throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`CARDIOCOM, LLC
`Petitioner
`v.
`ROBERT BOSCH HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC.
`Patent Owner
`_____________________
`CASE IPR2013-00468
`Patent No. 7,516,192
`_____________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
`
`

`

`Patent Owner Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. (“Bosch”) hereby
`
`opposes Petitioner Cardiocom, LLC’s (“Cardiocom”) Motion to Exclude Evidence
`
`(Paper 57, “Mot.”).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Through its motion, Petitioner Cardiocom seeks to deprive the Board of
`
`secondary considerations evidence that plays a “critical role in the obviousness
`
`analysis.” Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`Despite admitting that there was a long-felt need for the claimed inventions of U.S.
`
`Patent No. 7,516,192 (“the ’192 patent”) in deposition, Cardiocom’s expert has
`
`failed to affirmatively identify any secondary considerations evidence
`
`demonstrating that the claims of the ’192 patent are obvious. Rather, Cardiocom
`
`asks the Board to exclude the substantial evidence of secondary considerations that
`
`Bosch and Dr. David have submitted. Notably, Cardiocom does not challenge the
`
`reliability and authenticity of the underlying evidence. Instead, Cardiocom raises
`
`several technical arguments that are meritless as a matter of law.
`
`First, Cardiocom seeks to exclude Dr. David’s opinions on secondary
`
`considerations, premising its argument on the untenable position that secondary
`
`considerations evidence requires an “element-by-element” claim chart analysis.
`
`With no Federal Circuit law requiring such an analysis—and certainly none cited
`
`by Cardiocom—there is no basis for Cardiocom’s requested relief. Moreover,
`
`-1 -
`
`

`

`Cardiocom and Dr. Stone have not identified a single element of the ’192 patent
`
`claims that is purportedly not related to the secondary considerations evidence.
`
`Second, Cardiocom moves to exclude Bosch’s secondary considerations
`
`evidence as allegedly inadmissible hearsay. Cardiocom is wrong. The challenged
`
`evidence is not hearsay. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-
`
`20905 RMW, 2009 WL 112834, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2009), aff’d, 645 F.3d
`
`1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011). And, even if it were, Dr. David is entitled as an expert to
`
`rely on hearsay evidence to form his opinions.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`Cardiocom submitted its petition in this proceeding on July 24, 2013,
`
`accompanied by Dr. Stone’s original declaration. Paper 1; Ex. 1008. Neither the
`
`petition nor Dr. Stone’s declaration contained any discussion of secondary
`
`considerations of non-obviousness. See generally id. And Dr. Stone has
`
`confirmed on numerous occasions that he did not consider any such evidence
`
`before concluding that the claims of the ’192 patent were obvious:
`
`Q. So you made up your mind that the claims of the ’420, ’186 and
`’192 patents were invalid as obvious before you considered any
`evidence of secondary considerations?
`[A.] That’s -- that pretty well states the case.
`
`Ex. 2069, 784:15-21; see also id. 783:1-15. In fact, Dr. Stone even testified that,
`
`had he considered such evidence, his opinions on invalidity may ultimately have
`
`-2 -
`
`

`

`come out the other way. Ex. 2009, 258:6-19.
`
`In response to the petition, Bosch submitted the declaration of Dr. David,
`
`wherein he considered and analyzed numerous pieces of secondary considerations
`
`evidence demonstrating the non-obviousness of the ’192 patent. Dr. David
`
`testified as to the existence of at least the following commercial secondary
`
`considerations for the ’192 patent: (1) the invention’s commercial success;
`
`(2) long-felt but unresolved needs; (3) praise by others; (4) teaching away by
`
`others; and (5) copying of the inventions by others. See Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 70-110; see
`
`also Exs. 2010-2057.
`
`Dr. David testified that a nexus exists between the claims of the ’192 patent
`
`and the secondary considerations evidence, such as commercial success. See, e.g.,
`
`Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 73, 88-91, 94-96, 107-110. By way of example, Dr. David testified
`
`that the “substantial, long lasting commercial success” of Bosch’s products were
`
`linked to the scripting features that are “related to the inventions of the ’192
`
`patent.” Id. ¶ 88. Dr. David similarly testified that the VA requirements that were
`
`copied from Bosch’s Health Buddy product were “driven by the scripting features
`
`of the Bosch ’192 patent.” Id. ¶ 107.
`
`In reply, Cardiocom and Dr. Stone did not provide any contrary evidence of
`
`secondary considerations. Paper 52; Ex. 1022. In fact, Dr. Stone admitted over
`
`and over again that there existed secondary considerations of non-obviousness,
`
`-3 -
`
`

`

`including long-felt need and demand. See, e.g., Ex. 2009, 27:1-9, 34:14-35:1,
`
`49:17-20, 59:22-60:1, 76:18-77:5, 90:21-91:24, 103:4-6, 438:22-439:3. Rather
`
`than rebutting this evidence of non-obviousness, Cardiocom and Dr. Stone chose
`
`only to criticize Dr. David’s opinions and evidence, faulting Dr. David for not
`
`conducting an “element-by-element” claim analysis for the secondary
`
`considerations evidence. Mot., 4; Ex. 1022 ¶ 63; Ex. 2069, 792:18-793:9. As Dr.
`
`Stone admitted at deposition, however, Cardiocom’s “element-by-element” test is
`
`cut out of whole cloth as it has no basis in the case law. See Ex. 2069, 795:2-21.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`“Objective evidence of nonobviousness is an important component of the
`
`obviousness inquiry because ‘evidence of secondary considerations may often be
`
`the most probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that
`
`an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.’”
`
`Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
`
`699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Where properly
`
`presented, evidence of secondary considerations must be considered. Plantronics,
`
`Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`Cardiocom bears the burden of demonstrating obviousness, including the
`
`burden of presenting secondary evidence supporting its non-obviousness case in its
`
`petition. Gnosis S.P.A. v. South Alabama Med. Sci. Found., Case IPR2013-00116,
`
`-4 -
`
`

`

`Paper 61, at 2-3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2014) (“[T]he secondary considerations
`
`evidence is part of the body of evidence from which Petitioners must establish that
`
`a preponderance emerges, in order to prove unpatentability of the patented
`
`claims.”). Cardiocom admittedly elected not to present any secondary
`
`considerations evidence in its petition. See Ex. 2069, 784:15-21. Having failed to
`
`even try to carry its burden with respect to secondary considerations, Cardiocom
`
`now invites error by asking the Board to ignore the evidence of secondary
`
`considerations presented by Bosch and thus skip a necessary step in the
`
`obviousness analysis.
`
`A.
`
`Cardiocom Has Fundamentally Misstated the Secondary
`Considerations Analysis.
`
`Contrary to Cardiocom’s assertions, a prima facie case supporting nexus
`
`between secondary considerations evidence and patent claims requires simply that
`
`“the patentee shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing
`
`(product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and
`
`claimed in the patent.” Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851
`
`F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “A requirement for proof of the negative of all
`
`imaginable contributing factors would be unfairly burdensome, and contrary to the
`
`ordinary rules of evidence.” Id. at 1394. That prima facie test was met in Demaco,
`
`through evidence of the admitted success of the patented invention. Id. Dr. Stone
`
`does not dispute that the Health Buddy product practiced the claims of the ‘192
`
`-5 -
`
`

`

`Patent.
`
`Once the prima facie test is met, it falls to the patent challenger (Cardiocom)
`
`to “adduce evidence to show that the commercial success was due to extraneous
`
`factors other than the patented invention, such as advertising, superior
`
`workmanship, etc.” Id. at 1393. At bottom, Cardiocom’s motion to exclude fails
`
`because it seeks to foist on Bosch a burden that Cardiocom has borne all along—to
`
`“adduce evidence” (through an “element-by-element” analysis or otherwise)
`
`demonstrating that the commercial success and other secondary considerations
`
`factors identified by Dr. David were due to something other than the claimed
`
`inventions of the ’192 patent. Cardiocom has never “adduce[d]” any such
`
`evidence and therefore its criticisms of Dr. David ring hollow.
`
`B.
`
`Dr. David Established a Sufficient Nexus Between the Secondary
`Considerations Evidence and the Claimed Invention.
`
`There is no dispute that evidence of secondary considerations must be tied to
`
`the claimed inventions of the ’192 patent.1 In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580
`
`1 Bosch has also provided evidence of secondary considerations in related
`
`proceedings concerning U.S. Patent Nos. 7,840,420 and 7,921,186. While there is
`
`overlap in the exhibits of secondary considerations for the ’192, ’420 and ’186
`
`patents, Dr. David provides testimony in each proceeding that ties the evidence to
`
`the particular features claimed in the patent at issue in the proceeding.
`
`-6 -
`
`

`

`(Fed. Cir. 1995). But, in moving to exclude, Cardiocom seeks to impose on Bosch
`
`and Dr. David a greater burden of demonstrating sufficient nexus than has ever
`
`been required by the Federal Circuit, i.e., the comparison of secondary
`
`considerations evidence to the ’192 patent claims on an “element-by-element”
`
`basis. See, e.g., Mot., 4; Ex. 1022 ¶ 63. Notably, neither Cardiocom nor Dr. Stone
`
`cite a single case to support this supposed test. Indeed, if Cardiocom’s “element-
`
`by-element” test were accepted, the use of secondary considerations evidence in
`
`any patent case would effectively be eliminated, as articles, marketing materials,
`
`and the like rarely—if ever—describe the features claimed in patents on an
`
`“element-by-element” basis.
`
`Cardiocom’s arguments to the contrary, Dr. David has provided testimony
`
`establishing a sufficient nexus between the secondary considerations evidence he
`
`considered and the claimed inventions of the ’192 patent. See Section II, supra;
`
`see also Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 73, 88-91, 94-96, 107-110. Moreover, in addition to Dr.
`
`David’s supporting testimony, many of the exhibits of secondary considerations
`
`specifically mention the scripting features that are claimed in the ’192 patent. E.g.,
`
`Ex. 2020 (“Care Composer allows the service’s users to design or modify protocols
`
`and assists them in defining patient health status data and designing disease-
`
`specific messages.”); Ex. 2023 (“Every day the Health Buddy asks patients a series
`
`of questions about their weight, blood pressure, medication and specific aspects of
`
`-7 -
`
`

`

`their conditions.”); Ex. 2055 (citing VA staff testimony about working with Health
`
`Hero “to develop targeted questionnaires for patients with diabetes, heart disease,
`
`and other chronic disorders”).
`
`Dr. Stone himself even testified that there was a long-felt need for the
`
`claimed inventions of the ’192 patent. See Ex. 2069, 835:23-836:7, 1302:24-
`
`1303:19; Ex. 2009, 27:1-9, 34:14-35:1, 49:17-20, 59:22-60:1, 76:18-77:5, 90:21-
`
`91:24, 103:4-6, 438:22-439:3. The totality of this evidence provides a more than
`
`sufficient nexus to the claimed inventions, and thus clearly distinguishes the cases
`
`that Cardiocom relies upon. See, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d
`
`1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (patentee’s witnesses “testified that commercial
`
`success was due to unclaimed or non-novel features of the device”); In re Paulsen,
`
`30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding insufficient evidence to establish
`
`commercial success was not due to other extraneous factors).
`
`C.
`
`Cardiocom’s Arguments Are Legally Unsound and Ignore the
`Evidence Presented by Bosch and Dr. David.
`
`Cardiocom ignores all of the contrary evidence discussed above and takes an
`
`out-of-context quote from Dr. David’s deposition to suggest that he ignored the
`
`real drivers of the success of the Health Buddy. Mot., 6 (citing David Dep. (Ex.
`
`1041), 161:6-9). This is a gross mischaracterization of Dr. David’s opinions.
`
`Initially, Cardiocom fails to disclose that Dr. David did not even understand the
`
`question from Cardiocom’s attorney that elicited the testimony Cardiocom relies
`
`-8 -
`
`

`

`upon. Ex. 1041, 161:10-17. More importantly, Dr. David actually testified the
`
`opposite of what Cardiocom suggests, stating that “[w]hat was important for my
`
`declaration is that nexus you described yourself relating to claims in the patent.”
`
`Id., 160:25-161:3. Dr. David thus focused on success attributable to the claimed
`
`invention and, having established that the nexus existed, did not attempt to analyze
`
`every other factor that could have also possibly contributed to the success. See
`
`also id., 160:2-18, 172:1-7, 621:3-15. Nor was he required to, as Federal Circuit
`
`law does not require a patent owner to “prove as part of its prima facie case that the
`
`commercial success of the patented invention is not due to factors other than the
`
`patented invention. It is sufficient to show that the commercial success was of the
`
`patented invention itself.” Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1394.
`
`For the same reason, the Board should also reject Cardiocom’s argument
`
`relating to the alleged contribution of the four-button design to the commercial
`
`success of the Health Buddy. Mot., 5. Once Dr. David established a sufficient
`
`nexus to the claimed inventions, he was not required to rebut all imagined
`
`contributing factors. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1394. Moreover, Cardiocom’s
`
`contention that the years of praise, success, and long-felt need for the Health
`
`Buddy is attributable solely to the four-button design is absurd. Indeed, the
`
`absurdity of the claim is confirmed by the fact that Cardiocom has not come forth
`
`with a single shred of independent evidence—articles, newscasts, webpages, or any
`
`-9 -
`
`

`

`other objective evidence—tying the commercial success of the Health Buddy to the
`
`four-button design. Instead, Cardiocom relies only on attorney argument,
`
`supplemented with Dr. Stone’s declaration parroting those arguments without any
`
`evidentiary support. See Paper 52, 4-5; Ex. 1022 ¶ 64. But as the Federal Circuit
`
`has stated, such “‘argument’ and ‘conjecture’ are insufficient” to rebut evidence of
`
`secondary considerations. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Rosemount, Inc. v.
`
`Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
`
`Cardiocom separately argues that Dr. David’s analysis of the commercial
`
`success of Bosch’s Health Buddy was insufficient because there is no evidence
`
`Health Buddy ever made a profit. See Mot., 6-7. Again, however, Cardiocom is
`
`fabricating legal standards, because a “profitability analysis” is not an actual legal
`
`requirement for assessing secondary considerations evidence.2 Notably,
`
`Cardiocom never presented evidence demonstrating that Bosch was unprofitable,
`
`2 In the single case Cardiocom cites, the district court did not even dismiss the
`
`evidence of commercial success based on whether the evidence sufficiently
`
`demonstrated profitability, as Cardiocom contends; rather, the evidence was
`
`dismissed because there was no nexus between the success and the claimed
`
`invention. Cable Elec. Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
`
`Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A nexus has been established here.
`
`-10 -
`
`

`

`and the fact that the Health Hero business has been selling the Health Buddy for at
`
`least the last 15 years belies Cardiocom’s assertion that the product was
`
`commercially unsuccessful. Moreover, Dr. David demonstrated specific examples
`
`of that commercial success, such as through hospitals and pharmacies adopting
`
`usage of the Health Buddy. Ex. 2007 ¶ 79; Exs. 2011-2014. He also cited several
`
`articles regarding substantial sales of the Health Buddy. See, e.g., Ex. 2055 (noting
`
`that the VA had eight pilot projects costing $750,000 each); Ex. 2016 (stating that
`
`Health Hero landed an additional $8 million in new financing for Health Buddy);
`
`Ex. 2010 (noting that the VA awarded a new contract for the Health Buddy in
`
`2011). This testimony and evidence is more than sufficient to demonstrate
`
`commercial success and is unrebutted by any actual evidence adduced by
`
`Cardicom.
`
`At most, Cardiocom’s challenge goes to the sufficiency of the evidence;
`
`such a challenge is not properly brought as an evidentiary objection. See Office
`
`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48755, 48767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (noting
`
`that a motion to exclude “may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the
`
`evidence to prove a particular fact”).
`
`D.
`
`Dr. David Properly Relied Upon Third-Party Statements to
`Support His Expert Opinions.
`
`Cardiocom also seeks to exclude alleged “third-party hearsay evidence” that
`
`Dr. David relies upon in forming his opinions of non-obviousness. Cardiocom
`
`-11 -
`
`

`

`agrees that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, an expert witness such as Dr.
`
`David may rely on hearsay evidence. Mot., 8. Cardiocom nevertheless argues that
`
`Bosch’s secondary considerations evidence should be excluded because (1) Dr.
`
`David’s secondary considerations analysis is fundamentally flawed, and (2) such
`
`evidence is hearsay that should not be admitted as direct evidence of the truth of
`
`the matter asserted. Id.
`
`Cardiocom’s first argument is circular and must be rejected. Earlier in its
`
`motion, Cardiocom argues that Dr. David’s opinions should be excluded as
`
`fundamentally flawed because of the evidence he relies upon. Mot., 6-7.
`
`Cardiocom goes on to argue that the evidence Dr. David relies upon should be
`
`excluded because his opinions are fundamentally flawed. Id., 8. Cardiocom does
`
`not get to assume its conclusion in order to justify its motion to exclude.
`
`Cardiocom’s second hearsay argument must also be rejected for multiple
`
`reasons. First, it fails because it challenges evidence as “hearsay” even though that
`
`evidence is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid.
`
`801(c)(2). The proffered evidence is cited in connection with secondary
`
`considerations factors such as praise from others, commercial success, and long-
`
`felt need; these factors turn on public recognition of the claimed inventions, which
`
`is demonstrated by the challenged evidence. Relying on evidence for this purpose
`
`is a legitimate non-hearsay use. See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor, 2009 WL 112834,
`
`-12 -
`
`

`

`at *14 (“[T]he article does not constitute hearsay because it was admitted not for
`
`its truth, but as a proper secondary consideration of nonobviousness in the form of
`
`praise from others in the industry.”).
`
`For example, Cardiocom complains of the alleged use of hearsay evidence in
`
`Paragraph 88 of Dr. David’s declaration, where Dr. David discusses the
`
`commercial success of the claimed inventions as evidenced by media coverage
`
`about the Health Buddy product. Mot., 7. In providing this opinion, Dr. David
`
`specifically relies on a news article titled “Health Hero Improves Patient Care With
`
`Direct Provider Link.” Ex. 2020. In discussing the article, Dr. David does not rely
`
`on the truth or accuracy of the statements made; rather, he relies on the statements
`
`to demonstrate the secondary consideration of commercial success. Ex. 2007 ¶ 88.
`
`As in the Hynix case, such evidence is not hearsay.3 Similarly, Dr. David relies
`
`upon a VA solicitation (Ex. 2056) not for the truth of its contents, but rather to
`
`3 Moreover, even if the Board entertained Cardiocom’s hearsay argument,
`
`Cardiocom fails to acknowledge that Ex. 2020 is a periodical and thus falls under
`
`the hearsay exception set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 803(18); other exhibits falling
`
`under the periodicals exception include Exs. 2011-2017, 2019, 2021-2027, 2030-
`
`2036, 2050-2055, and 2057. Cardiocom categorically ignores the hearsay
`
`exceptions, making the sweeping (and incorrect) statement that all of Bosch’s
`
`evidence “fall under no exceptions” to the hearsay rule. Mot., 8.
`
`-13 -
`
`

`

`demonstrate an awareness by the market that the VA required others to copy the
`
`scripting features that were first supported by the Health Buddy product. Ex. 2007
`
`¶ 107; see also Ex. 1041, 621:24-625:15.
`
`Aside from not constituting hearsay, the evidence that Cardiocom complains
`
`about all is discussed as bases for Dr. David’s opinions of non-obviousness and is
`
`not simply repeated verbatim for their truth. Bosch therefore does not rely upon
`
`Dr. David’s declaration simply as a conduit to get in otherwise inadmissible
`
`evidence. The case that Cardiocom relies upon is distinguishable on this basis.
`
`See Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, No. CIV 05-0172 JBLFG, 2007 WL 2219449,
`
`at *3 n.4 (D.N.M. May 14, 2007) (Rule 703 “does not allow the proponent of the
`
`expert testimony to use the expert as a conduit for a party to get in otherwise
`
`inadmissible evidence”).
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For at least the foregoing reasons, Bosch respectfully requests that the Board
`
`deny Cardiocom’s motion to exclude evidence.
`
`Dated: August 13, 2014
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By:
`
`/Don Daybell/
`Don Daybell, Reg. No. 50,877
`Attorney for Patent Owner Robert Bosch
`Healthcare Systems, Inc.
`
`-14 -
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e))
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the above-captioned PATENT
`
`OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`
`EVIDENCE was served in its entirety on August 13, 2014, upon the following
`
`parties via electronic mail:
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`Daniel W. McDonald
`Andrew J. Lagatta
`Merchant & Gould
`80 South 8th St., Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`CardiocomIPR@merchantgould.com
`
`By:
`
`/Karen Johnson/
`Karen Johnson
`
`-15 -
`
`

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