UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
`
`KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS
`ELECTRONICS NV, et al.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`CASE NO. C03-1322JLR
`
`v.
`
`DEFIBTECH LLC, et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`ORDER
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`This matter comes before the court on the parties’ request for construction of
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`disputed claim terms. At the court’s direction, the parties selected ten claim terms for a
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`“first round” of claim construction. After an October 11, 2005 Markman hearing, the
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`court construed the first round of terms in an October 25 order (Dkt. # 119). The court
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`directed the parties to narrow their disputes in light of the October 25 order, but they
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`were largely unable to do so. The court held a second Markman hearing on all
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`remaining terms on December 8, 2005, and now construes those terms.
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`II. BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS
`
`This order should be read in conjunction with the court’s October 25 order. That
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`order contained an introduction to the technology and patents at issue as well as an
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`ORDER – 1
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`1
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`LIFECOR427-1008
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`

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`overview of the law of claim construction. The court will not repeat that discussion
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`here.
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`The remaining terms raise only one legal issue that did not arise in the October 25
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`order: the construction of means-plus-function claims. Section 112 of the Patent Act
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`permits an inventor to draft claims in means-plus-function format. 35 U.S.C. § 112;
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`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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`Once a court has identified a means-plus-function claim, it must clarify what the recited
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`function is, and then must hunt in the specification for “structure” that fulfills the stated
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`function. Id. at 1258. A court must interpret a means-plus-function claim to encompass
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`“all structure in the specification corresponding to that element and equivalent
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`structures.” Id.
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`For each of the asserted means-plus-function terms in this action, the parties have
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`agreed that the terms are in means-plus-function format, and have agreed on the recited
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`function. The court’s task in construing the terms is therefore limited to identifying
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`corresponding structure in the specification. The court will address more particularized
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`legal issues regarding the interpretation of means-plus-function claims as they arise.
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`The court now turns to the construction of the remaining terms. As in the
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`October 25 order, it will begin with terms from the shock delivery patents and conclude
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`with terms from the self-test patents.
`
`A.
`
`Construing Terms in the Shock Delivery Patents
`
`1.
`
`Terms appearing solely in the ‘212 Patent
`
`a.
`
`“Timer” and “timing signal corresponding to the application of
`electrical energy”
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`At oral argument, the court proposed definitions for “timer,” which appears in
`
`Claims 1 and 9, and “timing signal,” which appears only in Claim 1. The court proposed
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`ORDER – 2
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`2
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`

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`that a “timer” is a “device or component capable of measuring time and capable of
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`producing output corresponding to its time measurements,” and that a “timing signal
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`corresponding to the application of electrical energy” is a “signal that the timer produces
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`corresponding to the elapsed time of a defibrillator shock pulse or phase of a pulse.”
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`These definitions are derived from the three paragraphs in the specification that discuss
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`the timer. ‘212 Patent at 7:3-31. The parties seemed to accept these definitions when
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`the court proposed them. In any event, they offer no compelling evidence in support of
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`different definitions.
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`The court notes that the specification describes the timer as capable of cutting off
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`a defibrillator pulse when it receives information from another device indicating that the
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`pulse voltage or current has dropped below a threshold value. ‘212 Patent at 7:12-15,
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`7:29-31. Defibtech suggested at oral argument that the “timer” of Claims 1 and 9
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`requires such a capability, but the court finds no indication that the inventors intended
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`such a limitation on the claimed timer.
`
`b.
`
`“Plurality of electronic switches” and “means for selectively
`connecting the energy source to the electrodes in a first polarity
`and a second polarity”
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`The “plurality of electronic switches” of Claim 8 and the “means for selectively
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`connecting the energy source to the electrodes in a first polarity and a second polarity” of
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`Claim 1 refer to the same element of the defibrillator. This element is generally
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`described as a “connecting mechanism” or “connector” that connects the defibrillator’s
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`energy source to the electrodes for shock delivery. ‘212 Patent at 6:44-50 & Fig. 10,
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`element no. 34. Subsequently, the patent describes the connector in substantially greater
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`detail as a specific five-switch configuration. ‘212 Patent at 6:61-7:52 & Fig. 11. The
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`dispute over these terms is whether, as Defibtech contends, Claims 1 and 8 require this
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`ORDER – 3
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`3
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`five-switch configuration. Philips contends that any of numerous configurations of two
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`or more switches known to persons of skill in the art would satisfy Claims 1 and 8.
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`The means-plus-function term in Claim 1 presents the easier interpretation issue.
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`Philips points to the general disclosure of a “connecting mechanism” as sufficient
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`disclosure of the structure corresponding to the claimed function. The court disagrees.
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`The patent’s discussion of a “connecting mechanism” discloses no structure at all. As
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`Defibtech noted in oral argument, the “connecting mechanism” corresponds to no more
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`than a two-dimensional box in Figure 10 of the ‘212 Patent. This is insufficient, as a
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`matter of law, to fulfill the inventors’ duty to pinpoint a structure that corresponds to the
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`function cited in a means-plus-function term. See Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics
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`Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The court cannot designate
`1
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`the “connector” in Figure 10 and the written description of a “connecting mechanism” as
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`corresponding structure, because they serve merely as an introduction to the five-switch
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`configuration in Figure 11 and the accompanying disclosure of actual structure. See
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`Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Moreover, Philips cannot cure the lack of structure other than the five-switch
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`configuration by noting that “[o]ther switches and switch configurations may be used, of
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`course, without departing from the scope of the invention.” ‘212 Patent at 7:48-49. An
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`inventor cannot meet his obligation to disclose structure corresponding to a means-plus-
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`function term merely by stating that the structure will be obvious to those of skill in the
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`Med. Instrumentation and other Federal Circuit precedent focus on an inventor’s duty
`1
`to “clearly link[]” structure in the specification to a means-plus-function term. 344 F.3d at
`1211. Philips did not fail to “clearly link” the “connecting mechanism” to its means-plus-
`function term; it failed instead to pinpoint any structure for the connecting mechanism other
`than the five-switch configuration.
`
`ORDER – 4
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`4
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`art. Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1212 (“It is important to determine whether one
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`of skill in the art would understand the specification itself to disclose the structure, not
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`simply whether that person would be capable of implementing that structure.”). Claim 1
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`sends the public on a search for structure corresponding to a “means for selectively
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`connecting.” It would be incongruous to conclude that the inventors satisfied their
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`obligation to reward that search by disclosing nothing more than a “connecting
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`mechanism.” The only disclosure of structure corresponding to the “means for
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`selectively connecting . . .” is the five-switch configuration noted above, and the court
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`interprets the means-plus-function claim accordingly.2
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`The “plurality of electronic switches” in Claim 8 presents a closer question.
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`Freed from the strictures of means-plus-function format, the inventors arguably signaled
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`their intent to permit other switch configurations by noting that such configurations
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`would be apparent to those of skill in the art. ‘212 Patent at 7:48-49. In addition,
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`because Claim 11 depends from Claim 8 and discloses the five-switch configuration
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`explicitly, claim differentiation requires the court to presume that Claim 8 encompasses
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`other configurations.
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`Defibtech insists that Philips disavowed all but the five-switch configuration as a
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`“plurality of switches” in the prosecution of the patent. Defibtech points to an office
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`action in which the examiner rejected Claims 1 and 8 as obvious in light of the Swanson
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`The court notes that Claim 7, which depends from Claim 1, discloses the five-switch
`2
`configuration. Claim differentiation compels the presumption that the terms have different
`scope. In this case, however, because the “means for selectively connecting” has no
`corresponding structure other than the five-switch configuration, Defibtech has overcome the
`presumption. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A
`means-plus-function limitation is not made open-ended by the presence of another claim
`specifically claiming the disclosed structure which underlies the means clause or an equivalent
`of that structure.”).
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`ORDER – 5
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`5
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`Patent, which also disclosed a five-switch configuration in an internal defibrillator,
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`although not the same configuration as in the ‘212 Patent. J.A. 02692. Defibtech
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`correctly notes that the inventors disavowed Swanson’s five-switch configuration. J.A.
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`02692, 02697. The inventors did not, however, expressly limit the invention to the five-
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`switch configuration that they disclosed in their patent application. The inventors
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`explained that it would take undue experimentation to implement Swanson’s five-switch
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`configuration in an external defibrillator because the configuration would not work with
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`high voltage. J.A. 02692. In an affidavit accompanying the response to the office
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`action, inventor Daniel Powers stated that Swanson’s five-switch configuration would
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`not work in an external defibrillator, and that “[d]eveloping a circuit design that protects
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`the [external defibrillator] circuit from load faults is a major design challenge.” J.A.
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`02701.
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`The interpretation of the “plurality of switches” term, for which the intrinsic
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`evidence does not provide an unambiguous definition, requires the court to consider
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`extrinsic evidence for the first time. In a rebuttal report, Philips expert Dr. Leslie
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`Geddes reviewed a different prior art reference and noted that it did not disclose “what
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`types of switches” should be used, and that one skilled in the art would have “extensive
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`difficulty” designing an external defibrillator switching circuit based on that reference.
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`Snyder Decl. Ex. 12 (Geddes Rebuttal Report at 23). Unlike Dr. Powers, Dr. Geddes
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`does not even mention the configuration of the switches. The court cannot draw
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`In its prior order, the court stated that the only extrinsic evidence before it was a set of
`3
`dictionary definitions. October 25 order at 5. That was true for the first round of asserted
`terms, but the parties have introduced inventor and expert testimony in support of some of the
`remaining terms. The court is mindful of the Federal Circuit’s cautious approach to extrinsic
`testimony, id., and has considered the evidence accordingly.
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`ORDER – 6
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`conclusions regarding his views on the ease of configuring an appropriate switch array.
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`The court concludes that Dr. Geddes’ testimony lends some support to the notion that
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`designing an appropriate switch array was no simple task for one skilled in the art.
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`The court has also considered Mr. Powers’ deposition, in which he testified that
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`he knew of no functional switch configurations other than the five-switch configuration
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`when the inventors first filed a shock delivery patent application. Powers Dep. at 85
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`(DM 034). Defibtech has not provided enough of the deposition transcript to provide
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`full context for his testimony. The court determines that, like Dr. Geddes’ testimony,
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`Mr. Powers’ testimony slightly strengthens the evidence in favor of a limited
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`construction of “plurality of switches,” because it shows that they, as persons of skill in
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`the art, had no actual alternative configuration to back up their statement in the ‘212
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`Patent that other switch configurations would be apparent to those of skill in the art.
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`Based on all of the evidence before it, the court concludes that the “plurality of
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`switches” is limited to the five-switch configuration disclosed in the specification.
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`Philips cannot deny that it disavowed the Swanson five-switch configuration. Thus, the
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`construction of “plurality of switches” is not as broad as the claim language would
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`suggest. At best, the court could construe the term to mean “a plurality of switches, but
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`not the plurality of switches disclosed in Swanson.” Even this interpretation, however,
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`would be unreasonable in light of the inventors’ statements during prosecution. Mr.
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`Powers admitted in prosecuting the patent that designing an appropriate switch
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`configuration was difficult. In light of that admission, the statement in the specification
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`that “other switches and switch configurations may be used” rings hollow, at least as a
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`statement of what one of skill in the art could accomplish without undue
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`experimentation. Although the inventors’ five-switch configuration might be equivalent
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`to other configurations, the term “plurality of switches” must be limited to the disclosed
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`ORDER – 7
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`7
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`five-switch configuration and those equivalents. The court therefore construes the
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`“plurality of switches” in Claim 8 in the same manner it construed the “means for
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`selectively connecting” in Claim 1. The term requires the five-switch configuration
`4
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`from the ‘212 Patent or its equivalent.
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`2.
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`Terms appearing only in the ‘879 Patent
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`a.
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`“The electrodes being electrically connected in a first polarity to
`an energy source external to the patient”
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`The “electrodes being electrically connected” term appears in one step of the
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`method disclosed in Claim 1 of the ‘879 Patent. That method comprises these steps:
`
`
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`placing two electrodes on a patient, the electrodes being electrically
`connected in a first polarity to an energy source external to the patient;
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`charging the energy source to an energy level corresponding to a first start
`amplitude;
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`discharging the energy source across the electrodes;
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`adjusting the discharge parameter based on the measured patient
`impedance;
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`reversing the polarity of the connection of the energy source to the
`electrodes to a second polarity;
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`discharging the energy source across the electrodes.
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`‘879 Patent Claim 1. The parties agree that the disputed term requires an electrical
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`connection such that current flows in only one direction. Their dispute is over the term
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`“being.” Defibtech contends that the term “being electrically connected” is in present
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`Philips suggests, without explanation, that the presence of the “plurality of switches”
`4
`term in Claim 17 of the ‘454 Patent (which neither party has offered for construction) should
`affect the court’s construction. Phillips Opp’n at 29. As the court previously noted, the ‘454
`Patent incorporates the specification of the ‘212 Patent (October 25 order at 6), and the court
`finds no new disclosure in the ‘454 specification that would alter its construction of “plurality
`of switches.”
`
`ORDER – 8
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`tense, and that when read in context of the claim, it means that the circuit between the
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`defibrillator energy source and the patient must be complete at the moment the two
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`electrodes are placed on the patient. Philips would have the court interpret the term to
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`mean that the electrodes are placed such that they “will be” electrically connected during
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`discharge.5
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`The court rejects Defibtech’s limitation. It is apparent, even to one not of skill in
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`the art, that the electrical connection between the energy source and the patient need not
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`exist from the moment the electrodes are placed on the patient. The patent envisions that
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`discharge is initiated not by placing the electrodes on a patient’s chest, but rather by the
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`user manually initiating discharge or the defibrillator automatically initiating discharge
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`in response to heart activity measured through the electrodes. ‘879 Patent at 5:8-9.
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`There is no suggestion in the patent (beyond a literal reading of the tense of the verb
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`“being”) that having the electrical connection exist at the instant the electrodes are
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`placed on the patient is important, necessary, or in any way relevant to the claimed
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`defibrillator method. Claim construction is not a “gotcha” game in which an imprecisely
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`used word invariably dooms the inventor, but rather a process where a court must
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`interpret terms “in the context in which they were used by the inventor, considered by
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`the examiner, and understood in the field of the invention.” Toro Co. v. White Consol.
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`Indus., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this case, a review of the patent shows
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`Philips cites Alitris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
`5
`for the proposition that the steps of a method claim need not be performed in the order in which
`they are written, but the concept is irrelevant here. Regardless of the order in which one
`performs the steps of Claim 1, Defibtech’s interpretation of “being” would require that the
`electrical connection between the energy source and the patient exist when the electrodes are
`placed on the patient. Altering the order of the steps does not alter the meaning of the language
`describing a single step.
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`ORDER – 9
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`that “being electrically connected in a first polarity” means “connected such that, during
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`discharge, current will flow from the energy source through the patient in only one
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`direction.”
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`3.
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`Other Shock Delivery Terms.
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`a.
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`“Based on,” “dependent on,” “depends on,” and “function of”
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`The terms “based on,” “dependent on,” “depends on,” and “function of” appear in
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`many claims within the shock delivery patents. In each instance, the term is used to
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`describe how the defibrillator incorporates a patient-dependent electrical parameter to
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`adjust shock delivery. E.g., ‘612 Patent Claim 1 (“adjusting the discharge parameter . . .
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`as a function of the value of the electrical parameter”); ‘454 Patent Claim 15 (“adjusting
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`the tilt of the waveform based on the value of the monitored electrical parameter”); ‘905
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`Patent Claim 4 (“shaping the waveform so that an initial parameter of a waveform phase
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`depends on a value of the electrical parameter”). The parties agree that each term means
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`that the shock adjustment is based on the measured parameter; their dispute is over
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`whether the terms require the shock adjustment to be based solely on the measured
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`parameter.
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`The court finds no reason to limit these terms to require adjustment based solely
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`on the cited parameter. Defibtech points to numerous disclosures in the specification of
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`shock delivery aspects that are “determined by” a measured electrical parameter. It fails,
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`however, to point to a single location where the inventors required that shock delivery be
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`“determined only by” the measured parameter. For that reason, the court declines to
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`impose such a limitation on these terms. Employing Philips’ proposed definition
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`(“using”) defines these terms just as well as Defibtech’s (“determined by”). Neither
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`phrase requires that the patient-dependent electrical parameter be the sole influence on
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`the shock modification, and neither do the asserted claim terms.
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`ORDER – 10
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`10
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`b.
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`“Electrical parameter” and “patient-dependent electrical
`parameter”
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`As the discussion of the previous terms suggests, the terms “electrical parameter”
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`and “patient-dependent electrical parameter” also appear frequently in the claims of the
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`shock delivery patents. In each instance, the claims require “monitoring a patient-
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`dependent electrical parameter” or “monitoring an electrical parameter” during
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`defibrillator discharge. The parties agree that electrical parameters are measurements
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`like voltage, current, charge, resistance, or inductance. They disagree over whether time
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`can serve as an electrical parameter in these patents.
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`The patents themselves provide support for the notion that time is, at least by
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`proxy, an electrical parameter. In several disclosures in the specification, the inventors
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`seem to indicate that the defibrillator can monitor time as an indirect method of
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`monitoring an electrical parameter. For example, the patents teach that one can measure
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`patient impedance by measuring the time it takes for a fixed amount of charge to
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`discharge through the patient. ‘454 Patent Claim 55, 7:7-9.
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`The prosecution history, however, creates substantial confusion over whether
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`time can serve as an electrical parameter. Responding to a rejection of several claims in
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`light of the prior art Pless Patent (United States Patent No. 5,352,239), the inventor’s
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`attorney argued to the PTO that Pless taught the monitoring of time, not of an electrical
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`parameter. J.A. 02879 (“Attorney stated that while the Pless reference measures a
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`patient-dependent parameter, it does not measure a patient-dependent electrical
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`parameter (i.e. charge).”). The PTO’s statement is difficult to explain, however, in light
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`of Pless. Pless appears to repeatedly disclose a defibrillator that monitors time and
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`voltage. E.g., Pless Patent at 4:8-16, 4:42-53, 5:64-66. Pless also notes that the purpose
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`of the measurements is to compensate for differences in patient impedance. Pless Patent
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`ORDER – 11
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`11
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`at 2:1-6 (discussing how patient impedance may change due to build-up of scar tissue),
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`2:29-31 (noting that prior art did not provide “therapeutic flexibility”), 3:24-26, 6:56-57.
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`Pless discloses the determination of a second pulse width by measuring by the length of
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`time required for the defibrillator capacitor to decay to a selected decay voltage. Pless
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`Patent at 5:64-66. This is strikingly similar to the disclosures of the ‘454 Patent noted
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`above. In both patents, the defibrillator monitors time and an electrical parameter. In
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`Pless, the electrical parameter is voltage. In the ‘454 Patent, it is charge. In both
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`patents, the purpose of monitoring these parameters is to compensate for differences in
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`patient impedance. It is unclear to the court how the inventors could disclaim Pless’s
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`teaching without disclaiming their own method of monitoring time and an electrical
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`parameter.
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`The references to the Bach Patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,850,357) during prosecution
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`are also troubling, although less so. The inventors distinguished their invention from
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`Bach for two reasons: that Bach disclosed a fixed-tilt defibrillator, and that Bach taught
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`the measurement of time, not an electrical parameter. J.A. 01441. In the same page,
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`however, the inventors note that Bach teaches voltage measurements, but not the
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`adjustment of voltage based on a patient-dependent parameter. Id. In other words, Bach
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`does teach monitoring time and an electrical parameter, but it does not teach the
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`adjustment of the waveform based on the electrical parameter. Moreover, although Bach
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`does not explicitly teach that the monitored voltage is patient-dependent, it would appear
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`to be patient-dependent in the sense that the length of time it takes the voltage to decay
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`to the threshold level depends on patient impedance. The court has no difficulty
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`concluding that the variable-tilt defibrillator in the patents-in-suit differ from the fixed-
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`tilt defibrillator in Bach, but it is not apparent why Bach’s measurement of voltage is not
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`a measurement of a patient-dependent electrical parameter.
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`ORDER – 12
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`12
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`Neither party has provided a compelling explanation of the impact of the
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`prosecution history on the construction of “electrical parameter.” Pless appears to teach
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`the monitoring of time and voltage as proxies for patient impedance, and also teaches
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`modifying a second phase of a multiphasic wave form based on those measurements.
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`Bach appears to teach the monitoring of time and a patient-dependent voltage. Yet the
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`inventors, whose own application disclosed an invention that contains all or part of these
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`teachings, seemed to indicate that these similarities were points of distinction.
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`Because the parties have not addressed these issues, the court reserves its ruling
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`on the construction of “electrical parameter.” The parties shall either stipulate to a
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`construction, or shall each provide a supplemental brief of no more than five pages
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`explaining the prosecution history regarding this term. If they cite the Bach Patent, they
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`must provide a copy of it to the court. The parties shall file the supplemental briefs
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`within 15 days of this order.
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`c.
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`“Controller” and “controlling”
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`Several method claims of the shock delivery patents require “controlling” the
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`duration of a waveform phase, while several apparatus claims require a “controller” that
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`operates a connecting mechanism between the energy source and the electrodes. Philips
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`offers straightforward definitions: “controlling” means “regulating,” and a “controller”
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`is a circuit or component that controls. Defibtech, on the other hand, believes that
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`“controlling” means “operating switches or other connecting mechanism to adjust the
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`shape of the waveform delivered to a patient in response to a patient-dependent electrical
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`parameter measured during the delivery of the waveform.”
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`The court adopts Philips’ definition. Defibtech correctly notes that in many
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`instances, the inventors described their “invention” (as opposed to an embodiment) as
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`“provid[ing] a defibrillator method and apparatus for adjusting the characteristics of the
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`ORDER – 13
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`13
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`

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`defibrillator waveform in response to a real-time measurement of a patient-dependent
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`electrical parameter.” ‘927 Patent at 5:56-58. Defibtech does not, however, point to a
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`single instance in which the term “controlling” or “controller” is employed inconsistently
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`with this description of the invention. In the claims, the language surrounding the term
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`“controller” or “controlling” is uniformly consistent with this object of the invention.
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`E.g., ‘927 Patent Claim 1 (“controlling duration of the truncated exponential biphasic
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`waveform”), Claim 6 (“a controller operating the connecting mechanism to deliver
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`electrical energy . . .”); ‘454 Patent Claim 3 (“controlling the duration of a waveform
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`phase based on a value of the electrical parameter”). Thus, Defibtech’s proposed
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`definition is surplusage. The claim language places limitations on “controlling” or the
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`“controller” that are consistent with the purpose of the invention. There is no need for
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`the definitions of “controller” and “controlling” to contain those limitations.
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`d.
