Paper No. 43
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`____________________
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`
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`APPLE INC.,
`TWITTER, INC., AND YELP INC.,
`Petitioners
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`v.
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`EVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENCE LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________________
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`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-00086
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-008121
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`____________________
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`
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`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
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`1 Per the Board’s Order (Paper 16 at 4), Petitioner Apple identifies this as a
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`consolidated filing.
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`
`
`
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`____________________
`
`
`
`APPLE INC.,
`TWITTER, INC., AND YELP INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`EVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENCE LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`____________________
`
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-00086
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2014-008121
`
`____________________
`
`
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`Petitioners’ Request for Rehearing
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`1 Per the Board’s Order (Paper 16 at 4), Petitioner Apple identifies this as a
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`consolidated filing.
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`
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`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
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`Table of Contents
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`I.
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`II.
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`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
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`Standard of Review .......................................................................................... 1
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`III. Argument ......................................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`The Board’s Final Written Decision Misapprehends the Evidence
`Establishing that Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Containers” ............... 1
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`1.
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`2.
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`Gibbs Discloses a Logical Data Structure Comprising Objects,
`and Is Thus a “Container” ........................................................... 2
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`Petitioners Have Consistently Relied on Gibbs’ System, Not an
`Individual Object, as Meeting the Claimed “Container” ............ 8
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`B.
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`C.
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`The Board Erred as a Matter of Law When Construing “a First
`Register Having a Unique Container Identification Value” ............... 10
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`The Board Misapprehended Gibbs’ Disclosure of “a Neutral Space
`Register” .............................................................................................. 14
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`IV. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 15
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`
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`IPR2014-00086 & -00812
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Petitioners respectfully request rehearing of the Board’s final written
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`decision, Paper 42 (“Dec.”). The Board found claims 2-12, 14, and 16 of U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,010,536 (“the ’536 patent”) not anticipated by U.S. Patent No.
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`5,836,529 to Gibbs (Ex. 1006). Dec. at 29. The Board’s decision overlooks and
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`misapprehends evidence and arguments showing both the anticipatory nature of
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`Gibbs and the proper construction of the claims. Petitioners respectfully ask the
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`Board to reconsider its decision and find claims 2-12, 14, and 16 anticipated.
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`II.
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`Standard of Review
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`“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for
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`an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c); see, e.g., IPR2013-00194, Paper 69
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`at 13. An abuse of discretion exists “when [the] decision is based on clearly
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`erroneous findings of fact, is based on erroneous interpretations of the law, or is
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`clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
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`F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The party challenging the decision
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`“must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended
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`or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a
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`motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`III. Argument
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`A. The Board’s Final Written Decision Misapprehends the Evidence
`Establishing that Gibbs Discloses the Claimed “Containers”
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`The Board’s final written decision misapprehends and overlooks evidence
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`showing that Gibbs describes the claimed “containers.” First, despite finding the
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`term “container” to be “a logically defined data enclosure which encapsulates any
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`element or digital segment … or set of digital elements,” (Dec. at 8), the Board
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`found Gibbs to not disclose such a “container.” Specifically, the Board found that
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`Gibbs does not disclose any single, logically defined enclosure comprising the
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`instantiated transport, map, and report objects. Dec. at 23. This conclusion
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`overlooks the extensive evidence presented by Petitioners showing that the train
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`management software in Gibbs creates an object-oriented programming structure,
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`i.e. a logical data structure that comprises instantiated transport, map, and report
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`objects. See § III.A.1 below. If it did not, Gibbs’ software would simply not work.
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`Second, the Board found that, based on its reading of one paragraph (¶ 110)
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`of Dr. Houh’s Declaration, “Petitioner’s evidence is inconsistent, and does not
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`specify where the container element is found in Gibbs.” Dec. at 23. This
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`overlooks Petitioners’ unambiguous identification of Gibbs’ object-oriented
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`programming structure as the claimed “container,” and misapprehends the context
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`of the remaining paragraphs of Dr. Houh’s Declaration. See § III.A.2 below.
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`1. Gibbs Discloses a Logical Data Structure Comprising
`Objects, and Is Thus a “Container”
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`As described in the Petition and Dr. Houh’s Original Declaration (Ex. 1003),
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`Gibbs discloses a logical data structure created by the train management software
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`2
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`which comprises a collection of instantiated objects that work together to
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`implement the Gibbs train management system. Pet. at 12-13; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 69-
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`75; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 2-3, 8a, 9b, 5:52-6:43, 22:23-55. Gibbs’ various objects exist
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`in the memory of a computer as a logical data structure when the train
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`management software is executing on a workstation. Ex. 1009 at ¶ 37; Reply at 4-
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`5; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 78, 89; Pet. at 14; Ex. 1006 at 8:44-53, 9:27-31. As Dr. Houh
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`explained, in Gibbs’ object-oriented system “each object is instantiated as part of a
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`logical data structure in the system as it is operating.” Ex. 1009 at ¶ 37. Even Dr.
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`Green agreed – he testified that Gibbs discloses “a highly structured railroad
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`system information database” within “an object-oriented programming structure
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`as conventionally known in the art.” Ex. 2006 at ¶¶ 78, 94; Ex. 1006 at 3:65-4:10,
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`7:20-27. Thus, the evidence before the Panel established that the Gibbs TMS
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`workstations, in operation, create a data structure (a “highly structured . . .
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`information database”) comprised of the different objects to implement the object
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`oriented design of the Gibbs train management software.
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`This data structure created by the Gibbs software clearly meets the Board’s
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`definition of a “container”: “a logically defined data enclosure which encapsulates
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`any element . . . or set of digital elements.” See Dec. at 8. Critically, as Dr. Green
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`testified, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand “logically defined”
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`to include data elements related by a software mechanism (e.g., the Gibbs
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`3
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`software). Reply at 6 (citing Ex. 2006 at ¶ 35). Likewise, Dr. Houh explained that
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`a logical data enclosure could include “a system process, an execution stack (the
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`memory allocated to a running software application), contiguous blocks of physical
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`memory, a file structure or file header, various instances of object-oriented
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`programming design concepts,” etc. Ex. 1009 at ¶ 29; Reply at 6-7. Undisputed
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`evidence before the Board thus established that Gibbs describes a software
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`mechanism (software running on each TWS workstation) that relates various
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`digital elements (a specific set of instantiated transport, map, and report objects in
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`the Gibbs scheme), thereby yielding a “highly structured . . . information database”
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`/ “logical data structure” (i.e., a logically defined data enclosure). Reply at 6-7;
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`Ex. 1009 at ¶ 37; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 107-144; Pet. at 12-19; see Ex. 1006 at 3:65-4:10,
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`7:20-27. Nothing more is required to satisfy the claimed “container.”
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`The Board overlooked or did not appreciate the evidence presented by
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`Petitioners establishing that the train management software in operation creates
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`“containers.” This evidence included Dr. Houh’s first declaration, where he
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`consistently identified the operation of the Gibbs train management software as the
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`critical feature that gives the “map” and “report” objects their key functionality
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`(i.e., displaying or reporting on which “real world” objects are within a user-
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`defined area at any given time). See, e.g., Ex. 1003 at ¶ 161 (“The railroad
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`management system . . . generates an output list [containing] any transport objects
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`4
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`which meet selected criteria entered by the user into a report or map object. The
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`transport objects added to the output list are displayed by the map or report.”); id.
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`at ¶ 172 (“the map object . . . accesses and display[s] transport objects that are
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`within the geographic boundaries.”); id. at ¶ 128 (“The map object also actively
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`displays the location of each type of train that is selected by the user for display . .
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`. whenever the train’s location is updated.”); id. at ¶ 91 (explaining map object
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`enables display of map); id. at ¶ 93 (explaining “zooming” functionality of map
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`object); id. at ¶ 166 (updating a map object’s display of a train “whenever the
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`train’s location is updated.”). See also Pet. at 24-25; Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 14, 33-34.
