throbber
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD IN THE UNITED
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`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`Trial Nos.:
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`IPR 2014~00059
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`Re:
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,415,280
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`Patent Owners:
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`PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC & Level 3 Communications
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`Petitioner:
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`Rackspace US, Inc. & Rackspace Hosting, Inc.
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`UPDATED DECLARATION OF ROBERT B. K. DEWAR
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`1. My name is Robert B. K. Dewar.
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`I reside at 1591 Carpenter Hill Road,
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`Bennington, VT 05201, and am working for the software company Ada
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`Core Technologies in New York, New York, that I founded.
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`I have been
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`retained by PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC.
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`I understand that
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`PersonalWeb is an owner of patents involved in several Inter Parte
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`Reviews (IPRs). This declaration relates to U.S. Patent No. 6,415,280
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`(the “280 patent), and the IPR that it is involved in which I understand to
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`be IPR No. 2014—00059.
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`2.
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`I am currently Professor Emeritus at New York University in the
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`Department ofComputer Science. My curriculum vitae (CV) is attached
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`:23
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`ma
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`at the rear of this declaration. My educational and professional
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`background is summarized below.
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`3. To summarize my educational and academic background, I was educated
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`at a preparatory school in England, and attended one year of public
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`school there. I then immigrated to the United States where I attended the
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`University of Chicago Lab School. I then attended the University of
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`Chicago where I earned BS and PhD degrees in the field of Chemistry.
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`My PhD work in Chemistry involved substantial use of computers. After
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`receiving my PhD degree, I took a position as Assistant Professor of
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`Computer Science at the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1968.
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`4. I thereafter received tenure as an Associate Professor of Computer
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`Science at the Illinois Institute of Technology. I was Full Professor of
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`Computer Science, CIMS, NYU, since 1975, and am currently Professor
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`Emeritus at New York University in the Department of Computer
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`Science. I was Chairman of the Department of Computer Science from
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`1977-1980 at CIMS, NYU. I was Director of Undergraduate Studies,
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`Computer Science from 1981-1987, CIMS, NYU. I was Associate
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`Director of Courant Institute, from 1994-1997.
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`5. My teaching experience as a Professor includes (i) undergraduate courses
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`relating to Introduction to programming for non-majors, first course for
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`majors (CS1/CS2 equivalents, taught in Fortran, Pascal, SNOBOL, Ada
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`95), Assembly language and Computer Architecture, Operating Systems,
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`Microprocessors, Text processing systems, Programming Languages,
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`Formal language theory, Numerical Analysis, Data processing, and
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`Introduction to Algol-68, and (ii) graduate courses relating to Formal
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`language theory, Theory of Computation, Algorithms, Programming
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`Languages, Compilers, Data Communications, Microprocessor
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`Architectures, Real Time Systems, Information Theory, and
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`Programming by Transformation.
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`6. I have authored or co-authored numerous articles and books relating to
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`computer science, programming, and data processing systems, as shown
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`in my CV.
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`7. My research has centered on compilers, programming languages,
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`operating systems, and microprocessor architectures. I have engaged in
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`extensive consulting (apart from serving as an expert witness) in the area
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`of operating systems and distributed systems, including writing several
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`operating systems for Honeywell used in distributed applications such as
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`airline reservations and freight management.
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`8. In 1994 I founded Ada Core Technologies to commercially exploit the
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`work on Ada (programming language) that I was involved with at New
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`York University. I became CEO and President of Ada Core
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`Technologies.
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`9. I retired from New York University in 2005.
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`10. I have received numerous awards including the SIGAda (Special Interest
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`Group on Ada) award for outstanding Ada Community Contributions, as
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`well as several other awards, which are listed in my attached CV.
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`11. I am familiar with USENETs and Bulletin Board Systems, and used the
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`same in the 1980s and 1990s.
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`12. I have served as an expert witness on a number of occasions in cases
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`involving patent and copyright issues. A list of several cases in which I
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`served as an expert witness can be found in my attached CV.
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`13. I am being compensated for my time at the rate of $500/hour for service
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`that I am providing in connection with these Inter Partes Reviews (IPRs).