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`“Energy source”
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`Where the term “energy source” appears in a claim in the shock delivery patents,
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`the patent invariably describes it as connected to the defibrillator electrodes and/or
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`discharged across the electrodes. Thus, whatever the energy source is, it must be a
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`source that is capable of delivering a therapeutic shock to a patient. The court therefore
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`construes “energy source” to mean “a source of energy that is capable of delivering a
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`therapeutic shock to a patient.” The parties’ main dispute seems to be whether a battery
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`is such an energy source. The patent indicates that a battery can be part of such an
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`energy source. E.g., ‘454 Patent Claim 23 (“the energy source comprises a battery”).
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`However, if a battery is incapable of delivering a therapeutic shock, it is also incapable
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`of serving as an “energy source” on its own. At oral argument, Defibtech claimed
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`(without evidence) that a battery is incapable of delivering enough shock in a short
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`enough period of time to have therapeutic use, and that only a capacitor or set of
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`ORDER – 14
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`14
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`

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`capacitors could accomplish the task. The court need not resolve this issue. The
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`claimed “energy source” is one capable of delivering a therapeutic shock. Determining
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`which sources of energy meet this requirement is a question for another day.
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`e.
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`“Patient”
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`“Patient” appears throughout the claims of the shock delivery patents. Even this
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`most basic term gives the parties cause to argue. Philips contends that a patient is a
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`person. Defibtech contends that a patient is any “recipient of a waveform.” Philips
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`queries whether, under Defibtech’s construction, a “watermelon” could serve as a
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`patient. Defibtech responds that a watermelon does not have a heart. The court wonders
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`if it has accidentally wandered into a junior high school debate meet.
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`The patents uniformly discuss defibrillation of human patients. The court must
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`construe the term “patient” accordingly, absent some indication that the inventors
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`intended a broader scope. Prior art references that discuss defibrillation of other animals
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`might bear on the validity of the patents-in-suit, but the inventions before the court are
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`not intended for use on anyone but humans.
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`B.
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`Construing Terms in the Self-Test Patents
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`1.
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`Terms in the ‘059 Patent
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`a.
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`“Patient simulator”
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`The parties’ key dispute over the term “patient simulator” in Claims 1, 8, and 9 is
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`whether the patient simulator is necessarily electrically connected to the defibrillator’s
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`electrode interface. Defibtech argues that this electrical connection is present in the
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`preferred embodiment (‘059 Patent at 3:15-65), and thus must be read into the claims.
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`The court cannot adopt Defibtech’s proposed limitation. Defibtech seeks to
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`import a limitation from the preferred embodiment into claims that do not require the
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`limitation. The court declines to do so, for many of the same reasons it rejected
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`ORDER – 15
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`15
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`Defibtech’s construction of “through electrodes” and “indication of the condition of the
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`defibrillator” in its first Markman order. October 25 order at 16-17, 23-25. The court
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`construes “patient simulator” to mean “components or circuitry that simulate a patient.”
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`b.
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`“Performing a defibrillator self test” and “providing an
`indication of the result of the defibrillator self-test”
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`As with many other self-test patent terms, Defibtech insists that the generic claim
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`language “performing a defibrillator self-test” and “providing an indication of the result”
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`of this test somehow includes limitations relating to the electrodes. ‘059 Patent Claim 5.
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`The court’s discussion of the term “indication of the condition of the
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`defibrillator” in its first Markman order demonstrates that Defibtech’s limitations are
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`inappropriate. October 25 order at 23-25. The court construes “performing a
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`defibrillator self-test” to mean “carrying out a defibrillator self-test.” “Providing an
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`indication of the result” of this self-test means precisely what it says – no definition is
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`necessary. Philips suggests that the indication must be whether the defibrillator “passed
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`or failed” the self-test, but the ‘059 Patent does not require a binary indication.
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`2.
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`Terms in the ‘374 Patent
`
`a.
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`“System monitor”
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`The term “system monitor” appears in Claims 22, 24, 25, and 26. In each of these
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`claims, the “test signal generator” from independent Claim 1 comprises a “system
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`monitor.” Claim 22 discloses a “system monitor” without qualification. A series of
`6
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`dependent cla