`571-272-7822
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` Paper 33
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` Entered: March 25, 2015
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owners.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JONI Y. CHANG, and
`MICHAEL R. ZECHER, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`TURNER, Administrative Patent Judge.
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`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting inter
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`partes review of claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of U.S. Patent
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`No. 7,802,310 B2 (“the ’310 Patent,” Ex. 1001). Patent Owners,
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`PersonalWeb Technologies LLC and Level 3 Communications, LLC
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`(collectively “PersonalWeb”), filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 8). On
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`March 26, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 24, 32, 70,
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`81, 82, and 86 on a single ground of unpatentability alleged in the Petition.
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`Paper 9, “Dec.”
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`After institution of trial, PersonalWeb filed a Patent Owner Response
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`(“PO Resp.,” Paper 15) and Apple filed a Reply thereto (“Reply,” Paper 22).
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`An oral argument was held on November 17, 2014. The transcript of the
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`oral hearing has been entered into the record. Paper 31.
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`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final Written
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`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
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`Apple has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that all claims
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`for which trial is instituted, claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310
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`Patent, are unpatentable.
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`
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`A.
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`Related Matters
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`
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`Apple indicates that the ’310 Patent was asserted against it in
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`PersonalWeb Tech. LLC v. Apple Inc., Case No. 6:12-cv-00660-LED,
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`pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Pet. 2.
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`2
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`Other petitions seeking inter partes review of PersonalWeb’s patents
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`were filed previously, with those patents and the ’310 Patent sharing a
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`common disclosure. Id. at 3–4. Another Petition, filed in Case IPR2014-
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`00062, was pending regarding the ’310 Patent, but that proceeding, as well
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`as the proceedings involving patents with common disclosures, were
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`terminated based on a settlement reached between the parties. IPR2014-
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`00062, Paper 33.
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`
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`B. The ’310 Patent (Ex. 1001)
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`The ’310 Patent relates to a data processing system that identifies data
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`items using substantially unique identifiers, otherwise referred to as True
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`Names, which depend on all the data in the data item and only on the data in
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`the data item. Ex. 1001, 1:44–48, 3:52–55, 6:20–24. According to the ’310
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`Patent, the identity of a data item depends only on the data and is
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`independent of the data item’s name, origin, location, address, or other
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`information not derivable directly from the data associated therewith. Id. at
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`3:55–58. The invention of the ’310 Patent also provides that the system can
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`publish data items, allowing other, possibly anonymous, systems in a
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`network to gain access to the data items. Id. at 4:32–34.
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`3
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`C.
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`Illustrative Claim
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`
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`The ’310 Patent includes claims 1–87, of which a trial was instituted
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`on claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86. Of those the challenged claims, claims
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`24, 70, 81, and 86 are independent claims. Independent claim 70 is
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`reproduced below:
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`70. A computer-implemented method operable in a
`system which includes a network of computers, the system
`implemented at least in part by hardware including at least one
`processor, the method comprising the steps of:
`
`in response to a request at a first computer, from another
`computer, said request comprising at least a content-based
`identifier for a particular data item, the content-based identifier
`for the particular data item being based at least in part on a
`given function of at least some data which comprise the
`contents of the particular data item, wherein the given function
`comprises a message digest or a hash function, and wherein two
`identical data items will have the same content-based identifier:
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`(A) hardware in combination with software, determining
`whether the content-based identifier for the particular data item
`corresponds to an entry in a database comprising a plurality of
`content-based identifiers; and
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`(B) based at least in part on said determining in step (A),
`selectively permitting the particular data item to be accessed at
`or by one or more computers in the network of computers, said
`one or more computers being distinct from said first computer.
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`Ex. 1001, 44:1–23.
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`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
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`The following prior art references were relied upon in the instituted
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`ground of unpatentability:
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`4
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`Woodhill
`Stefik
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`
`July 15, 1997
`US 5,649,196
`US 7,359,881 B2 Apr. 15, 2008
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`(Ex. 1014)
`(Ex. 1013)
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`
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`E. Ground of Unpatentability Instituted for Trial
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`The following table summarizes the challenge to patentability that
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`was instituted for inter partes review:
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`References
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`Basis Claims challenged
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`Woodhill and Stefik
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`§ 103
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`24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86
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`
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
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`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
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`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Absent any special
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`definitions, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as
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`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the
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`entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2007).