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`The Board also overlooked identified portions of the Gibbs disclosure
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`showing how these objects work together when the software is running. Reply at
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`3-4; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 89-100. For example, the Board overlooked Gibbs’ disclosure
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`of how a single map object interacts with and incorporates multiple report and
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`transport objects. Reply at 3-4. Figure 8a of Gibbs depicts the display of a map
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`including generated reports and transport objects that are within the selected
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`geographic boundaries and meet other selected criteria. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 94; see id. at
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`¶¶ 89-100, 108-09; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 8a, 20:2-5 (generated display shows map
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`objects), 20:5-16 (transport objects), 20:17-21 & 20:30-40 (report objects); Pet. at
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`15 (the map object “determine[s] which transport objects are within the selected
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`map area”), id. at 18. Gibbs explains in Figure 9a how the map and report objects
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`5
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`maintain collections of transport objects within the selected boundaries and can
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`iterate through each object in the collection to monitor its status. Ex. 1003 at
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`¶¶ 102-04; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 9b, 22:23-55; Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 42-46. Gibbs thus clearly
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`shows transport and other objects being incorporated into a structured collection of
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`instantiated objects that enables the TMS system, in operation, to display a map
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`containing these various objects. Reply at 3-4. This functionality derives from the
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`object-oriented design of the transportation management software, which, when
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`executing, creates “a highly structured . . . information database.” See Reply at 7-
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`8; Pet. at 20; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 69-75; Ex. 1006 at 3:65-4:10. All of this evidence
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`established that the Gibbs TMS system, in operation, creates “containers.”
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`The Board disregarded this evidence, and instead relied on testimony from
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`Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Green, who focused on the design (e.g., organization of
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`the code) rather than the operation of the Gibbs train management software. Dr.
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`Green, in particular, pointed to the logical organization of the Gibbs software code,
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`in which objects are defined in two object libraries, a transport object library and a
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`service object library. Dec. at 23 (citing Ex. 2006 at ¶¶ 86-94). By focusing on
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`this logical design rather than on the data structures that come into existence when
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`the Gibbs train management software is running, Dr. Green and Patent Owner
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`improperly confused the record of this proceeding. In particular, Dr. Green’s
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`testimony ignores that Gibbs’ object libraries are not databases that exist in the
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`6
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`memory of a TMS workstation; they are the blueprints or code that the computer
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`uses to create the “highly structured railroad system information database” that
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`Dr. Green acknowledges is created when the TMS workstation runs the train
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`management software. See Ex. 2006 at ¶¶ 78, 94. As Dr. Houh explained in reply:
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`[While Gibbs’] code libraries contain the software routines that are
`used to build the objects, the libraries themselves do not contain any
`data from the railroad system. When the software is executed on a
`user’s workstation, it uses the code libraries to create instances of the
`objects, and these objects acquire and store data about the railroad
`system, about other objects, and from the user. This is how software
`conventionally works, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`understand that.
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`Ex. 1009 at ¶ 11; Reply at 4-5. Once these objects are instantiated and exist in
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`memory, they are no longer stored in “separate” libraries; instead, they exist within
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`a data structure in the memory of the computer and constantly interact with each
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`other to enable the train management system to operate. See Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 107-
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`144; Pet. at 12-19. And while not all of the objects defined in the two libraries will
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`be instantiated every time the software executes, it is undisputed that Gibbs’
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`objects, when they are instantiated, are tightly coupled by Gibbs’ software into a
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`logical data enclosure by the train management software, which creates the object-
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`oriented data structure in the memory of the TMS workstation. Ex. 1009 at ¶ 37;
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`Reply at 4-5; see Ex. 2006 at ¶¶ 78, 94. The evidence before the Board thus
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`7
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`clearly established that Gibbs discloses a “highly structured . . . information
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`database” or “logical data structure” including each of the interacting objects that
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`collectively implement Gibbs’ system, which means it is “a logically defined data
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`enclosure” (i.e., a “container”) according to the claims.
