throbber
Paper No.44
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: February 7, 2018
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALWEB TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, and
`LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Patent Owners.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JONI Y. CHANG, and
`MICHAEL R. ZECHER, Administrative Patent Judges
`
`TURNER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DECISION ON REMAND
`35 U.S.C. § 144 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a)
`
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`We address this case on remand after a decision by the U.S. Court of
`Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Personal Web Technologies, LLC v.
`Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 987–94 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Personal Web Tech.”).
`As background, Petitioner, Apple, Inc. (“Apple”), filed a Petition
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,802,310 B2 (“the ’310 Patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”).
`Patent Owners, PersonalWeb Technologies LLC and Level 3
`Communications, LLC (collectively “PersonalWeb”), filed a Preliminary
`Response (Paper 8). We determined that the information presented in the
`Petition demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that Apple
`would prevail in challenging of claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 as
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we
`instituted trial on March 26, 2014, on the ground that the challenged claims
`are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Woodhill1 and Stefik2. Paper 9 (“Dec.
`on Inst.”).
`During the course of trial, PersonalWeb filed a Patent Owner
`Response (Paper 15, “PO Resp.”), to which Apple filed a Reply to the Patent
`Owner Response (Paper 22, “Reply”). We held an oral hearing on
`November 17, 2014, with a transcript of that hearing appearing in the record.
`See Paper 31 (“Tr.”).
`
`
`1 Woodhill, U.S. Patent No. 5,649,196, issued July 15, 1997 (Ex. 1014).
`2 Stefik, U.S. Patent No. 7,359,881 B2, issued Apr. 15, 2008 (Ex. 1013).
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`On March 25, 2015, we issued a Final Written Decision in this
`proceeding in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`Paper 33 (“Final Dec.”). We concluded that Apple had demonstrated by a
`preponderance of the evidence that claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86 of the
`’310 patent were unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combination of
`Woodhill and Stefik. Final Dec. 25. Subsequently, PersonalWeb requested
`rehearing under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), where that request for rehearing was
`denied. Papers 34, 35. PersonalWeb appealed the Final Written Decision,
`except as to claim 70, to the Federal Circuit. Paper 36.
`The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s claim construction of the
`claim terms “content-dependent name,” “content-based identifier,” and
`“digital identifier,” also concluding that PersonalWeb “does not deny that
`Woodhill discloses the required content-based identifier under the Board’s
`construction.” Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 991.
`The Federal Circuit also determined the Board did not sufficiently
`explain and support the following conclusions: (1) Woodhill and Stefik
`disclose all of the elements recited in the challenged claims of the ’310
`Patent; and (2) a relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to
`combine Woodhill and Stefik in the way the ’310 Patent claims and
`reasonably expected success. Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 991–94.
`Consequently, the Federal Circuit vacated our determination of obviousness
`as to claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310 Patent and remanded this case
`to us for further proceedings. Id. at 994. The Federal Circuit’s mandate
`issued on April 7, 2017.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`On June 22, 2017, we issued an Order instructing the parties to file
`briefs specifically pointing out where Petitioner made out a proper case of
`obviousness on the instituted ground, or where Petitioner failed to make out
`such a case. Paper 39, 2. In accordance with this Order, the parties filed
`briefs on July 12, 2017. Papers 42, 43. PersonalWeb makes clear that it did
`not appeal claim 70, such that we need not address claim 70. Paper 43, 1.
`See also Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 990.
`
`We have reconsidered the record developed during trial anew by
`reviewing the parties’ positions in light of the Federal Circuit’s guidance
`regarding the patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Woodhill and
`Stefik of claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86, as well as the parties’ newly-filed
`briefs. For the reasons that follow, we maintain that Apple has demonstrated
`by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86 of the
`’310 Patent are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combination of
`Woodhill and Stefik.
`
`A. The ’310 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’310 Patent relates to a data processing system that identifies data
`items using substantially unique identifiers, otherwise referred to as True
`Names, which depend on all the data in the data item and only on the data in
`the data item. Ex. 1001, 1:44–48, 3:52–55, 6:20–24. According to the ’310
`Patent, the identity of a data item depends only on the data and is
`independent of the data item’s name, origin, location, address, or other
`information not derivable directly from the data associated therewith. Id. at
`3:55–58. The invention of the ’310 Patent also provides that the system can
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`publish data items, allowing other, possibly anonymous, systems in a
`network to gain access to the data items. Id. at 4:32–34.