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`
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`1. The Standard to be Applied in Claim Construction
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`PersonalWeb asserts that the proper claim construction standard to be
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`applied in this proceeding should not be the broadest reasonable construction
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`consistent with the Specification, given the imminent expiration of the ’310
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`Patent on April 11, 2015. PO Resp. 10. PersonalWeb argues that the proper
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`standard to be applied is that laid out by the United States Court of Appeals
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`for the Federal Circuit in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005) (en banc). PO Resp. 10. PersonalWeb also argues that it has no
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`ability to amend the patent and that no appeal will take place until after the
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`patent expires. Id. We do not agree. PersonalWeb had the ability to file a
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`Motion to Amend and have it be considered in this proceeding. Such
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`consideration of any motion to amend could have been expedited in view of
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`the expiration of the ’310 Patent, but no such motion was filed or
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`contemplated. See Paper 13, 2.
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`PersonalWeb also argues that:
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`[T]he USPTO has no authority to change the claim construction
`standard required by Phillips for IPR proceedings because an
`IPR is not an examination proceeding and the applicable claim
`construction standard is a substantive issue (not a mere
`procedural issue). Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d
`1330,1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`
`PO Resp. 10. The Federal Circuit has determined, however, that the claim
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`construction standard to be applied to claims of an unexpired patent in an
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`inter partes review is the broadest, reasonable claim construction standard.
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`See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 448667, at
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`*5–8 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2015). Therefore, although we acknowledge the
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`imminent expiration of the ’310 Patent, we continue to construe the
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`challenged claims according to the broadest reasonable claim construction
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`standard.
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`6
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`2. “data item” and “data” (Claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86)
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`
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`In the Decision to Institute, we construed the claim term “data item”
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`as a “sequence of bits,” which includes one of the following: (1) the
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`contents of a file; (2) a portion of a file; (3) a page in memory; (4) an object
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`in an object-oriented program; (5) a digital message; (6) a digital scanned
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`image; (7) a part of a video or audio signal; (8) a directory; (9) a record in a
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`database; (10) a location in memory or on a physical device or the like; and
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`(11) any other entity which can be represented by a sequence of bits. We
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`also construed the claim term “data” as a subset of a “data item.” Dec. 6–8.
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`PersonalWeb does not dispute this construction. PO Resp. 2–3. Having
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`considered whether the construction set forth in the Decision to Institute
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`should be changed in light of evidence introduced during trial; we are not
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`persuaded any modification is necessary.
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`
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`3. “digital identifier”(Claim 86)
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`“content-dependent name” (Claims 24 and 32)
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`“content-based identifier” (Claims 70 and 81)
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`
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`Claim 86 recites that the “digital identifier for a particular sequence of
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`bits, the digital identifier being based, at least in part, on a given function of
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`at least some of the bits in the particular sequence of bits,” with claims 24,
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`70 and 81 reciting very similar recitations for “content-dependent name,”
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`and “content-based identifier.” Claim 32 provides that “the data used by the
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`function to determine the content-dependent name of the particular data item
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`comprises of all of the contents of the particular data item,” according to that
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`7
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`embodiment.
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`In the Decision to Institute, we determined that the claims themselves
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`provide a definition of the claim terms “digital identifier,” “content-
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`dependent name,” and “content-based identifier”—namely, an identifier for
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`a data item “being based at least in part on a given function of at least some
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`of the bits in the particular sequence of bits of the particular data item.”
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`Dec. 8–10.
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`With respect to “digital identifier” and “content-based identifier,”
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`PersonalWeb notes that the above construction conflicts with the district
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`court’s construction of the same terms, but does not dispute this
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`construction. PO Resp. 3–4.
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`With respect to “content-dependent name,” PersonalWeb does dispute
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`this construction, arguing that for claim 32, the limitation should be
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`understood to be based “at least in part on a given function of all of the bits”
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`(id. at 4), and that construing a “name” as an “identifier” would be “wrong,
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`unreasonable and illogical.” Id. PersonalWeb continues that one of ordinary
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`skill in the art would have recognized the significant differences between a
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`“name” and an “identifier,” with the former allowing for reference, access,
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`search and address of that data item. Id. at 4–5. Apple counters that nothing
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`in the Specification of the ’310 Patent provides for such a distinction
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`between name and identifier, and that PersonalWeb’s declarant, Dr. Robert
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`Dewar, acknowledged the same. Reply 1–3 (citing Ex. 1035, 32). We agree
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`with Apple.