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`2.
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`Petitioners Have Consistently Relied on Gibbs’ System, Not
`an Individual Object, as Meeting the Claimed “Container”
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`Petitioners never contended a single transport object, standing alone, met all
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`of the elements of the claims. See Pet. at 12-19. Instead, Petitioners identified the
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`structured set of objects, as executing in the Gibbs system, as being the “container”
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`of claim 2. See id. at Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 109-10 (“The railroad management system
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`also uses objects to display and transmit information to the user, such as through
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`maps and reports. . . . The objects used by the Gibbs railroad management system
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`are examples of logically defined data enclosures, and are “containers” as specified
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`in claim 2 of the ‘536 patent…”). In particular, Petitioner’s evidence shows how
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`various objects within the logical data “object oriented” programming structure
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`created by the Gibbs software – most notably the “map” and “report” objects –
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`interact with and incorporate other Gibbs “objects” representing “real world”
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`objects (e.g., “train” or “transport” objects) when the Gibbs TMS software is
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`executing. Pet. at 12-19; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 107-144; see, e.g., id. at ¶ 90 (“Each map
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`object contains routines and program which collect data from other objects in the
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`system in order to generate a map requested by the user.”); id at ¶¶ 122, 133, 180.
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`8
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`Thus, while Petitioners explained that various Gibbs objects individually
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`exemplify aspects of “containers” within the meaning of the patent, Petitioners also
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`consistently identified the set of objects together – which exists as a data structure
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`in the memory of the TMS workstation when the software is executing – as the
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`claimed “container.” Indeed, Petitioner’s mapping of Gibbs to the preamble
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`“container” showed how the collection of instantiated objects in the Gibbs TMS
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`system had different objects working together, which meet each of the claimed
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`registers that form part of the container. Pet. at 12-19; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 107-144.
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`The Board did not appear to appreciate the significance of this evidence
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`when it concluded that “the original Houh Declaration described the various
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`objects in some detail but, other than paragraph 110, did not specify what
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`particular object or group of objects constitutes a ‘container.’” Dec. at 22. The
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`evidence in this record also plainly refutes Patent Owner’s characterization of this
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`one sentence in Dr. Houh’s report as suggesting otherwise – a characterization the
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`Board relied on in its Decision. Dec. at 22. That assertion cannot be reconciled
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`with other statements in Dr. Houh’s first declaration (as illustrated above), as well
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`as his deposition testimony and his reply declaration. Ex. 1008 at 102:19-104:13;
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`Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 33-37; Reply at 3-7.
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`All of this evidence was properly before the Board and must be considered
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`in determining what the preponderance of the evidence establishes. See Dec. at 28-
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`9
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`29 (denying Patent Owner’s motion to exclude). Certainly, a misperceived conflict
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`in Dr. Houh’s testimony cannot override the probative value of the evidence itself,
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`which establishes by more than a preponderance of the evidence that Gibbs
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`describes a collection of instantiated objects organized as a logical data structure
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`in the memory of the computer, and thus clearly meets the “container” element of
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`the claims as the Board has construed that term. See § III.A.1 above.
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`B.
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`The Board Erred as a Matter of Law When Construing “a First
`Register Having a Unique Container Identification Value”
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`The Board erred as a matter of law when it construed “a first register having
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`a unique container identification value” in claim 2 to be limited to “a first register
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`having a value that uniquely identifies the given container.” The Board addressed
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`this term for the first time in their final written decision, limiting the clause to one
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`exemplary embodiment of the invention – the “identity register.” Dec. at 14, 25-
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`26. By limiting this clause to this one example, the Board failed to give this clause
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`its broadest reasonable interpretation. The Board also failed to incorporate all of
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`the definitional attributes of the “identity register,” thereby committing an
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`independent legal error.
