throbber
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`Paper No. __
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TARGET CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DESTINATION MATERNITY CORPORATION
`Patent Owner
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2013-00533
`Patent No. RE43,531 E
`__________________
`
`Filed: September 16, 2014
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and
`MITCHELL G. WEATHERLY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION
`FOR OBSERVATION REGARDING CROSS-EXAMINATION
`OF REPLY WITNESS
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED .................................................... 1
`
`RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DMC’S OBSERVATIONS .................... 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Thomas Does Not Offer Legal Opinions .............................................. 1
`
`Thomas Properly Considered the Subject Matter of the Claims
`Rejected for Obviousness in These Proceedings .................................. 2
`
`C.
`
`Thomas’s Opinion Finds, in Part, that the
`
`
`
`
`
`
` ............................................ 7
`
`
`
`..................................... 9
`
`D.
`
`Thomas’s Declaration Supports that
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Thomas Properly Considered the Factors Supported by the
`Available Evidence .............................................................................. 10
`
`Thomas Does Not “Misquote[] Deposition Testimony”..................... 10
`
`III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 11
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-i-
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Petitioner Target Corporation (“Target” or “Petitioner”) hereby opposes
`
`Patent Owner Destination Maternity Corporation’s (“DMC” or “Patent Owner”)
`
`Motion for Observation Regarding Cross-Examination of Reply Witness (Paper
`
`47) (“Motion for Observation”) and requests that the Board deny the Motion for
`
`Observation in all respects.
`
`II. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DMC’S OBSERVATIONS
`As a preliminary matter, DMC’s Motion for Observation should be rejected
`
`as procedurally improper. A motion for observation on cross examination should
`
`be filed only where the filing “party does not believe a motion to exclude the
`
`testimony is warranted.” See OFFICE PATENT TRIAL PRACTICE GUIDE, 77 Fed. Reg.
`
`48,756, at 48,767-68 (Aug. 14, 2012). DMC filed a Motion to Exclude that seeks,
`
`in part, to exclude Thomas’s testimony. (Paper 49, at 3-7.) As such, the Board
`
`should deny DMC’s redundant Motion for Observation.
`
`Below, Target responds to DMC’s observations in the same order as they are
`
`raised in DMC’s Motion for Observation.
`
`A. Thomas Does Not Offer Legal Opinions
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.A of its Motion for Observation is
`
`relevant in these proceedings, if at all, only to confirm that Thomas does not
`
`purport to opine on the law or provide legal opinions, as further discussed in
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-1-
`
`

`
`
`
`Target’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, filed
`
`contemporaneously herewith. Target disagrees that any aspect of the Thomas
`
`Declaration “should be given no weight if admissible.”
`
`B.
`
`Thomas Properly Considered the Subject Matter of the Claims
`Rejected for Obviousness in These Proceedings
`
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.B of its Motion for Observation is not
`
`relevant for any of the reasons DMC provides. Thomas’s declaration correctly sets
`
`forth the legal framework for analyzing commercial success. (See Ex. 1110, ¶¶ 19-
`
`22.) And in his deposition, for example, Thomas made clear that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(Ex. 2099, at 38:16-41:5.) Thomas’s understanding is reflected more generally in
`
`his report, in which he states, for example:
`
`
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-2-
`
`

`
`
`
`(Ex. 1110, ¶¶ 23.) Indeed, Thomas understands
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` (Ex. 2099, at 22:15-
`
`23:18.) Thus, to the extent the Board admits any of the testimony cited by DMC, it
`
`should also admit the testimony at Ex. 2099, pages 22:15-23:18.
`
`It is not Thomas but DMC who does “not understand the legal framework
`
`for analyzing dependent claims” whose obviousness is at issue. (See Paper 47, at
`
`3.) In an attempt to support admitting the cited testimony in this proceeding,
`
`DMC’s Motion for Observation misstates the law of nexus in the commercial
`
`success context. DMC appears to believe that it can obtain the benefit of a
`
`“presumption” of a nexus
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`.1 (See Paper
`
`47, at 1-4.) DMC is incorrect for several reasons, each of which shows that the
`
`cited testimony is not relevant for the purposes that DMC specifies:
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent Nos. RE43,531 (“’531 Patent”) and RE43,563 (“’563 Patent”).
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-3-
`
`

