UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`GOOGLE INC.,
`MATCH.COM LLC, and PEOPLE MEDIA, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, LLC
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-000381
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONER GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S
`RESPONSE TO PETITION
`(INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,628,314 B1)
`
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and LYNNE E.
`PETTIGREW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`Mail Stop Patent Board
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`1 Case IPR2014-00699 has been joined with this proceeding.
`
`
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`GOOGLE INC.,
`MATCH.COM LLC, and PEOPLE MEDIA, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, LLC
`Patent Owner
`____________
`
`Case IPR2014-000381
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONER GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY TO PATENT OWNER’S
`RESPONSE TO PETITION
`(INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 6,628,314 B1)
`
`
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and LYNNE E.
`PETTIGREW, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`Mail Stop Patent Board
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`1 Case IPR2014-00699 has been joined with this proceeding.
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Cases IPR2013-00038
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
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`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
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`I.
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`II.
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`Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1
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`Logan’s “AccountNo” Reads on the Claimed “Unique Identifier” ............... 1
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`A. Google and the Board’s Construction of “Unique Identifier” is
`Proper ................................................................................................... 1
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`B.
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`Logan’s “AccountNo” Uniquely Identifies “Information Sent
`… From the Computer” ........................................................................ 4
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`III. Logan Discloses “Providing a Unique Identifier to the Computer” ............... 7
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`A.
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`Logan At Least Inherently Discloses “Providing a Unique
`Identifier to the Computer” .................................................................. 7
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`B.
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`The Board’s Proposed Construction is Consistent with BRI ............... 9
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`IV. LOGAN’S SYSTEM IS DIRECTED AT TARGETED
`ADVERTISING ........................................................................................... 10
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`V.
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`Logan and Robinson Renders Claim 15 of the ’314 Patent Obvious ........... 13
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`VI. Mr. Gray’s Testimony is Admissible ........................................................... 14
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`VII. The PTO’s Rulemaking Authority is Not Before the Board ........................ 14
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`VIII. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 15
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases IPR2013-00038
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`Page(s)
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`STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 2
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`77 Fed. Reg. 157 .............................................................................................. 2, 7, 15
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 .................................................................................................... 7, 15
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`37 C.F.R. § 1.68 ....................................................................................................... 14
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`28 U.S.C. § 1746 ...................................................................................................... 14
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 7
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`ii
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`Petitioner’s Reply
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Cases IPR2013-00038
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
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`In its Institution Decision of April 9, 2014, the Board correctly found that
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`Petitioner Google is likely to prevail in showing that Logan anticipates claims 11-
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`13, 18, 20, and that Logan in view of Robinson render obvious claim 15 of the ’314
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`Patent. Paper 9, at 14, 16-17. In response, Patent Owner BE Tech advances three
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`primary arguments that Logan does not disclose (1) a “unique identifier,” (2)
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`“providing a unique identifier to the computer,” and (3) “selection of advertising
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`content for transfer to the computer in accordance with the demographic
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`information” as recited in claim 11 of the ’314 Patent. Because BE Tech misreads
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`Google’s Petition and Logan, and misstates the scope of the ’314 Patent’s claims,
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`the Board should cancel claims 11-13, 15, 18, and 20 of the ’314 Patent.
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`II.
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`Logan’s “AccountNo” Reads on the Claimed “Unique Identifier”
`A. Google and the Board’s Construction of “Unique Identifier” is
`Proper
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`BE Tech argues that the construction of “unique identifier” set forth by
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`Google and adopted by the Board “incompletely cit[es] the specification and
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`completely ignor[es] the actual claim language in which the term appear[.]”
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`Response at 6. Curiously, BE Tech does not proffer any alternative construction
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`of the term.2 BE Tech instead points to disclosures in the ’314 Patent that reference
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`2 Because BE Tech did not file a preliminary response nor set forth any alternative
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`construction of the claimed features in its response, it cannot later argue or advance
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`1
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`the “user ID” as being assigned to the software application downloaded by the user
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`(Response at 7), stored in a cookie and sent to the computer (id. at 8), and received
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`from the server (id. at 8) to conclude that “the idea of a ‘unique identifier’
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`discussed in the specification is not limited to ‘information that uniquely identifies
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`a user.’” Id. at 9.3 BE Tech fails to recognize that these disclosures occur after the
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`server assigns the unique “user ID” to the user.
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`The ’314 specification discloses that once a user completes a form
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`requesting demographic information, “flow moves to block 140 where server 22
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`alternative constructions. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 313, 316(a)(8); 77 Fed. Reg. 157
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`(August 14, 2012) at 48766 (“The [patent owner] response should identify all the
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`involved claims that are believed to be patentable and state the basis for that
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`belief.”)
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`3 Somewhat strangely, it appears that BE Tech is arguing that “user ID” disclosed
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`in the ’314 Patent does not correspond to the “unique identifier” claimed in the
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`’314 Patent. Notwithstanding that BE Tech failed to point out what in the
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`specification supports the claimed “unique identifier”3 or offer an alternative
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`construction for the term, the ’314 specification clearly supports Google and the
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`Board’s construction of “unique identifier” to mean “any unique information that
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`can be used to identify a user” as discussed herein.
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`2
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`assigns a unique ID to the user and then stores that ID along with the received
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`demographic data[.]” Ex. 1001, 17:12-14 (emphases added); Fig. 8. Only after this
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`unique ID (also known as the user ID) has been assigned and stored on the server,
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`is it transferred to the client computer by being assigned to the software application
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`to be downloaded by the client computer, or stored in a cookie to be placed on the
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`client computer. Ex. 1001, 17:29-38.
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`In either case, the ’314 specification also discloses that the application
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`software permits different demographically-targeted advertising for each user. Id.
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`at 17:43-46. Whenever a user logs in, the application checks the login which is
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`associated with the user ID. Id. at 17:38-41,48-52. If the user is not new and his/her
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`password is correct, the user’s preferences and customizations are loaded. Id. at
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`18:55-58. If the user is determined to be new, the application may request the same
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`demographic information as requested in the form provided prior to the download
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`of the software application. Id. at 18:1-9. After receiving this information, the
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`server assigns a user ID to the new user and provides the user ID to the client
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`computer. Id. at 18:11-16.
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`As can be seen, all of the foregoing disclosures in the ’314 Patent supports
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`that the user ID is a unique ID created by server and assigned to the user by the
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`server. See id. at 17:12-14. Only after its creation, the user ID can be transferred to
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`3
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`the computer and/or be used at logins to check for new users. Accordingly, BE
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`Tech’s argument is without merit.
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`BE Tech also appears to argue that Google and the Board’s construction of
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`the “unique identifier” must fail because the “user ID” in the ’314 specification
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`cannot uniquely identify both a user and information sent from the computer. This
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`is also incorrect as it is contradicted by the ’314 specification. Indeed, the ’314
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`Patent discloses that “since client software application 10 communicates with
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`server 22 from time to time and can report back computer usage information as
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`well as information concerning the display of the banners, this information can be
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`associated with the user's demographic information (by way of their unique
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`ID) at the server and then used by the advertisers to help them better understand
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`the consuming public.” Ex. 1001 at 16:17-24 (emphasis added). Accordingly,
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`under the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation and as supported by BE Tech’s own
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`disclosure in the ’314 Patent, Google and the Board’s construction of “unique
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`identifier” to mean “information that uniquely identifies a user” is consistent and
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`proper.
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`B.
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`Logan’s “AccountNo” Uniquely Identifies “Information Sent …
`From the Computer”
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`
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`In alleging that Logan’s “AccountNo” does not uniquely identify
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`information sent … from the computer, BE Tech conveniently ignores the explicit
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`4
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`disclosure of Logan and instead relies on abstract arguments and incomplete
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`hypotheticals.4 See Response at 13-14.
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`BE Tech appears to have confused the claim language when it argued that
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`“[i]n the abstract, a unique identifier of a user has nothing to do with the computer”
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`and “[b]y their nature, these AccountNos refer to matters pertaining to the users,
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`not the computer.” PO Response, p. 13. Claim 11 recites “said identifier uniquely
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`identifies information sent over said computer network from the computer to said
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`server[.]” (Emphasis added.) As such, the claim focuses on the information sent
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`from the computer and does not require the unique identifier to identify, associate,
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`or correspond to the computer itself.
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`In contrast to BE Tech’s abstract arguments, Logan in fact explicitly
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`discloses the above limitation. For example, Logan discloses that a player 103
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`(which is implemented by a computer, Logan at 3:1-2) uploads a “usage log” to the
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`server via FTP protocol. Logan, 8:10-18. Moreover, this usage log (or usage log
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`table 333) is indexed by subscriber field that contains the AccountNo of the
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`subscriber. Id. at 26:9-23. Accordingly, the Subscriber Table 313 at the server,
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`which is also indexed by the AccountNo (id. at 21:18-20), will be modified and
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`updated with computer usage information whenever the usage log is uploaded from
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`the computer to the server. Id. at 21:38-43.
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`4 BE Tech does not rely on any opinions of its expert for this argument.
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`5
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`BE Tech’s argument regarding the term “uniquely” similarly misses the
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`mark. In its Response, BE Tech provides the hypothetical example of Users A, B,
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`and C being identified by AccountNos 1, 2, and 3, and argues that “[i]f AccountNo
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`1 identifies information sent from the computer, so, too, do AccountNos 2 and 3.”
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`Id. at 13-14. BE Tech concludes “[t]here is nothing ‘unique’ about any
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`identification by AccountNo 1of information sent from the computer.” Id. at 14.
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`BE Tech does not consider that the information is “unique” because it is
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`information indexed by AccountNo 1, which is associated with a specific user.
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`As a practical example, consider the analogy of Logan’s AccountNo to a
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`driver’s license number. A driver’s license number by itself uniquely identifies the
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`driver, but could also uniquely identify other information such as registered
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`vehicles or the driver’s driving history including accidents, tickets, citations, etc.
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`Because the license number can index or organize any information specific to
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`driver, the driver’s license number can therefore unique identify a plurality of
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`information.
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`As discussed above, the ’314 specification explicitly discloses that a user ID
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`is uniquely assigned to a specific user. Ex. 1001, 17:12-14. This unique user ID is
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`also associated with computer usage information which is sent back to the server
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`from the client computer. Ex. 1001 at 16:17-24. Accordingly, similar to the ’314
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`6
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`Patent’s user ID, Logan’s AccountNo also performs the exact same function of
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`uniquely identifying computer usage information associated with a specific user.
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`III. Logan Discloses “Providing a Unique Identifier to the Computer”
`A.
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`Logan At Least Inherently Discloses “Providing a Unique Identifier
`to the Computer”
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`Regarding claim 11’s limitation of “providing a unique identifier to the
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`computer,” BE Tech argues that “[i]n the specification of the ’314 patent, it is
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`explained that this term refers to ‘receiv[ing] an assigned ID from the server.’”
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`Response at 15.5 It is unclear if BE Tech is advancing a proposed construction. If
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`not, it cannot later advance new construction arguments. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
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`316(a)(8); 77 Fed. Reg. 157 (August 14, 2012) at 48766. If so, BE Tech is
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`incorporating the terms “receiving” and “server” into the limitation and is therefore
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`improperly importing non-claimed limitations from the specification. See
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`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`As discussed with respect to Logan, the player 103 uploads the usage log
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`that includes the AccountNo to the server. Logan 7:66-8:18. As the AccountNo is
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`found in the player 103, it necessarily follows that prior to the player 103
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`5 BE Tech’s reading of “unique identifier” as the “assigned ID” (same as the “user
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`ID”) further confirms Google and the Board’s broad reading of the term as
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`discussed previously.
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`uploading the usage log with the AccountNo, the AccountNo must have been
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`provided to the player 103.
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`BE Tech’s expert, Mr. Goldstein opined that the “AccountNo could have
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`been provided to the subscriber, rather than the computer, by regular mail, by
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`email, by telephone, or in other ways,” (Decl. ¶ 21) or “provided to the subscriber
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`through the use of a floppy disk or other removable conventional storage devices.”
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`(Decl. ¶ 21). In any of the above circumstances, the subscriber would still have to
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`provide the AccountNo to the player 103 in order for the player 103 to upload the
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`usage logs. Accordingly, even under Mr. Goldstein’s examples, Logan still
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`discloses “providing a unique identifier to the computer,” as required by claim 11.
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`Further, even though it is not required by the limitation of the claim, the
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`AccountNo must also have been provided to the computer by the server. Again,
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`Logan discloses that the server stores the unique AccountNo in various tables used
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`to keep track of the subscriber’s account, preferences, etc. Logan 20:31-21:43.
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`When the player 103 uploads the usage information, the server processes the usage
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`information by using the AccountNo contained in the Subscribers Table to modify
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`the subscriber’s preferences. Id. at 16:58-65; 26:35-52. As testified to by Mr.
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`Stephen Gray, Google’s expert, because the server manages and modifies various
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`data using the AccountNo, it follows that the server must have provisioned the
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`unique AccountNo. See Ex. 2003(“Cross-Examination Gray”) at 182:21-183:23.
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`That is, there are no other components in Logan’s system other than the server that
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`can ensure that a provided AccountNo is a unique number.
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`BE Tech’s arguments and reliance on Mr. Goldstein are conclusory and
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`incomplete. All of the Mr. Goldstein’s hypotheticals (i.e., email, snail mail,
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`telephone, physical storage devices) focus on the means of transferring and not the
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`origin and destination of the AccountNo. Mr. Goldstein and BE Tech brush over
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`the fact that one component in Logan still must have initially provided the unique
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`AccountNo and the other component of Logan must have received the AccountNo,
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`directly or indirectly.
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`The Board’s Proposed Construction is Consistent with BRI
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`B.
`The Board has properly construed “providing a unique identifier to a
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`computer” to mean “associating a unique identifier to a computer, regardless of
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`where the identifier is stored or maintained.” Paper 9 at 9. BE Tech argues that the
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`Board erred because it failed to “consider[] the fact that ‘associating’ appears twice
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`in Claim 11, distinct from ‘providing[.]’” p. 19. BE Tech’s argument fails because
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`it has not considered that the Board did not construe the term “providing” by itself,
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`but rather the phrase “providing a unique identifier to a computer.” Paper 9 at 8-9.
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`The Board’s interpretation is consistent with the BRI standard.
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`As correctly noted by the Board, the language of the claims and the ’314
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`specification do not limit the scope of the limitation. There are alternative ways of
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`providing the user ID to the computer including for example using a cookie
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`mechanism. The only requirement is that the unique ID identifies a user, and that
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`unique ID is known to a computer.
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`Even assuming that the Board’s construction is too broad, Logan still
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`discloses a more limiting construction of the feature. As discussed previously, as
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`Logan’s AccountNo is found in the player 103 and ultimately uploaded to the
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`server, it necessarily follows that the AccountNo must have been provided to the
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`player 103. For at least the above reasons, BE Tech’s arguments with respect to
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`“providing a unique identifier to the computer” is without merit.
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`IV. LOGAN’S SYSTEM IS DIRECTED AT TARGETED ADVERTISING6
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`BE Tech argues that “Logan discloses a system for the delivery of
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`personalized programming to a subscriber that is not based on user demographics.”
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`Response at p. 20. BE Tech goes on for more than 14 pages summarizing certain
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`disclosures of Logan. Yet, it still completely misreads Logan.
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`To start, Logan is directed to a targeted advertising system and discloses that
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`“[b]ecause personal data describing each subscriber’s subject matter interest is
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`6 The language at issue in claim 11 is “selecting advertising content for transfer to
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`the computer in accordance with the demographic information associated with said
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`unique identifier.” BE Tech misquotes the claim language in the title of Section
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`VII.
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`available, along with personal data (age, marital status, zip code, etc.), particular
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`advertising segments may be directed to only those subscribers having a likely
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`interest in the goods or services advertised.” Logan, 9:39-43. While this disclosure
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`alone contradicts BE Tech’s position, the way of how Logan performs this targeted
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`advertising will be reiterated.
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`To generate program schedule of program segments for a subscriber, Logan
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`discloses that the server can either prepare a Schedule Table 307 by supplementing
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`the subscriber’s initial selection (Ex. 1002, 16:58-65) or prepare a Schedule Table
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`307 containing program segments selected entirely by the server for the subscriber
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`based on the matching procedure 342 as shown in Fig. 4. Id. at 17:1-10.
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`In either scenario, the program segments in Schedule Table 307 are selected
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`“by comparing the content of the Programs Table 303, the Subscribers Table 313,
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`and the Advertisements Table 311.” Ex. 1002, 20:31-62. This comparison or
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`matching algorithm is illustrated by the Matching Block 342 of Fig. 4. As
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`discussed in the Petition and testified to by Google’s expert, Mr. Gray, this
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`matching algorithm provides targeted advertising based on demographics. See
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`Paper 1 (“Petition”), pp. 23-24; Ex. 1004, pp. 51-52; Ex. 2003 (“Cross-
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`Examination Gray”), 350:11-22.
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`Logan discloses that in order to “identify and insert advertising program
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`segments into the Schedule Table 307 … the invention utilizes additional
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`information which describes each advertisement to be placed before subscribers.”
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`Ex. 1002, 24:2-6. This information is contained in the Advertisement record which
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`includes a “DemographicMatch” function and “DemographicWeight.” See id. at
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`20:55-62; 24:6-8.
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`The DemographicMatch function “returns a value based on and advertiser
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`specified relationship based on the subscriber’s personal record including (age,
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`sex, marital status, size of household, etc.)[.]” Id. at 25:4-10. The “relative
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`importance of demographic values derived by the DemographicMatch function and
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`the value returned by InterestMatch7” is specific by the DemographicWeight value.
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`Id. at 25:11-14. That is, DemographicWeight factors in both a subscriber’s interest
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`and demographic information.
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`The matching algorithm ultimately “compares the characteristics of the
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`subscriber with the makeup of the target audience defined by the fields of the
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`Advertisement record” to determine which of the advertisement are inserted into
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`the Schedule Table 307 (see id. at 25:15-25) which is then downloaded to the
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`player 103. Id. at 16:65-17:1. Accordingly, the advertisement selected and
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`7 InterestMatch returns a value “indicative of the extent to which a given
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`advertisement is likely to be suited to the interests of a particular subscriber” based
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`on the subscriber’s expressly stated interest or derived interested based on
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`previously played programs. See id. at 24:25-27,55-58.
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`transferred to the player 103 disclosed in Logan is at least based on the
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`demographic information of the subscriber.
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`Regarding Logan’s disclosure of “DemographicMatch” and
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`“DemographicWeight,” BE Tech argues that the weighting is not used to select
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`advertisements because “already scheduled advertisements are ‘prioritized,’ i.e.,
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`ordered in the previously-established queue.” Response at 22. As discussed, Logan
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`sets forth the possibility that no programs are initially selected by the subscriber
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`and that the server could by itself select program segments for inclusion in the
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`Schedule Table 307 based on the matching procedure. Id. at 17:1-10. Regardless,
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`even if there is a “previously-established queue,” Logan’s method still meets the
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`claimed feature. That is, based on DemographicWeight, only highly prioritized
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`advertisements are selected from a queue to be included in the Schedule Table 307,
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`which is then transferred to the computer along with the appropriate program
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`segments. See id. at 25:15-25. It is clear that there is no distinction between this
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`disclosure of Logan and the claimed limitation of “providing a unique identifier to
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`the computer.”
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`V.
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`Logan and Robinson Renders Claim 15 of the ’314 Patent Obvious
`Logan explicitly teaches every feature of claim 11. As discussed in the
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`Petition, Robinson teaches the benefits of using a cookie to uniquely identify a
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`user. See Paper 1 (“Petition”) at pp. 57-60. BE Tech argues that, without any
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`expert declaration or testimony, it would not have been obvious to combine the
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`teachings of Robinson with Logan because a person of ordinary skill in the art
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`would not have been motivated to replace adequately design choices (e.g., Logan).
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`This attorney argument fails because of the explicit motivation of enhanced
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`security provided by Robinson itself in the context of web-based systems. See Ex.
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`1003 at 8:39-41; see also, e.g., Paper 1 (“Petition”) at pp. 57-60; Ex. 1004, ¶159.
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`Accordingly, there is proper motivation to combine Logan and Robinson, of which
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`renders claim 15 obvious.
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`VI. Mr. Gray’s Testimony is Admissible
`BE Tech alleges that Mr. Gray’s testimony is not admissible because it does
`
`not include an oath or affidavit sufficient under 37 C.F.R. § 1.68 or 28 U.S.C.
`
`1746. Response at 36. BE Tech fails to acknowledge that Mr. Gray testified under
`
`oath during his depositions that the opinions contained in his declarations are his
`
`own. See Ex. 2003 (“Cross-Examination Gray”), pp. 89-92, 295-96, 352-53. Out of
`
`an abundance of caution, Mr. Gray has submitted a new declaration confirming the
`
`same. Ex. 1021. Accordingly, Mr. Gray’s testimony is admissible.
`
`VII. The PTO’s Rulemaking Authority is Not Before the Board
`
`BE Tech concludes its Response by advancing the argument that the PTO
`
`does not have substantive rulemaking authority to adopt the Broadest Reasonable
`
`14
`
`
`
`Cases IPR2013-00038
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`
`
`Interpretation (“BRI”) standard commonly used by the Board. Response at 36-38.
`
`Yet this issue is not before the Board in this proceeding.
`
`
`
`Petitioner notes that BE Tech failed to provide a proposed claim
`
`construction standard that would change the application of Logan to the claims of
`
`the ’314 Patent. In fact, BE Tech failed to explicitly provide any claim construction
`
`at all. Accordingly, BE Tech cannot later advance alternative claim constructions
`
`and its BRI argument is irrelevant to this proceeding. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
`
`316(a)(8); 77 Fed. Reg. 157 (August 14, 2012) at 48766.
`
`VIII. Conclusion
`
`
`
`For at least the above reasons, the Board should cancel claims 11-13, 18, and
`
`20 of the ’314 Patent as being anticipated by Logan and claim 15 as obvious in
`
`view of Logan and Robinson.
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Clinton H. Brannon/
`
`Clinton H. Brannon
`
`Reg. No. 57,887
`
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`
`1999 K Street, NW
`
`Washington, DC 20006
`
`
`
`Counsel for Google Inc.
`
`15
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
`
`
`
`
`UPDATED EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Cases IPR2013-00038
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`
`1009
`
`1010
`
`1011
`
`1012
`
`Exhibit # Reference Name
`1001
`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 to Hoyle
`1002
`U.S. Patent No. 5,721,827 to Logan
`1003
`U.S. Patent No. 5,918,014 to Robinson
`1004
`Declaration of Stephen Gray
`1005
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314
`1006
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 6,141,010
`1007
`Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995)
`1008
`Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society
`(Oct. 15, 2012),
`http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_th
`e_Internet.pdf
`“Hypertext Markup Language,” Network Working Group Request
`for Comments 1866, November 1995
`September 2012 Web Server Survey, Netcraft.com,
`http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2012/09/10/september-2012-web-
`server-survey.html (last visited Sep. 28, 2013)
`“The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) Version 1.1,” Network
`Working Group Request for Comments 3875, October 2004
`Application Server Product Vendors, Service-Architecture.com,
`http://www.service-
`architecture.com/products/application_servers.html (last visited Sep.
`28, 2013)
`“HTTP State Management Mechanism,” Network Working Group
`Request for Comments 2109, February 1997
`“HTTP State Management Mechanism,” Network Working Group
`Request for Comments 6265, April 2011
`“Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program,” Network
`Working Group Request for Comments 675, December 1974
`Netscape Homepage, Netscape.com,
`http://web.archive.org/web/19961219074448/http://www7.netscape.c
`om/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013)
`Download Netscape Communicator or Netscape Navigator Software,
`Netscape.com,
`http://web.archive.org/web/19961230200703/http://www.netscape.co
`m/comprod/mirror/client_download.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013)
`
`1013
`
`1014
`
`1015
`
`1016
`
`1017
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cases IPR2013-00038
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`
`Supplemental Declaration of Stephen Gray
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 2002/0178232 to Ferguson
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
`
`Exhibit # Reference Name
`1018
`U.S. Patent No. 5,347,632 to Filepp
`1019
`Stephen Gray Curriculum Vitae
`1020
`Deposition Transcript of Neil Goldstein
`(NEW)
`1021
`(NEW)
`1022
`(NEW)
`1023
`(NEW)
`1024
`(NEW)
`1025
`(NEW)
`
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,134,532 to Lazarus
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,230,204 to Fleming
`
`The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms,
`selected pages, (6th ed. 1996)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s Reply
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Cases IPR2013-00038
`Patent 6,628,314 B1
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e), I, Clinton Brannon, hereby certify that a
`
`copy of the foregoing PETITIONER GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY TO PATENT
`
`OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITION has been served via electronic mail
`
`transmission on the Attorney of Record for related inter partes review petitions of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 (Nos. IPR2014-00038) at the following address:
`
`Jason S. Angell
`Robert E. Freitas
`Daniel J. Weinberg
`Jessica N. Leal
`FREITAS ANGELL & WEINBERG LLP
`350 Marine Parkway, Suite 200
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`jangell@fawlaw.com
`rfreitas@fawlaw.com
`dweinberg@fawlaw.com
`jleal@fawlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: September 10, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Clinton H. Brannon/
`
`Clinton H. Brannon
`
`Reg. No. 57,887
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`1
`
`
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