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`Under the BRI standard, the Board must first “look to the specification to
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`see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad
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`interpretation.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007); Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
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`10
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`2012). Here, as Dr. Green admitted, there is no definitional language in the ’536
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`patent equating the claimed “first register” to the “identity register” example in the
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`disclosure. Ex. 2009 at 113:1-22, 11:3-10; Reply at 9-10. The Board confirmed
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`this in its decision – it observed the term “first register” is not found nowhere in
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`the disclosure, but only appears in the claims and abstract. Dec. at 14.
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`If a claim element is not expressly or otherwise defined, the plain language
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`actually used in the claim dictates the broadest reasonable interpretation of that
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`claim element. Here, the plain language of the “first register” clause does not
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`require the “first register” to be the “identity register” example in the specification
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`– it states simply that the first register need only store “a unique container
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`identification value.” As Petitioners explained in their reply (Rep. at 9-10), there
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`are examples of unique container identification values in the patent disclosure that
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`could be stored in a “first register” other than an identity register. For example, as
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`Patent Owner has itself argued, one container may contain another container, with
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`the parent container including “the logical description of [the child] container.”
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`Resp. at 39 (citing Ex. 1001 at 9:4-9). In such a situation, the first register could
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`plausibly store a unique container identification value of the encapsulated child
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`container – a configuration clearly shown in Gibbs. See Ex. 1009 at ¶¶ 61-62.
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`The Board overlooked or did not fully appreciate the significance of the
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`undisputed evidence supporting this reading of the clause. For example, Patent
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`11
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`Owner’s expert, Dr. Green, confirmed the “identity register” was simply one of
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`several possible alternatives of a “first register.” Ex. 2009 at 113:1-22, 107:2-
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`110:22; Reply at 9-10. The additional testimony of Dr. Green cited by the Board
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`(Dec. at 14) is not inconsistent with this admission – he simply confirmed the
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`“identity register” could be the first register, not that it must be the first register.
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`Petitioners also identified other examples of unique container identification
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`registers in the disclosure. See Reply at 10 (discussing “content key register” and a
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`“content description register” that each “identify[] the container contents.”); Ex.
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`1001 at 15:32-37. The Board overlooked or did not fully appreciate this undisputed
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`evidence of other examples of “first” registers disclosed in the ’536 patent.
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`Given this undisputed evidence of other examples in the ’536 patent that
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`could be the “first register,” it was clear error for the Board to limit the meaning of
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`this claim term under the BRI standard to one example – the “identity register.”
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`Reading a limitation into a claim, particularly where it is expressly described as
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`merely exemplary, is inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of a
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`term. See In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); MPEP § 2111.
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`This is particularly important when, as here, the patent disclosure does not use the
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`claim term, and identifies alternative possible embodiments for it. But even if the
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`’536 patent had identified the “identity register” as the only example of a “first
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`12
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`register” (which it does not), it would be error for the Board under the BRI
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`standard to limit the claim to this one embodiment. The Federal Circuit has held:
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`“[T]his court has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a
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`single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to
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`that embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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`Finally, even if the “first register” were properly equated to the “identity
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`register” example in the ’536 patent, the Board committed an independent legal
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`error by not incorporating into its construction the complete definitional attributes
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`of this “identity register.” As both Patent Owner and Dr. Green explained, the
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`“identity register” includes as an essential feature a “unique network wide
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`identification” of “the given container.” Resp. at 16-19 (emphasis added); Ex.
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`2003 at ¶ 48. The Board’s decision, however, expressly incorporates only a
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`portion of the definition of an “identity register” – that it contain a “unique
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`identification” of the “given container” – and omits the “network wide” portion of
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`the definition entirely. Dec. at 14-15. This is particularly confusing because the
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`Board referred to this “unique network wide identification” feature of the “identity
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`register” to support its conclusions on the meaning of the “first register.” Id. Thus,
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`the Board, even under its own reasoning, committed legal error by attaching a
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`meaning to the “first register” element found nowhere in the patent disclosure.
