UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
`Patent Owners
`
`Case 1PR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310
`
`Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JONI Y. CHANG, and
`MICHAEL R. ZECHER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S REPLY
`
`Mail Stop "PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`PERSONAL WEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
`Patent Owners
`
`Case 1PR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310
`
`Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JONI Y. CHANG, and
`MICHAEL R. ZECHER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S REPLY
`
`Mail Stop "PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`Case 1PR2013-00596 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,802,310
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. (cid:9)
`
`The Board properly construed the challenged claims ........................................ 1
`
`II. Apple’s Woodhill and Stefik combination is proper and clearly teaches the
`challengedclaims . ..................................................................................................... 4
`
`Personal Web misconstrues the scope of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony . ........... 4
`A.
`Binary object identifiers are used to request particular binary objects from
`B.
`the backup server in Woodhill...............................................................................4
`Personal Web’s contention related to the number of comparisons necessary
`C.
`to determine whether access to a file is organized is irrelevant . ........................... 8
`PersonaiWeb’s argument that "one would not have modified Woodhill to
`D.
`check whether access to a file by a computer was authorized when the computer
`already had the current version of that file" is both misleading and incorrect.... 10
`Stefik does not teach away from the modification of Woodhill in light of
`E.
`Stefik. ................................................................................................................... 12
`III. PersonaiWeb’s alleged evidence of secondary considerations fails to overcome
`the prima facie case of obviousness........................................................................13
`
`IV. Conclusion........................................................................................................15
`
`
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`Case 1PR2013-00596 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,802,310
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm ’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................................................................1
`
`Phillips v. A WH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................
`
`1
`
`Wyers v. Master Lock Co.,
`616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010)...........................................................................14
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a).....................................................................................................1
`
`Regulations
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)................................................................................................1
`
`11
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`Case 1PR2013-00596 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,802,310
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`On March 26, 2014, the Board instituted inter partes review of claims 24,
`
`32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of U.S. Patent No. 7,802,310 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
`
`the combination of Woodhill and Stefik (Decision, Paper 9.) PersonalWeb’s
`
`subsequent attempts to sidestep this rejection with improperly narrow claim
`
`constructions, mischaracterizations of the prior art, and weak objective evidence
`
`fail to overcome the overwhelming case of obviousness. The Board accordingly
`
`should reject the challenged claims for the same reasons identified in the Decision
`
`and in view of the comments below.
`
`I. The Board properly construed the challenged claims.
`
`Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), the challenged claims must be given their
`
`broadest reasonable interpretations in light of the patent specification. This
`
`standard requires that claim terms be given their ordinary and customary meaning,
`
`unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification. Phillips v. A WH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
`
`Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`Despite the Board’s construction of the claim term "content-dependent
`
`name" in its Decision, PersonalWeb attempts to apply an improperly narrow
`
`construction of this term. Although applying this improper discussion still does not
`
`enable Personal Web to overcome the obviousness of the claims, the Board should
`
`1
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`nevertheless disregard PersonaiWeb’s attempt to draw a distinction between
`
`"content-dependent name" and the other "identifier" terms in the ’310 patent.
`
`The Board construed "content-dependent name" as an "identifier for a data
`
`item. . ." (Decision, p. 10), but PersonaiWeb contends that the Board’s
`
`construction of this term is improper because it equates the terms "name" and
`
`"identifier." (P0 Response, Paper 15, pp. 4-5.)
`
`In other words, PersonaiWeb
`
`contends that "something is not a ’name’ simply because it is an ’identifier." (Id.
`
`at 4.)
`
`Fatal to PersonalWeb’s argument, however, is that there is no support
`
`anywhere in the ’310 patent specification for drawing such a distinction. To the
`
`contrary, the terms "name" and "identifier" are used interchangeably throughout
`
`the specification. For example, the ’310 patent specification states that:
`
`In operation, data items. . .in a DP system employing the
`
`present invention are identified by substantially unique
`
`identifiers (True Names), the identifiers depending on all
`
`of the data in the data items and only on the data in the
`
`data items.
