-65. Dr. Green’s testimony also shows this
`
`supposed distinction is illusory, stating first “the word ‘interaction’ implies a two-
`
`way flow of actions,” (Ex. 2009 at 154:7-16), but later stating interaction meant
`
`only “the possibility that communications could go in either direction,” (id. at
`
`156:15-157:6 (emphasis added), 158:18-21). Gibbs satisfies either construction.
`
`The Board should maintain its finding that Gibbs anticipates claims 2-12, 14
`
`and 16, as that finding is supported by substantial evidence.
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`
`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
`
`
`
`Dated: October 27, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Registration No. 43,401
`Sidley Austin LLP
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`jkushan@sidley.com
`(202) 736-8914
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Certificate of Service
`
`I hereby certify that on this 27th day of October, 2014, a copy of this
`
`Petitioner’s Reply has been served in its entirety by email on the following counsel
`
`of record for Patent Owner and Petitioners Yelp and Twitter:
`
`Patent Owner:
`Anthony Patek
`Gutride Safier LLP
`835 Douglass Street
`San Francisco, CA 94114
`anthony@gutridesafier.com
`pto@gutridesafier.com
`
`Todd Kennedy
`Gutride Safier LLP
`835 Douglass Street
`San Francisco, CA 94114
`todd@guttridesafier.com
`
`
`Petitioners Yelp and Twitter
`Vaibhav P. Kadaba
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2800
`Atlanta, GA 30309-4528
`wkadaba@kilpatricktownsend.com
`rartuz@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`
`Dated: October 27, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket