`Tel: 571-272-7822
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`Paper 106
`Entered: July 8, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
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`AKER BIOMARINE AS and ENZYMOTEC LTD. and
`ENZYMOTEC USA, INC.,
`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`NEPTUNE TECHNOLOGIES AND BIORESSOURCES INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
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`Case IPR2014-000031
`Patent 8,278,351 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before LORA M. GREEN, JACQUELINE WRIGHT BONILLA, and
`SHERIDAN K. SNEDDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`SNEDDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`
`DECISION
`Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71
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`1 Case IPR2014-00556 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`IPR2014-00003
`US 8,278,351 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Aker Biomarine AS (“Aker”) and Enzymotec Ltd. and Enzymotec
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`USA, Inc. (“Enzymotec”) (collectively, “Petitioner”), filed a Request for
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`Rehearing (Paper 105, “Req. Reh’g” or “Request”) of our Final Decision
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`(Paper 104, “Final Dec.”).
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`In rendering the decision to institute, we instituted an inter partes
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`review as to claims 16, 9, 12, 13, 1929, 32, 35, 36, and 4246 of U.S.
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`Patent No. 8,278,351 B2 (Ex. 1001; “the ’351 patent”) for the following
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`grounds of unpatentability:
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`(i) Claims 1, 36, 9, 1213, 1924, 2629, 32, 3536, and 4246 of
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`the ’351 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by
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`Beaudoin I (Ex. 1002); and
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`(ii) Claims 16, 9, 12, 13, 1929, 32, 35, 36, and 4246 of the ’351
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`patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combination
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`Fricke (Ex. 1006), Bergelson (Ex. 1017), Yasawa (Ex. 1015),
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`Itano (Ex. 1009), and the WHO Bulletin (Ex. 1018).
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`Decision to Institute, 28–29 (Paper 22 (“Dec.”)).
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`We, then, denied the remaining grounds of unpatentability asserted by
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`Petitioner as redundant to the grounds of unpatentability on which we
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`already initiated an inter partes review. Id. at 2728. The grounds of
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`unpatentability that were denied as redundant include:
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`(i) Claims 1, 36, 9, 12, 13, 1924, 2629, 32, 35, 36, and 4246
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Beaudoin II (Ex. 1003);
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`(ii) Claims 1, 36, 9, 12, 13, 1924, 2629, 32, 35, 36, and 4246
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Maruyama (Ex. 1004);
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`(iii) Claims 1, 36, 9, 12, 13, 1924, 2629, 32, 35, 36, and 4246
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Fujita (Ex. 1005);
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`(iv) Claims 1, 36, 9, 1924, 2629, 32, and 4246 under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 102(b) over Fricke (Ex. 1006);
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`(v) Claims 1, 1921, 24, and 4244 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over
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`Rogozhin (Ex. 1008);
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`(vi) Claims 16, 9, 12, 13, 1929, 32, 35, 36, and 4246 under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Beaudoin I and Bergelson
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`(Ex. 1017);
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`(vii) Claims 16, 9, 12-13, 19–29, 32, 35, 36, and 4246 under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of a Beaudoin I, the Final
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`Prospectus (Ex. 1011), 2001 Press Release (Ex. 1012), and
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`Bergelson; and
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`(viii) Claims 16, 9, 1213, 1929, 32, 3536, and 4246 under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Fujita, Watanabe (Ex.
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`1039), Itano (Ex. 1009), and Yasawa (Ex. 1015).
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`Id.
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`In our Final Decision, we found that Petitioner had established by a
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`preponderance of the evidence that claims 14, 6, 9, 12, 13, 1927, 29, 32,
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`35, 36, and 4246 were unpatentable, but found that Petitioner did not
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`establish sufficiently that claims 5 and 28 were unpatentable. Final Dec. 36–
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`37.
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`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends that the Board
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`should reconsider its decision not to institute the following grounds of
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`unpatentability that were denied as redundant:
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`(i) Claims 5 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Maruyama (Ex.
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`1004); and
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`(ii) Claims 5 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Fujita (Ex. 1005).
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`Reh’g Req. 115.
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`For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is
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`denied.
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters the party
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`believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
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`matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.71(d).
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`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends that the Board lacks
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`authority to decline to institute on grounds of unpatentability based, in whole
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`or in part, on Maruyama and Fujita. Req. Reh’g 1014. Petitioner further
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`argues that it was an abuse of discretion to decline to institute on grounds of
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`unpatentability based on Maruyama and Fujita under the principles of
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`redundancy. Id. at 1415. We disagree.
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`We begin our analysis by noting that the rules for inter partes reviews
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`were promulgated to take into account the “effect of any such regulation on
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`the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration
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`of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.”
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`35 U.S.C. § 316(b). As mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11), 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.100(c) was promulgated to require that the final written determination
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`in an inter partes review to be issued one year after the date of institution,
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`except that the review may be extended by not more than six months for
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`good cause shown. Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) provides that “[a]t any
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`time prior to institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny some or
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`all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged claims.”
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`This discretion stems directly from 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), which recognizes,
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`among other things, that inter partes proceedings must be conducted to
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`ensure the ability of the Office to timely complete the proceedings.
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`The concept of redundancy is a tool used by the Board in determining
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`whether to exercise its discretion to deny some or all grounds set forth in the
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`Petition. The proper focus of a redundancy designation is on whether
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`Petitioner articulates a meaningful distinction in terms of relative strengths
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`and weaknesses with respect to the application of the prior art disclosures to
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`one or more claim limitations. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive
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`Casualty Inc. Co., CBM2012-00003 (Paper No. 7), at *2 (PTAB, Oct. 25,
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`2012).
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`In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner argues why the grounds of
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`unpatentability based on Maruyama or Fujita are stronger than the grounds
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`of unpatentability on which we instituted. Req. Reh’g, 78. This analysis,
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`however, is based on a comparison of the claim construction for the term
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`“about” set forth in our Decision of Institution and Final Decision. Id. The
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`analysis is not based upon the claim construction for the term “about” set
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`forth in the Petition and, more importantly, the analysis is not part of the
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`Petition.
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`Petitioner, in its Petition, did not explain adequately the relative
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`strengths or weaknesses between the applied prior art references. If
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`Petitioner believed that any other grounds set forth in the Petition had certain
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`weaknesses or strengths, as compared to grounds of unpatentability based on
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`Maruyama or Fujita, for example based on alternative claim constructions
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`that Patent Owner might have raised, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to
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`identify those strengths or weaknesses in its Petition. Doing so would have
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`allowed us to recognize and weigh such factors in rendering a decision as to
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`whether to institute review based on the different asserted grounds. Simply
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`proposing different grounds of unpatentability directed to the same subset of
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`claims does not distinguish meaningfully the applied prior art references.
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`Based on the analysis set forth in the Petition, we determined certain
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`grounds to be redundant, as the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
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`different stated grounds were not readily apparent from the analysis set forth
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`in the Petition. It is a matter of discretion to not proceed with any redundant
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`ground and we exercised that discretion without abuse of the process.
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`Petitioner further request that we exercise our authority 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.5 and reverse our decision not to institute as to Maruyama and Fujita.
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`Req. Reh’g, 910. In making this request, Petitioner fails to appreciate that
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`we are charged with securing “the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution
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`of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Reversing our decision not to
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`institute as to Maruyama and Fujita after issuance of our Final Decision
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`would defeat the purpose of that mandate.
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`For the forgoing reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the Board
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`misapprehended or overlooked any matter in denying the redundant grounds
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`of unpatentability based on either Maruyama or Fujita.
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`III. ORDER
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`In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
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`ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for rehearing is denied.
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`PETITIONER:
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`Amanda Hollis
`amanda.hollis@kirkland.com
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`PATENT OWNER:
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`Dean Farmer
`dfarmer@cooley.com
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