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Paper No. _____
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`Filed on behalf of: Telefonaktiebolaget L. M. Ericsson
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________
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`BROADCOM CORPORATION
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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` TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON
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`Patent Owner
`____________________
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`Case IPR2013-00636
`Patent 6,424,625
`____________________
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`PATENT OWNER’ REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71, Patent Owner Telefonaktiebolaget LM
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`Ericsson (“Ericsson”) respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its denial of
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`Ericsson’s Motion for Additional Discovery (“Decision”) because Ericsson
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`submits that the Board overlooked certain critical legal authorities bearing on the
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`Motion.
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`A. Standard of Review
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`II. Argument
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`The Board will review requests for rehearing for an abuse of discretion. 37
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`C.F.R. 42.71(d). The Board will grant requests for rehearing where a decision
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`rests on an erroneous application of the law. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc. et al.
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`v. Cont’l Automotive Sys. US, Inc., IPR2013-00014 Paper No. 15 at 3; Star Fruits
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`S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Ericsson respectfully
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`submits that the Board erred (a) in its holding that limitation of discovery holds a
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`higher statutory priority than limitation of duplicative proceedings; and (b) in its
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`holding that “Broadcom must have had control over the Texas Litigation” before
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`35 U.S.C. § 315(b) bar may be invoked, See Decision at 7.
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`B. The Board Overlooked that the Principal Purpose of the America Invents
`Act (AIA) is to Limit Multiple Proceedings, and that Limiting Discovery is a
`Subsidiary Purpose, and Erred by Elevating the Latter Over the Former.
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`A major goal of the AIA was “to limit unnecessary and counterproductive
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`litigation costs.” H. Rep. No. 112-98 at 40 (2011). The AIA limited litigation
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`costs in two ways: (1) by enacting provisions intended to eliminate duplicative,
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`wasteful and harassing proceedings; and (2) by limiting discovery costs.
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`The first goal of AIA, limiting and constraining repetitive litigation, was
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`plainly a primary goal. Congress expressly condemned “repeated litigation and
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`administrative attacks on the validity of a patent.” H. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48.
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`Toward that end, Congress enacted several measures so that AIA could not “be
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`used as [a] tool[ ] for harassment” of patent owners. Id.
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`First, Congress expressly provided that the Board could not take jurisdiction
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`of any inter partes review unless all real parties in interest were identified. See 35
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`U.S.C. § 312 (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if . . . the
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`petition identifies all real parties in interest”) (emphasis added). The obvious
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`purpose of this provision was to curtail the ability of related parties to use others as
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`a shill for them while preserving the ability to repeat litigation in other fora. “Real
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`parties in interest” is not a defined term, but Congress did not refer to a “privy”, or
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`to “control” anywhere in in Section 312.
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`Congress further provided in 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) that “inter partes review
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`may not be instituted if . . . the petitioner or any real party in interest filed a civil
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`action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” In addition, it provided
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`for an automatic stay of the civil action in the event that the petitioner or real party
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`in interest files a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent. Id. at
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`315(a)(2). These clauses clearly preclude repetitive litigation.
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`Congress then barred institution of inter partes review for any “petitioner,
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`real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner” if any are served with a complaint
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`alleging infringement of the patent by the patent owner if the defendants were
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`served more than one year before filing. Id. at 315(b). This clause furthers the
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`statutory imperitive to prevent multiple actions. Congress also provided that
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`multiple proceedings before the Board involving the same action may be
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`consolidated. Id. at 315(d). Finally, Congress directed that any final written
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`decision from the PTO shall bind the petitioner, real party in interest, and the privy
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`of the petitioner and estop them from any subsequent attacks before the Office, any
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`district court, or the International Trade Commission. Id. at 315(e). Thus,
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`Congress enumerated multiple provisions to curb excessive litigation and repetitive
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`attacks on patent owners.
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`The goal of limiting discovery was clearly a subsidiary method to control
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`costs. Congress authorized discovery in one section, 35 U.S.C. § 316(5).
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`Nevertheless, Congress permitted discovery as “necessary in the interest of
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`justice.” Id. Moreover, the PTO specifically stated that discovery can be utilized to
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`resolve the primary goal of reducing repetitive litigation. See Changes to
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`Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
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`Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680,
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`48689 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“additional discovery may be authorized where patent
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`owner raises sufficient concerns regarding the petitioner’s certification of
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`standing.”).
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`Ericsson respectfully submits that the Decision, which promoted the
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`subsidiary goal – limitation of discovery costs – at the expense of the primary goal
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`– elimination of repetitive and harassing proceedings – was erroneous as a matter
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`of law, and as a matter of discretion because it was not “in the interests of justice.”
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`Limited discovery is necessary to determine the facts bearing on whether
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`Broadcom was a real party in interest or privy of the defendants in Ericsson Inc., et
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`al. v. D-LINK Corp., et al., Civil Action No. 6:10-CV-473 (LED/KGF).
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`C. The Board Erred as a Matter of Law in its Holding that “Broadcom must
`have had control over the Texas Litigation.”
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`
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`Congress did not define “real party in interest” or “privy,” but the text and
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`structure of the AIA militate in favor of a broad and liberal construction to achieve
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`the AIA’s intended result of limiting repetitive litigation. Both Congress and the
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`PTO stated that the term “privity” has acquired an “expanded meaning” and that it
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`will give effect to judgments by extending the term “beyond its classical
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`description.” See 154 Cong. Rec. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of
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`Sen. Kyl) (citing Cal. Physicians’ Serv. v. Aoki Diabetes Research Inst., 163 Cal.
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`App. 4th 1506 (Cal. App. 2008)); see also Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg.
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`48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Trial Practice Guide” or “TPG”).
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`The PTO further acknowledged the broad aim of the AIA in the Trial
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`Practice Guide, which clearly states that the determination of who is a real party in
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`interest or privy must be made on the facts of each case. See TPG at 48,760. The
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`PTO cited Cal. Physicians with approval in its discussion regarding the expansion
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`of the scope of privity beyond the “control” test. Cal. Physicians held that “[t]he
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`word ‘privy’ has acquired expanded meaning. The courts, in the interest of justice
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`and to prevent expensive litigation, are striving to give effect to judgments by
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`extending ‘privies’ beyond the classical description. The emphasis is not on a
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`concept of identity of parties, but on the practical situation . . . The concept refers
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`‘to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in
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`the prior litigation which is ‘sufficiently close’ so as to justify application of the
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`doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” 163 Cal. App. 4th at 1521 (citations omitted)
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`(emphasis added).
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`The court then declared that “[n]otions of privity have been expanded to the
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`limits of due process.” Id. at 1522. The proper test for privity that satisfies due
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`IPR2013-00636
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`Paper No. _____
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`process is to determine if the parties have “an identity or community of interests
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`with, and adequate representation by, the losing party in the first action as well as
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`that the circumstances must have been such that the party to be estopped should
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`reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication.” Id. Further,
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`when the appellant argued that it did not control the prior litigation, the court
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`denied the contention and stated, “preclusion can apply even in the absence of such
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`control.” Id. at 1524.
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`The PTO adopted that exact language in the Trial Practice Guide, see TPG at
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`48,760; the Board’s contrary holding, that “Broadcom must have had control over
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`the Texas Litigation,” was, respectfully, in error.
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`Where Ericsson’ burden is to show an identity or community of interest
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`sufficient to make Broadcom expect to be bound by the Texas Litigation, it was
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`error to require a showing of control. The combination of Broadcom’s
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`indemnification agreements, ancillary legal actions, discussions with D-Link
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`Defendants, amicus curiae brief, and its reliance on evidence from the Texas
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`Litigation collectively indicate that Broadcom has an identity or community of
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`interest that was served in the Texas Litigation. It was error to refuse to permit
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`discovery sufficient to further show this community of interest.
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`Paper No. _____
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`III. Conclusion
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`Ericsson respectfully requests that the Board reconsider its Decision.
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`Allowing limited discovery on the relationship between petitioner and the D-Link
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`Defendants promotes Congress’ principal purpose of the AIA – to prevent repeated
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`litigation and multiple attacks on the validity of patents. It also conforms to the
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`broad doctrine of privity because denying privies the right to inter partes review is
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`in the interest of justice, as provided by both Congress and the PTO.
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`Dated: February 7, 2014.
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`
`
` /Peter J. Ayers/
`PETER AYERS
`Lee & Hayes, PLLC
`13809 Research Blvd., Suite 405
`Austin, TX 78750
`Telephone: 512.505.8162
`Fax: 509.944.4693
`Attorney for Patent Owner Telefonaktiebolaget
`LM Ericsson
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`IPR2013-00636
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`Paper No. _____
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that on February 7, 2014 the foregoing was served
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`via email on Lead and Back-up Counsel for Broadcom Corporation identified in
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`Broadcom’s Mandatory Notices, whom consented to electronic service:
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`Dominic E. Massa, Lead Counsel
`Michael A. Diener, Back-up Counsel
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`WH-External-Broadcom-IPR2013-601@wilmerhale.com
`dominic.massa@wilmerhale.com
`michael.diener@wilmerhale.com
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`LEE & HAYES PLLC
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` /Peter J. Ayers/
`Peter J. Ayers, Reg. No. 38,374
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`REQUEST FOR REHEARING
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`9
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`IPR2013-00636

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