`
`(’310 patent, 31:38-42; see also 31:45-48) (emphasis added.) As such, there is no
`
`basis in the challenged patent for PersonalWeb’s construction, and ample support
`
`for the Board’s adopted construction.
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`2
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`Even PersonaiWeb’s declarant, Dr. Dewar, cannot support PersonaiWeb’s
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`improper attempt to distinguish between a "name" and an "identifier" in the ’310
`
`patent. At deposition, Dr. Dewar admitted that the opinions contained in his report
`
`related to this distinction concerned only "the general meaning of identifier and
`
`name" and that "in the ’310 patent content identifiers are names." (Dewar
`
`Transcript, Ex. 1035, pp. 22-25.) As PersonaiWeb’s declarant testified:
`
`There is nothing in the specification of the ’310
`
`Q. (cid:9)
`patent that distinguishes between content-based name
`
`and content-based identifier, correct?
`
`A. (cid:9)
`
`Correct.
`
`(Id. at 32.) Indeed, during his deposition, Personal Web’s declarant confirmed that
`
`"the whole thrust of the patent is that the content-based identifier is a name. That’s
`
`the thrust of the ’310 patent."
`
`(Id. at 23-24.) Accordingly, the Board should
`
`disregard PersonaiWeb’s unsupported attempt to draw a distinction between
`
`"content-dependent name" and the other "identifier" terms used in the ’310 patent.
`
`Regardless, as outlined in the Petition, these claims would have been
`
`obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art over Woodhill in view of Stefik
`
`whether the challenged claim recites a "content-dependent name" or a "content-
`
`based identifier." (Petition, Paper 1, pp. 41-5 1.)
`
`3
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`II. Apple’s Woodhill and Stefik combination is proper and clearly teaches
`the challenged claims.
`
`The Board instituted inter partes review of challenged claims 24, 32, 70, 81,
`
`82, and 86 of the ’310 patent based on the combination of Woodhill and Stefik. In
`
`response, PersonalWeb has attempted to mischaracterize the prior art and
`
`misconstrue Apple’s expert testimony in an effort to overcome this clear case of
`
`obviousness. The Board accordingly should reject the challenged claims for the
`
`same reasons identified in the Decision.
`
`A.
`
`PersonalWeb misconstrues the scope of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony.
`
`PersonalWeb falsely contends that Apple’s expert, Dr. Goldberg, limited his
`
`obviousness opinion to a modification of Woodhill’s "granularization restore
`
`procedure," which relates to the restoration to the local computer of a prior version
`
`of a file on a granule-by-granule basis. (P0 Response, pp. 12-14.) Yet
`
`PersonaiWeb admits that the record evidence is not so limited, conceding that Dr.
`
`Goldberg opines that binary objects disclosed in Woodhill are equivalent to the
`
`"data items" (and implicitly "sequence[s] of bits") of the challenged claims.
`
`(Id. at
`
`12-13.)
`
`B.
`
`Binary object identifiers are used to request particular binary
`objects from the backup server in Woodhill.
`
`As explained above in Section A, PersonalWeb’s attempt to distinguish
`
`between "content dependent names" and "content dependent identifiers" is
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`4
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`unsupported by anything in the specification of the ’310 patent, and is expressly
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`contradicted by PersonaiWeb’s own expert. (Dewar Transcript, p. 25;
`
`see also id.
`
`at 22, 26-27.) And it is beyond dispute that Woodhill’s "binary object identifier
`
`74" and "contents identifier" are unique, content-based identifiers for binary
`
`objects and granules, respectively. (P0 Response, p. 25.) Accordingly,
`
`Personal Web’s argument that the "alleged identifier in the Woodhill/Stefik
`
`combination is NOT a ’name" should be rejected. (Id. at 33.)