`
`
`
`First, claim 1 in each patent, among other claims, is subject to an
`
`anticipation rejection in these proceedings. (IPR2013-00530, Paper 13, at 22;
`
`IPR2013-00531, Paper 10, at 29; IPR2013-00532, Paper 10, at 23; IPR2013-
`
`00533, Paper 11, at 25.) Where commercial success evidence relates only to an
`
`independent claim rejected for anticipation that underlies a dependent claim
`
`rejected for obviousness, there is no nexus to the dependent claim. In re Paulsen,
`
`30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Thus, whether elements of claim 1 may be
`
`embodied in DMC’s
`
` products does nothing
`
`to show that
`
` was “attributable to,” or even related to, elements
`
`of the dependent claims that are subject to obviousness rejections in these
`
`proceedings. See id. (“AST limits its argument respecting the evidence adduced to
`
`demonstrate nonobviousness to laptop computers covered by [independent] claims
`
`1 and 18, claims which we have previously concluded are unpatentable under
`
`section 102. AST has not established that the commercial success . . . experienced
`
`by Grid laptop computers are probative of the nonobviousness of the inventions of
`
`[dependent] claims 2-4, 6, and 28-34. It has not been shown that such evidence is
`
`relevant to a computer within the scope of these claims, i.e., that it is attributable to
`
`the inventions of these claims, rather than . . . to the features possessed by the
`
`computers of [independent] claims 1 and 18.”).
`
`Second, “[a] prima facie case of nexus is generally made out when the
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-4-
`
`

`
`
`
`patentee shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing (product
`
`or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed
`
`in the patent” and is “coextensive with the patented invention.” Demaco Corp. v.
`
`F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Brown &
`
`Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2000). The coextensivity requirement is separate from, and means something more
`
`than, the requirement that the patent claims at issue cover, or read on, the
`
`commercial product in question. See id.; Rambus, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor,
`
`254 F.R.D. 597, 602 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The reason for the first part of this inquiry
`
`is obvious: . . . If the product does not read on the claim, there can be no relevance
`
`of the product’s commercial success to whether the claim is obvious or not.”).
`
`Indeed, “for a presumption [of nexus] to attach, the patentee must also show that
`
`the claimed invention is ‘coextensive’ with the product.” Id. As the Rambus court
`
`explained:
`
`Th[e coextensivity] requirement accommodates the reality that many
`products embody dozens of patents or features and that their success
`or failure cannot solely be attributed to any particular one. Where the
`product is coextensive with the claimed invention, for example, where
`the product might be a pharmaceutical compound and the claimed
`invention the active ingredient, the patentee’s evidence of the
`commercial success of the product is relevant to obviousness. . . .
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-5-
`
`

`
`
`
`Where the product is not coextensive with the claimed
`invention, this chain of reasoning breaks down. For example, if a
`product embodies several claimed inventions, why should any one
`invention be presumed to be the cause of its success? Put another
`way, how could one tell that the product’s success was due to the
`claimed invention at issue and not the collective utility of the other
`inventions? Thus, where the product is not coextensive with the
`claimed invention, the patentee must show more to establish the chain
`of inference that suggests that the claimed invention is non-obvious.
`This showing can take many forms, but it must explain how the
`product’s commercial success was caused, at least in part, by the
`claimed invention and not by “other economic and commercial factors
`unrelated to the technical quality of the patented subject matter.”
`
`254 F.R.D. at 602 (quoting Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d
`
`1015, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (internal citations omitted).
`
`DMC wholly ignores the Federal Circuit’s coextensivity requirement, which
`
`precludes a presumption of nexus here, because DMC has failed to show that any
`
`elements unique to the § 103-Rejected Claims, (see Paper 42, at 5),
`
`
`
`. See Demaco, 851
`
`F.2d at 1392 (“When the thing that is commercially successful is not coextensive
`
`with the patented invention—for example, if the patented invention is only a
`
`component of a commercially successful machine or process—the patentee must
`
`show prima facie a legally sufficient relationship between that which is patented
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-6-
`
`

`
`
`
`and that which is sold.”); Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1482 (evidence of purported
`
`“commercial success” must be “attributable to the inventions of the[] claims”
`
`subject to rejection for obviousness).
`
`Finally, DMC’s own arguments for the relevance of the cited testimony are
`
`inconsistent. DMC argues, on the one hand, that “each claim must be considered
`
`as defining a separate invention,” (Paper 47, at 4), but then argues that the
`
`dependent claims subject to obviousness rejections in these proceedings
`
`collectively constitute “the ‘invention as a whole’” for obviousness purposes, (id.
`
`(emphasis omitted)). DMC cannot aggregate its claims into a single “invention”
`
`for purposes of analyzing the obviousness of any particular claim. Indeed,
`
`obviousness, including any proffered secondary considerations, such as purported
`
`“commercial success” and the related issue of nexus, must be analyzed on a claim-
`
`by-claim basis. MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam Beauty & Closures, Inc., 731 F.3d
`
`1258, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1482.
`
`C. Thomas’s Opinion Finds, in Part, that the
`
`
`
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.C of its Motion for Observation is not
`
`relevant to any issue at hand for several reasons:
`
`First, Thomas’s testimony in his declaration speaks for itself; his opinions
`
`are limited and focused on
`
`
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-7-
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. (See generally
`
`Ex. 1110.) What Thomas arguably “[d]id [n]ot [o]pine” on is simply not relevant.
`
`Second, DMC improperly attempts to derive from Thomas’s testimony
`
`reasons for which DMC may have acted in a certain way relative to its maternity
`
`pant product lines. (See Ex. 2099, at 122:2-18, 123:9-17.) As Thomas’s
`
`subsequent testimony makes clear, however,
`
`
`
` (See id. at 122:19-130:25.) Thus, to the extent the Board admits any
`
`of the testimony cited by DMC, it should also admit the testimony at Ex. 2099,
`
`pages 122:19-130:25.
`
`Third, as discussed above, see supra Part II.B, DMC misunderstands and
`
`misapplies the law of nexus, incorrectly assuming
`
`that “there is a
`
`presumption of nexus” here. (Paper 47, at 11.) Indeed, there is no such
`
`presumption here, because DMC has failed to show
`
`
`
`
`
`. See Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392; Paulsen, 30 F.3d at
`
`1482; Rambus, 254 F.R.D. at 602.
`
`
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-8-
`
`

`
`
`
`D. Thomas’s Declaration Supports that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.D of its Motion for Observation is not
`
`relevant to any issue at hand. Thomas’s testimony in his report speaks for itself.
`
`Thomas’s Declaration contains page after page of detailed analysis, based on facts,
`
`supporting and explaining his opinions. DMC’s argument that “Mr. Thomas did
`
`no independent commercial success analysis to rebut Mr. Green,” (see Paper 47, at
`
`12), is simply wrong. Among other analyses that are readily apparent in his
`
`declaration, Thomas analyzed numerous DMC documents, including the
`
`transcripts of depositions of DMC personnel, which contain information
`
`contradictory to Green’s opinions but which Green failed to consider. (See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. 1110, ¶¶ 41-43.) Indeed, that Green allegedly lacked “any evidence at all that
`
`there would be any reason to believe that any other factors were present” to affect
`
`his opinions, (see Paper 47, at 12), was a deficiency that DMC was in the unique
`
`position to cure—instead, DMC apparently chose to hand Green what amounted to
`
`a carefully selected, closed universe of materials to support his opinion. Thus,
`
`especially in this case, simply because a portion of Thomas’s analysis focuses on
`
`what Green ignored, or what DMC failed to provide to Green, does not mean that
`
`Thomas “did no independent commercial success analysis to rebut Mr. Green.”
`
`Moreover, Thomas’s opinion is replete with evidence and is itself offered to “help
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-9-
`
`

`
`
`
`the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, see FED.
`
`R. EVID. 702(a); i.e., whether sufficient facts exist
`
`
`
`. (See generally Ex. 1110.)
`
`E.
`
`Thomas Properly Considered the Factors Supported by the
`Available Evidence
`
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.E of its Motion for Observation is not
`
`relevant for any of the reasons DMC provides. Thomas’s testimony in his report
`
`speaks for itself. Thomas’s declaration correctly sets forth the proper legal
`
`framework for analyzing commercial success, including the factors that should be
`
`considered in the analysis. (See Ex. 1110, ¶¶ 19-22). Thomas’s responses to the
`
`vague hypotheticals posed to him during his deposition regarding
`
`
`
`, (see Ex. 2099, at
`
`46:15-49:13), do not somehow override the correctness of the proper legal
`
`framework he sets forth—and applies—throughout his report with respect to the
`
`actual products and available sales data and other facts here.
`
`Thomas Does Not “Misquote[] Deposition Testimony”
`
`F.
`The testimony DMC cites in Part II.F of its Motion for Observation is not
`
`relevant for any of the reasons DMC provides. Although a citation error was
`
`discovered in Thomas’s report during his deposition, he subsequently provided
`
`testimony correcting the error and identifying the correct citation. (See Ex. 2099,
`
`at 238:13-240:11, 262:23-273:10.) The incorrect citation did not fully support the
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-10-
`
`

`
`
`
`proposition for which it was cited, but the correct citation, to which Thomas
`
`testified, does. (See id.) Therefore, to the extent the Board admits any of the
`
`testimony cited by DMC, it should also admit the testimony at Ex. 2099, pages
`
`238:13-240:11 and 262:23-273:10.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`The Board should deny DMC’s Motion for Observation in all respects.
`
`Dated: September 16, 2014
`
`By:
`
`
`
`/s/ Norman J. Hedges
`Norman J. Hedges (Reg. No. 44,151)
`FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
`300 N. Meridian St., Ste. 2700
`Indianapolis, IN 46204-1750
`Telephone: 317-237-0300
`Facsimile: 317-237-1000
`Norman.Hedges@FaegreBD.com
`
`US.54879105.01
`
`-11-
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that I caused a true and
`correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner’s Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion for
`Observation Regarding Cross-Examination of Reply Witness to be served via e-
`mail, as a PDF file attachment, on September 16, 2014, on the following:
`
`Paul A. Taufer
`Michael L. Burns
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`One Liberty Place
`1650 Market St., Ste. 4900
`Philadelphia, PA 19103-7300
`Telephone: (215) 656-3385
`Facsimile:
`(215) 606-3385
`Paul.Taufer@dlapiper.com
`Michael.Burns@dlapiper.com
`
`Stuart E. Pollack
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`1251 Avenue of the Americas
`27th Floor
`New York, NY 10020-1104
`Telephone: (212) 335-4964
`Facsimile:
`(212) 884-8464
`Stuart.Pollack@dlapiper.com
`
`By:
`
`
`
`/s/ Norman J. Hedges
`Norman J. Hedges (Reg. No. 44,151)
`FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
`300 N. Meridian St., Ste. 2700
`Indianapolis, IN 46204-1750
`Telephone: 317-237-0300
`Facsimile: 317-237-1000
`Norman.Hedges@FaegreBD.com
`
`
`
`Dated: September 16, 2014
`
`US.54879105.01

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket