`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 71
`Entered: June 1, 2015
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`BROADCOM CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`WI-FI ONE, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)1
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
`MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Request for Rehearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 We exercise our discretion to issue one Order to be filed in each case. The
`parties are not authorized to use this style heading for any subsequent
`papers.
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`
`I.
`SUMMARY
`Patent Owner, Wi-Fi One, LLC,2 requests rehearing of the Final
`
`Written Decisions (IPR2013-00601, Paper 66, “601 Dec.”; IPR2013-00602,
`
`Paper 60, “602 Dec.”; IPR2013-00636, Paper 60, “636 Dec.”). Paper 70
`
`(“Req.”).3 Patent Owner seeks rehearing on the grounds that:
`
`1. The Board misapprehended the purpose of the “real party in interest
`
`or privy” language in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), and misapprehended the
`
`correct legal standard for determining whether a non-party is a “real
`
`party in interest or privy of petitioner” under § 315(b); and
`
`2. The Board misapprehended the entirety of the factual record and
`
`overlooked evidence supporting Patent Owner’s contention that
`
`certain district court defendants are real parties in interest and/or
`
`privies of Petitioner in this proceeding.
`
`Req. 2. Patent Owner also argues that our Final Written Decisions raise
`
`administrative law issues. Id. at 4, 13–15.
`
`The Requests for Rehearing are denied.
`
`
`
`2 On July 11, 2014, Patent Owner filed an Updated Mandatory Notice in
`IPR2013-00601 indicating that the patent-at-issue had been assigned to
`Wi-Fi One, LLC, and that Wi-Fi One, LLC and PanOptis Patent
`Management, LLC are now the real parties-in-interest. Paper 43. The same
`paper was filed in IPR2013-00602 (Paper 40) and IPR2013-00636
`(Paper 38).
`3 Patent Owner filed a Request for Rehearing in each of IPR2013-00601
`(Paper 70), IPR2013-00602 (Paper 64), and IPR2013-00636 (Paper 64). All
`three requests put forward substantively the same arguments and, thus, we
`address them together with reference to the Request in IPR2013-00601.
`Citations are to IPR2013-00601, unless otherwise noted.
`
`2
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part:
`
`A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for
`rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The
`burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the
`party challenging the decision. The request must specifically
`identify
`all matters
`the party believes
`the Board
`misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each
`matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a
`reply.
`
`A. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`
`Patent Owner argues that the Board misapprehended the purpose of
`
`the “real party in interest, or privy” language of § 315(b). Req. 4.
`
`Specifically, Patent Owner argues that “the legislative purpose of [35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(b)] is to ensure IPR Petitions are not used as a litigation tactic for
`
`purposes of delay” (id. at 4), and that “[t]he plain text of the statute makes
`
`clear that . . . § 315(b) is intended to prevent litigation defendants from
`
`subverting the statutory time-bar by having their agents or cohorts file an
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`IPR petition that they themselves are barred from filing” (id. at 5). Patent
`
`Owner also argues that the legal standard for determining whether a third
`
`party is a “real party in interest, or privy of petition” under § 315(b) “is
`
`purposefully broad and flexible so that the Board can determine, on a case-
`
`by-case basis and in light of all relevant facts, whether particular parties are
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`attempting to circumvent the § 315(b) time-bar.” Req. 7.
`
`Patent Owner has not argued in its Patent Owner Response the
`
`legislative purpose of § 315(b). We could not have misapprehended or
`
`overlooked arguments not before us. Moreover, Patent Owner identifies
`
`3
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`nothing in our Decision that it contends mischaracterizes the legislative
`
`purpose of § 315(b). We are not persuaded, therefore, that we have
`
`overlooked or misapprehended the legislative purpose of § 315(b).
`
`Patent Owner also argues that we misapprehended the legal test that
`
`should be applied to determine whether a non-party is a “real party in
`
`interest, or privy” for purposes of § 315(b). Req. 6. Specifically, Patent
`
`Owner contends that “the Board applied a narrow and rigid standard that is
`
`erroneous as a matter of law” (id. at 7) because it “requires — as an absolute
`
`and necessary condition — that Broadcom controlled or could have
`
`exercised control over one or more of the District Court Defendants in
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`relation to the District Court Litigation” (id.) without “also considering, inter
`
`alia, the non-party’s control over the IPR” (id. at 8). According to Patent
`
`Owner, “the issue under § 315(b) is whether the District Court Defendants
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`have attempted to circumvent the one-year statutory time-bar.” Req. 9.