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`My compensation is not contingent upon my performance, the outcome
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`of this review, or any issues involved or related to this review.
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`14. I have reviewed and am familiar with at least the following documents,
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`and any other document mentioned herein: the ‘280 patent; U.S. Patent
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`No. 5,649,196 to Woodhill (Woodhill); Langer; the Mercer declaration;
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`and the Mercer deposition transcript. It is my understanding that the ‘280
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`patent has an effective filing date of April 11, 1995.
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`My Understanding of the Law Regarding Patent Validity
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`15. The following is what I have been told about the law regarding validity
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`of a patent, and it represents my understanding of the same. It is my
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`understanding that Rackspace (who I understanding is a “petitioner” in
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`this proceeding) has the burden of proving invalidity in an IPR
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`proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence. As explained below, it is
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`my opinion that the challenged claims of the ‘280 patent are not invalid
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`under this standard.
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`16. Anticipation. It is my understanding that a claim of a patent is
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`“anticipated” only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is
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`found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
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`reference. If even a single element is missing, the claim is not
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`anticipated. It is my understanding that a feature is “inherent” in a
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`reference only if that feature is necessarily present in the reference - not
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`merely probably or possibly present. Furthermore, it is my understanding
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`that in order to anticipate, a prior art reference must not only disclose all
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`elements of the claim, but must also disclose those elements arranged as
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`in the claim.
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`17. Obviousness. It is my understanding that a patent claim is invalid for
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`“obviousness” if the claimed invention as a whole would have been
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`obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in
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`view of a single prior art reference or a combination of prior art
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`references. I understand that a determination of whether a claimed
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`invention would have been obvious requires taking into consideration
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`factors which include assessing the scope and content of the prior art, the
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`differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and the level
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`of ordinary skill in the art. It is my understanding that the level of
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`ordinary skill in the art is determined by considering the type of problems
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`encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the
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`rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the
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`technology involved, and the educational level of active workers in the
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`field. It is my understanding that a prior art reference may be considered
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`to teach away from the invention when a person of ordinary skill, upon
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`reading the reference, would be led in a direction divergent from the path
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`that was taken by the claimed invention; and that the general rule is that
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`references that teach away cannot serve to create a prima facie case of
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`obviousness.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
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`18. As of 1995, it is my opinion that a person of ordinary skill in the art to
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`which the ‘280 patent pertains would likely be a person with a bachelors
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`degree in computer science with ten to fifteen years of teaching or work
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`experience in the field. Of course, one of ordinary skill in the art might
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`have either more formal education with less experience, or less formal
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`education with more experience.
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`Issues Involving the ‘280 Patent
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`19. It is my understanding that the Board, in a decision dated April 15, 2014,
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`instituted a trial regarding the ‘442 patent for only the following: (a)
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`whether claims 10, 15, 16, 18, 25, 36 and 38 are anticipated under 35
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`U.S.C. §102(e) by Woodhill (Ex. 1003); and (b) whether claims 10, 15,
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`16, 18, 25, 31-33, 36 and 38 are obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over
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`Woodhill (Ex. 1003) and Langer (Ex. 1004).
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`Claim Constructions
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`20. I have used the following interpretations of claim terms in my
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`declaration. I have been asked to use these constructions for purposes of
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`this proceeding.
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`21. “file” and “data file” (claims 10, 15, 18, 25, 36, 38). The ordinary
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`meaning of “file” in this art at the time of the invention was the following
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`definition given in the 1994 Microsoft Computer Dictionary: “file A
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`complete, named collection of information, such as a program, a set of
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`data used by a program, or a user-created document. A file is the basic
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`unit of storage that enables a computer to distinguish one set of
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`information from another. A file might or might not be stored in human-
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`readable form, but it is still the ‘glue’ that binds a conglomeration of
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`instructions, numbers, words or images into a coherent unit that a user
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`can retrieve, change, delete, save, or send to an output device.”
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`(emphasis added) (Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary, Second Edition
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`(1994) – Ex. 2011.) This is consistent with a “named” data item referred
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`to at col. 5:48-49 of the ‘280 patent. A “named” data item as described
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`in the ‘280 patent means that the data item is a coherent unit that is
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`individually manipulatable by a user so that a user can selectively
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`retrieve, change, delete, save, or send it to an output device. In other
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`words, one of skill in the art would have understood that a “named” data
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`item is one that is necessarily a complete coherent unit that a user can
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`selectively retrieve, change, delete, save, or send to an output device.
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`Thus, the ordinary meaning of “file” as described in the 1994 Microsoft
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`Computer Dictionary is both proper and consistent with the description of
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`“file” in the ‘280 patent.
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`22. A mere segment of a basic file is NOT a “file.” Both the specification of
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`the ‘280 patent and the 1994 Microsoft Computer Dictionary are clear in
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`this respect. The specification of the ‘280 patent expressly differentiates
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`between a “file” and a mere “segment” of a file, making clear that they
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`are different and that a mere “segment” is not a “file.” As shown in Fig.
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`2 of the ‘280 patent, the patent differentiates between a “file” 120 and a
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`mere “segment” 122 of a basic file. (‘280 patent, Fig. 2; col 5:25-35.)
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`The specification of the ‘280 patent explains, as shown in Fig. 2, that a
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`“file” is at a different position in the hierarchy than a mere “segment” of
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`a file. (‘280 patent, col. 5:25-31.) The ‘280 patent also explains that
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`while a “file” can be named by a user, a mere “segment” of a file cannot
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`be so named. (‘280 patent, col. 5:44-45; col. 8:28.) Regardless of how
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`“file” is construed, the specification (which includes the drawings) of the
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`‘280 patent makes clear that a mere “segment” cannot be a “file.” One of
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`ordinary skill in the art, upon reviewing the specification of the ‘280
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`patent, would have understood that files are different than segments – i.e.,
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`a mere segment cannot qualify as a “file.”
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`23. Woodhill’s binary objects are “equivalent” to the “segments” in the ‘280
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`patent, which demonstrates that Woodhill’s binary objects (and granules)
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`are not “files.”
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`24. According to the 1994 Microsoft Computer Dictionary, a mere segment
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`of a file cannot be a “file” at least because: (a) a mere segment of a file is
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`not a “complete” collection of information, (b) a mere segment of a file is
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`not a coherent unit that a user can retrieve, change, delete, save or send to
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`an output device, (c) a segment typically has no file header, and (d) a
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`mere segment of a file is not named. (Microsoft Press Computer
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`Dictionary, Second Edition (1994) – Ex. 2011.)
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`25. I also note that this construction would NOT “preclude a data file from
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`including smaller data files” in all cases. For example, a package such as
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`a ZIP file may include a plurality of inner files – these would ALL be
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`“files” under PO’s construction because each of these files would satisfy
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`the limitations of a “file” discussed above. Each inner file would be
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`individually named and each would satisfy the ordinary meaning of a
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`“file” in the 1994 Microsoft Computer Dictionary discussed above. Both
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`before formation of the ZIP file and after unpacking the ZIP file, each of
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`the inner files thereof would have a file header and each would be
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`individually manipulatable by users, with each being a coherent unit that
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`a user can retrieve, change, delete, save or send to an output device. In
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`contrast, that is not the case with the binary objects and granules in
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`Woodhill. Binary objects and granules in Woodhill do not have headers,
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`are not individually manipulatable as files by users, are not inner files of
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`a package file (e.g., ZIP file), and do not satisfy the definition of a “file”
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`in the 1994 Microsoft Computer Dictionary. A binary object or granule
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`in Woodhill: (a) is determined solely based on size (number of bits) and
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`is NOT based on the extent of any coherent unit that is named or
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`individually manipulatable; (b) has no header because it is based solely
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`on size, (c) is NOT a coherent unit that a user can retrieve, change, delete,
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`save or send to an output device, (d) is NOT a “complete” collection of
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`information, and (e) is not named. The binary objects and granules in
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`Woodhill, for example, are mere portions of a basic file, do not have
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`headers, cannot be named, and are not complete coherent units that a user
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`can selectively change, delete, save or send to an output device.
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`Petitioner’s expert admits, for instance, that a user cannot access a
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`granule in Woodhill and then delete only that granule.
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`26. One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
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`also understood that a “file” has a file header. The 1994 Microsoft
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`Computer Dictionary explains the ordinary meaning that “a file header
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`identifies a data file by name, size, and time and date of creation or
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`revision; it might also identify the program with which the file was
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`created.” (Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary, Second Edition (1994) –
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`Ex. 2011.) Accordingly, a “file” at the time of the invention, and in the
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`‘280 patent, should be construed as including a file header. This is
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`important because binary objects and granules in Woodhill do not have
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`file headers, and thus demonstrating that they cannot be “files” or “data
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`files” for this additional reason.
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`27. For example, consider a book that makes up a WORD “file.” The book
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`includes many pages. The WORD file has a header. It would
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`unreasonable to allege that an arbitrary portion of one page of the book
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`constitutes its own “file.” In a similar manner, any allegation that a mere
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`binary object or granule in Woodhill constitutes its own “file” is
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`unreasonable, contrary to the ordinary meaning of “file” at the time of the
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`invention, and contrary to the specification of the ‘280 patent which
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`differentiates between files and segments.
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`28. The proper construction for a “data file” is the same as the construction
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`for a “file” discussed above, except that a “data file” includes data.
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`29. Preambles of claims 36 and 36 are limiting. I have been instructed to
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`assume that the preambles of claims 36 and 38 are limiting and entitled to
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`patentable weight.
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`30. “data identifier” (claims 10, 18, 25). It is my understanding that the
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`PTAB construed “data identifier” as a “substantially unique data
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`identifier for a particular element.” I have been instructed to assume this
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`construction for this term for purposes of this proceeding.
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`31. “name” for a data file (claim 18). A “name” for a data file in this art is
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`more than simply an identifier. It cannot reasonably be said that all
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`identifiers are file names. For example, while a fingerprint is an
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`identifier for a person, it is not a “name” for that person. Something is
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`not a “name” for a file simply because it identifies a file. Any attempt to
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`simply replace “name” with “identifier” in a construction would be
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`incorrect and contrary to the claim language itself. Even Woodhill
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`contrasts the difference between a file “name” and a binary object
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`“identifier” (see e.g., file name 40 and file name 80 in Figs. 3-4 of
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`Woodhill, compared to binary object identifier 74 in Fig. 3 of Woodhill),
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`evidencing that they are not necessarily the same thing in this art. One of
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`ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
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`understood that there can be a significant difference between a file
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`“name” and a mere “identifier.” One of ordinary skill in the art would
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`have recognized that a “name” for a data file is used to both (a)
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`particularly identify a particular file so that the name can be used to
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`differentiate the file from other files, and (b) refer to that file, access that
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`file, search for that file, and address that file so that a user can use the
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`name to selectively retrieve, change, delete, save or send the file to an
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`output device. (E.g., ‘280 patent, col. 16:13-16; col. 17:15-50; col. 19:1-
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`27; col. 23:61-67; col. 24:56-67; col. 34:35-49; and Ex. 2011.) This is
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`relevant because Woodhill’s binary object identifiers 74 and “contents
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`identifiers,” are not “names” for data files.
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`32. “a particular data file having a particular name specifying a location”
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`(claim 18). This means that the particular data file has a name that
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`particularly identifies the particular data file. And the “name” has the
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`same construction as “name” above, except that the particular name also
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`specifies a location (in addition to the other requirements of a “name”
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`above). For example, see the “pathname” described in the specification
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`of the ‘280 patent which contains both the name of a file and a location
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`of that file. (E.g., ‘280 patent, col. 5:38-44; col. 8:27-28; col. 9:6-7; col.
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`18:42-43.) This is important because Woodhill’s “file location 38” field
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`is not a particular name for a data file because it does not particularly
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`identify any data file.
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`The Challenged Claims are Not Anticipated by Woodhill and Would
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`Not Have Been Obvious
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`33. It is my opinion that the challenged claims of the ‘280 patent are not
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`anticipated by Woodhill and would not have been obvious for at least the
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`following reasons.
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`Woodhill fails to disclose or suggest a data file having two
`different names as required by claim 18.
`34. Claim 18 of the ‘280 patent requires: “a particular data file having a
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`particular name specifying a location in the network at which the data
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`file may be located . . . another name for the particular data file, the
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`other name including a data identifier determined using a given function
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`of the data, where said data used by the given function comprises the
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`contents of the particular data file . . .” Thus, claim 18 requires two
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`different names for a particular data file.
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`35. Both recited names must satisfy all requirements of a “name” for a data
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`file as set forth above in the claim constructions section, including
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`particularly identifying that data file. In additional to the basic
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`requirements of a “name”, the first “name” recited in claim 18 must also
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`specify a location for the particular data file, and the second “name”
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`recited in claim 18 must be determined using a function of the data of the
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`particular data file. Referring to the specification of the ‘280 patent, for
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`example, the first “name” recited in claim 18 may be a “pathname” as
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`described in the specification. (E.g., ‘280 patent, col. 5:38-44; col. 8:27-
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`28; col. 9:6-7; col. 18:42-43.) A “pathname” is a name that contains both
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`the name of a file and a location of that file. Id. For instance, the
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`specification explains that a “pathname” may contain both a “processor
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`name” where the file is located and a “final file name” that was provided
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`by user for particularly identifying the file. And the second “name”
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`recited in claim 18 may be a True Name as described in the specification,
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`which is determined using a function (e.g., MD5) of the data of the data
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`file. Thus, the specification of the ‘280 patent fully supports two
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`different names for a given file as recited in claim 18.
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`36. It is my understanding that petitioner argues that the “data file” is a
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`particular binary object and that the first recited name in claim 18
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`corresponds to Woodhill’s “file location 38” as shown in Fig. 3 of
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`Woodhill. This is incorrect. Woohill’s “file location 38” is not a “name”
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`for a data file. Woodhill’s “file location 38” does not particularly
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`identify any binary object or any granule. The allegation that “file
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`location 38” field is a “name” for a data file is analogous to saying that
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`“backup server 12” in Woodhill is a “name” for a file. This is illogical
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`and unreasonable. There is simply no “name” for a binary object or
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`granule in Woodhill that, in addition to particularly identifying a binary
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`object or granule which a “name” must do, also specifies a location for
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`the binary object or granule. Indeed, nothing in Record 34 of Woodhill
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`identifies a particular binary object or granule. Claim 18 cannot be
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`anticipated by Woodhill for at least these reasons, and there would have
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`been no logical reason to have modified Woodhill to have met the claim
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`in this respect.
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`37. I also note that neither binary objects nor granules in Woodhill are even
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`“files.” Additionally, binary object identifiers 74 and “contents
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`identifiers” in Woodhill are not file “names.”
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`38. Woodhill discloses file name 40 in Fig. 3 and file name 80 in Fig. 4.
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`(Woodhill, Figs. 3-4; col. 3:61; col. 4:56-57.) However, neither of these
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`file names 40, 80 in Woodhill are “determined using a given function of
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`the data, where said data used by the given function comprises the
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`contents of the particular data file,” and neither of these particularly
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`identifies a binary object or granule. Other than 40 and 80, there is no
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`other file name in Woodhill.
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`Granules corresponding to “contents identifiers” in the alleged “update
`request” in Woodhill are never provided to the requesting local
`computer 20 in response to the “update request” (claims 10, 18, 25, 36
`and 38).
`39. Claims 10, 18, 25, 36 and 38 each require a “request” for a data file,
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`which request includes the name (or identifier, or hash) of that particular
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`data file. These claims further require that, in response to the request, the
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`requested file is provided to the requesting computer or client. For
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`example, claim 25 requires “in response to a client request for the
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`particular data file, the request including at least the data identifier of
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`the particular data file, providing the [requesting] client with the
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`particular data file from a given one of the servers . . .” This subject
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`matter cannot be met if it is alleged that “files” are granules and “names”
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`are “contents identifiers” with respect to Woodhill’s granularization
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`restore procedure.
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`40. It is my understanding that petitioner relies upon Woodhill’s
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`granularization restore procedure. However, in Woodhill’s
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`granularization restore procedure granules corresponding to “contents
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`identifiers” in the alleged request (“update request”) are NOT provided
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`from the remote backup server 12 to the requesting computer in response
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`to the “update request.” (Woodhill at col. 17:18-67.) Thus, Woodhill
`
`cannot meet these claims if the claimed data files are argued to be are
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`granules and the names are argued to be “contents identifiers.” Moreover,
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`no name of the large database file at issue is included in the “update
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`request,” so that the claimed data file cannot be considered to be the large
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`database file.
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`41. In Woodhill, granules corresponding to “contents identifiers” in the
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`alleged request (“update request”) are never provided to the requesting
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`computer in response to the update request. (Woodhill at Fig. 5I and col.
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`17:18-67.) The “contents identifiers” in the alleged “update request”
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`were calculated in step 444 and thus are not for granules that are being
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`requested – the requesting local computer 20 already has the granules
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`corresponding to the “contents identifiers” calculated in step 444 and
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`therefore they are never provided to the local computer in response to the
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`update request. Thus, the cited art fails to meet these claims.
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`42. Turning to the “contents identifiers” for the reconstituted granules in
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`Woodhill, the “contents identifiers” for the granules reconstituted at col.
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`17:48-50 are only used for comparison in box 450 of Fig. 5i after the Fig.
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`5h reconstitution of those granules, and are not included in any “request”
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`regarding a data item.
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`Binary objects corresponding to records 58 allegedly in the
`“update request” are not provided to the requesting
`computer in response to the update request (claims 10, 18, 25,
`36 and 38)
`43. In Woodhill, binary objects corresponding to the binary object
`
`identification records 58 argued to be in Woodhill’s “update request” are
`
`NOT provided to the requesting computer in response to the update
`
`request. (Woodhill at col. 17:18 to col. 18:9.) The granularization
`
`restore procedure in Woodhill transmits select granules – not binary
`
`objects. And record 58 and binary object identifier 74 do not identify
`
`particular granules. Thus, Woodhill cannot meet the above-identified
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`claims if the claimed data files are argued to be binary objects and the
`
`identifiers are argued to be binary object identifiers 74 or binary object
`
`identification records 58.
`
`44. As explained above, claims 10, 18, 25, 36 and 38 each require a
`
`“request” for a data file, which request includes the name (or identifier,
`
`or hash) of that particular data file. These claims further require that, in
`
`response to the request, the requested file is provided to the requesting
`
`computer or client. For example, claim 25 requires “in response to a
`
`client request for the particular data file, the request including at least
`
`the data identifier of the particular data file, providing the [requesting]
`
`client with the particular data file from a given one of the servers . . .”
`
`This subject matter cannot be met if the claimed “data file” is considered
`
`to be one of Woodhill’s binary objects and the identifier to the binary
`
`object identifier 74 or record 58 related to that object, because the binary
`
`objects corresponding to the identifier allegedly in the “request” are not
`
`disclosed as being transmitted to the local computer 20 in response to the
`
`request in Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure.
`
`45. In Woodhill, binary objects corresponding to binary object identification
`
`records 58 argued to be in the request (“update request”) are NOT
`
`provided to the requesting computer in response to the request.
`
`
`
`20
`
`

`

`(Woodhill at Fig. 5I and col. 17:18-67.) Woodhill never discloses such
`
`an occurrence, and instead indicates to the contrary. The restore
`
`procedure transmits only particular granules based on whether they have
`
`changed – NOT binary objects.
`
`46. I also note that the granularization restore procedure in Woodhill is
`
`different than the self-audit procedure of Woodhill in that the different
`
`procedures transmit different items, use different comparisons, and so
`
`forth. The two procedures cannot be combined.
`
`47. Thus, in the granularization process upon which petitioner relies,
`
`Woodhill never provides any binary object to the local computer 20 in
`
`response to the “update request.” No binary object sequence of bits is
`
`ever sent from the backup file server 12 to a local computer 20 in the
`
`restore procedure of Woodhill’s granularization feature. In Woodhill’s
`
`granularization process, the backup file server 12 sporadically sends only
`
`select “granules” of a large database file to the local computer.
`
`(Woodhill, col. 17:60-65.) Binary object identifiers 74 and records 58 do
`
`not identify granules, and certainly are not names or identifiers for
`
`granules. Woodhill’s granularization embodiment does not send large
`
`database files or binary objects from server 12 to the local computer –
`
`
`
`21
`
`

`

`just select granules. Thus, Woodhill fails to meet these claims for this
`
`reason as well.
`
`There is no request containing a binary ojbect identifier 74 in
`Woodhill’s self-audit procedure (claims 10, 18, 25, 36 and 38)
`48. As explained above, claims 10, 18, 25, 36 and 38 each require a
`
`“request” for a data file, which request includes the name (or identifier,
`
`or hash) of that particular data file. These claims further require that, in
`
`response to the request, the requested file is provided to the requesting
`
`computer or client. For example, claim 25 requires “in response to a
`
`client request for the particular data file, the request including at least
`
`the data identifier of the particular data file, providing the [requesting]
`
`client with the particular data file from a given one of the servers . . .”
`
`49. Woodhill’s self-audit embodiment also fails to disclose or suggest this
`
`subject matter. (Woodhill, col. 18:10-38.) There is no “request” in
`
`Woodhill’s self-audit procedure that includes a binary object identifier 74
`
`or “contents identifier.” Woodhill explains in the description of the self-
`
`auditing procedure that the Record 58 is “stored in File Database 25.”
`
`(Woodhill, col. 18:16-19.) While Woodhill states that the Record 58 is
`
`“stored in File Database 25”, the Record 58 is never described as part of
`
`a “request” for the binary object. (Woodhill, col. 18:16-19.) Moreover,
`
`Woodhill elsewhere indicates that, in a message, portions of the Record
`
`
`
`22
`
`

`

`58 other than the binary object identifier 74 are used to identify a binary
`
`object. (Woodhill, col. 11:65 to col. 12:5.) Accordingly, in Woodhill’s
`
`self-auditing procedure there is no description of a “request” for a binary
`
`object or anything else that includes a binary object identifier 74. To the
`
`contrary, Woodhill indicates that any such “request” would NOT include
`
`a binary object identifier 74. (E.g., Woodhill, col. 11:65 to col. 12:5.)
`
`Woodhill indicates that binary object identifiers 74 are certainly not used
`
`for accessing binary objects. Id. Additionally, there is no request for a
`
`“data file” in Woodhill’s self-audit procedure as explained herein.
`
`Woodhill restores a randomly selected binary object – not a “data file.”
`
`(Woodhill, col. 18:25.) A binary object is not a “data file.” And neither
`
`a binary object identifier 74 nor a binary object identification record 58 is
`
`a “name” for a data file.
`
`Binary objects and granules are not “data files” as required
`by the challenged claims.
`50. The binary objects and granules in Woodhill are not “files” or “data
`
`files” for the reasons explained above in the claim construction section.
`
`Accordingly, the challenged claims cannot be met by the cited art for this
`
`reason as well. Petitioner relies on a “granule” or “binary object” from
`
`Woodhill as the alleged “data file” with respect to all challenged claims.
`
`Because these are not data files as explained above in the claim
`
`
`
`23
`
`

`

`construction section, petitioner’s allegations regarding all challenged
`
`claims necessarily fail.
`
`51. For instance, the challenged claims require a “request” for a data file that
`
`includes the name, identifier, or hash of that data file. Woodhill never
`
`requests a file. There are no requests in Woodhill for a large database file.
`
`52. Moreover, the challenged claims require names, identifiers, or hashes for
`
`data files to be used in particular manners. It is my understanding that
`
`petitioner relies solely on Woodhill’s “contents identifiers” for granules,
`
`and binary object identifiers 74 for binary objects, in this respect.
`
`However, neither “co

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