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`13
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`C. The Board Misapprehended Gibbs’ Disclosure of “a Neutral
`Space Register”
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`The Board misapprehended Petitioner’s explanation and evidence showing
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`how Gibbs discloses a “neutral space register.” For example, Petitioners pointed to
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`Gibbs’ operation of a train consist report, in which a user first selects a train object
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`presented on a map, which then causes the report object to interact with the
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`specified train object and to finally display a graphical image of the selected train.
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`Pet. at 18; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 88, 98, 125-137; Reply at 14-15. The Board concluded,
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`however, that Gibbs does not disclose a “neutral space register” because “[o]nly
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`after the train is selected is location information in the form of latitude and
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`longitude generated for the selected train,” and that latitude and longitude are
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`“mere data” that do not identify space in which interaction may occur. Dec. at 27.
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`Both conclusions reflect a misunderstanding of the evidence presented. First, the
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`Board failed to appreciate that before a user can select a train, the train must be
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`depicted on the map, i.e., it must be within the map’s geographical boundaries
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`based on its location and then displayed on the map. To create the train consist
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`report, the user selects the train on the map, which can only happen after the map
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`object has retrieved the location data for the train from the train object. Reply at
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`14; Ex. 1006 at 16:53-54 (“To generate a train consist report, the train report object
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`414 prompts the user to select a particular train.”), 8:20-31 (“The CMO 90 . . .
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`enabl[es] the user to directly activate each of the objects within the map”); Ex.
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`14
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`1003 at ¶¶ 88, 98; Ex. 1006 at Fig. 8a-8f. The latitude and longitude are the space
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`on the map where the user can initiate the interaction between the transport object
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`and the report object. Reply at 14-15. The Board misapprehended this evidence.
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`Second, the Board’s conclusion that latitude and longitude are “mere data”
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`that do not identify space misapprehends the broadest reasonable meaning of the
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`claimed register: a “value or code associated with a container” for “identifying
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`space in which the container may interact with other containers, processes,
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`systems, or gateways.” Dec. at 9-10 (emphasis added). It is unclear what, if
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`anything, could fulfill the “value” portion of the Board’s construction of “register”
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`other than “mere data.” Gibbs expressly discloses latitude and longitude data (a
`
`“value or code”) that represent a location on a map (“for identifying space”) where
`
`interaction between Gibbs’ object-oriented programming structure (“the
`
`container”) and a corresponding transport object (“with other containers, processes,
`
`systems, or gateways”) can be triggered by the user (“in which the container may
`
`interact”). Pet. at 18; Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 88, 98, 125-137; Reply at 14-15. By not
`
`using the broadest reasonable construction of the claimed “neutral space register,”
`
`the Board’s decision misapprehends Gibbs’ disclosure and Petitioner’s arguments.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`The Board should reconsider its decision and find that claims 2-12, 14, and
`
`16 are invalid as anticipated by Gibbs.
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: May 15, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Registration No. 43,401
`Sidley Austin LLP
`1501 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`jkushan@sidley.com
`(202) 736-8914
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`Certificate of Service
`
`I hereby certify that on this 15th day of May, 2015, a copy of this
`
`Petitioner’s Reply has been served in its entirety by email on the following counsel
`
`of record for Patent Owner and Petitioners Yelp and Twitter:
`
`Patent Owner:
`Anthony Patek
`Gutride Safier LLP
`835 Douglass Street
`San Francisco, CA 94114
`anthony@gutridesafier.com
`pto@gutridesafier.com
`
`Todd Kennedy
`Gutride Safier LLP
`835 Douglass Street
`San Francisco, CA 94114
`todd@guttridesafier.com
`
`
`Petitioners Yelp and Twitter
`Vaibhav P. Kadaba
`Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
`1100 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2800
`Atlanta, GA 30309-4528
`wkadaba@kilpatricktownsend.com
`rartuz@kilpatricktownsend.com
`
`
`Dated: May 15, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Jeffrey P. Kushan/
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple
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