`B. Illustrative Claim
`The ’310 Patent includes claims 1–87, of which a trial was instituted
`
`on claims 24, 32, 70, 81, 82, and 86. Of those the challenged claims, claims
`24, 70, 81, and 86 are independent claims. Independent claim 24 is
`reproduced below:
`
`24. A computer-implemented method implemented at
`least in part by hardware comprising one or more processors, the
`method comprising:
`(a) using a processor, receiving at a first computer from a
`second computer, a request regarding a particular data item, said
`request including at least a content-dependent name for the
`particular data item, the content-dependent name being based, at
`least in part, on at least a function of the data in the particular
`data item, wherein the data used by the function to determine the
`content-dependent name comprises at least some of the contents
`of the particular data item, wherein the function that was used
`comprises a message digest function or a hash function, and
`wherein two identical data items will have the same content-
`dependent name; and
`(b) in response to said request:
`the
`(i) causing
`the content-dependent name of
`particular data item to be compared to a plurality of values;
`(ii) hardware
`in
`combination with
`software
`determining whether or not access to the particular data
`item is unauthorized based on whether the content-
`dependent name of the particular data item corresponds to
`at least one of said plurality of values, and
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`(iii) based on said determining in step (ii), not allowing
`the particular data item to be provided to or accessed by
`the second computer if it is determined that access to the
`particular data item is not authorized.
`Ex. 1001, 40:1–26.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Construction
`In the Final Written Decision, we began our analysis by addressing
`the parties’ arguments regarding claim construction, as well as the standard
`to be applied in claim construction. Final Dec. 5–10. Because the ’310
`Patent expired on April 11, 2015, PersonalWeb argued that we should not
`have relied on the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, and should
`have instead applied the standard of Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Final Dec. 5–6; Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at
`990–91. The Federal Circuit found that our construction was correct under
`either standard, rendering moot the issue of the proper claim construction
`standard to be applied. Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 990.
`We construed multiple claim terms in the Institution Decision, with
`those same claim terms also construed in the Final Written Decision.
`Dec. on Inst. 6–11; Final Dec. 5–10. Of import to the remanded case, we
`construed the following terms: “digital identifier” (Claim 86); “content-
`dependent name” (Claims 24 and 32); and “content-based identifier”
`(Claims 70 and 81). We construed these claim terms as “an identifier for a
`data item being based, at least in part, on a given function of at least some of
`the bits in the particular sequence of bits of the particular data item.” Final
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`Dec. 7–9. The Federal Circuit affirmed that construction, and also
`acknowledged that PersonalWeb did not deny that Woodhill discloses the
`required content-based identifier under that construction. Personal Web
`Tech., 848 F.3d at 991.
`B. Federal Circuit Decision Regarding Obviousness Determination
`On appeal to the Federal Circuit, PersonalWeb argues that we erred in
`our ultimate obviousness determination. Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at
`989. The Federal Circuit determines that we did not adequately support our
`findings that the prior art disclosed all elements of the challenged claims and
`that a relevant skilled artisan would have had a motivation to combine the
`prior art references to produce the claimed inventions with a reasonable
`expectation of success. Id. More specifically, the Federal Circuit
`determines that we did not sufficiently explain and support the conclusions
`that: (1) Woodhill and Stefik disclose all of the elements recited in the
`challenged claims of the ’310 Patent; and (2) a relevant skilled artisan would
`have been motivated to combine Woodhill and Stefik in the way the ’310
`Patent claims and reasonably expected success. Id. at 991–94. The Federal
`Circuit emphasizes that their review of our obviousness determination is
`“rooted not just in the law of obviousness but in basic principles of
`administrative law.” Id. at 992–94.
`With respect to exemplary claim 24, the Federal Circuit finds that the
`portion of the Petition (Pet. 42) relied upon for satisfying the element
`“causing the content-dependent name of the particular data item to be
`compared to a plurality of values” mentions only Stefik, not Woodhill, but
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`that Apple made clear that it relies solely on Woodhill for disclosure of this
`claim element. Id. at 993. The Federal Circuit determines that the Final
`Written Decision does not explain, analyze, or adopt the portion of Apple’s
`Petition that specifically reference the specifically-cited section of Woodhill.
`Id. (citing Final Dec. 14–15; Pet. 33–34).
`The Federal Circuit also concludes our response to another of
`PersonalWeb’s argument is incomplete. Id. PersonalWeb argued that
`Woodhill’s binary object identifiers are not used to access, search for, or
`address binary objects (PO Resp. 34), in response to which we referred to a
`portion of Apple’s Reply that referenced a specific portion of Woodhill.
`Final Dec. 21–22 (citing Reply 5; Ex. 1014 (Woodhill), 17:40–46). The
`Federal Circuit concludes that our opinion “does not explicitly say, let alone
`explain, how Woodhill shows that determination to involve a comparison
`between the content-based identifier and a plurality of values.” Personal
`Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 993.
`With respect to a motivation to combine Woodhill and Stefik, the
`Federal Circuit determines that our reasoning also was deficient. Id. The
`Federal Circuit determines that:
`The Board’s most substantial discussion of this issue merely
`agrees with Apple’s contention that “a person of ordinary skill in
`the art reading Woodhill and Stefik would have understood that
`the combination of Woodhill and Stefik would have allowed for
`the selective access features of Stefik to be used with Woodhill's
`content-dependent identifiers feature.” Id. at *8 (emphasis
`added). But that reasoning seems to say no more than that a
`skilled artisan, once presented with the two references, would
`have understood that they could be combined. And that is not
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`enough: it does not imply a motivation to pick out those two
`references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention.
`Id. at 993–94 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Federal Circuit
`further finds that “a clear, evidence-supported account of the contemplated
`workings of the combination is a prerequisite to adequately explaining and
`supporting a conclusion that a relevant skilled artisan would have been
`motivated to make the combination and reasonably expect success in doing
`so.” Id. at 994.
`The Federal Circuit vacates our determination of obviousness as to
`claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86 of the ’310 Patent and remands this case to us
`for further proceedings. Id.
`C. Alleged Obviousness over Woodhill and Stefik
`Claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86
`In its Petition, Apple contends that claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86 are
`unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combination of Woodhill and Stefik.
`Pet. 28–43. Apple provides a rationale for modifying Woodhill in light of
`Stefik to arrive at the features of claims 24, 32, 81, 82, and 86. Id. at 41–42.
`In support of its asserted ground of unpatentability, Apple relies on the
`testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. Goldberg. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 61–88.
`In its Patent Owner Response, PersonalWeb presents a myriad of
`arguments that the modification to Woodhill based on Stefik would not have
`been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art, and that certain aspects
`of Woodhill and Stefik, even if combined, would not meet the limitations of
`the challenged claims. PO Resp. 12–41. Apple responds to these arguments
`in its Reply. Reply 4–13. As noted above, both parties provided briefing
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`after remand on whether the Petition explains and supports that Woodhill
`and Stefik disclose all of the elements recited in the challenged claims, and
`whether a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Woodhill
`and Stefik as provided in the challenged claims with a reasonable
`expectation of success. Paper 42 (“Pet. Br.”); Paper 43 (“PO Br.”).
`We begin our analysis with brief overviews of Woodhill and Stefik,
`then we address the parties’ arguments as to whether Woodhill and Stefik
`disclose all of the elements of the challenged claims, as well as whether the
`Petition supports and explains that a skilled artisan would have been
`motivated to combine Woodhill and Stefik as provided in the challenged
`claims with a reasonable expectation of success.
`1. Woodhill
`Woodhill discloses a system for distributed storage management on a
`computer network system. Ex. 1014, 1:11–17. Figure 1 of Woodhill,
`reproduced below:
`
`10
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`Figure 1 depicts a computer network system that includes a distributed
`storage management system. As illustrated in Figure 1 of Woodhill, each
`local area network 16 includes multiple user workstations 18 and local
`computers 20. Id. at 3:24–44. Woodhill’s system includes a Distributed
`Storage Manager (“DSM”) program for building and maintaining the File
`Database. Id. at 3:44–49.
`The DSM program views a file as a collection of data streams, and
`divides each data stream into one or more binary objects. Id. at 4:13–23,
`7:40–43; Fig. 5A, item 132. More specifically, the data streams represent
`regular data, extended attribute data, access control list data, etc. Id. at
`7:44–47. For each binary object being backed up, a Binary Object
`Identification Record is created in a File Database and includes a Binary
`Object Identifier to identify a particular binary object uniquely. Id. at 7:60–
`8:1, 8:33–34.
`Binary Object Identifiers are calculated based on the contents of the
`data so that the Binary Object Identifier changes when the contents of the
`binary object changes. Id. at 8:57–62, 8:40–42. Notably, the Binary Object
`Identifier includes a Binary Object Hash field which is calculated against the
`contents of the binary object that is taken one word (16 bits) at a time using
`a hash algorithm. Id. at 8:22–32. Duplicate binary objects can be
`recognized from their identical Binary Object Identifiers, even if the objects
`reside on different types of computers in a heterogeneous network. Id. at
`8:62–65.