`
`Personal Web fundamentally misunderstands Woodhill’ s disclosure in
`
`further arguing that "Woodhill’s ’binary object identifiers 74’ are not used to
`
`access binary objects, search for binary objects, or address binary objects."
`
`(Id. at
`
`34.) In particular, the "update request" described in Woodhill "includes the Binary
`
`Object Identification Record 58" for the requested binary object. (Woodhill, Ex.
`
`1007, 17:40-46.) Since Binary Object Identification Record 58 includes Binary
`
`Object Identifier 74 (see id. at 4:43-47; Dewar Transcript, pp. 50-51), the "update
`
`request" uses Binary Object Identifier 74. Thus, as PersonaiWeb’s expert admits,
`
`any time a binary object identification record 58 is provided for a particular binary
`
`object, the binary object identifier is necessarily provided as well.
`
`(Id. at 5 1.)
`
`Personal Web incorrectly states that even though a Binary Object
`
`Identification Record 58 is provided and a binary object is accessed in the context
`
`of the restore procedure described in Woodhill column 17, "Woodhill expressly
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`5
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`explains how this is done and it does NOT involve any binary object identifier 74."
`
`(P0 Response, p. 34.) But the portions of Woodhill to which Personal Web cites in
`
`support have nothing at all to do with the restore procedure described in Woodhill
`
`column 17.
`
`For example, PersonaiWeb cites to a portion of the specification that
`
`describes the use of a certain information from a Binary Object Identification
`
`Record 58 in the context of the compression routine described at Woodhill, 11:57-
`
`12:5. (See P0 Response, p. 34 (citing Woodhill, 11:65-12:7).) There, Woodhill
`
`describes an instance in which two pieces of information(cid:151)the Binary Object
`
`Stream Type 62 and the Binary Object Offset Field 72(cid:151)from a Binary Object
`
`Identification Record 58 are used when running a compression routine to compress
`
`a file. (Woodhill, 11:57-12:5.)
`
`Unlike the restore procedure described in column 17, which does utilize
`
`Binary Object Identification Record 58, PersonalWeb’s purported example here is
`
`not an instance in which Binary Object Identification Record 58 is provided in a
`
`request for another file. Rather, it describes the compression of a file at a single
`
`location(cid:151)an operation that necessarily requires the memory location (i.e., Binary
`
`Object Offset Field 72) and data type (i.e., Binary Object Stream Type 62), but not
`
`any further information in the Binary Object Identification Record 58. The
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`language of Woodhill here is clear that what is used is "the Binary Object Stream
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`no
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`Type field 62 from the Binary Object Identification Record 58 and the Binary
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`Object Offset field 72 from
`
`the Binary Object Identification Record
`
`58."
`
`(Woodhill, 12:1-4) (emphasis added.) Thus, this portion of the specification fails to
`
`support PersonaiWeb’s contention that Binary Object Identifier 74 is not
`
`necessarily used whenever Binary Object Identification Record 58 is provided,
`
`because in this example the Binary Object Identification Record 58 is never
`
`provided.
`
`PersonaiWeb also cites to Woodhill at 9:18-20 as a further example. (P0
`
`Response, p. 34.) This portion of Woodhill describes a procedure in which the
`
`system determines which portions of a file have changed and therefore need to be
`
`backed up. This is accomplished based on a comparison of a current Binary Object
`
`Identifier 74 with prior versions. (Woodhill, 9:14-22.) It is not an instance in which
`
`Binary Object Identification Record 58 is used in a request, and nevertheless relies
`
`on the Binary Object Identifier 74, thereby failing entirely to support
`
`Personal Web’s position.
`
`PersonaiWeb further states that Woodhill’s "contents identifiers" are not
`
`used to access granules, search for granules, or address granules, and notes that "in
`
`Woodhill’s procedure for reconstituting a binary object on a granule-by-granule
`
`basis, ’contents identifiers’ are not used or even mentioned," adding that "[t]his
`
`same procedure is used in the restore procedure." (P0 Response, pp. 34-3
`
`5.)
