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TARGET CORPORATION
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`DESTINATION MATERNITY CORPORATION
`Patent Owner
`
`__________________
`
`Case IPR2013-00533
`Patent No. RE43,531
`__________________
`
`Before JENNIFER S. BISK, MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, and
`MITCHELL G. WEATHERLY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_________________
`
`PETITIONER’S RESPONSE TO PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO FILE
`SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b)
`
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED ........... 1
`
`COUNTER STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS .................................... 2
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICABLE RULES .................................. 2
`
`IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4
`
`A. DMC Fails to Meet the “Reasonably Could Not Have Been
`Obtained Earlier” Element of Rule 42.123(b) ....................................... 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`DMC Possessed the Unfiled Documents, but Simply
`Failed to File them, on Its May 5 Response Deadline ................ 4
`
`DMC Fails to Provide Any Evidence Supporting Its
`Alleged “Clerical Error” ............................................................. 5
`
`The IPR Decisions DMC Cites Are Inapposite Here ................. 7
`
`B.
`
`Permitting Supplementation Under the Circumstances Present
`Here Would Not Be “in the Interests-of-Justice” and Would Set
`a Troublesome Precedent in Other Proceedings Before the
`Board ..................................................................................................... 8
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 10
`
`US.54324607.01
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Pursuant to the Board’s May 28, 2014 Order, Petitioner, Target Corporation
`
`(“Target” or “Petitioner”), hereby responds to Patent Owner, Destination Maternity
`
`Corporation’s (“DMC” or “Patent Owner”), Motion to File Supplemental
`
`Information Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) (the “Motion”).
`
`DMC has not met the standard for late submission of supplemental
`
`information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b). DMC fails to show why it reasonably
`
`could not have earlier obtained the documents in question, which are listed on
`
`pages 2–3 of the Motion (collectively, the “Unfiled Documents”). Indeed, DMC
`
`admits that it had possession of those documents when they were due to be filed
`
`but simply failed to file them due to a purported “clerical error” for which DMC
`
`does not provide any evidentiary support. Permitting late submissions of evidence
`
`under the circumstances presented here would not be in the interests-of-justice and
`
`would set a troublesome precedent in other proceedings before the Board.
`
`Accordingly, Target respectfully requests that the Board deny DMC’s Motion.1
`
`
`1 Subject to the Board’s approval, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(d), Target does
`
`not oppose DMC being permitted to file and serve any exhibits that are merely
`
`duplicative of exhibits Target previously filed and served in this proceeding;
`
`specifically, DMC’s proposed exhibit numbers 2035, 2036, and 2037. Further,
`
`US.54324607.01
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`
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`II. COUNTER STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`1.
`
`Target disputes DMC’s assertions that the Unfiled Documents:
`
`(a) “were either unintentionally not filed [as exhibits] contemporaneously with the
`
`[Patent Owner’s] Response, or attached to declarations rather than filed as
`
`exhibits,” (Mot. 2), and (b) “reasonably could not have been obtained earlier
`
`because of a clerical error,” (id. at 3; see also id. at 3–5).
`
`2.
`
`The Unfiled Documents are “related to . . . Patent Owner’s Response”
`
`and should have been “filed contemporaneously with [it].” (Id. at 2, 3, 7.)
`
`3.
`
`DMC variously cited the Unfiled Documents—though not by exhibit
`
`numbers—within its Patent Owner’s Response and other papers filed with it. (See
`
`id. at 7; see also Paper 25 (Response), Ex. 2017 (Brookstein Decl.), Ex. 2022
`
`(Green Decl.).)
`
`4.
`
`DMC possessed the Unfiled Documents no later than, and, in view of
`
`the previous sentence, likely before, its May 5, 2014 Response deadline.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICABLE RULES
`A motion to submit supplemental information “must show” both (1) “why
`
`the supplemental information reasonably could not have been obtained earlier,”
`
`and (2) “that consideration of the supplemental information would be in the
`
`to the extent that the Board grants any aspect of the Motion, Target does not
`
`oppose DMC’s request to file a motion to seal, (see Mot. 2 n.1), as appropriate.
`
`US.54324607.01
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`
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`interests-of-justice.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b). Rule 42.123(b)’s use of the word
`
`“and” to connect its two elements means that meeting the standard under the rule
`
`requires a showing of “not one [element] or the other, but both.” Crooks v.
`
`Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 58 (1930) (holding that the word “and” in its “ordinary
`
`sense” is a conjunctive word, requiring “not one or the other, but both”); City of
`
`Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980) (holding that by using “and” to
`
`describe “the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive,
`
`Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both
`
`discriminatory purpose and effect are absent” (emphasis in original)).
`
`The trial rules are “construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
`
`resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Nonetheless,
`
`“[p]ractitioners involved in inter partes review proceedings are expected to know
`
`the rules for those proceedings.” Tasco, Inc. v. Pagnani, IPR2013-00103, Paper 7,
`
`at 2 (P.T.A.B. July 19, 2013).
`
`“Evidence consists of affidavits, transcripts of depositions, documents, and
`
`things. All evidence must be filed in the form of an exhibit.” 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.63(a). “Each exhibit must be filed with the first document in which it is cited
`
`except as the Board may otherwise order.” Id. § 42.6(c). Further, “[e]vidence that
`
`is not taken, sought, or filed in accordance with this subpart [subpart A of 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42, which includes §§ 42.1–99] is not admissible.” Id. § 42.61(a).
`
`US.54324607.01
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`

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`
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`A. DMC Fails to Meet the “Reasonably Could Not Have Been
`Obtained Earlier” Element of Rule 42.123(b)
`
`DMC failed to follow the trial rules. The rules are clear that evidence must
`
`be filed as an exhibit, 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(a), and all exhibits “must be filed with the
`
`first document in which [they are] cited,” id. § 42.6(c). DMC’s deadline to file the
`
`Unfiled Documents, as exhibits, was its May 5, 2014 Response deadline (Due Date
`
`1). See Microsoft Corp. v. Surfcast, Inc., IPR2013-00292, Paper 41, at 2 (P.T.A.B.
`
`Feb. 19, 2014) (“As the exhibits go to the declarations submitted in support of the
`
`Patent Owner Response, the time for filing and discussing the exhibits was the
`
`time for filing the Patent Owner Response.”). DMC failed to meet that deadline,
`
`and further failed even to serve the Unfiled Documents on Target until May 23,
`
`2014, (Mot. 3), “18 calendar days after [DMC] filed its Response,” (id. at 6).
`
`DMC claims that a “clerical error” is to blame. But DMC provides no evidence of
`
`any form to support that claim. Thus, the Board should deny DMC’s Motion.
`
`1. DMC Possessed the Unfiled Documents, but Simply Failed
`to File them, on Its May 5 Response Deadline
`
`DMC admits that the Unfiled Documents are “related to its Patent Owner’s
`
`Response” and should have been “filed contemporaneously with the Response.”
`
`(Mot. 2, 3, 7.) The Unfiled Documents were variously cited—though not by
`
`exhibit numbers—within DMC’s Response and other papers filed with it. (See id.
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`US.54324607.01
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`
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`at 7; see also Paper 25 (Response), Ex. 2017 (Brookstein Decl.), Ex. 2022 (Green
`
`Decl.).) Thus, DMC not only “reasonably could . . . have . . . obtained” the
`
`Unfiled Documents earlier than May 29, when DMC filed its Motion (or even May
`
`23, when DMC first served the Unfiled Documents), but DMC in fact had
`
`possession of those documents no later than its May 5 Response deadline. Indeed,
`
`given DMC’s citations to, and apparent reliance on, the Unfiled Documents in its
`
`papers filed on May 5, DMC most likely possessed the Unfiled Documents well
`
`before that time. DMC’s Motion should be denied for this reason alone.
`
`2. DMC Fails to Provide Any Evidence Supporting Its Alleged
`“Clerical Error”
`
`DMC provides no explanation for its failure to timely file the Unfiled
`
`Documents other than baldly blaming a “clerical error.” DMC claims that the
`
`alleged “clerical error” precipitated DMC’s “not including the exhibits in the
`
`filing” or “unintentionally excluding certain documents as exhibits” with its
`
`Response. (Mot. 3.) But DMC does not provide any actual evidence supporting or
`
`even describing the circumstances surrounding the alleged “clerical error”—e.g., a
`
`declaration, affidavit, or other documents, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(a)—to show that a
`
`“clerical error” in fact occurred, or even likely occurred, as DMC alleges. Indeed,
`
`DMC provides no evidence demonstrating the ‘who?,’ ‘what?,’ ‘when?,’ ‘how?,’
`
`or ‘why?’ underlying the alleged “error.” To the extent any evidence addressing
`
`these questions exists, DMC should have filed it with its Motion. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`US.54324607.01
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`
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`42.22(a)(2) (A motion “must include . . . a detailed explanation of the significance
`
`of the evidence including material facts.”); id. § 42.23(b); ABB, Inc. v. ROY-G-BIV
`
`Corp., IPR2013-00062, Paper 79, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2014) (ordering that a
`
`motion under § 42.123(b) “must be accompanied by an affidavit or declaration of
`
`counsel setting forth the reasons why the information could not reasonably have
`
`been obtained earlier”).