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`Although claim 32 does recite that the data used comprises “all of the
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`8
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`contents of the particular data item,” we are not persuaded that the
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`construction of the claim term “content-dependent name” should vary with
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`the scope of the claims. Once properly defined, the scope of this term in
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`claim 32 would be different, but that would not require a different
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`construction of the base term.
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`In addition, the Specification of the ’310 Patent provides that “data
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`items . . . are identified by substantially unique identifiers (True Names)”
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`(Ex. 1001, 31:38–42), and we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the
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`art, in view of the Specification of the ’310 Patent, would not have
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`determined that identifiers and names are directed to different aspects of the
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`invention in that context. Although both PersonalWeb and Dr. Dewar opine
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`about the distinctions between names and identifiers (PO Resp. 4–5; Ex.
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`2020 ¶ 23), these distinctions are not present in the Specification. As such,
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`we are persuaded that it is reasonable to construe “content-dependent name”
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`as an identifier for a data item being based, at least in part, on a given
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`function of at least some of the bits in the particular sequence of bits of the
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`particular data item.
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`
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`4.
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` “selectively permit” (Claim 70)
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`“selectively allow” (Claims 81 and 86)
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`
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`Claim 70 recites “selectively permitting the particular data item to be
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`accessed,” and claims 81 and 86 recite “selectively allow said particular
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`sequence of bits to be provided to or accessed by other devices.” In the
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`Decision to Institute, we determined that, in the context of claims 70, 81, and
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`86, the claim terms “selectively permitting” should be construed as
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`“permitting based on whether the recited condition is met,” and “selectively
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`allow” should be construed as “allowing based on whether the recited
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`condition is met.” Dec. 10–11. PersonalWeb continues to argue that
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`Apple’s proposed constructions, in the Petition, are wrong (PO Resp. 6–8),
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`but given that the particular constructions were not adopted (Dec. 10–11),
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`these arguments are moot.
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`
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`5.
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`“to be accessed” “accessed by” (Claims 24 and 70)
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`PersonalWeb also argues that claims 24 and 70 require a “request”
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`that includes a content-dependent name or identifier for a corresponding data
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`item. PO Resp. 8. PersonalWeb continues that this is important “because
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`both parties agree that in the alleged Woodhill/Stefik combination granules
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`corresponding to contents identifiers in the alleged request (“update
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`request”) are NEVER provided to the requesting computer in response to the
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`request.” Id. at 9–10. Although PersonalWeb raises this argument in the
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`claim construction section of its Patent Owner’s Response, we are not
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`persuaded that this is an issue of claim construction. We agree that claim 70
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`requires “selectively permitting the particular data item to be accessed,” and
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`claim 24 requires that “the particular data item corresponding to the content-
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`dependent name is in the request is provided to or accessed by,” but we find
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`this to be an issue of whether the combination of Woodhill and Stefik meets
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`the elements of the claims, not an issue of claim construction.
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`
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`10
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`B.
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`Principles of Law
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`To prevail in its challenges to the patentability of the claims, Apple
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`must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
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`and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
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`obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
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`in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
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`Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). To establish obviousness of a claimed
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`invention, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior
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`art. See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
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`2003); In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974).
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`A patent claim composed of several elements, however, is not proved
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`obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was known,
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`independently, in the prior art. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. In that regard, for an
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`obviousness analysis it is important to identify a reason that would have
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`prompted one of skill in the art to combine prior art elements in the way the
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`claimed invention does. Id. A precise teaching directed to the specific
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`subject matter of a challenged claim, however, is not necessary to establish
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`obviousness. Id. Rather, obviousness must be gauged in view of common
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`sense and the creativity of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Id. Moreover,
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`obviousness can be established when the prior art, itself, would have
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`suggested the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
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`In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976).
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`11
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`We analyze the instituted ground of unpatentability in accordance
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`with the above-stated principles.
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`
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`C.
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`Priority of the Subject Claims
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`Apple asserted that claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310
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`Patent are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the earliest priority
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`application under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Pet. 55–57. Specifically, Apple asserted
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`that the earliest priority application does not provide sufficient written
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`description support for the claim feature: “a hash function.” Id. at 55. In the
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`Decision to Institute, we found that that the original disclosure of the earliest
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`priority application of the ’310 Patent—namely, the application filed on
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`April 11, 1995—provides sufficient written description support for the
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`claimed feature “a hash function.” Dec. 11–13. We are not persuaded that
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`any modification is necessary in light of any evidence or argument
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`introduced during trial. Thus, we determine that Priority Web has
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`established that it is entitled to the benefit of the April 11, 1995 filing date.
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`
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`D. Claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86
`– Alleged Obviousness over Woodhill and Stefik
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`Apple asserts that claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310 Patent
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`are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Woodhill
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`and Stefik. Pet. 28–43. Apple provides a rationale for modifying Woodhill
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`in light of Stefik to arrive at the features of claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86.
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`12
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`Id. at 41–42. In support of its asserted ground of unpatentability, Apple
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`proffers the testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. Goldberg. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 61–88.
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`Woodhill discloses a system for distributed storage management on a
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`computer network system. Ex. 1014, 1:11–17. Figure 1 of Woodhill,
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`reproduced below:
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`
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`Figure 1 depicts a computer network system that includes a distributed
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`storage management system. As illustrated in Figure 1 of Woodhill, each
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`local area network 16 includes multiple user workstations 18 and local
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`computers 20. Id. at 3:24–44. Woodhill’s system includes a Distributed
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`Storage Manager (“DSM”) program for building and maintaining the File
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`Database. Id. at 3:44–49.
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`The DSM program views a file as a collection of data streams, and
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`divides each data stream into one or more binary objects. Id. at 4:13–23,
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`7:40–43; Fig. 5A, item 132. More specifically, the data streams represent
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`regular data, extended attribute data, access control list data, etc. Id. at
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`13
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`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
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`7:44–47. For each binary object being backed up, a Binary Object
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`Identification Record is created in a File Database and includes a Binary
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`Object Identifier to identify a particular binary object uniquely. Id. at 7:60–
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`8:1, 8:33–34.
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`Binary Object Identifiers are calculated based on the contents of the
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`data so that the Binary Object Identifier changes when the contents of the
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`binary object changes. Id. at 8:57–62, 8:40–42. Notably, the Binary Object
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`Identifier includes a Binary Object Hash field which is calculated against the
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`contents of the binary object that is taken one word (16 bits) at a time using
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`a hash algorithm. Id. at 8:22–32. Duplicate binary objects can be
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`recognized from their identical Binary Object Identifiers, even if the objects
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`reside on different types of computers in a heterogeneous network. Id. at
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`8:62–65.
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`We agree with Apple that the Binary Object Identifiers of Woodhill
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`are equivalent to the “digital identifier,” “content-dependent name,” and
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`“content-based identifier” recited in claims 24, 70, 81, and 86. Pet. 31.
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`They are based on a cryptographic hash, with the chance of two objects
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`being assigned the same Binary Object Identifier being very small.
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`Ex. 1014, 8:33–36. Based on this, two identical items will have the same
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`Binary Object Identifier. Ex. 1007 ¶ 67.
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`
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`Stefik discloses a system for preventing the unauthorized access to
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`digital works. Ex. 1013, 1:17–20. Stefik discloses receiving a request for
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`access to a particular digital work from a requester, including a unique
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`identifier for the digital work, and only providing access if it is determined
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`14
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`IPR2013-00596
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`that the request is authorized. Id. at 9:47–49, 31:13–20, 41:60–65. As
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`discussed by Apple, the process of matching the identifier for the work
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`would involve comparing it with a plurality of values, and providing for
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`selective access. Pet. 42.
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`Apple further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`reading Woodhill and Stefik would have understood that the combination of
`
`Woodhill and Stefik would have allowed for the selective access features of
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`Stefik to be used with Woodhill’s content-dependent identifiers feature.
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`Pet. 42. We agree in this regard and are persuaded that the combination of
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`Woodhill and Stefik renders claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310
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`Patent unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`
`Turning to PersonalWeb’s arguments against this ground,
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`PersonalWeb argues that the modification to Woodhill based on Stefik
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`would not have been obvious because one of ordinary skill in the art would
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`have wanted to minimize—not maximize—the number of comparison
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`procedures required for access. PO Resp. 12–18. PersonalWeb continues
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`that, based on typical large database files being restored in Woodhill, the
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`combination would have a large number comparisons that would need to be
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`made. Id. at 15–16. In other words, PersonalWeb asserts that the number of
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`binary object identifiers and content identifiers would be in the thousand to
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`million range, and the combination of Woodhill and Stefik would require an
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`access determination for each. Id. Based on this, PersonalWeb argues that
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`one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to minimize the number of
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`comparisons, and would have viewed an increase in multiple orders of
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`15
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`magnitude to be “wasteful, unnecessary, inefficient and costly.” Id. at 17.
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`PersonalWeb also adds that Stefik already has a system for controlling
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`distribution of files, and that if its usage rights would have been employed in
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`Woodhill, if at all, they would not utilize Woodhill’s unique identifiers. Id.
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`at 18.
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`Apple responds that none of the challenged claims require a
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`determination of whether access to an entire file is authorized, and that the
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`claims are satisfied by a determination of whether access to a data item or a
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`sequence of bits is authorized. Reply 8. In addition, Apple counters that “a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to minimize the number
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`of comparisons required by selecting more convenient (e.g., larger)
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`maximum sizes for granules and/or binary objects,” and that “Woodhill is
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`not limited to ‘large database files.’” Id. at 9–10. We agree with Apple.
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`A person of ordinary skill in the art is not an automaton, and can
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`apply common sense in arriving at efficient solutions. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
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`As Apple suggests, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have selected larger
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`sizes for the granules and/or binary objects for larger sized files (Reply 10),
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`and we are persuaded that PersonalWeb’s view of such ordinarily skilled
`
`artisans would require their rote adoption of the methods of Woodhill and
`
`Stefik without contemplation. Additionally, as discussed above, the claims
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`specify access to particular data items, but do not require any minimization
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`of access comparisons. Thus, we do not find PersonalWeb’s argument to be
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`persuasive.
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`16
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`Next, PersonalWeb argues that, because the system in Woodhill
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`already has the most recent version of a file, there would have been no
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`reason to have modified Woodhill to implement methods for checking
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`whether access is authorized for a previous version of the same file. PO
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`Resp. 19–22. In essence, PersonalWeb argues that, if the computer already
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`has been permitted access to the current version of the file, common sense
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`dictates that the computer also is authorized to access the previous versions
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`of that same file. Id. PersonalWeb further argues that the rationale put forth
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`by Apple, namely “to prevent unauthorized users from accessing a different
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`user’s back up files,” makes no sense because Woodhill is concerned with
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`current and previous versions of the same file. Id. at 20. We do not agree.
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`As Apple argues, the Woodhill system includes multiple local
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`computers connected to the same remote backup file server, which store files
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`and binary objects from multiple users. Reply 11; Ex. 1014, 3:25–27. It
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`would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have
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`addressed whether each user or each local computer was authorized to
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`access a particular binary object. Determining access based on binary object
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`identifiers would have been consistent with one of the purposes of Stefik.
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`See Ex. 1013, 9:47–49, 31:13–20, 41:60–65. Given the local area network
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`disclosed in Woodhill, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art
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`would have addressed access to multiple files, and not just multiple versions
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`of a single file, in considering the combination of Woodhill and Stefik.
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`PersonalWeb also argues that Woodhill already has a system for
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`access control, one that acts prior to the binary object identifiers being
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`created, such that it would not have been obvious to have used those
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`identifiers for access, and that the “access control list data” of Woodhill,
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`unrelated to the identifiers, would have been used instead. PO Resp. 21–22.
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`We do not agree. An obviousness evaluation is not limited necessarily to the
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`mere substitution of one element for another; although such a substitution
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`may be simpler, in situations such as this, the obviousness analysis requires
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`viewing factors such as the totality of the teachings, market forces, and
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`background knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. KSR, 550
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`U.S. at 417–18. The fact that Woodhill uses one access control method, and
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`Stefik uses another, does not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would
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`not have combined the aspects of each, instead of the wholesale swapping of
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`one for another. As discussed above, we are persuaded that one of ordinary
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`skill in the art would have employed the selective access features of Stefik to
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`be used with Woodhill’s content-dependent identifiers feature to provide
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`access control.
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`PersonalWeb argues that the teachings of Stefik would have led one
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`of ordinary skill in the art away from the path taken by the inventors of the
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`challenged claims. PO Resp. 22–24. PersonalWeb continues that Stefik
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`discloses the use of unique identifiers, but does not use them for determining
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`access and does not use them as part of Stefik’s “usage rights.” Id. We do
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`not agree.
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`At most, Stefik provides for alternative means for determining access
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`and does not “teach away” from the use of unique identifiers for access.
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`“[T]he prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not
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`constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such
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`disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution
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`claimed . . . .” In re Fulton,391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The fact
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`that Stefik does not teach specifically that unique identifiers are used for
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`determining access is not sufficient to constitute a teaching away, as
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`PersonalWeb has alleged.
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`Similarly, PersonalWeb argues that certain aspects of Stefik’s system
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`are disclosed to be “fundamental” or “key” requirements, and one would not
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`have modified Woodhill based on Stefik without utilizing such features. PO
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`Resp. 26. According to PersonalWeb, Stefik determines that the connections
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`between the usage rights and the works are fundamental, and combining the
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`teachings of Woodhill and Stefik would render Stefik’s distribution control
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`system inoperable for its intended purpose if the usage rights were not part
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`of the corresponding file. Id. at 26–28. We do not agree.
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`PersonalWeb’s argument in this regard mischaracterizes Stefik’s
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`disclosure regarding usage rights. Stefik provides that “the usage rights are
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`treated as part of the digital work” and that “[t]he attachment of usage rights
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`into a digital work may occur in a variety of ways” (Ex. 1013, 11:15–30
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`(emphases added)), not necessarily suggesting the bodily incorporation of
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`those usage rights. Additionally, Stefik provides that “[a] key feature of the
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`present invention is that the usage rights are permanently ‘attached’ to the
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`digital work” (id. at 6:44–45 (emphasis added)), with the use of quotation
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`marks suggesting that the rights need not become a part of the work
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`necessarily. The connection between the usage rights and the work is key,
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`indeed, but Stefik does not disclose that this must be accomplished in only
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`one way. PersonalWeb makes much of Apple’s affiant, Dr. Goldberg,
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`acknowledging that “because the binary object identifier 74 is calculated
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`from the contents of the binary object, it cannot be part of the binary object”
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`(PO Resp. 27; Ex. 2015, 123–124 (emphasis in original)), but we do find
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`this to be persuasive. Given that the binary object identifier is calculated
`
`from the contents of the binary object, it is connected to, and directly
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`attributable to, the contents. We are not persuaded that such connections
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`would run counter to the express concerns in Stefik that the identifier be “a
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`part of” the digital work. As such, we are not persuaded that combining the
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`teachings of Woodhill and Stefik would render Stefik’s distribution control
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`system inoperable for its intended use.
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`PersonalWeb also argues that the identifiers in Woodhill and Stefik
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`are not being used for their intended purposes in the combination, and that
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`they would not perform the same functions. PO Resp. 24–25. We are not
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`persuaded, however, because we agree with Apple that the challenged
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`claims have not been limited “‘to control the distribution of files or
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`determine whether access to data is authorized.’” Reply 13 (citing PO Resp.
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`25). The challenged claims require, for example, “selectively permitting the
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`particular data item to be accessed,” but do not limit the use of the claimed
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`identifiers as PersonalWeb has alleged. As such, we are not persuaded that
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`the identifiers in Woodhill and Stefik are being used contrary to their
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`intended purposes in the proffered combination.
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`Additionally, PersonalWeb argues that granules in Woodhill, in
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`response to an update request, are never provided to the requesting
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`computer, such that Woodhill’s granules cannot meet the limitations of the
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`claims. PO Resp. 30–32. PersonalWeb suggests that the Institution
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`Decision only relies on the binary objects and content-based identifiers in
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`Woodhill, instead of the granules. Id. at 30. Even if true, this does not
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`appear to be an argument against the instant ground in this proceeding and
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`would appear to moot (i.e., addressing only one aspect of Woodhill).
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`PersonalWeb also argues that the identifier in the Woodhill/Stefik
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`combination is not a “name” and is not used for accessing. PO Resp. 32–36.
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`PersonalWeb reiterates its arguments distinguishing a “name,” from an
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`“identifier,” as discussed in the claim construction section above, we agree
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`that the terms may be distinctive, but, in this case, the Specification of the
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`’310 Patent does not make that distinction. Even so, PersonalWeb argues
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`that “Woodhill does not use a hash as a file name, or as a substitute for a
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`name, in a computer network.” Id. at 33. In addition, PersonalWeb argues
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`that Woodhill’s binary object identifiers are not used to access, search for, or
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`address binary objects. Id. at 34. PersonalWeb also points out that
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`Woodhill discloses the use of names, but that this disclosure