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`7
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`This is not accurate, however, as Woodhill notes that at step 450 of FIG. 5H,
`
`"the Distributed Storage Manager program 24, for each binary object, compares
`
`the ’contents identifier’ of the next ’granule’ in the work area of remote backup file
`
`server 12 against the corresponding ’contents identifier’ calculated in step 444,"
`
`and determines if they match at step 452 - if they do not match, then the granule is
`
`transmitted at step 454. (Woodhill, 17:51-64.) The contents identifier is therefore
`
`explicitly provided for in Woodhill as a way to determine whether the granule is
`
`already stored locally or whether it is not stored locally and must be retrieved.
`
`C. (cid:9)
`
`PersonalWeb’s contention related to the number of comparisons
`necessary to determine whether access to a file is organized is
`irrelevant.
`
`PersonaiWeb contends that the "modification to Woodhill based on Stefik
`
`alleged by [Apple] would not have been obvious because one of ordinary skill in
`
`the art would have wanted to minimize (not maximize) the number of comparison
`
`procedures required to check whether access was authorized." (P0 Response, p.
`
`12.) This argument fails for several reasons.
`
`First, none of the challenged claims require a determination of whether
`
`access to an entire file is authorized. Rather, the claims are satisfied by a
`
`determination of whether access to a data item or (identically) a sequence of bits is
`
`authorized. Thus, a determination of whether a particular binary object or granule
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`(ii
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`is accessed is sufficient to meet the "selective access" elements of the challenged
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`claims.
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`During deposition, PersonalWeb’s declarant confirmed that the challenged
`
`claims do not require any determination based upon an entire file. (Dewar
`
`Transcript, p. 54.) In the case of a particular granule, it would take only a single
`
`determination to determine whether access to that granule was authorized. (Id. at
`
`58.) Similarly, in the case of a binary object that is not divided into granules, it
`
`would take only a single determination to determine whether access to that binary
`
`object was authorized. (Id. at 59.) Accordingly, PersonalWeb mischaracterizes
`
`what is required by the claims, and therefore what would need to be shown in the
`
`prior art to invalidate the claims.
`
`Second, PersonalWeb’s contention that a large number of individual
`
`determinations would be required by the proposed modification incorrectly
`
`assumes a particular size for both granules and binary objects. In particular,
`
`PersonalWeb’s argument ignores the clear statements in Woodhill that the size of
`
`such data items are merely a design choice and should be selected based on the
`
`sizes that would result in the most efficient results. (Woodhill, 4:23-26, 14:65-
`
`15:4; Dewar Transcript, pp. 38-42.) Thus, even if one wanted to use the restore
`
`procedure described at column 17 of Woodhill to determine whether access to an
`
`entire file is authorized - something that the challenged claims do not require - a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to minimize the number of
`
`comparisons required by selecting more convenient (e.g., larger) maximum sizes
`
`for granules and/or binary objects.
`
`Third, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the system
`
`disclosed in Woodhill is not limited to "large database files," and could be used to
`
`request and selectively access small files comprised of a single binary object.
`
`D. (cid:9)
`
`PersonaiWeb’s argument that "one would not have modified
`Woodhill to check whether access to a file by a computer was
`authorized when the computer already had the current version of
`that file" is both misleading and incorrect.
`
`PersonalWeb contends that the proposed modification of Woodhill fails
`
`because "there would have been no logical reason to have checked whether that
`
`same computer is authorized to access the previous version of that same file." (P0
`
`Response, p. 20.) This argument is both misleading and entirely incorrect.
`
`Claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 each require the ability to selectively allow
`
`providing a data item (sequence of bits) depending on whether or not the content-
`
`dependent identifier corresponds to another value. While a person of ordinary skill
`
`would understand Woodhill’s teaching of providing a location if known, and not
`
`providing a location if not known, to satisfy the claimed "selectively access"
`
`features, such features were otherwise well-known at the relevant time, as Stefik
`
`evidences. (Goldberg Deci., Ex. 1007, ¶ 86.)
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`The combination of Woodhill and Stefik clearly teaches that authorization
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`would be performed whether or not a computer already had a version of a file. As
`
`Dr. Goldberg explains in his declaration, "it would have been obvious to combine
`
`the backup and restore system disclosed in Woodhill with the repository of Stefik
`
`in order to add an authorization later to prevent unauthorized users from accessing
`
`a different user’s backup files."
`
`(Id. ¶ 84.)
`
`PersonalWeb attempts to dismiss this scenario by arguing that it "does not
`
`occur in Woodhill’s granularization restore procedure" because the fact that the
`
`local computer 20 already has a current version of the file means that "[a] user is
`
`never trying to access a different user’s files in the restore procedure." (P0
`
`Response, p. 20.) But nothing in Woodhill suggests that the granularization restore
`
`procedure is limited to the files of a single user.
`
`To the contrary, the Woodhill system clearly includes multiple local
`
`computers connected to the same remote backup file server. (Woodhill, FIG. 1;
`
`3:25-27.) Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would plainly understand that
`
`the remote backup file server would contain files and binary objects from multiple
`
`users and that the binary object identifiers could be used to determine whether each
`
`user (or at least, each local computer) was authorized to access that particular
`
`binary object. (Goldberg Decl. ¶ 84.)
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`E. (cid:9)
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`Stefik does not teach away from the modification of Woodhull in
`light of Stefik.
`
`Although Personal Web concedes that "Stefik describes unique identifiers for
`
`works," it contends that Stefik actually teaches away from the alleged modification
`
`of Woodhill because Stefik "never uses these identifiers for determining whether
`
`anything is authorized/unauthorized." (P0 Response, p. 23.) This argument
`
`misrepresents both the disclosures of Stefik and the purpose for which it is used in
`
`the combination with Woodhill.
`
`Apple relies on Stefik for its disclosure of selective access, and
`
`PersonaiWeb’s attack on features of Stefik on which Apple does not rely is
`
`superfluous. As the Board notes, "Stefik discloses receiving as [a] request for
`
`access to a particular digital work from a requester, including a unique identifier
`
`for the digital work, and only providing access if it is determined that it is
`
`authorized." (Decision, p. 16 (citing Stefik, Ex. 1013, 9:47-49, 31:13-20, 41:60-
`
`65).) Combined this with Woodhill’s description of using content-based identifiers
`
`for binary objects clearly meets the limitations of the challenged claims. (Petition,
`
`pp. 41-43.)
`
`Personal Web’s contention that the unique identifiers of Stefik are not used is
`
`apparently based on the assumption that they are not actually used to perform file
`
`management operations within the system. (See, e.g., P0 Response, p. 18.) The
`
`disclosure of Stefik makes clear that this assumption is flawed. Stefik clearly
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`12
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`discloses the use of a "unique identifier" and describes its use in requests that
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`"indicate" the particular file involved in the file management transaction. (Stefik,
`
`9:55-59; 34:57-59; 35:19-21; 35:49-51.)
`
`PersonaiWeb also contends that the combination of Woodhill and Stefik
`
`does not render the challenged claims obvious because "prior art elements are not
`
`used for their intended purpose and do not serve their intended function in the
`
`alleged combination." (P0 Response, p. 24.) This argument fundamentally
`
`mischaracterizes the challenged claims, essentially contending that the claimed
`
`identifiers are used only "to control distribution of files or determine whether
`
`access to data is authorized," when the claims have not been limited in this
`
`manner. (Id. at 25.)
`
`III. PersonaiWeb’s alleged evidence of secondary considerations fails to
`overcome the prima fade case of obviousness.
`
`PersonaiWeb’s arguments of secondary considerations of non-obviousness
`
`lack evidentiary value and cannot overcome the compelling case of obviousness set
`
`forth in Apple’s petition. PersonaiWeb has failed to establish any nexus between
`
`the alleged novel features of the challenged claims and any of the supposed
`
`"evidence of the validity of the [’310] patent" provided in Patent Owner’s reply.
`
`(Id. at 41.) Simply, the facts do not support PersonalWeb’s assertions, and even if
`
`they did, they would be insufficient because "[s]econdary considerations of
`
`13
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`nonobviousness. . .simply cannot overcome a strong prima facie case of
`
`obviousness." Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`PersonaiWeb relies on three license agreements as evidence to support its
`
`argument that the challenged claims are not obvious.
`
`(See, e.g., P0 Response, pp.
`
`41-42.) The relied upon agreements grant licenses to a wide variety of U.S. and
`
`foreign "True Name patents." (Bermeister Deci., Ex. 2019, ¶J 3-9.) However,
`
`PersonaiWeb has not provided any evidence that the subject matter of the
`
`challenged claims motivated the decision to license. To the contrary, Personal Web
`
`has failed to even attempt to establish the required nexus. In his testimony
`
`regarding these licenses, PersonaiWeb’s declarant, Kevin Bermeister, makes no
`
`mention of the ’310 patent claims specifically (or even the underlying technology,
`
`generally), let alone how any feature of these claims was responsible for the
`
`license agreements. PersonalWeb’s attorney argument similarly fails to make any
`
`such connection. (See, e.g., P0 Response, pp. 41-42.)
`
`Further, the relationship between the underlying parties undermines any
`
`suggestion that the relied upon agreements are evidence of non-obviousness of the
`
`claimed invention. PersonaiWeb’s declarant acknowledged’ that each of the three
`
`I PersonaiWeb relies upon a declaration of Mr. Bermeister in at least one
`
`related IPR involving U.S. Patent No. 7,945,544. See, 1PR2013-00084, Ex. 2009.
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`licenses involved related parties with interlocking ownership and/or business
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`interests. Rather than identifying any connection between these licenses and the
`
`claimed features, PersonaiWeb merely argues that the licenses were not for the
`
`purpose of settling litigation, and, therefore must somehow be indicative of non-
`
`obviousness. As such, these agreements lack any evidentiary value here.
`
`As a result, PersonaiWeb has failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence of
`
`obviousness of the challenged claims.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`For at least the foregoing reasons, Apple has demonstrated that claims 24,
`
`32, 70, 81, 82 and 86 of the ’310 patent are obvious. Accordingly, Apple
`
`respectfully requests that the Board maintain its rejection of these claims.
`
`September 8, 2014 (cid:9)
`
`Respectf ily sub
`
`By:
`Mark W Rygiel, Regi ration No 45,871
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple Inc.
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & Fox P.L.L.C.
`1100 NEW YORK AVENUE NW
`WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`Although Apple did not cross-examine Mr. Bermeister, his sworn testimony in this
`
`proceeding further demonstrates the insufficiency of PersonaiWeb’s evidence for
`
`overcoming the obviousness of their "True Name" patents.
`
`15
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Case 1PR2013-00596 of
`U.S. Patent No. 7,802,310
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the enclosed
`
`PETITIONER APPLE INC.’S REPLY and associated Exhibit List and Exhibit
`
`1035 were served electronically via e-mail on September 8, 2014, in their entireties
`
`on Attorneys for Patent Owners PersonaiWeb Technologies, LLC and Level 3
`
`Communications, LLC:
`
`Joseph A. Rhoa (Lead Counsel)
`Updeep S. Gill (Back-up Counsel)
`Nixon & Vanderhye P.C.
`901 North Glebe Road, 11th Floor
`Arlington, VA 22203-1808
`
`j ar@nixonvan. corn
`usg@nixonvan.com
`
`Mark W. Rygiel, Registration No. 45,871
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & Fox P.L.L.C.
`1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW
`WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
`(202) 371-2600
`
`Attorney for Petitioner Apple Inc.
`
`
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