`
`Although DMC provides a variety of attorney arguments in its Motion, such
`
`arguments are not evidence that the Board may consider in assessing DMC’s
`
`Motion. Federal Circuit law is clear that “unsworn attorney argument . . . is not
`
`evidence.” GemTron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2009); see also ElCommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490, 506 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014) (noting that because “[a]ttorney argument is not evidence,” “the district
`
`court erred in granting summary judgment without a proper evidentiary basis for
`
`its conclusion”); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d
`
`1249, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`DMC’s failure to provide evidence supporting its “clerical error” assertion
`
`wholly undermines the basis for its Motion. See In re Heights Melrose Group,
`
`LLC, No. 4:11-cv-03531, 2012 WL 439120, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 09, 2012)
`
`(refusing to allow additional evidence where the proponents alleged that the
`
`evidence was not timely submitted “due to a clerical error” but failed to provide
`
`US.54324607.01
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`-6-
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`
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`“admissible evidentiary support, such as an affidavit or declaration on personal
`
`knowledge” to support and explain the alleged “clerical error”); see also Lue-
`
`Martin v. The March Grp., No. 03-105, 2008 WL 4329212 (D.V.I. Sept. 16, 2008)
`
`(granting defendants’ motion to strike where “plaintiff’s contention that her
`
`counter statement of facts was not [timely] filed because of a clerical error is not
`
`supported by the record”). Indeed, the fact that DMC’s “clerical error” argument is
`
`wholly unsupported by evidence strongly implies that DMC is using “clerical
`
`error” merely as a convenient euphemism for failure to comply with the trial rules.
`
`Accordingly, DMC’s Motion should be denied.
`
`3. The IPR Decisions DMC Cites Are Inapposite Here
`Citing two IPR decisions, DMC claims that where a “prior oversight” has
`
`occurred, the “reasonably could not have been obtained earlier” element of
`
`§ 42.123(b) may be met “with a showing that consideration of the supplemental
`
`information would be in the interests of justice.” (Mot. 4.) DMC’s assertion is
`
`incorrect at least because it improperly conflates the Rule’s two separate elements.
`
`See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 172; Crooks, 282 U.S. at 58.
`
`Further, neither of the IPR decisions DMC cites support its position. (See
`
`Mot. 4-5.) First, in IPR2013-00191, Paper No. 39, the Board, pursuant to
`
`§ 42.123(b) permitted correction of a citation to a prior art reference. Id. at 2, 5.
`
`But the Board noted that “[t]ypically, an oversight may not be a sufficient reason to
`
`US.54324607.01
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`
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`submit supplemental evidence.” Id. at 4. Indeed, the Board allowed the correction
`
`because it only involved “minor issues.” Id. Second, in IPR2013-00401, Paper
`
`No. 41, the Board permitted the patent owner to file supplemental information—
`
`two documents that the patent owner had possessed for “several months”—because
`
`the documents in question were the “[p]etitioner’s own statements.” Id. at 3.
`
`Here, in contrast to those cases, DMC seeks to add to the record dozens of
`
`documents it failed to timely file due to an alleged “clerical error,” (see Mot. 3), or
`
`“oversight,” (see id. at 4), for which DMC provides no evidentiary support. The
`
`cited cases do not support the proposition that a party who fails to meet a filing
`
`deadline for dozens of documents without an explanation supported by evidence
`
`will be permitted to file those documents as supplemental information pursuant to
`
`§ 42.123(b) merely by claiming “clerical error.” DMC’s Motion should be denied.
`
`B.
`
`Permitting Supplementation Under the Circumstances Present
`Here Would Not Be “in the Interests-of-Justice” and Would Set a
`Troublesome Precedent in Other Proceedings Before the Board
`
`Granting DMC’s Motion would amount to allowing DMC to twice skirt the
`
`trial rules without consequence. First, it would allow DMC to file, late, the dozens
`
`of Unfiled Documents. DMC knew the rules—it does not claim otherwise—or at
`
`least is “expected to know” them, Tasco, IPR2013-00103, Paper 7, at 2, but simply
`
`missed its deadline to file the Unfiled Documents. Second, it would allow DMC to
`
`prevail under § 42.123(b) where DMC has wholly failed to provide evidentiary
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`US.54324607.01
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`-8-
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`

`
`
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`support for its alleged “clerical error” and, as such, cannot meet the “reasonably
`
`could not have been obtained earlier” element of § 42.123(b). Permitting DMC to
`
`prevail under § 42.123(b) without meeting both of its factors would, in and of
`
`itself, be contrary not only to the interests-of-justice but to law. See City of Rome,
`
`446 U.S. at 172; Crooks, 282 U.S. at 58.
`
`Moreover, in claiming that this is essentially a “no-harm, no-foul” situation
`
`because the Unfiled Documents were “publicly available,” (Mot. 5-6), previously
`
`produced to Target, (id.), or Target was purportedly “aware of the information”
`
`they contained, (id. at 8), DMC glosses over the true nature of the harm. Mere
`
`possession of, access to, or awareness of information does not make it proper
`
`evidence in an IPR proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(a). Thus, in missing its
`
`deadline to file the Unfiled Documents as exhibits, DMC prejudiced Target by
`
`forcing Target to contend with the uncertainty of whether the Unfiled Documents
`
`will be evidence in this proceeding such that Target and its expert(s) will need to
`
`substantively address them. Indeed, DMC neither cited the Unfiled Documents as
`
`if they were exhibits (i.e., by exhibit number, see id. § 42.63(c)) in its May 5
`
`papers nor filed the Unfiled Documents as exhibits, leaving Target to understand,
`
`under the trial rules, see id. §§ 42.6(c), 42.61(a), 42.63(a), (c), that the Unfiled
`
`Documents were not evidence in this proceeding, (see Mot. 4 (discussing Target’s
`
`objections to evidence pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1))).
`
`US.54324607.01
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`-9-
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`

`
`
`
`This uncertainty—in addition to DMC’s failure even to serve the Unfiled
`
`Documents until “18 calendar days after [DMC] filed its Response,” (Mot. 6)—has
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`delayed the preparation of Target’s Reply and, until the Board decides DMC’s
`
`Motion, will continue to do so. Moreover, due to DMC’s error, Target has been
`
`forced to spend time and resources addressing the issue, which has diverted
`
`resources from the preparation of Target’s Reply and imposed further delay.
`
`Granting DMC’s Motion would communicate to participants in other
`
`proceedings before the Board that it is OK to miss deadlines set by the Board or
`
`the trial rules—and impose unnecessary prejudice on an opposing party, as Target
`
`has experienced here—so long as one files a motion under § 42.123 blaming a
`
`“clerical error.” Permitting supplementation under the present circumstances
`
`would not be in the interests-of-justice. As such, DMC’s Motion should be denied.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, Target respectfully requests that the Board
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`deny DMC’s Motion.
`
`Dated: June 6, 2014
`
`By:
`
`
`
`/s/ Norman J. Hedges
`Norman J. Hedges (Reg. No. 44,151)
`FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
`300 N. Meridian St., Ste. 2700
`Indianapolis, IN 46204-1750
`Telephone: 317-237-0300
`Facsimile: 317-237-1000
`Norman.Hedges@FaegreBD.com
`
`US.54324607.01
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`-10-
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`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), I hereby certify that I caused a true and
`
`correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner’s Response to Patent Owner’s Motion to
`File Supplemental Information Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(b) to be served via e-
`mail, as a PDF file attachment, on June 6, 2014, on the following:
`
`Paul A. Taufer
`Michael L. Burns
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`One Liberty Place
`1650 Market St., Ste. 4900
`Philadelphia, PA 19103-7300
`Telephone: (215) 656-3385
`Facsimile:
`(215) 606-3385
`Paul.Taufer@dlapiper.com
`Michael.Burns@dlapiper.com
`
`Stuart E. Pollack
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`1251 Avenue of the Americas
`27th Floor
`New York, NY 10020-1104
`Telephone: (212) 335-4964
`Facsimile:
`(212) 884-8464
`Stuart.Pollack@dlapiper.com
`
`By:
`
`
`
`/s/ Norman J. Hedges
`Norman J. Hedges (Reg. No. 44,151)
`FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
`300 N. Meridian St., Ste. 2700
`Indianapolis, IN 46204-1750
`Telephone: 317-237-0300
`Facsimile: 317-237-1000
`Norman.Hedges@FaegreBD.com
`
`
`
`Dated: June 6, 2014

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