`
`Although our Decision on Patent Owner’s Motion for Additional
`
`Discovery (Paper 23) focuses primarily on Broadcom’s (“Petitioner”)
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`exercise of control, or opportunity to exercise control over the prior District
`
`Court lawsuit (Req. 8), that is because that was the focus of Patent Owner’s
`
`Motion for Additional Discovery. See, e.g., Paper 14, 6 (“Here, evidence
`
`will prove that Broadcom has had the opportunity to control and maintains a
`
`substantive legal relationship with the D-Link Defendants sufficient to bind
`
`Broadcom to the District Court’s judgment.”).
`
`That decision, however, did not characterize the legal standard, for all
`
`cases, as being limited strictly to a petitioner’s control, or opportunity to
`
`control, a non-party in previous litigation. To the contrary, it addressed
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`control, or opportunity to control, by a non-party generally as one of a
`
`number of factors:
`
`Whether parties are in privity, for instance, depends on whether
`the relationship between a party and its alleged privy is
`“sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the trial
`outcome and related estoppels.” [Office Patent Trial Practice
`Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012].
`Depending on the circumstances, a number of factors may be
`relevant to the analysis, including whether the non-party
`“exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s
`participation in a proceeding,” and whether the non-party is
`responsible for funding and directing the proceeding. Id. at
`48,759-60.
`
`Paper 23, 7.
`
`That decision also addresses Patent Owner’s theory that the indemnity
`
`agreements imply that the District Court Defendants are real parties in
`
`interest in these inter partes reviews (“IPRs”). See id. at 12–13. Patent
`
`Owner relied on substantively the same arguments and evidence in its Patent
`
`Owner Response as in its Motion for Additional Discovery, and our Final
`
`Written Decision, thus, applied essentially the same analysis. 601 Dec. 8–9.
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended the proper legal
`
`standard for establishing privity or real party in interest.
`
`B. District Court Defendants
`
`Patent Owner argues that we misapprehended and overlooked
`
`evidence establishing that certain District Court defendants are real parties in
`
`interest and/or are in privity with Petitioner for purposes of this proceeding.
`
`Req. 10–13. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that it has made “a strong
`
`circumstantial showing that Petitioner and at least some of their District
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`Court Defendant customers are in cahoots” because “there are indemnity
`
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`agreements,” they “share a common economic and legal interest,” and
`
`“[Petitioner] has been coordinating with the District Court Defendants for
`
`many years.” Id. at 11–12. According to Patent Owner, “the Board erred
`
`when it decided the § 315(b) issue without reviewing the known indemnity
`
`agreements.” Id. at 12.
`
`Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive. The evidence cited by
`
`Patent Owner were Paper 3, and Exhibits 2005 and 2015–2018. PO
`
`Resp. 8–14. Exhibit 2018 is a final judgment of infringement in the co-
`
`pending district court litigation that sheds no light on whether Broadcom
`
`controlled, or could have controlled, the district court defendants, or vice-
`
`versa. All of the other evidence was considered in our Decision on Patent
`
`Owner’s Motion for Additional Discovery. For example, we considered,
`
`and rejected, Patent Owner’s argument that an indemnity relationship is
`
`sufficient to establish privity:
`
`Contrary to Ericsson’s assertion that “[t]he weight of authority
`strongly supports that an indemnity agreement . . . establish[es]
`privity,” Mot. 6, Bros. Inc, TRW, Dentspl[]y and other cases
`noted supra illustrate that more is required. Control of the
`litigation, or some sort of representation, constitutes a “crucial”
`factor. Dentsply, 42 F.Supp.2d at 398.
`
`Paper 23, 9. As we indicated in our Final Written Decision, Patent Owner’s
`
`Response relied on substantively the same arguments and evidence as its
`
`Motion for Additional Discovery, and we were not persuaded for the same
`
`reasons as explained in our decision on that motion. 601 Dec. 8–9.
`
`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked
`
`the evidence relied upon by Patent Owner. To the extent Patent Owner is
`
`arguing that we should have granted its Motion for Additional Discovery
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`directed to the indemnity agreements, the argument is untimely because our
`
`decision denying that discovery was issued well over a year before our Final
`
`Written Decision, Patent Owner requested rehearing (Paper 27) and we
`
`denied that request (Paper 28). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(1).
`
`In these proceedings, Patent Owner does not set forth a persuasive
`
`argument, supported by evidence, that the District Court Defendants funded,
`
`controlled, or could have controlled these proceedings, or that Petitioner’s
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`indemnity agreements even mention IPRs, let alone would show funding,
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`control, or ability to control IPRs, or would have obligated Broadcom to file
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`specific, if any, IPRs. See Req. 12. Instead, Patent Owner generally asserts
`
`that “Broadcom’s duty to indemnify triggered the successive attack on [it]s
`
`patents,” without specifying, based on cited precedent supporting the theory,
`
`how even a generic trigger for some unspecified future action, even if it
`
`existed, elevates the District Court Defendants to real parties in interest in
`
`the IPRs. See PO Resp. 13.
`
`Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner failed to provide evidence of
`
`the non-party’s lack of participation in, or control over, this proceeding, and
`
`that the Declaration of David Djavaherian (Ex. 1007) submitted by
`
`Petitioner in its Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion for Additional
`
`Discovery is carefully worded to obscure the true nature of the relationship
`
`between Petitioner and the District Court defendants. Req. 11, 12. Patent
`
`Owner did not make these arguments in the Patent Owner Response. We,
`
`therefore, could not have misapprehended or overlooked them.
`
`7
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`
`C. Administrative Law Issues
`
`Patent Owner argues that “the Board’s Final Written Decision and
`
`other actions in this IPR are ultra vires, undertaken without statutory
`
`authority.” Req. 13. Specifically, Patent Owner argues the following:
`
`The Board’s refusal to consider a reasonably full evidentiary
`record in connection with the § 315(b) issue; its denial of all
`discovery on the issue; and its refusal to consider the terms of
`the known indemnity agreement and other known facts all
`violate the Board’s duties under the APA. See Olenhouse v.
`Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1581 (10th Cir. 1994);
`Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade [Comm’n], 946 F.2d 821, 836-39
`(Fed. Cir. 1991).
`
`Id. at 14. Patent Owner also argues that (1) our actions are inconsistent with
`
`public statements made during the rulemaking process and, therefore, violate
`
`the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); (2) our Decision is contrary to
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.3(b) and our failure to follow our rules is contrary to the
`
`APA; and (3) our Decision does not establish that we have jurisdiction to
`
`hear this petition in light of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), contrary to the APA. Id. at
`
`15.
`
`Patent Owner’s arguments are predicated on its contention that we
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`lack jurisdiction under § 315(b) because the defendants in the co-pending
`
`district court litigation are real parties-in-interest who were served with a
`
`complaint alleging infringement more than one year before the filing of the
`
`Petitions in these proceedings. As discussed above, we are not persuaded
`
`that we erred in determining that those defendants are not real parties in
`
`interest. As a result, we are not persuaded that the Petitions were time-
`
`barred under § 315(b), and we are, therefore, not persuaded that our Final
`
`Written Decisions are ultra vires actions that exceed our statutory authority.
`
`8
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`
`III. Conclusion
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has not shown that our Final
`
`Written Decision in IPR2013-00601 should be modified. For the same
`
`reasons, Patent Owner also has failed to show that our Final Written
`
`Decisions in IPR2013-00602 and IPR2013-00636 should be modified.
`
`Accordingly, it is:
`
`ORDER
`
`ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Requests for Rehearing are denied.
`
`9
`
`
`
`IPR2013-00601 (Patent 6,772,215 B1)
`IPR2013-00602 (Patent 6,466,568 B1)
`IPR2013-00636 (Patent 6,424,625 B1)
`
`For PETITIONER:
`
`Dominic E. Massa
`Michael A. Diner
`Zachary Piccolomini
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
`Dominic.massa@wilmerhale.com
`michael.diener@wilmerhale.com
`Zachary.piccolomini@wilmerhale.com
`
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Peter J. Ayers
`J. Christopher Lynch
`Sarah Spires
`LEE & HAYES PLLC
`peter@leehayes.com
`chris@leehayes.com
`Sarah.spires@skiermontpuckett.com
`
`10
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`