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`
`2. Stefik
`Stefik discloses a system for preventing the unauthorized access to
`
`digital works. Ex. 1013, 1:17–20. Stefik discloses receiving a request for
`access to a particular digital work from a requester, including a unique
`identifier for the digital work, and only providing access if it is determined
`that the request is authorized. Id. at 9:47–49, 31:13–20, 41:60–65.
`3. Specific Claim Terms
`In its Petition, Apple identifies that the Binary Object Identifiers of
`Woodhill are equivalent to the “digital identifier,” “content-dependent
`name,” and “content-based identifier”3 recited in claims 24, 70, 81, and 86.
`Pet. 31. These Binary Object Identifiers are based on a cryptographic hash,
`with the chance of two different objects being assigned the same Binary
`Object Identifier being very small. Ex. 1014, 8:33–36. In Woodhill, two
`identical items will have the same Binary Object Identifier. Ex. 1007 ¶ 67.
`The Federal Circuit acknowledged that PersonalWeb did not deny that
`Woodhill discloses the required content-based identifier as we had construed
`that term. Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 991.
`4. Apple’s Assertions Regarding Claim 24
`In its Petition, Apple relies in part on its analysis of claim 70 to
`
`demonstrate that elements of claim 24 are taught or suggested by Woodhill
`and/or Stefik, and thereafter extends that analysis to the other challenged
`
`3 The Federal Circuit used the term “content-based identifier” to refer to all
`of the terms in this list (Personal Web Tech., 848 F.3d at 990), and we adopt
`this terminology herein except where specifically referring to claim 81.
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`claims. Pet. 28–43. Given that claim 70 is no longer at issue in this
`proceeding (see PO Br. 1), we examine that analysis in our consideration of
`independent claim 24, still at issue.
`
`Claim 24 is directed to a computer-implemented method implemented
`at least in part by hardware comprising one or more processors. Apple
`identifies that Woodhill is directed to a system and method for the
`distributed management of the storage space and data on a networked
`computer system, where that system includes at least two storage devices for
`storing data files. Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1014, Abs.).
`Claim 24 also provides that a first computer receives a request
`regarding a particular data item from a second computer, with the request
`including at least a content-dependent name for the particular data item.
`Claim 24 continues that the content-dependent name is based, at least in
`part, on at least some of the contents of the particular data item, and that the
`function is a message digest function or a hash function, such that two
`identical data items will have the same content-dependent name. Apple
`identifies the Binary Object Identifier in Woodhill as being equivalent to the
`claimed content-dependent name. Id. at 31–33 (citing Ex. 1014, 8:33–38,
`8:33–38, 58–65; Ex. 1007 ¶ 67). As discussed above, this assertion is not
`denied by PersonalWeb.
`In response to the request, claim 24 recites that the content-dependent
`name of the particular data item is compared to a plurality of values. As
`pointed out by Apple, the anticipation ground applying Woodhill (Pet. 28–
`37, 38–39), which is incorporated into the obviousness ground over
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`Woodhill and Stefik (Pet. 41–43), discusses this aspect of claim 24 in depth.
`Pet. Br. 3. The Petition references the following disclosure of Woodhill
`regarding this limitation:
`Program control then continues with step 446 where the
`Distributed Storage Manager program 448 transmits an ‘update
`request’ to the remote backup file server 12 which includes the
`Binary Object Identification Record 58 for the previous version
`of each binary object as well as the list of ‘contents identifiers’
`calculated in step 444.
`Pet. 33–34 (quoting Ex. 1017, 17:40–46, Figs. 1, 5I). Apple continues that,
`in order “[t]o determine which data needs to be restored by the update
`request, the remote backup file server of Woodhill must be able to reference
`its local files using the information it receives - namely the Binary Object
`Identification Record.” Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 70). The Petition then
`relies on the testimony of Dr. Goldberg as to how that referencing
`necessarily must be accomplished, i.e., that the remote backup fileserver
`maintains some sort of file system or other mapping (i.e., a database) that
`allows the Binary Object Identification Record to serve as a lookup for the
`requisite file data that is to be restored. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 72).
`
`We agree with Apple’s argument that Woodhill compares the content-
`dependent name of the particular data item to a plurality of values.
`Woodhill is clear that the remote backup file server “routes” the storage files
`to “magnetic tape or other low cost storage media” (Ex. 1014, 10:13–21, 32–
`34), and it would have been necessary for the remote backup file server to
`maintain some type of system for managing its files, per Dr. Goldberg’s
`testimony (Ex. 1007 ¶ 72). The use of a database in Woodhill to determine
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`which data need to be restored would necessarily require comparisons with a
`plurality of values, per the discussed element of claim 24.
`Claim 24 also recites that the hardware in combination with software
`determines whether or not access to the particular data item is unauthorized
`based on whether the content-dependent name of the particular data item
`corresponds to at least one of the plurality of values. Lastly, based on the
`access authorization step, the particular data item is not allowed to be
`provided to or accessed by the second computer if it is determined that
`access to the particular data item is not authorized.
`Apple identifies the Petition as providing for the above-discussed
`limitations of claim 24 both through Woodhill alone, and in combination
`with Stefik. Pet. Br. 6. The Petition provides an interpretation of these latter
`elements of claim 24 as meaning that “the location can be provided if
`known, and not provided if not known,” which is asserted to be fully taught
`by Woodhill. See Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 75). In the Decision on
`Institution, we determined that the challenged claims refer to authorized and
`unauthorized access, as opposed to not providing information if not known,
`and, we thus, relied also on the teachings of Stefik for the determining and
`authorization steps. Dec. on Inst. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1013, 1:17–20, 9:47–49,
`31:13–20, 41:60–65). The Petition cites to the teachings of Stefik,
`specifically of a system that addresses the problem of preventing
`unauthorized access to digital works, with an access request utilizing a
`unique identifier for the digital work. Pet. Br. 7–8 (citing Pet. 26, 41–43;
`Ex. 1013, 9:47–61, 41:60–65). See also Section II.C.2. We agree with
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`Apple that access provided in Stefik would necessarily require a comparison
`between the unique identifier and other values to see if a match can be
`obtained. This is further supported by the testimony of Dr. Goldberg. Ex.
`1007 ¶¶ 57, 85). As such, we remain persuaded that the combination of
`Woodhill and Stefik teach the latter limitations of claim 24.
`Turning to a rationale or motivation to combine Woodhill and Stefik,
`Apple points to its Petition as “‘explain[ing] why one of skill would have
`been so motivated’ based on evidence in the references and ‘supported by
`evidence of the knowledge of a skilled artisan’ in the form of Dr. Goldberg’s
`declaration.” Pet. Br. 10 (quoting Outdry Techs. Corp. v. Geox S.p.A., 859
`F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Apple points to pages 41 through 43
`of its Petition, citing Dr. Goldberg’s testimony, as demonstrating that a
`skilled artisan would have combined the backup and restore system in
`Woodhill with the repository in Stefik to add an authorization layer to
`prevent unauthorized users from accessing a different user’s back up files.
`Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 84). Apple indicates that preventing unauthorized
`users from accessing a different user’s back up files is a precise and specific
`reason why a skilled artisan would have modified Woodhill in view of Stefik
`to arrive at the claimed subject matter. Id. at 11.
`Apple further buttresses this by pointing to portions of the Petition
`(Pet. 26, 41–43) that discuss the purpose of Stefik to prevent authorized
`access to digital works, and the testimony of Dr. Goldberg (Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 57,
`85, 88) that both Stefik and Woodhill involve file management and aim to
`solve problems with secure access. Pet. Br. 11. Apple also cites the oral
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`hearing transcript that provides:
`We have two references that are in the same field, file
`management on a network system, two references that are
`addressing the same problem, secure access to data, and then
`each of these two references, Stefik and Woodhill, certainly take
`different approaches or they approach this problem in different
`ways, but they do so in a way that lends itself to a combination
`with the other in the way that the Board described in the decision,
`again, using
`the unique content-dependent
`identifiers of
`Woodhill with the selective access concept of Stefik.
`Id. at 11–12 (quoting Paper 31, 18:19–19:2).
`
`Additionally, Apple points to the Petition and Dr. Goldberg’s
`testimony as explaining and supporting that a skilled artisan would have had
`a reasonable expectation of success in combining the backup and restore
`system of Woodhill with the repository of Stefik. Id. at 13. Apple contends
`that that “the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of
`success because ‘any particular choice of a unique identifier would have
`been a mere design choice among well-known options, including content-
`dependent identifiers such as message digest identifiers.’” Id. (citing Pet.
`42). Apple also indicates that Dr. Goldberg’s testimony provides support
`that Stefik’s authorization layer would have been added with a reasonable
`expectation of success because modifying Woodhill to perform Stefik’s
`selective access function would have been a mere design choice, with such
`options as using content-dependent identifiers. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 87).
`As such, Apple has provided in the Petition a sufficient rationale or
`motivation to combine Woodhill and Stefik, and that combination teaches or
`suggests all of the limitations of claim 24. Therefore, we maintain that
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`Apple has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 24 of
`the ’310 Patent is unpatentable under § 103(a) over the combination of
`Woodhill and Stefik.
`5. PersonalWeb’s Assertions Regarding Claim 24
`PersonalWeb’s briefing focuses on Apple’s alleged failure to make
`out a proper case of obviousness at least because “Apple: (1) failed to meet
`its burden of establishing that the prior art discloses all elements of the
`challenged claims, and (2) failed to meet its burden of establishing that a
`skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Woodhill and Stefik
`in the way the ‘310 patent claims and reasonably expect success.” PO Br. 1.
`In particular, PersonalWeb argues that Woodhill and Stefik fail to disclose
`comparison of a data item identifier to a plurality of values to determine
`access authorization, and that the Petition fails to meet its burden of
`establishing that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the
`references as claimed with a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 1–15.
`We consider PersonalWeb’s arguments in each contention below.
`PersonalWeb takes claim 24 as representative and argues that the
`Petition and Institution Decision are “fatally flawed.” Id. at 1–2.
`PersonalWeb points out that the Institution Decision relies, in part, on Stefik
`for the comparison with a plurality of values step of claim 24, whereas the
`Petition relies on Woodhill. Id. (citing Dec. on Inst. 16; Pet. 42). Although
`we agree that we relied, mainly, on different portions of Woodhill and Stefik
`in the Institution Decision, we disagree that Woodhill and Stefik fail to teach
`the cited elements of claim 24.
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`As discussed above, the Petition provides that, in order to determine
`which data need to be restored by the update request, in Woodhill, the
`remote backup file server must be able to reference its local files using the
`information it receives, and that such a server would maintain some sort of
`file system or other mapping (i.e., a database) to perform the lookup. See
`Pet. 33−35 (citing Ex. 1017, 17:40–46, Figs. 1, 5I; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 70, 72). This
`is equivalent to the limitation of claim 24, namely: “causing the content-
`dependent name of the particular data item to be compared to a plurality of
`values.”
`We also note that in another portion of its Briefing, PersonalWeb cites
`to a portion of Woodhill detailing “comparing the current value of the
`binary object identifier associated with a particular binary object to one or
`more previous values of the of the binary object identifier associated with
`that particular binary object.” PO Br. 10, n.1 (citing Ex. 1014, 2:14–17,
`emphases added). Although PersonalWeb cites that portion of Woodhill to
`show that the comparison is made against prior values of the same binary
`object, i.e., not for determination of authorization, that citation demonstrates
`that Woodhill provides for comparison of a binary object identifier with
`other values. The subject step in claim 24, i.e., causing the comparison, does
`not require more, with only subsequent steps of claim 24 using the
`comparison to determine authorization.
`The next element of claim 24 recites “determining whether or not
`access to the particular data item is unauthorized based on whether the
`content-dependent name of the particular data item corresponds to at least
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2013-00596
`Patent 7,802,310 B2
`one of said plurality of values.” As discussed above, Stefik prevents
`unauthorized access to digital works, with an access request utilizing a
`unique identifier for the digital work, which would necessarily require a
`comparison between the unique identifier and other values to see if a match
`can be obtained. See Pet. 33−35 (citing Ex. 1013, 9:47–61, 41:60–65; Ex.
`1007 ¶¶ 57, 85),
`Although PersonalWeb addresses latter elements recited in claim 24
`as a unitary step, i.e., comparison and determination, obviousness need not
`be determined on such a limited basis. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining
`that obviousness must be gauged in view of common sense and the creativity
`of an ordinarily skilled artisan). As we explain above, Apple properly relies
`upon Woodhill to show the comparison of the content-dependent name to a
`plurality of values, and that comparison would have been used to determine
`authorization, based on the teachings of Woodhill and Stefik. The
`obviousness ground is based on both Stefik and Woodhill, as such the
`arguments raised against either reference individually can be ineffective in
`showing non-obviousness. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed.
`Cir. 1986). Here, PersonalWeb’s arguments that Stefik’s unique identifiers
`701 are not used to determine access to anything unauthorized and are not
`content-based (PO Br. 4) are unavailing in view of the teachings of Woodhill
`of the use of such content dependent identifiers.
`PersonalWeb also a

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket